311 F.3d 282 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This unusual case arises from the tragic death of James(cid:13) S. Flemming, who died as a result of a plane crash off the(cid:13) coast of St. Thomas in the United States Virgin Islands.(cid:13) James Flemming survived the crash, but drowned when the(cid:13) plane sank. James Flemming’s wife, Sabine Flemming, sued(cid:13) the airline, Air Sunshine, Inc., and the pilot, George J.(cid:13) James (collectively "Air Sunshine"). The parties entered into(cid:13) settlement discussions during which the plaintiff contended(cid:13) that the airplane’s crash into the water resulted only in(cid:13) emotional distress to her husband and that his death by(cid:13) drowning was a separate occurrence from the crash itself.(cid:13) She thus claimed that her husband’s accident constituted(cid:13) multiple occurrences under Air Sunshine’s insurance(cid:13) policy.(cid:13) The parties entered into a partial settlement under which(cid:13) the defendants paid plaintiff $500,000. The settlement(cid:13) 2(cid:13) order provided that the issue of multiple occurrences under(cid:13) Air Sunshine’s insurance policy would be "non-jury" and(cid:13) decided by the District Court. Following discovery, extensive(cid:13) briefing, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded(cid:13) that Air Sunshine’s policy allowed recovery for multiple(cid:13) occurrences, but that James Flemming’s death resulted(cid:13) from a single occurrence.(cid:13) On appeal, Sabine Flemming claims that although the(cid:13) court correctly determined that the policy allowed for(cid:13) multiple recoveries, "it should have left the factual(cid:13) determination of the number of occurrences to the jury."(cid:13) Flemming Br. at 27. We agree with the District Court that(cid:13) the settlement authorized the court to decide the entire(cid:13) issue of multiple occurrences. We also agree with the(cid:13) court’s ultimate determination that, while Air Sunshine’s(cid:13) policy allowed coverage for multiple occurrences, the events(cid:13) that led to James Flemming’s death constituted a single(cid:13) occurrence under that policy. We therefore affirm the(cid:13) District Court’s final order in all respects.(cid:13) I. Facts and Procedural Background(cid:13) A. The Plane Crash and the Partial Settlement(cid:13) James Flemming was a passenger on an Air Sunshine(cid:13) flight from St. Croix to St. Thomas in the United States(cid:13) Virgin Islands on February 8, 1997. The plane, piloted by(cid:13) Defendant James, crashed into the ocean at night during(cid:13) its approach to St. Thomas. The plane was not destroyed(cid:13) on impact, but immediately began taking on water and(cid:13) sinking. Pilot James and three of the four passengers(cid:13) escaped from the plane before it sank, although one(cid:13) passenger later drowned when he could no longer hold on(cid:13) to a life vest he was sharing with another passenger.(cid:13) According to deposition testimony and Sabine Flemming’s(cid:13) biomechanics expert, James Flemming was still alive after(cid:13) the plane crashed and was struggling with his seat belt as(cid:13) the pilot and the other passengers exited the aircraft.(cid:13) James Flemming did not escape from the sinking plane,(cid:13) ultimately drowning.(cid:13) 3(cid:13) The parties vigorously dispute the circumstances of the(cid:13) plane crash and the alleged lack of precautions and rescue(cid:13) efforts taken by pilot James. James testified in his(cid:13) deposition that when the plane hit the water, he was(cid:13) "scared to death" and "must have been knocked out." App.(cid:13) at 169-70. James stated that, after hitting the water he(cid:13) could not make radio contact because "the next thing [he](cid:13) remember[s] is the water being up about midway deep past(cid:13) the tops of the seat cushion tops . . . and the plane from(cid:13) that point in time sunk within 15 seconds." Id. at 172-73.(cid:13) James said that, after impact, he swam through the cabin(cid:13) and found a life jacket floating in the back. He heard(cid:13) passengers yelling, and one passenger in front of him said(cid:13) that he could not swim, so James gave him his life jacket.(cid:13) He stated that it was very dark and that he wished he had(cid:13) retrieved more life vests, but that "the plane was just about(cid:13) ready to sink," and that he "really didn’t think [he] had the(cid:13) time" to get more vests. Id. at 173-76. He stated that once(cid:13) he emerged from the plane, he could not see any(cid:13) passengers because it was "pitch black" and he was in(cid:13) shock. Id. at 177, 196-97. James disputed the account of(cid:13) other passengers that James Flemming was still in his seat(cid:13) trying to remove his seatbelt when James swam through(cid:13) the plane’s cabin. James explained that the cabin was very(cid:13) small and that he would have brushed against James(cid:13) Flemming if he was there. James eventually swam to some(cid:13) nearby rocks for safety.(cid:13) Two surviving passengers, Frankie Bellot and Eugene(cid:13) Willett, both testified in depositions that, from the time they(cid:13) got out of the plane, about three or four minutes passed(cid:13) before the plane sank. They testified that the pilot left the(cid:13) plane first. They also stated that it was very dark and that(cid:13) they could not remember every detail because the events(cid:13) were so chaotic. Willett stated that he saw James Flemming(cid:13) alive and still in his seat trying to detach his seatbelt while(cid:13) he was exiting the plane.(cid:13) Sabine Flemming filed a wrongful death action against(cid:13) the airline and the plane’s pilot in the District Court of the(cid:13) Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix. She sued individually(cid:13) and in her capacity as personal representative of the estate(cid:13) of her late husband, asserting claims of negligence,(cid:13) 4(cid:13) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional(cid:13) infliction of emotional distress. Thereafter, the parties(cid:13) entered into settlement negotiations, with a Magistrate(cid:13) Judge facilitating the discussions. Eventually, the parties(cid:13) agreed to a partial settlement, which the Magistrate Judge(cid:13) memorialized in an order dated March 3, 1998.(cid:13) Under the partial settlement set forth in the Magistrate(cid:13) Judge’s order, Air Sunshine agreed to pay Sabine Flemming(cid:13) $500,000 for the release of all claims regarding the death of(cid:13) James Flemming. Air Sunshine’s insurer was allowed to(cid:13) "intervene . . . on a complaint for declaratory judgment." Id.(cid:13) at 12. The settlement order states that, presumably for(cid:13) purposes of the declaratory judgment motion, " [t]he issues(cid:13) to be considered (non-jury) are federal preemption through(cid:13) Warsaw Convention ["Warsaw"] and Death on the High Seas(cid:13) Act ["DOHSA"], and multiple occurrences as they relate to(cid:13) insurance coverage herein." Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The(cid:13) order provided that Sabine Flemming would file "a(cid:13) statement of multiple occurrences claimed (that have(cid:13) reasonably been pled in plaintiff ’s amended complaint)(cid:13) within twenty (20) days," and that Air Sunshine could(cid:13) "specify its DOHSA defense claim" in response to this(cid:13) statement. Id.(cid:13) The settlement order then laid out a series of additional(cid:13) situations under which Sabine Flemming could recover(cid:13) more than the $500,000 base settlement amount. These(cid:13) additional recoveries depended on the court’s resolution of(cid:13) the Warsaw/DOHSA and multiple occurrence issues. Under(cid:13) these settlement provisions, if Sabine Flemming did not(cid:13) prevail on the multiple occurrences issue, she could not(cid:13) recover any amount beyond the initial $500,000 payment.1(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. With regard to these potential additional recoveries, the settlement(cid:13) order states:(cid:13) (c) If the plaintiff does not prevail on multiple occurrences or if the(cid:13) insurer prevails on Warsaw, the plaintiff gets nothing additional.(cid:13) (d) If the plaintiff prevails on multiple occurrences and the insurer(cid:13) does not prevail on Warsaw and DOHSA, the plaintiff gets(cid:13) $450,000.00 additional.(cid:13) (e) If the plaintiff prevails on multiple occurrences and the insurer(cid:13) prevails on DOHSA, the parties will then litigate the plaintiff ’s(cid:13) 5(cid:13) The order specified that "whether the plaintiff is entitled to(cid:13) a jury trial on such issue of damages shall be decided at(cid:13) such time upon briefs." Id. at 13.(cid:13) Along with the settlement order, the court issued a(cid:13) separate scheduling order detailing a discovery and briefing(cid:13) schedule solely on the "plaintiff ’s claim for multiple(cid:13) occurrences." Id. at 1061. That scheduling order stated(cid:13) that, following discovery, Sabine Flemming would file a(cid:13) "motion and memorandum regarding multiple occurrences"(cid:13) with the District Court, and all further action would be(cid:13) stayed pending its decision. Id. at 1062. Under the(cid:13) settlement order, discovery relating to other issues would(cid:13) be allowed only if Sabine Flemming prevailed on her claim(cid:13) for multiple occurrences. Id. at 13.(cid:13) The record does not reveal that Air Sunshine’s insurer(cid:13) ever intervened by seeking a declaratory judgment action.(cid:13) However, the case nonetheless proceeded along the route(cid:13) contemplated by the settlement and scheduling orders, with(cid:13) Air Sunshine effectively asserting the positions of its(cid:13) insurer. Pursuant to the settlement order, Sabine Flemming(cid:13) filed a notice of occurrences in March 1998. She identified(cid:13) four separate "occurrences": 1) the crash of the plane and(cid:13) the negligent operation of the plane; 2) the failure to(cid:13) provide a pre-flight safety briefing; 3) the failure to notify(cid:13) passengers of the impending crash and failure to provide(cid:13) emergency safety instructions; and 4) after the crash, the(cid:13) failure to provide James Flemming with a life vest or other(cid:13) safety equipment, the failure to provide him any aid or(cid:13) assistance in exiting the plane or in any other fashion, and(cid:13) the pilot’s "taking the life jackets and swimming off instead(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) DOHSA allowed damages to a maximum of $450,000.00 additional,(cid:13) e.g.(cid:13) (i) If the plaintiff shows total $400,000.00 economic, plaintiff gets(cid:13) no additional.(cid:13) (ii) If the plaintiff shows total $650,000.00 economic, plaintiff gets(cid:13) $150,000.00 more.(cid:13) (iii) If the plaintiff shows total $1,000,000.00 economic, plaintiff(cid:13) gets $450,000.00 additional.(cid:13) App. at 12-13.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) of providing assistance (i.e., the Captain failing to go down(cid:13) with the ship)." Id. at 56-57.(cid:13) In April 1998, the parties entered into a release of claims(cid:13) as contemplated by the partial settlement agreement. The(cid:13) release waived claims in exchange for $500,000 from Air(cid:13) Sunshine, "subject to the reservation that Plaintiff ’s estate(cid:13) may be entitled to additional sums if it is successful in its(cid:13) claim of ‘multiple occurrences’ " under the settlement(cid:13) agreement and order. Id. at 436.(cid:13) B. Air Sunshine’s Insurance Policy(cid:13) Resolution of this appeal requires us to construe both the(cid:13) partial settlement agreement and the terms of Air(cid:13) Sunshine’s insurance policy with regard to the issue of(cid:13) "multiple occurrences." Some of the relevant terms are(cid:13) found in Liability Coverage D of the policy, entitled "Single(cid:13) Limit Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability." Under(cid:13) Coverage D, the insurer agrees(cid:13) to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the(cid:13) insured shall become legally obligated to pay as(cid:13) damages because of bodily injury sustained by any(cid:13) person (excluding any passenger unless the words(cid:13) "including passengers" appear in item 3 of the(cid:13) Declarations) and property damage, caused by an(cid:13) occurrence and arising out of the ownership,(cid:13) maintenance or use of the aircraft . . .(cid:13) App. at 354 (emphasis added).2 Because the words(cid:13) "including passengers" appear in item 3 of the declarations(cid:13) page for the Air Sunshine policy, this coverage extends to(cid:13) passengers. The policy limits liability under Coverage D(cid:13) regardless of the number of persons injured or the number(cid:13) of claims brought. The limitation begins:(cid:13) The total liability of the [insurance] Company for all(cid:13) damages, including damages for care and loss of(cid:13) services, because of bodily injury or property damage(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. In the "Definitions" section of the policy, words with specific(cid:13) definitions are printed in boldface type. We omit these emphases from(cid:13) our quotations of the policy language.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) sustained by one or more persons . . . as the result of(cid:13) any one occurrence shall not exceed the limit of liability(cid:13) stated in the Declarations as applicable to "each(cid:13) occurrence."(cid:13) Id. at 357 (emphasis added).3 The declarations page for(cid:13) Coverage D limits liability for "each occurrence" to(cid:13) $10,000,000. Id. at 362. Coverage D is subject to further(cid:13) limitations as follows:(cid:13) And further provided that if the Declarations are(cid:13) completed to show "passenger liability Limited(cid:13) internally to", the total liability of the Company for all(cid:13) damages, including damages for care and loss of(cid:13) service, because of bodily injury to passengers shall(cid:13) not exceed:(cid:13) (a) as respect any one passenger, the amount stated in(cid:13) the Declarations as applicable to "each person" . . .(cid:13) Id. at 357. The declarations page for Coverage D lists(cid:13) "Single Limit - including passengers with passenger liability(cid:13) limited internally to" and limits liability for"each person" to(cid:13) $500,000. Id. at 362.(cid:13) The parties dispute the effect of these limits, and(cid:13) specifically contest the extent of a person’s coverage for(cid:13) "multiple occurrences." Coverage for multiple occurrences(cid:13) may also be referred to as "policy stacking" because Sabine(cid:13) Flemming seeks to aggregate or "stack" coverages and(cid:13) coverage limits for each occurrence under the policy. See,(cid:13) e.g., Rupert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 243, 244 n.1(cid:13) (3d Cir. 2002) (defining "stacking" in context of automobile(cid:13) insurance policy). Under the settlement, Sabine Flemming(cid:13) has received $500,000, the limit of coverage for one(cid:13) occurrence under the policy. Her claim for the additional(cid:13) recovery contemplated by the partial settlement therefore(cid:13) depends first on whether she can stack multiple coverage(cid:13) limits for more than one occurrence.(cid:13) The meaning of "occurrence" is thus central to this case.(cid:13) "Occurrence" is defined under the policy as"an accident,(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. "Bodily injury" is defined under the policy as "bodily injury, sickness,(cid:13) disease or mental anguish . . . including death." App. at 358.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,(cid:13) which results in bodily injury or property damage during(cid:13) the policy period neither expected or intended from the(cid:13) standpoint of the Insured . . ." App. at 359. Coverage D(cid:13) further defines the scope of an "occurrence":(cid:13) For the purpose of determining the limit of the(cid:13) Company’s liability, all bodily injury and property(cid:13) damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure(cid:13) to substantially the same general conditions shall be(cid:13) considered as arising out of one occurrence.(cid:13) Id. at 357 (emphasis added).(cid:13) To address the "multiple occurrences" issue under the(cid:13) policy, Sabine Flemming submitted the opinions of three(cid:13) expert witnesses. Her biomechanics expert stated that(cid:13) multiple occurrences of negligence caused James(cid:13) Flemming’s injuries and death, and her aviation expert(cid:13) opined that the pilot committed several negligent acts and(cid:13) violated federal regulations. A third expert, an insurance(cid:13) advisor, concluded that the policy, interpreted in light of(cid:13) industry custom and usage, permitted stacking and that(cid:13) there were two insured occurrences in this case-- the(cid:13) crash and the pilot’s neglect to instruct or assist James(cid:13) Flemming.(cid:13) Air Sunshine submitted the opinion of an insurance(cid:13) consultant, Charles A. Tarpley, who concluded that the(cid:13) crash and subsequent death of James Flemming comprised(cid:13) only one occurrence under the policy and industry custom(cid:13) and practice. Tarpley opined that to find multiple(cid:13) occurrences under common insurance industry usage and(cid:13) the specific policy language, "it is necessary to identify(cid:13) multiple separate accidents, each resulting in bodily(cid:13) injury," and that the "crash into the ocean is the accident(cid:13) that gave rise to Mr. Flemming’s injury." Id. at 427.(cid:13) C. District Court Decisions(cid:13) After discovery and a hearing on multiple occurrences,(cid:13) the District Court issued an opinion on January 14, 2000,(cid:13) holding that the policy permits stacking but that there was(cid:13) only one occurrence, and, therefore, Sabine Flemming(cid:13) 9(cid:13) could not recover any additional amount under the(cid:13) settlement. The court concluded that, under the policy, "an(cid:13) individual may not recover more than $500,000 from Air(cid:13) Sunshine in the event of bodily injury during a flight(cid:13) arising from one accident." App. at 23. In a subsequent(cid:13) opinion on a motion for reconsideration, the court noted(cid:13) that even though an individual could recover a maximum of(cid:13) $500,000 for bodily injury resulting from one occurrence or(cid:13) accident, an additional award could be recovered if Sabine(cid:13) Flemming could prove a second occurrence caused the(cid:13) death of her husband.(cid:13) In its initial opinion, the court construed "occurrence" to(cid:13) be synonymous with "accident" and then decided whether(cid:13) there was more than one "accident" or "occurrence" in this(cid:13) case. The District Court relied on the "cause" theory(cid:13) adopted by this Court, under which "a court asks if there(cid:13) was one proximate, uninterrupted cause which resulted in(cid:13) all of the injuries and damage." Id. at 23 (citation omitted).(cid:13) The court found that "the proximate cause of Flemming’s(cid:13) death is indisputably the plane crash," that none of the(cid:13) other alleged negligent acts "standing on their own would(cid:13) have led to Flemming’s demise absent the crash," that(cid:13) these other negligent acts do not meet the definition of(cid:13) "accident," and that "[p]laintiffs do not assert that at any(cid:13) point Flemming was out of danger and then placed back(cid:13) into harm’s way by Air Sunshine or its employees." Id. The(cid:13) court therefore concluded that because the plane crash "led(cid:13) to a continuous chain of events culminating in Flemming’s(cid:13) death," it was the proximate cause of his death. Id. The(cid:13) court also denied Sabine Flemming’s motion to strike(cid:13) Tarpley’s expert opinion. Because, under the settlement(cid:13) order, Sabine Flemming gets no additional award if she(cid:13) does not "prevail on multiple occurrences," the court’s(cid:13) ruling effectively disposed of the entire case.(cid:13) Sabine Flemming filed a motion for reconsideration,(cid:13) which the court granted on April 6, 2000. After explaining(cid:13) that it had held that the policy allowed recovery for multiple(cid:13) occurrences, the court vacated its initial finding that only(cid:13) one occurrence took place. It reinterpreted the Magistrate(cid:13) Judge’s settlement order to mean that "this Court was only(cid:13) to decide the legal question of whether multiple occurrences(cid:13) 10(cid:13) are contemplated by the insurance policy" and that the(cid:13) issue of whether there was more than one occurrence was(cid:13) a jury issue. Id. at 29. The court held that it should have(cid:13) ended its analysis once it determined that the policy allows(cid:13) recovery for multiple occurrences.(cid:13) Air Sunshine then filed another motion for(cid:13) reconsideration in June 2000, arguing both that the policy(cid:13) does not permit stacking and that the court had the power(cid:13) under the settlement order to decide whether there actually(cid:13) were multiple occurrences under the policy on these facts.(cid:13) On July 17, 2001, the court granted the motion for(cid:13) reconsideration, and reversed itself for the second time by(cid:13) vacating the April 6, 2000 decision and reinstating its(cid:13) original January 14, 2000 opinion, which held that only(cid:13) one occurrence led to James Flemming’s death.4 The court(cid:13) forthrightly admitted that it had erred in the April 6 opinion(cid:13) "because it did not properly consider the Agreement as a(cid:13) whole." Id. at 33. After assessing the settlement order, the(cid:13) documents referenced in that order, the transcript of the(cid:13) settlement conference, and the scheduling order, the court(cid:13) concluded that it "was to determine the entire issue of(cid:13) liability as it relates to multiple occurrences" and that(cid:13) Sabine Flemming had waived her right to a jury trial on(cid:13) this entire issue. Id. at 37. On September 6, 2001, the(cid:13) court declared its judgment final. Id. at 40.(cid:13) Sabine Flemming and Air Sunshine both timely appeal. 5(cid:13) The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this case(cid:13) under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. We have jurisdiction over the(cid:13) District Court’s final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. The record does not reveal why there was over a year-long delay(cid:13) between the filing of the second motion for reconsideration and the(cid:13) court’s decision.(cid:13) 5. Sabine Flemming filed her appeal before the District Court entered(cid:13) final judgment in this case, and in response, Air Sunshine filed a(cid:13) protective cross-appeal and a notice to dismiss the appeal. After the(cid:13) court issued a final judgment dismissing the case, Air Sunshine(cid:13) withdrew its motion to dismiss the appeal.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) II. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial(cid:13) Sabine Flemming contends on appeal that the settlement(cid:13) only authorized the court to resolve the question of whether(cid:13) the policy allowed for the stacking of coverage, and that she(cid:13) never waived the right to have a jury decide whether the(cid:13) events which led to James Flemming’s death constituted(cid:13) multiple occurrences. In the alternative, Sabine Flemming(cid:13) argues that even if the court could decide whether there(cid:13) were multiple occurrences, it erred in holding that the(cid:13) events resulting in James Flemming’s death constituted a(cid:13) single occurrence under the policy. Finally, Sabine(cid:13) Flemming claims that the District Court erred in denying(cid:13) her motion to strike the expert opinion of Charles A.(cid:13) Tarpley. On cross-appeal, Air Sunshine argues that the(cid:13) District Court erred in concluding that the policy allows(cid:13) stacked coverage for multiple occurrences.(cid:13) We first consider whether the settlement allowed the(cid:13) court to decide whether multiple occurrences may be found(cid:13) in this case. Basic contract principles apply to the review of(cid:13) settlement agreements. See In re Cendant Corp. Prides(cid:13) Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000). We exercise(cid:13) plenary review over the District Court’s legal construction of(cid:13) the settlement agreement. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v.(cid:13) Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002). We also have(cid:13) plenary review over application of the construction of an(cid:13) agreement to the facts of a case. See STV Engineers, Inc. v.(cid:13) Greiner Engineering, Inc., 861 F.2d 784, 787 (3d Cir. 1988)(cid:13) The District Court read the terms of the settlement to(cid:13) entail a waiver of Sabine Flemming’s Seventh Amendment(cid:13) right to a jury trial on the entire issue of multiple(cid:13) occurrences. In her first amended complaint, she(cid:13) demanded a jury trial. We have joined other courts of(cid:13) appeals in establishing that an intentional relinquishment(cid:13) of the right to a jury trial is not required for waiver. See,(cid:13) e.g., In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 723, 726 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1998) (holding that right to jury trial may be waived by(cid:13) "inaction or acquiescence"); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington,(cid:13) 139 F.3d 366, 379 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that "once a party(cid:13) makes a timely demand for a jury trial, that party(cid:13) subsequently waives that right when it participates in a(cid:13) bench trial without objection").(cid:13) 12(cid:13) Air Sunshine argues that Sabine Flemming waived her(cid:13) right to a jury trial expressly and impliedly in the(cid:13) settlement, and confirmed this waiver in numerous other(cid:13) statements made by her counsel in written submissions to(cid:13) the court and during various oral arguments. We begin(cid:13) with the settlement order and the documents referenced by(cid:13) that order.(cid:13) The sparse language of the settlement order provides at(cid:13) least some support for Sabine Flemming’s arguments. The(cid:13) operative language of the order states that "[t]he issues to(cid:13) be considered (non-jury) are . . . multiple occurrences as(cid:13) they relate to insurance coverage herein." App. at 12. One(cid:13) could plausibly read this language in isolation to mean that(cid:13) the non-jury issue is limited to whether the policy allows(cid:13) coverage for multiple occurrences. Counsel for Sabine(cid:13) Flemming suggested at oral argument that the phrase"as(cid:13) they relate to insurance coverage" would be superfluous if(cid:13) the court was also to decide whether there were multiple(cid:13) occurrences on the facts of this case. This Court concludes(cid:13) that the phrase "as they relate to insurance coverage"(cid:13) simply frames the multiple occurrences issue as a matter of(cid:13) insurance coverage and grounds the issue in Air Sunshine’s(cid:13) insurance policy. Whether the events which led to James(cid:13) Flemming’s death constituted multiple occurrences under(cid:13) the policy logically "relate[s] to insurance coverage."(cid:13) Other provisions of the settlement order strongly support(cid:13) the District Court’s ultimate ruling. The order’s only(cid:13) reference to further litigation beyond the court’s"non-jury"(cid:13) determination of the issues of Warsaw/DOHSA and(cid:13) multiple occurrences is found in paragraph (e). This(cid:13) paragraph states: "If the plaintiff prevails on multiple(cid:13) occurrences and the insurer prevails on DOHSA, the(cid:13) parties will then litigate the plaintiff ’s DOHSA allowed(cid:13) damages to a maximum of $450,000.00 additional. . . ." Id.(cid:13) at 12-13. As the District Court observed in its July 17,(cid:13) 2001 opinion granting the second motion for(cid:13) reconsideration, if the parties intended to reserve the(cid:13) factual issue of the existence of multiple occurrences for a(cid:13) jury, then this paragraph "would have provided additional(cid:13) language to the effect that should Plaintiffs prevail on the(cid:13) legal issue of multiple occurrences, then the parties shall(cid:13) 13(cid:13) litigate the factual issue of whether Flemming’s death was(cid:13) the result of one or more occurrences." Id. at 35.(cid:13) Furthermore, paragraph (g) of the settlement order states(cid:13) that "[a] separate scheduling order shall be entered(cid:13) regarding the plaintiff ’s claim for multiple occurrences. If(cid:13) plaintiff prevails on such claim, additional discovery will be(cid:13) allowed concerning the remaining issues." Id. at 13. We(cid:13) believe that the phrase "multiple occurrences" in the(cid:13) settlement order encompasses one entire issue, and that(cid:13) the phrase "remaining issues" refers to all other disputes,(cid:13) such as damages.(cid:13) Statements made by the Magistrate Judge and the(cid:13) parties during the settlement conference support the(cid:13) conclusion that the settlement agreement limited possible(cid:13) jury involvement to consideration of damages, rather than(cid:13) consideration of any issues regarding Sabine Flemming’s(cid:13) multiple occurrence theory. Sabine Flemming’s attorney(cid:13) stated to the court that "as soon as you say I don’t prevail(cid:13) on multiple occurrences nothing ever happens after that."(cid:13) Id. at 36. The Magistrate Judge’s response reveals that,(cid:13) even if Sabine Flemming prevailed under her theory of(cid:13) multiple occurrences, she would be limited to pursuing(cid:13) DOHSA damages, potentially before a jury:(cid:13) That’s correct. If Defendant does not prevail on Warsaw(cid:13) and if Plaintiff does prevail on multiple occurrences,(cid:13) and if defendant prevails on DOHSA [sic], then we are(cid:13) left with the matter of setting what Plaintiff ’s pecuniary(cid:13) or DOHSA [sic] allowed claims are, and that matter(cid:13) would then have to go to trial. By agreement . .. all of(cid:13) the prior matters will have been determined by the(cid:13) judge without a jury. However, with regard to whether(cid:13) or not plaintiff is entitled to a jury in actually(cid:13) determining the amount of her DOHSA [sic] allowed . . .(cid:13) damages . . . to the extent the Plaintiff is allowed a jury(cid:13) by law, Plaintiff would ask for that jury. A Defendant(cid:13) would contest that and the court would decide at that(cid:13) time whether or not the Plaintiff was entitled to a jury(cid:13) as to some or all of the claims allowable under DOHSA(cid:13) [sic].(cid:13) Id. (emphasis added).(cid:13) 14(cid:13) Sabine Flemming’s counsel objected to this(cid:13) characterization, arguing that his client had demanded a(cid:13) jury trial in her complaint and that "[t]he issue of whether(cid:13) or not plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial appears to be a(cid:13) legal issue which would be decided by the court." Id. Yet(cid:13) the court then clarified its view of the jury trial issue,(cid:13) responding that whether Sabine Flemming would be(cid:13) entitled to a jury trial "would be reserved until the time that(cid:13) situation 5 occurs." Id. Sabine Flemming’s counsel(cid:13) answered, "Correct," and the court clarified that the jury(cid:13) trial issue would arise only when it would be "applicable"(cid:13) under "situation 5" and that it would not be(cid:13) "predetermined." Id. at 68. "Situation 5" refers to a(cid:13) provision in a letter the Magistrate Judge sent to counsel(cid:13) suggesting settlement terms, and that provision became(cid:13) paragraph (e) in the final settlement order.6 Id. at 1049. The(cid:13) settlement language, supplemented by the settlement(cid:13) conference and the Magistrate’s letter that set the terms of(cid:13) the settlement, demonstrates that the only possible jury(cid:13) issue involves damages, and that this issue would arise(cid:13) only after the court decided the multiple occurrence issue.7(cid:13) Finally, any doubt we might have is assuaged by our(cid:13) review of Sabine Flemming’s numerous submissions and(cid:13) briefings to the District Court. She argued at length in her(cid:13) various district court submissions not just that the policy(cid:13) allowed stacking, but also that the facts of this case(cid:13) amount to multiple occurrences under the policy. For(cid:13) example, on the first page of her Memorandum Regarding(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 6. The letter fails to mention any role for a jury regarding any element of(cid:13) the multiple occurrence issue. It simply states that"[i]f insurer prevails(cid:13) on Warsaw and/or no multiple occurrences, plaintiff gets nothing(cid:13) additional" and "[i]f plaintiff prevails on Warsaw and multiple occurrence(cid:13) and defendant prevails on DOHSA -- litigate plaintiff ’s economic damage(cid:13) . . . ." App. at 1049 (emphasis added).(cid:13) 7. The Magistrate Judge strongly suggested, in a status conference after(cid:13) the District Court granted the first motion for reconsideration, that the(cid:13) settlement left the entire multiple occurrences issue to the court. The(cid:13) Magistrate Judge stated that he was "surprised" with the District Court’s(cid:13) reading of the settlement, and he declared some of Sabine Flemming’s(cid:13) arguments "inconsistent with the language of the order." App. at 91-92,(cid:13) 96.(cid:13) 15(cid:13) Multiple Occurrences, she stated that "[t]he point at issue(cid:13) here is whether Mr. Flemming was subjected to more than(cid:13) one ‘occurrence’ or act of negligence which resulted in his(cid:13) injury and death." Id. at 868. In her Reply Memorandum(cid:13) Regarding Multiple Occurrences, she wrote that "[t]he(cid:13) Defendant is to assume the additional events occurred as(cid:13) stated by Plaintiff, and if so, does that constitute multiple(cid:13) occurrences." Id. at 977 (citations omitted) (emphasis(cid:13) added). Later, in the conclusion to this Reply(cid:13) Memorandum, Sabine Flemming again seemed to contend(cid:13) that the court should decide both the legal issue (whether(cid:13) the policy permits stacking) and the factual issue (whether(cid:13) there are multiple occurrences in this case):(cid:13) Accordingly, this Court should make a decision, as(cid:13) noted in the settlement entered into before the(cid:13) Magistrate, and as reflected in his Order, and render a(cid:13) decision holding that there were ‘multiple occurrences’(cid:13) in this case.(cid:13) Id. at 990.(cid:13) Furthermore, Air Sunshine rightly notes that in Sabine(cid:13) Flemming’s Memorandum Regarding Multiple Occurrences,(cid:13) the entire fact section and much of the argument section(cid:13) address whether the events leading to James Flemming’s(cid:13) death constitute multiple occurrences, and not simply(cid:13) whether the policy allows stacking. Her briefs leading up to(cid:13) the District Court’s first opinion on January 14 extensively(cid:13) argue the facts of the case and whether they establish(cid:13) multiple occurrences. Although she now argues that she(cid:13) did not waive her right to a jury trial on some elements of(cid:13) the multiple occurrences issue, in her prior submissions to(cid:13) the court before its first opinion was issued, not to mention(cid:13) in the settlement itself, Sabine Flemming acquiesced to the(cid:13) court reaching this issue.8(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. In her reply brief to this Court, Sabine Flemming further undercuts(cid:13) her own argument. She states that "the issue at hand was not what(cid:13) actually happened, but whether Flemming’s versions of the events, if(cid:13) proven, would support multiple occurrences under the policy resulting in(cid:13) policy stacking." Flemming Rep. Br. at 3. The District Court in fact(cid:13) decided whether her version of events "would support multiple(cid:13) occurrences under the policy resulting in policy stacking," and nothing(cid:13) more.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) We conclude that Sabine Flemming effectively waived her(cid:13) right to a jury trial on the entire issue of multiple(cid:13) occurrences by entering into the partial settlement and by(cid:13) later acquiescing to the court deciding the multiple(cid:13) occurrence issue "non-jury." The court did not exceed the(cid:13) scope of its authority under the settlement in reaching the(cid:13) factual question of whether the events leading to James(cid:13) Flemming’s death constituted multiple occurrences as that(cid:13) term is defined under the policy.(cid:13) III. Policy Stacking(cid:13) Before turning to the factual question, we consider Air(cid:13) Sunshine’s contention on cross-appeal that the policy does(cid:13) not allow for the stacking of coverage for multiple(cid:13) occurrences under any facts.(cid:13) We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal(cid:13) determination regarding the scope of coverage under the(cid:13) policy. See On Air Entertainment Corp. v. National Indem.(cid:13) Co., 210 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 2000). Because this case(cid:13) arose under diversity jurisdiction, we must apply the law of(cid:13) the Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands Code provides that(cid:13) "[e]very insurance contract shall be construed according to(cid:13) the entirety of the terms and conditions as set forth in the(cid:13) policy and as amplified, extended or modified by any rider,(cid:13) endorsement, or application attached to and made a part of(cid:13) the policy." 22 V.I.C. S 846. Further, under Virgin Islands(cid:13) law, "in the absence of express local laws to the contrary,(cid:13) the ‘rules of the common law, as expressed in the(cid:13) restatements of law approved by the American Law(cid:13) Institute, and to the extent not so expressed, as generally(cid:13) understood and applied in the United States, shall be the(cid:13) rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin Islands . . . .’ "(cid:13) Buntin v. Continental Ins. Co., 583 F.2d 1201, 1204 n.3 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1978) (quoting 1 V.I.C. S 4).(cid:13) A court " ‘should read policy provisions to avoid(cid:13) ambiguities, if possible, and not torture the language to(cid:13) create them.’ " Coakley Bay Condo. Ass’n v. Continental Ins.(cid:13) Co., 770 F.Supp. 1046, 1051 (D.V.I. 1991) (quoting(cid:13) Northbrook Ins. Co. v. Kuljian Corp., 690 F.2d 368, 372 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1982)). "[A]n insurer’s failure to ‘express clearly and(cid:13) 17(cid:13) unequivocally its intent’ to exclude when it could have done(cid:13) so easily supports a conclusion that the relevant language(cid:13) is ambiguous." Id. at 1050 (quoting Buntin, 583 F.2d at(cid:13) 1206).(cid:13) The District Court, in its initial January 14 opinion,(cid:13) stated that the policy "caps the amount of recovery for(cid:13) bodily injury or property damage for all claims arising from(cid:13) one occurrence at $10,000,000" and that the policy also(cid:13) "further limits recovery per passenger to $500,000 for(cid:13) bodily injury, but it does not indicate that this sum is(cid:13) dependent on the number of occurrences." App. at 22-23.(cid:13) The court concluded that under the policy, "an individual(cid:13) may not recover more than $500,000 from Air Sunshine in(cid:13) the event of bodily injury during a flight arising from one(cid:13) accident." Id. at 23. The court clarified this statement from(cid:13) its April 6 opinion, which has been vacated but still(cid:13) explains the holding on stacking that was never reversed:(cid:13) "[i]f Plaintiffs were able to prove that a second occurrence(cid:13) was responsible for the death of Flemming, Plaintiffs could(cid:13) recover an additional $500,000 for the second occurrence."(cid:13) Id. at 29.(cid:13) We agree that the policy allows coverage to be stacked.(cid:13) The policy states that liability for bodily injury"as the(cid:13) result of any one occurrence shall not exceed" $10,000,000,(cid:13) which is "the limit of liability stated in the Declarations as(cid:13) applicable to ‘each occurrence.’ " Id. at 357, 362. Because(cid:13) the Declarations include the phrase "passenger liability(cid:13) limited internally to," the policy further limits liability "as(cid:13) respect any one passenger" to $500,000, which is"the(cid:13) amount stated in the Declarations as applicable to‘each(cid:13) person.’ " Id.9(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 9. In a footnote discussing this policy limitation, the District Court(cid:13) stated:(cid:13) The policy provides that "if the Declarations are completed to show(cid:13) ‘passenger liability limited internally to’, the total liability of the(cid:13) Company for all damages, including damages for care and loss of(cid:13) service, because of bodily injury or property damage to passengers(cid:13) shall not exceed . . . as respect to any one passenger, the amount(cid:13) stated in the Declarations as applicable to ‘each person.’ " The(cid:13) Declarations do not contain such a phrase and limit individual(cid:13) recovery to $500,000.(cid:13) 18(cid:13) This language could be read to mean, as Air Sunshine(cid:13) argues, that the policy "delineates distinct liability limits for(cid:13) each person as opposed to the $10 million total limit for(cid:13) each occurrence" and therefore the court impermissibly(cid:13) inserted unstated terms into the policy to conclude that it(cid:13) allowed stacking. Air Sunshine Br. at 57. However, no clear(cid:13) policy language prevents stacking. The policy language fails(cid:13) to state clearly that the "each person" limitation is an(cid:13) independent cap that works separately from the "each(cid:13) occurrence" limitation. The policy may be reasonably(cid:13) interpreted to mean that coverage for one occurrence may(cid:13) not exceed $10,000,000 total, and, within that cap, liability(cid:13) per passenger is "limited internally to" $500,000 under the(cid:13) "each person" limit. The language is at best ambiguous as(cid:13) to whether the $500,000 "each person" cap applies to a(cid:13) single passenger regardless of the number of occurrences to(cid:13) which that passenger is subjected.(cid:13) No clear policy language excludes policy stacking, and(cid:13) any ambiguity in the policy should be interpreted in favor(cid:13) of Sabine Flemming. See C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v.(cid:13) American Home Assur. Co., 640 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1981) ("All ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer(cid:13) and in favor of coverage."). We find that the policy allows(cid:13) stacking of the $500,000 "each passenger" coverages for(cid:13) multiple occurrences. Therefore, we must now consider(cid:13) whether the circumstances surrounding James Flemming’s(cid:13) death constituted multiple occurrences under the policy.(cid:13) IV. Multiple Occurrences(cid:13) A. Accepting Flemming’s Allegations(cid:13) Sabine Flemming suggested in her briefing to the District(cid:13) Court that "[d]efendant is to assume the additional events(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) App. at 23 n.3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court’s(cid:13) statement that the declarations page "do[es] not contain such a phrase"(cid:13) is in error, as the declarations page clearly includes the relevant words(cid:13) and thus the "internal limitation" applies. Id. at 362. However, since our(cid:13) review is plenary, this error does not prevent us from affirming the(cid:13) court’s ultimate conclusion, no matter if its reasoning was flawed. See(cid:13) Klein v. General Nutrition Co., Inc., 186 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999).(cid:13) 19(cid:13) occurred as stated by Plaintiff, and if so, [whether they](cid:13) constitute multiple occurrences." Id. at 977. In oral(cid:13) argument before the District Court on the first motion for(cid:13) reconsideration, Sabine Flemming’s counsel suggested that(cid:13) the court was to accept her allegations as true for purposes(cid:13) of its ruling. Id. at 1357-58; 1363-64. Air Sunshine never(cid:13) objected to this assessment. Her counsel made the same(cid:13) assertion at oral argument before this Court, and Air(cid:13) Sunshine’s counsel again failed to disagree.(cid:13) However, while the parties appear to be under the(cid:13) impression that the settlement establishes this procedure,(cid:13) the settlement and its supporting documents in no way set(cid:13) forth such a process. It simply declares that "the issues to(cid:13) be considered (non-jury) are . . . multiple occurrences as(cid:13) they relate to insurance coverage herein." Id. at 12. In the(cid:13) absence of any agreed instructions to the contrary, the(cid:13) District Court should have made explicit findings of fact(cid:13) based on the evidence before it, and then applied these(cid:13) facts to the policy language and relevant caselaw. However,(cid:13) the District Court failed to provide any guidance as to the(cid:13) nature of its consideration of the facts in its opinion. It did(cid:13) not make clear whether it was accepting Sabine Flemming’s(cid:13) allegations as true.(cid:13) We express our frustration with the ad hoc, imprecise(cid:13) procedures followed by the parties and hence by the(cid:13) District Court. For purposes of these appeals, however, we(cid:13) will accept Sabine Flemming’s allegations as true. Under(cid:13) any review of the facts, the events which led to James(cid:13) Flemming’s death did not constitute multiple occurrences(cid:13) under the policy.(cid:13) B. Multiple Occurrences under Air Sunshine’s(cid:13) Insurance Policy(cid:13) This Court has adopted the "cause theory" to determine(cid:13) the number of occurrences under an insurance policy.(cid:13) Under the cause theory, "[t]he general rule is that an(cid:13) occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of the(cid:13) resulting injury. . . . Using this analysis, the court asks if(cid:13) ‘(t)here was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and(cid:13) continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and(cid:13) 20(cid:13) damage.’ " Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,(cid:13) 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations and quotations(cid:13) omitted). Air Sunshine’s insurance policy also contains a(cid:13) specific policy definition of "occurrence:"(cid:13) an accident, including continuous or repeated(cid:13) exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury(cid:13) or property damage during the policy period neither(cid:13) expected or intended from the standpoint of the(cid:13) insured . . . .(cid:13) App. at 359. The policy further narrows the scope of(cid:13) "occurrence" in discussing limitations on liability:(cid:13) For the purpose of determining the limit of the(cid:13) Company’s liability, all bodily injury and property(cid:13) damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure(cid:13) to substantially the same general conditions shall be(cid:13) considered as arising out of one occurrence.(cid:13) Id. at 357 (emphasis added). The policy therefore explicitly(cid:13) defines "occurrence" to mean an "accident."(cid:13) As we already noted, in her notice of occurrences, Sabine(cid:13) Flemming specified four separate alleged occurrences: 1)(cid:13) the plane crash itself; 2) the failure to provide a pre-flight(cid:13) safety briefing; 3) the failure to notify passengers of the(cid:13) impending crash and failure to provide emergency safety(cid:13) instructions; and 4) after the crash, the failure to provide(cid:13) any aid to James Flemming. Because the District Court(cid:13) failed to find facts with regard to these allegations, we(cid:13) assume each allegation of negligence to be true for(cid:13) purposes of this opinion. Even so, we find that all of these(cid:13) allegedly negligent acts constitute a single occurrence(cid:13) under the terms of the insurance policy.(cid:13) Sabine Flemming’s allegations of pre-crash negligence,(cid:13) including failure to provide a safety briefing and failure to(cid:13) provide warning of the crash, do not meet the policy(cid:13) definition of "occurrence" because they simply cannot be(cid:13) seen as "accidents" independent from the crash itself. Any(cid:13) pre-crash acts of negligence cannot be termed proximate(cid:13) causes of James Flemming’s death because the crash(cid:13) intervened and the pre-crash negligence would not have(cid:13) caused any injury absent the crash.(cid:13) 21(cid:13) While it is true that James Flemming did not die upon(cid:13) impact of the plane on the water, this fact alone does not(cid:13) mean that the proximate cause of his death was the failure(cid:13) of the pilot to aid passengers after the crash. Under both(cid:13) the policy definition and our cause theory, the plane crash(cid:13) was one "constant, uninterrupted cause" that subjected(cid:13) James Flemming to "continuous or repeated exposure to(cid:13) substantially the same general conditions" and led to his(cid:13) death. The danger that resulted from the plane crashing(cid:13) into the ocean at night was not interrupted or suspended(cid:13) by any intervening event. Any post-crash incidents(cid:13) stemmed from the extreme risk and disorder resulting from(cid:13) the collision. The short time frame between the crash and(cid:13) any subsequent negligent acts, while not dispositive, is(cid:13) relevant when considered in the context of the confusion(cid:13) and disorientation caused by the accident.(cid:13) The cases on which Sabine Flemming relies either(cid:13) concern different definitions of "occurrence" or can be(cid:13) distinguished factually from this case. For example, in(cid:13) Wiltshire v. Government of Virgin Islands, 893 F.2d 629 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1990), this Court found that a premature baby had(cid:13) suffered three distinct occurrences of medical malpractice(cid:13) during a single hospital stay. Id. at 634. Each of these(cid:13) negligent acts -- negligent placement of a catheter tube,(cid:13) negligent administration of CPR, and negligent placement of(cid:13) a second catheter tube into the infant’s scalp -- each(cid:13) caused distinct injuries and were separated in time from(cid:13) one another. The Virgin Islands Malpractice Act, which(cid:13) controlled in Wiltshire, provides that "injury arising out of(cid:13) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same(cid:13) conditions shall be considered as arising out of a single(cid:13) occurrence." Id. (quoting 27 V.I.C. S 166b(e)). We held that(cid:13) under this standard, the infant’s injuries "did not come(cid:13) about as a result of extended exposure to the same basic(cid:13) condition." Id.(cid:13) This case is governed by the definition of occurrence(cid:13) found in Air Sunshine’s insurance policy, which differs(cid:13) from the controlling standard in Wiltshire because the(cid:13) insurance policy here explicitly defines an occurrence as an(cid:13) accident. Common sense dictates that only one "accident"(cid:13) occurred here: the plane crash. Not only does this narrower(cid:13) 22(cid:13) definition undermine any application Wiltshire might have(cid:13) to this case, but in Wiltshire three separate acts of(cid:13) negligence occurred, each of which standing alone caused(cid:13) a separate injury. The three distinct acts could not be said(cid:13) to create "continuous or repeated exposure to substantially(cid:13) the same conditions" but instead created separate, distinct(cid:13) conditions. Here, however, the plane crash exposed James(cid:13) Flemming to "substantially the same conditions" (namely a(cid:13) sinking plane and the severe risk of drowning) that caused(cid:13) his death, and any alleged pilot negligence after the crash(cid:13) failed to change, suspend, or alter these conditions.(cid:13) We agree with Air Sunshine that the Wisconsin Court of(cid:13) Appeals opinion in Welter v. Singer, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Wis.(cid:13) Ct. App. 1985), is more analogous. The court described the(cid:13) facts in Welter as follows:(cid:13) Bruce Welter was riding his bicycle into a Janesville(cid:13) intersection when he was struck and seriously injured(cid:13) by a car driven by defendant Garland Singer. Welter’s(cid:13) cycling companion, John Ihle, Jr., was also hit by the(cid:13) Singer car, but was not seriously injured. Singer(cid:13) stopped after the collision but then drove clear of the(cid:13) intersection, dragging Welter beneath the car, before(cid:13) stopping again. In an apparent attempt to find reverse(cid:13) gear, Singer again moved the car forward about a foot.(cid:13) He then got out of the car and Ihle got in. Ihle backed(cid:13) up about ten feet in an attempt to free Welter. Welter(cid:13) suffered permanent paraplegia from the trauma.(cid:13) Id. at 84. Welter brought suit, arguing that under the(cid:13) defendant’s auto insurance policy, plaintiff suffered four(cid:13) separate accidents or occurrences. The policy limited(cid:13) liability for "each person" for "any one accident." Id. at 85(cid:13) n.1. This policy definition is similar to Air Sunshine’s policy(cid:13) definition in this case, as both define "occurrence" in terms(cid:13) of an "accident."(cid:13) The court in Welter quoted our opinion in Appalachian(cid:13) Ins. Co. and applied the "cause theory" to determine(cid:13) whether to affirm the trial court’s ruling that there was only(cid:13) one "occurrence." The court reasoned:(cid:13) If cause and result are so simultaneous or so closely(cid:13) linked in time and space as to be considered by the(cid:13) 23(cid:13) average person as one event, courts adopting the(cid:13) "cause" analysis uniformly find a single occurrence or(cid:13) accident . . . . [I]t was the initial collision which created(cid:13) the occasion and circumstances for any subsequent(cid:13) injuries. There is no assertion that the last three(cid:13) operations of Singer’s car would have inflicted any(cid:13) injury or would have occurred at all in the absence of(cid:13) the initial impact . . . . The entire incident lasted(cid:13) approximately one minute . . . . The proximity in both(cid:13) time and space of these events, and their direct(cid:13) interdependence, convince us that the average lay(cid:13) person would view the circumstances as a singular(cid:13) "accident" or "occurrence."(cid:13) Id. at 87-88. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff ’s(cid:13) argument that each of the driver’s acts constituted separate(cid:13) accidents or occurrences because the driver regained(cid:13) control of the car between each act. The court held that(cid:13) "[w]hile Singer may have regained full control of his car(cid:13) each time he stopped, Welter was still trapped beneath it.(cid:13) Hence, Singer never regained a full measure of control over(cid:13) either the car’s injury - inflicting potential or the situation(cid:13) in general." Id. at 88.(cid:13) In this case, the plane crash and the subsequent(cid:13) allegedly negligent acts are so "closely linked in time and(cid:13) space as to be considered by the average person as one(cid:13) event." Id. at 87. The initial plane crash "created the(cid:13) occasion and circumstances" for James Flemming’s(cid:13) subsequent death, and as the District Court concluded, the(cid:13) post-crash acts of the pilot would not have been injurious(cid:13) absent the crash. The failure to assist James Flemming(cid:13) medically, to provide him with emergency life vests, or(cid:13) otherwise to help him exit the plane all fall under the(cid:13) "substantially the same general conditions" created by the(cid:13) single accident -- the plane crash. These alleged post-crash(cid:13) negligent acts by the pilot were interdependent with, not(cid:13) independent of, the plane crash. Viewed in the light most(cid:13) favorable to Sabine Flemming, these facts do not support(cid:13) the claim that the pilot regained control of the situation in(cid:13) the crazed minutes following the crash such that the pilot’s(cid:13) post-crash actions amounted to an intervening cause or(cid:13) exposed James Flemming to a different set of conditions.(cid:13) 24(cid:13) Just as the court in Welter concluded, a"common sense(cid:13) view of the facts" shows that James Flemming’s death(cid:13) resulted from "causes acting concurrently with and directly(cid:13) attributable to" to the plane crash, and, therefore, the crash(cid:13) was the "predominant, active and continuing cause." Id. at(cid:13) 87.(cid:13) As a result, we conclude that the plane crash and the(cid:13) events stemming from the crash all constituted a single(cid:13) "accident" and subjected James Flemming and the other(cid:13) passengers to "continuous or repeated exposure to(cid:13) substantially the same general conditions." James(cid:13) Flemming’s death is tragic, but it was caused by only one(cid:13) occurrence under the terms of the policy. Thus, Sabine(cid:13) Flemming does not "prevail on multiple occurrences" and(cid:13) may not recover any additional money under the partial(cid:13) settlement.10(cid:13) V. Conclusion(cid:13) We hold that, under the partial settlement in this case,(cid:13) Sabine Flemming waived a jury trial on the entire issue of(cid:13) multiple occurrences, and reserved that entire issue for the(cid:13) District Court to decide. The court did not err in ultimately(cid:13) concluding that Air Sunshine’s insurance policy allowed for(cid:13) the stacking of coverages for multiple occurrences but that,(cid:13) even accepting Sabine Flemming’s allegations as true, only(cid:13) one occurrence resulted in James Flemming’s death.(cid:13) For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment of the(cid:13) District Court is AFFIRMED.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 10. Finally, we consider Sabine Flemming’s appeal of the District Court’s(cid:13) denial of her motion to strike Air Sunshine’s amended expert opinion of(cid:13) Charles A. Tarpley. We review a district court’s decision to admit or(cid:13) exclude an expert opinion for abuse of discretion. See Pearson v.(cid:13) Component Technology Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 506 n.11 (3d Cir. 2001). We(cid:13) agree with the District Court that the expert’s opinion as to the custom(cid:13) and usage of the term "occurrence" in the insurance industry did not(cid:13) constitute an impermissible legal conclusion. We find no abuse of(cid:13) discretion in the court’s refusal to exclude this opinion.(cid:13) 25(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 26