FAIRLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; STONE v. MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
Docket Nos. 149722 and 149940
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided June 5, 2015
497 MICH 290
FAIRLEY v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
STONE v MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
Docket Nos. 149722 and 149940. Decided June 5, 2015.
In Dоcket No. 149722, Michelle R. Fairley brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) after an MDOC employee driving an MDOC vehicle ran a red light and struck her car, seriously injuring her. Plaintiff‘s counsel filed and signed a notice of intent to file a claim against MDOC in the Court of Claims; however, plaintiff herself did not sign the notice, as
In Docket No. 149940, Lori L. Stone brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan State Police (MSP) for injuries she sustained when her stopped vehicle was struck by two MSP patrol cars. Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to file a claim against the MSP in the Court of Claims; however, the notice did not indicate that it had been verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths, as
In a memorandum opinion signed by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN, KELLY, ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, VIVIANO, and BERNSTEIN, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal and without hearing oral argument, held:
A notice of intent to file a claim against a department of the state under
In Fairley, Docket No. 149722, Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the Court of Claims for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.
In Stone, Docket No. 149940, Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the Court of Claims for reentry of its original order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.
ACTIONS — COURT OF CLAIMS — NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE A CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE — GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY — DEFECTIVE NOTICE.
A notice of intent to file a claim against the state or a department of the state must indicate that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths under
Kline Legal Group, PLC (by John Kenneth Kline and Elizabeth Kitchen-Troop), for Lori L. Stone.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, and Joseph T. Froehlich, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Corrections and the Michigan State Police.
MEMORANDUM OPINION. We consider in these consolidated cases whether a claimant‘s failure to comply with the notice verification requirements of
The purpose of
No claim may be maintained against the state unless the claimant, within 1 year after such claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place where such claim arose and in detail
the nature of the same and of the items of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained, which claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths. [
MCL 600.6431(1) .]
Plainly, then, unless a claimant‘s notiсe is “signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths,” a claim cannot proceed against the state. In both cases here, plaintiffs claim that nothing in the statute requires anyone other than the claimant to sign the notice and successfully argued in the Court of Appeals that defendants’ arguments for summary disposition regarding notice were waived because the plaintiffs’ alleged noncompliance with the statutory notice requirements was an affirmative defense that was not timely pleaded. Alternatively, defendants, both state agencies entitled to governmental immunity unless an exception applies, contend that complainants must “strictly” comply with the notice requirements in order to proceed. We conclude that failing to indicate anywhere on or with the notice that the document was verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths falls short of “strict” compliance and, as a result, plaintiffs’ cases must be dismissed.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. FAIRLEY v DEP‘T OF CORRECTIONS
On March 11, 2011, plaintiff Michelle Fairley was injured in an automobile accident after a Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) vehicle, operated by an MDOC employee, ran a red light and struck Fairley‘s car. Plaintiff faced life-altering injuries—to the brain, neck, and back—as well as associated pain, suffering, and emotional harm. Plaintiff‘s counsel subsequently filed a notice of injury and intent to hold MDOC liable in the Court of Claims. The parties do not
dispute the timeliness of the notice1 or the propriety of MDOC‘s designation as the responsible governmental agency.2 Thе notice plainly stated the facts surrounding the accident, including the location of the accident and the parties involved. While Fairley herself did not sign the notice, her attorney‘s signature and the date appeared below the following disclaimer:
This notice is intended to comply with all requirements of the law and all applicable statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations. . . . If you believe this notice does not comply in any way with the notice requirement of the governing bodies of the State of Michigan and/or MDOC, or with an statute, ordinance, rule or regulation, you should immediately notify by written notice. Any additional information required by statute[,] ordinance, rule, or regulation will be promptly furnished.
After Fairley filed her complaint with the court, defendant respоnded with more than 20 affirmative defenses. Although none of these defenses argued that plaintiff‘s notice of intent to file a claim was defective, defendant MDOC filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that plaintiff‘s notice of intent to file a claim failed to meet the standards set out in
B. STONE v MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
Lori Stone injured her neck when her stopped car was struck by two Michigan State Police patrol cars on May 19, 2007. Following the accident, Stone underwent surgery to fuse two of her neck vertebrae.
Stone subsequently filed a notice of intent to file a claim with the Court of Claims. As was the case in Fairley, the parties do not dispute the timeliness of the notice or that, at the time of filing, this notice plainly stated the facts surrounding the accident including the location of the accident and the parties involved. The nоtice concluded with the statement “I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.” The notice, undated, was signed by plaintiff and signed and “respectfully submitted” by her attorney, John Kline. Nevertheless, more than two years after responding to plaintiff‘s complaint, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that the notice supplied by plaintiff‘s counsel failed to meet the requirements of
What these notices are about is governmental immunity. It‘s exactly about putting up . . . restraints on cases that can be brought against the State. The Supreme Court can‘t be more clear, if you don‘t meet the requirements you don‘t abrogate governmentаl immunity. And the issue isn‘t what verify or verification means, it‘s what verify before an officer authorized to administer oaths means, and there‘s
just no evidence anywhere in this notice, the notice itself, that it was verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths.
The Court of Claims agreed with defendant and signed an order granting summary disposition in its favor. In an unpublished opinion per curiam, the Court оf Appeals reversed, concluding that the Court of Claims had erred and that the “the statute [
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a lower court‘s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition.6 Further, the meaning of the final provision in
itself.8 When legislative intent is clear from the language, no further construction is required or permitted.9
III. ANALYSIS
The issue in these cases is whether plaintiffs’ notices were “signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths” and if not, whether an ineffective notice in a case involving governmental immunity must nonetheless be pleaded as an affirmative defense or be waived.
Under the government tort liability act (GTLA),
result, plaintiffs must adhere to the conditions precedent in
It is well established that governmental immunity is not an affirmative defense, but is instead a characteristic of government. Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 198; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). “[I]t is the responsibility of the party seeking to
[W]hen the Legislature specifically qualifies the ability to bring a claim against the state or its subdivisions on a plaintiff‘s meeting certain notice requirements that the plaintiff fails to meet, no saving construction—such as requiring a defendant to prove actual prejudice—is allowed.[12]
In
[T]he Legislature has established a clear procedure that eliminates any ambiguity about whether an attempted
notice is effective. A claimant who complies with
MCL 600.6431 neеd not worry about whether a notice was properly received and processed by the correct governmental entity. By the same token, state entities can be secure knowing that only timely, verified claims in notices filed with the Court of Claims can give rise to potential liability. . . .[14]
If a notice, such as those here, fails to show that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths, how would a governmеntal entity be assured that the notice, which seeks to impose liability, was actually verified? It is for this very reason that
A. APPLICATION TO FAIRLEY
We are satisfied that there is no material factual dispute regarding the notice submitted by plaintiff Fairley, as it is undisputed that she failed to sign the notice of intent. Accordingly, plaintiff did not submit a notice “signed by the claimant” as required by the plain language of the statute. Further, because the MDOC is a state agency entitled to governmental
conclude that defective notice need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense because defendants are presumеd to be entitled to governmental immunity, and the burden is on plaintiff to prove that one of the exceptions to governmental immunity is applicable.
For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiff Fairley‘s notice was insufficient to maintain a claim against MDOC and, as a result, Fairley‘s claim should be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court of Claims improperly denied defendant‘s motion for summary dispоsition.
B. APPLICATION TO STONE
We also reject plaintiff Stone‘s notice for the similar reason that it was not clear from the face of the document that it was verified “before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” We are unpersuaded that the belated affidavit of plaintiff‘s counsel asserting his dual role as attorney and notary public can cure this deficiency. Plaintiff Stone‘s notice was either unverified but timely or untimely but verified, and in either circumstance it fails to meet the conditions precedent to maintaining a suit against the Michigan State Police.16
For these reasons, we likewise conclude that Stone‘s claim should be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court of Claims properly granted defendant summary disposition and the Court of Appeals erred by reversing that order.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Fairley, we hold that the lower courts erred by concluding that defendant was not entitled to summary disposition based on the plaintiff‘s failure to comply
with the notice requirements of
In lieu of granting defendants’ application for leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Fairley and remand that case to the Court of Claims for entry of an order granting summary dispositiоn in favor of defendant. We also reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Stone and remand that case to the Court of Claims for reentry of its original order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.
YOUNG, C.J., and MARKMAN, KELLY, ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, VIVIANO, and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concurred.