*1 APPEALS THE OF SPECIAL OF COURT JUDGMENT THAT WITH REMANDED TO COURT CASE VACATED. THE THE OF JUDGMENT DIRECTIONS TO VACATE AND COUNTY FOR MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT THAT FOR FURTHER PROCEED- REMAND TO COURT OPINION. WITH THIS NOT INCONSISTENT INGS BE PAID BY PETITIONER. TO COSTS
No. Maryland. Appeals of Court of April 2011. 16, 2011. Denied June
Reconsideration *6 Kumar, Rajesh Acting Deputy County Atty. (Stephanie A. Anderson, McWhorter, County Atty., Peggie P. and N. Associ- Marlboro, MD), brief, on for County Atty., Upper petition- ate ers. Vinick, (Timothy Maloney,
Car J. Hansel F. Steven B. and Laake, P.A., Joseph Joseph, M. Creed of Greenwald & Green- belt, MD), brief, respondent. Funk, Karen Funk Esq., Kruger, Esq.,
David M. J. & Baltimore, MD, Bolton, P.A., for Amicus Curiae brief of Local Insurance Trust. Government Jeon, Ajmel Quereshi, A. American Esq., Esq.,
Deborah Baltimore, MD, of Maryland, Civil Liberties Union for Amici Mary- Curiae brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of land and the Public Justice Center. HARRELL, BELL, C.J., BATTAGLIA,
Argued before GREENE, MURPHY, BARBERA, ADKINS and JJ. ADKINS, J. case, we must decide extent which Local (the “LGTCA”)1
Government Tort Claims Act limits the re of a man whose constitutional have been violated covery rights by a local government police Respondent its force. Keith arrested, hours, was Longtin interrogated for over charged rape with the and murder of his wife. He was held in prison eight During stay prison, for over months. his (the George’s County Department “Depart Prince Police ment”) exculpatory obtained DNA evidence and evidence of a killed, rapist serial the area where wife Longtin’s but Longtin failed to inform or release him. Only when the confirmed, match, Department through a that the DNA crime was committed by suspect, the other did it release *7 prison. from
Longtin Department, sued the George’s County, Prince and officers,2 “Defendants”) individual (together, the and obtained jury a verdict totaling million. The Defendants noted an $6.2 appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the verdict. Court, then petitioned Defendants granted and we a writ of certiorari to following questions, review the rephrased for the sake of clarity brevity:
1. Whether the Respondent’s claim is precluded for a
failure to comply requirements with the notice of the LGTCA?
2. damage Whether LGTCA cap applies to a monetary against
award a local government its employees and/or for violations of the Maryland Constitution and limits the recovery awarded the trial court? (“LGTCA” Act”)
1. The Local Government Tort Claims Act or “the (1974, Repl.VoL), § § located at seq. Md.Code 5-301 et of the (“CJP”). Proceedings Courts & Judicial Article Herndon, 2. The named Troy Harding, individual defendants are Ronald Frankenfield, Bert and Glen Clark. The Chief of Police and another detective were dismissed as defendants before trial. “Monell-type”3 Maryland recognizes 3. a claim Whether “pattern practice” based on a violation of the Mary land Constitution?
4. allowing Whether the trial court abused its discretion in of exculpatory
introduction evidence DNA results and subsequent person conviction crimes another for that murder? affirm.
We shall AND
FACTS LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 1. The Murder of Donna Zinetti Longtin and Zinetti met in George’s County, Donna Prince later, Maryland, They in 1998. married a few moving months Laurel, an apartment into MD. The trou- relationship was start, couple eventually bled from the and the separated, out of their home and a Longtin moving apart- into friend’s 4, 1999, By ment. October and Zinetti Longtin had been separated for 2 weeks. approximately
In the afternoon of October Donna body Zinetti’s was discovered the woods behind her apartment. She had been and stabbed to death while raped jogging sometime on Upon discovery body, October 4th. police began investigation. criminal homicide
Police
the crime
investigating
quickly learned of an alterca-
tion between
and Zinetti
day
her
preceding
murder,
3, 1999, Sunday.
October
That morning, Longtin
service,
and Zinetti attended Zinetti’s church. After
*8
a
a
Longtin overheard
comment from member of the church to
Zinetti,
enraged, suspecting
and became
an extramarital af-
members,
arguing
fair. After
with Zinetti and church
Longtin
man,
by
was
another
who
approached
attempted to calm him.
Servs.,
Dep’t
3.
"Monell”
to
refers Monell
Soc.
436 U.S.
(1978),
Supreme
S.Ct.
Longtin pushed rapidly ran his exited incident, parking the church lot. After of this learning (“CID”) Investigation Criminal Division Longtin considered a suspect. Zinetti,
The next day, having Longtin heard from called George’s County police the Prince her as report missing a person. Though Longtin already suspect, was a the police him along” “went and arranged meeting purportedly a get him to sign missing persons form. The officer who took the call then wrote a note to the lead detective informing him of the arranged meeting, and closing with “Good luck: Get that, him!” Longtin Soon after saw on a television news report that a body female’s had been discovered near Zinetti’s apartment complex. Longtin traveled to the scene. scene,
When he arrived at the crime approached he police officer, himself, identified and asked for more information. officer, recognizing Longtin suspect, as a called the CID guidance. asked for He then approached Longtin, asked cruiser, him to into get police his and took him to the interrogation room in the police Landover station. questioned over twenty-seven the next hours4 officers, multiple police and Longtin “em repeatedly and
phatically” killing denied his wife. Longtin testified that he requested interview, a lawyer during the and his cell phone records attempted show calls to two different lawyers from the interrogation room. Although they belt, had taken his wallet, shoelaces, and point, at some phone, his cell the officers maintained that Longtin was not under during arrest interrogation, thus justifying their decision not to advise him Miranda of his rights him present to a commissioner within the 24-hour period required by Md. Rule 4-212. As Longtin described, later he sleep was unable to during the interroga tion. Testimony alleged
4. length interrogation as to the of the varied at trial. opening arguments, Longtin’s counsel stated that the detention Later, length lasted 39 hours and 20 interrogation minutes. hours, lk was identified as 30 and 28 hours.
During investigation, Longtin this “marathon” revealed suspicious Longtin some details. mentioned Zinetti’s “walk- man,” scene, which found her at the crime body was a detail the police only Longtin believed the killer would know. police also told an officer that the would “never find” the knife Moreover, Longtin’s used in the murder. boss reported police that had called her on the Longtin morning of Zinetti’s (after church), dispute murder their at and said he inwas Canada to visit his sick father and would not be in to work day. twenty interrogation,
After hours in one approximately de- tective asked a of “what if’ Longtin questions, asking series him to how the murder took imagine place. Longtin respond- in ed that he had a vision which someone Zinetti grabbed from knife behind in the hallway, holding kitchen a kitchen to her point, throat. At that another officer took over the interroga- tion, and resumed the had questioning. Longtin, who hours, slept provided about more details to this officer vision, regarding stating gone his that he would have p.m., pushed Zinetti’s home around 11:30 where he would have Zinetti to the floor. He stated that Zinetti would have left her run, go house to for a after which he would have into the gone kitchen, knife, grabbed begun chase her. Longtin
On October Keith was arrested and charged first-degree with murder the death of his wife. to a presented day, commissioner that and police Cause, prepared a Statement of Probable which read as followed: victim,
On 10-4-99 about 1343 hrs the Donna Zinetti along was found dead the wooded area the 13100 block of Laurel, George’s County, Maryland. Larchdale Rd Prince subsequently transported The victim was to the medical Baltimore, Maryland post- examiner’s office [where] performed ruling mortem exam was and the of her death was a homicide.
During investigation who is the Defendant] estranged victims husband volunteered to come in and talk investigators about this incident. interviewing While *10 Defendant,] he developed suspect. as a At that point the was advised his Def[endant] [of] constitutional rights subsequently and admitted to be[ing] involved this case.
The defendant admitted to and having physical verbal apartment. altercation at the victim’s gave The defendant details about this had case that not been released to the media and only perpetrator would have known. He that during stated the altercation the victim ran out of her apartment and that he ran after her with a knife. The defendant knew that the victim had been stabbed several and times that the stabbing occurred the wooded area near the apartment. victim’s
Longtin jail, was then held in awaiting trial.
Significantly, the Statement listed Longtin’s responses to if’ the “what questions though they as were factual admis sions. The Statement declared that Longtin “admitted to having physical verbal and altercation apart at the victim’s ment!,]” even though Longtin had maintained that he was at murder, home on night of the only and described the “altercation” at her apartment response to a if’ “what question after nearly twenty hours of interrogation. The Statement also Longtin’s included statement that “the victim ran out of her apartment and that he ran after her with a knife[,]” an “admission” which directly followed his other if” hypothetical, “what statements.5 trial, Although, 5. interviewing at officer first said that this was events, Longtin's account of actual the officer later admitted that these details could have been details of a vision. The first mention of the p.m. response question, 11:30 visit came in to a “what if” and the instance, shortly details about the chase came thereafter. Prior to this night had been he insistent that was at his home the of Zinetti’s jury’s murder. acceptance Longtin’s Given the obvious version of story, phrased disputed we have light fact in the most favorable Owens-Illinois, Cook, Longtin. See Inc. v. (2005) (stating light facts “in the prevail- most the ... favorable to trial[.]”). ing parties liability on During investigation, police collected two possible samples DNA which implicated Longtin. could have Besides comparing Longtin’s DNA with the DNA of the perpetrator, couch, they sample also detected a blood on Longtin’s compared to Zinetti’s DNA. On January Crime Laboratory Maryland Division State Police (“Crime Lab”) completed its examination of the couch sample, and sent a letter to Detective Herndon that the test showed Then, the blood was neither Longtin’s nor Zinetti’s. February completed investigation Crime Lab its swabs, of the DNA found on the vaginal and concluded that Longtin was “excluded as possible of the DNA [a] donor[] Detective extracted[.]”6 Herndon was also notified of this results, finding. Longtin was unaware of these DNA test *11 in prison through Spring remained of 2000. Longtin’s charges
While were an pending, perpe- unknown trator committed a series of similar crimes the immediate vicinity of the Zinetti murder. Police eventually arrested a crimes, suspect for these Oesby, although they Antonio did not link immediately Oesby Later, to the Zinetti murder. police Oesby’s submitted DNA for comparison against perpetrator of Zinetti’s murder. 12, 2000,
By June the Crime Lab completed analysis its swabs, the DNA connected from the vaginal and confirmed a match Oesby’s with DNA The Lab sample. again notified Herndon, relayed Detective who the information to the State’s Attorney’s Longtin office. was released on June At 2000. that point, spent he had over months in eight prison, the last six months of occurred after exculpatory which DNA test Moreover, described, results. as the Special Appeals Court of Longtin’s imprisonment wreaked havoc on life: his incarceration,
During Longtin his lost three automobiles. He evicted from apartment was his and his possessions center, were left on the curb. the detention he inmate, attacked an placed a mass bunk in the report suspects. 6. The lab also excluded two other him guards watching middle of the floor with female use the He permitted restroom. was not to attend his wife’s funer- judge ruling al. As the trial noted when on appellants’ post- motions, Longtin trial left County custody “with little more than the clothes on his back.” George’s
Prince County Longtin, Md.App. ”). (“Longtin
A.2d Longtin’s
2. Civil Suit 22, 2001, Longtin On October filed a civil law suit Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, naming County, Police, it’s then-Chief of and five members of the Criminal Division, Investigation including interrogating officers. Longtin’s complaint thirteen-count alleged, among other violations, things, claim,7 constitutional or “pattern practice” and various common law claims such as false arrest and prosecution.8 malicious began The trial almost years five later, August trial, At 2006. the start of the the court granted partial summary motions for judgment regards to two of the original thirteen counts.9 trial,
At Longtin sought to establish unconstitutional actions by the police during officers his initial arrest and interroga- tion. described how the him grue- officers showed detail, explain, 7. We shall define the term and history in more "pattern practice” claims below. *12 Specifically, Longtin's (1) 8. complaint following contained the counts: Maryland 21, (2) Rights, violations of the Declaration of Article viola- 24, (3) arrest, Maryland Rights, tions of the Declaration of Article false (4) (5) (6) imprisonment, prosecution, false malicious intentional inflic- distress, (7) (8) tion of privacy/false light, pattern emotional invasion of conduct, (9) practice improper (10) misrepresentation, intentional detention, (11) negligent (12) conspiracy, request declaratory civil judgment, negligence. granted 9. The trial court Summary Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment Longtin’s regarding misrepresenta- Count intentional tion of facts. ability The court stated that "the Police have the misrepresent during interrogations.” certain facts The court also granted regards allegation negli- the Defendants’ motion with to the gence. pictures corpse, religion, some of his wife’s mocked his denied counsel, him him legal deprived sleep, access to of food and him, Application threatened and lied for Probable Cause. further that the and the Offi-
Longtin argued Department cers failed take to release him more proper steps promptly they exculpatory argued after discovered the evidence. He area, that ignored the officers evidence similar crimes area, ignored suspicious person evidence of a and failed exculpatory Longtin. Longtin to disclose evidence to submit- already ted that the officers had made their mind that he up culprit, anything was the and would do to extract a confession from him. claim,
Finally, part “pattern as of his or practice” introduced evidence that the policies, training, practices of Department partially the Police were to blame: set forth evidence [Longtin] through Detective Herndon sleep deprivation investigation that was a “tool” of that he had been trained to use. Admitted into evidence was an interrogation training interview and manual of the Prince George’s County Community Police Institute that told offi- they cers could read a his suspect rights “or wait until after he admits.” The manual stated that the interrogator should handcuffing angry suspect consider an to the wall “and let sit a while.” [him] Officers were advised to “wait out” a passive suspect because “few can it If a people keep up.” suspect “is so are convincing you starting to believe him ... go you room back unless [l]eave [and] [d]on’t re-fortify your guilty.” conviction that he is Detective it Kerry Jerningan policy testified that was departmental police necessarily did not have to take the suspect a district court if before commissioner within hours information, suspect continuously providing and con- firmed that a manual 4- police training described Md. Rule 212(f)(1) rule, Maryland procedural as not law” that “[a] could be waived.
465
(footnote
113-14,
Longtin,
Md.App.
190
The case was submitted to the
and on
August
jury
returned a
in favor of
verdict
Longtin
eight
on all
counts.11 The jury awarded
million
$5.2
in compensatory damages against
County, pursuant
to
5-303(b)(l)
(1974,
RepLVol.)
Md.Code
Section
Proceedings
(“CJP”),
Courts and Judicial
pro
Article
which
vides, with certain exceptions,
government
that “a local
shall
for any judgment against
employees
damages
be liable
its
for
resulting
jury
from tortious acts or omissions....”
also
disposed
by
summary
10. Besides the counts that were
for
motions
judgment,
involving declaratory judgment
dropped.
the count
Be-
trial,
you
fore
counsel for
stated
"I
[have
don’t believe
evidence,
position
it.]
address
I think the Court is in a
to hear the
and
case,
something
adjudged through
then after the
if there is
left
be
declaratory judgment,
judgment
the Court can issue its
at that time.”
agreed
delay
declaratory
The Court
at that time to
consideration of the
further,
judgment
point,
count. After that
the Court did not address it
Thus,
party
and neither
has since raised the issue.
like the Court of
Special Appeals,
having
we will treat the issue as
been abandoned. See
97,
9,
George’sCounty Longtin,
Md.App.
Prince
108 n.
988 A.2d
").
(”Longtin
26 n. 9
Special Appeals
11. The Court of
described the details of the verdict:
special interrogatories
The verdict sheet consisted of
on each defen-
liability,
entry
general
compensatory
dant’s
an
for a
verdict for
damages,
respect
liability
and entries with
to each defendant’s
sheet,
punitive damages. According
George’s
verdict
Prince
County was found liable for two constitutional violations: the Article
pattern
practice
remaining
24 count and the
Each of
claim.
individual defendants was also
liable
found
for two constitutional
(Article
conspiracy),
imprison-
violations
24 and civil
as well as false
ment,
distress,
privacy
intentional
infliction
emotional
inva-
light. Detective Herndon was also found liable for false
sion/false
prosecution.
respect
arrest and malicious
With
to the common law
torts,
jury specifically
found that each individual defendant "acted
addition,
jury
with malice.” In
found that each officer acted
"intentionally”
Longtin's
rights
in violation of
constitutional
and in
inflicting emotional distress.
(2010).
Longtin, Md.App.
See
at 107 n.
returned over million against individ- $1 ual officers. appealed
The Defendants to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision. The Defendants Court, then from sought granted. certiorari which we
DISCUSSION Requirements I. preclude Whether LGTCA’s Notice Longtin’s claim. raised by first issue the Defendants involves the
requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act. The Defendants argue comply failed to with the LGTCA, requirements notice and that his claims should precluded. therefore be One way protects the LGTCA local governments is the notice through provisions of CJP Section 5-304, which states:
... An action unliquidated damages may for brought be against a government local or its employees unless the notice of the claim required by this section is given within days 180 after the injury----[T]he notice shall given be mail, or person by certified return receipt request- ed----The notice shall be in writing and shall state the time, place, injury. and cause of the §CJP 5-304. This requirement designed to assist local governments in their handling potential claims: notice requirements]
[The are intended to apprise a local government of possible liability its at a time when it could i.e., conduct investigation, its own while evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undimin- by time, ished sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of injury responsibility and its in connection with it. Cherkes, 282, 323, 410, Dep’t (2001) Md.App.
Police 140 780 A.2d 434 (local governments longer escape "can no raise that defense to statutorily imposed indemnify."). duties to defend and
467
104, 126-27,
1,
Md.
872 A.2d
Montgomery County,
Rios v.
298-99,
284,
Ewing,
Faulk v.
371 Md.
(citing
379,
(2002);
1262,
Maynard,
A.2d
Williams v.
359 Md.
389-90,
(2000);
Bd.
County
754 A.2d
Jackson v.
(1963))
Comm’rs,
(quota-
233 Md.
195 A.2d
omitted).
tion marks and citations
the notice
is “a condition
Compliance
requirement
an
a local
precedent maintaining
against
government
action
to the extent otherwise not entitled to
employees
its
Rios,
immunity
application requirement. notice Section provides: section, the other Notwithstanding provisions of this unless can affirmatively defendant show that its defense has notice, prejudiced by been lack of motion and required upon for good may cause shown the court entertain the suit even though required given. notice was not statute, theBy language of the the burden is on the claimant Then, first to “good show cause.” if the local government cannot “affirmatively show that its has preju- defense been by notice,” diced lack of required “may” the court hear the case despite faulty “good notice. This cause” exception leaves the enforcing courts some discretion in the notice court, circumstances, requirement, and allows a in certain unjust avoid an result. case, Longtin provided notice to the Defendants 31, 2000,
letter dated October and apparently by received later, one defendants week which read as follows: 5-304, § Pursuant Mr. Longtin hereby [CJP] gives notice that he injuries suffered to his person proper- and his ty and important was denied rights guaranteed to him under the United States Constitution when he was arrested on October George County Prince Police [sic] Department, and thereafter incarcerated in Georges Prince County a period of months for a clearly murder he did not commit.
After Longtin filed his complaint, Defendants requested summary judgment on the grounds that he had failed to comply with LGTCA’s notice requirements. The Defen argued dants that the 180-day window began day arrest, Longtin’s October which a year was over before Longtin provided notice. The County thus argued that Longtin’s notice was untimely regard with to all but one of Longtin’s claims.13
In response, Longtin argued that the 180-day notice period later, did not commence until either when was re- jail leased from or when he discovered the exculpatory DNA evidence. Longtin also argued any failure comply the time requirement excused, should be because the Defen- dants suffered no prejudice and that his imprisonment and delay learning extent of the Defendants’ actions provid- good ed cause.
After hearing argument, the Circuit Court denied Defen *16 motion, finding dants’ prejudice.” ruling—presum “[no] This ably made “good under the cause” exception14—was chal lenged on appeal by the Defendants. that, view,
13. The Defendants conceded even under their notice of the prosecution timely claim of malicious was because it would not have began Longtin prison, to run until was released from a much later date. Special Appeals 14. The Court ruling classified the trial court's on the ruling "good notice issue as a cause”: Although by not raised contemplated by "motion” as subsection (d), Longtin, repeated filings, sought in good to invoke the cause court, exception, by explicitly finding and the circuit prejudice no to appellants, clearly 5-304(d) upon § rejecting relied in their notice of claim defense.
469
court, the Defendants criti-
In
intermediate appellate
“ear-
with the
ruling
cized the Circuit Court’s
as inconsistent
Heron,
in
in
and recited
cause” established
good
marks of
(2006)
Hunsicker,
A.2d 678
Md.App.
Wilbon v.
129, 877
Md.App.
George’s County,
v. Prince
and White
cases,
(2005).
in these three
explained
A.2d 1129
As
are:
usually
factors a court
considers
in
(generally
or mistake
determined
neglect
excusable
reference to a
reasonably prudent person
standard),
[2]
location out-of-
injury
or mental
physical
serious
and/or
state,
[3]
inability to retain counsel
in cases
involving
complex litigation,
...
[4]
ignorance
statutory notice
(5)
made
misleading representations
by
requirement, or
government.
of the local
representative
Heron,
Wilbon,
693, citing
at
913 A.2d. at
Md.App.
White,
62-63;
at
Md.App.
the court
waived the notice
for
properly
requirement
“good
(2)
cause”;
the trial
denial of the
motion for
County’s
court’s
summary judgment was
notice
preserved
appeal;
timely
regards
prosecu
one count—the malicious
full
preserves
tion claim—and the timeliness of that claim
the jury
“general
theory;15
amount of
award under a
verdict”
Longtin,
Md.App.
agree
Judge Robert writing for the Court of Special (“CSA”), Appeals first recognized the fit” “uneasy between the requirements LGTCA’s notice and state constitutional torts: The Court of Appeals has consistently said that (MTCA) LGTCA and the Maryland Tort Claims Act do not exclude State constitutional torts from their coverage. Less clear is whether the restrictions of those statutes would partial defeat all or recovery apply every respect to State constitutional torts. hand,
On the one the Court Appeals has said that a tort, State constitutional premised such as one on a violation of a “self-executing” provision, constitutional like Article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is enforceable common law action for damages. addition, State consti- tutional tort action cannot be defeated the assertion of official government Thus, or local immunity. it appears to independently LGTCA, exist which is premised on a governmental waiver of immunity. hand,
On the cases, other at least MTCA the Court of Appeals has indicated that recovery against the State is long available as as the claimant complies procedural requirements of the Act.
Longtin,
117-19,
Md.App.
Prince
121 n.
(2010) (some
omitted).
34 n. 33
citations
*18
deciding
unnecessarily
constitu-
to avoid
“obligation
court’s
State,
Id.
Davis v.
(citing
questions[.]”
tional
(1982)). Instead,
the
it
notice
“believefd]
[Heron, White, ], have in common with little Wilbon not Longtin charged here. was with presented situation offense, in the burglary disorderly conduct but murder or a life degree possibility of a double sentence. first White, Heron, he was Unlike quickly Unlike released. incarcerated, ancil- justifiably complaining he was not an Longtin alleged jury constitutional violation. and the lary lied County exculpato- found that and withheld agents If ry DNA him incarcerated. we assume keep evidence that the of the tort claims 180-day period notice most arrested, he ran from the date he not released until was was statutory period more than two months after the had ex- .... pired A.2d The interme-
Longtin, Md.App. at 35-36. untimeliness in appellate any diate court thus concluded that Longtin’s notice was excusable: short, person” Longtin’s posi- an “ordinary prudent Thus, given by day.
tion have notice the 180th we could not that, any Longtin’s if or all of claims conclude even notice on un- County individual against appellants and the were timely, circuit court did not abuse its discretion delay. finding any cause existed excuse good Id. resolved, the notice issue is better
We believe than possible, when on the timeliness of the notice on Heron, cause” “good exception. See 361 Md. at (Before at 58 reaching good exception, cause “it is neces- first, sary, to determine time of alleged injury his for each claims.”). appealed argued the Circuit Court that notice timely his he because sent his letter days within 180 after release prison, his from and although that court its on prejudice, rested decision lack of both argu- are preserved. ments See Md. Rule (appellate 8-131 courts may hear only those issues which “have been raised in or court”). decided the trial parties agree that if the 180-day period began notice arrest,
October the day Longtin’s then his notice *19 untimely, 13, was if period began 2000, but the on June his date, after, any release point Longtin’s notice would be issue, timely. may therefore, We resolve by this determining, law, as matter Longtin’s of when 180-day notice period began. We will first examine the notice issue with respect to claims, the false arrest and imprisonment and then turn to the Longtin’s remainder of counts.
A. Notice Period
False Arrest and Imprisonment
for
Heron,
start
an
We
examination of
which was also a
Heron,
258,
(2000).
false arrest case. See
A.2d
case,
The
in
plaintiff
Heron,
that
David
had been
by
arrested
the Prince
police
24,
George’s County
August
1997,
on
for
resisting arrest,
the
obstructing
police,
disorderly
and
conduct.
was
26, 1997,16
Heron
released from
on
prison
August
and
acquitted
later
all
1998,
of
charges.
of
about
May
two
acquittal,
months after his
Heron provided a
of
Notice
Claim
to Prince George’s County, alleging
imprisonment,
false
false
arrest, and malicious prosecution. Prince George’s County
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
that
asserting
the
notice was untimely
provided
as it was
more than 180 days
case,
16. The docket
entries Heron's criminal
number l-E-00079311
County,
24,
George’s
in Prince
August
show that he was committed on
26,
August
and released on
Longtin, Md.App.
1997. See also
(the
released").
at
"quickly
at
Heron
was
defendant
The
262, 761 A.2d
58.
See id. at
at
date of arrest.
from the
dismiss,
the issue
the motion to
and
granted
court
circuit
LGTCA’s
explained
this Court.
eventually reached
We
i.e.,
arose,
action
“his causes of
when
period begins
notice
filing
the
of [his
facts
legally operative
permitting
when
existence[,]”
facts
exist[ed]
or “when
came into
claims]
For the
Id. at
A.2d at 59.
each element.”
support
claims, we
that the
imprisonment
held
arrest and false
false
the LGTCA therefore
“injuries
purposes
for the
plaintiffs
occurred,
he was arrested
date
August
each
alleged
support
facts
police.
detained
Id.
his
were
time.”
element of
claim
existence
support
conclusion
seem
glance,
might
At first
began
on October
180-day period
Defendants’ claim that
inspection of the
Longtin’s
the date of
arrest. Closer
in pris
Unlike
Heron was
suggests
Longtin,
otherwise.
case
distinguish
There
need to
only
days.
two
was no
on for
release;
the date of arrest
the date
whichever
between
used,
Instead,
was too
the distinction
notice
late.
(and
date of arrest
Heron was between the
important
release),
later
the defendant was
and the much
date when
cited in
which
This
true for
few cases
Heron
acquitted.
rule;
imprisoned
a “date of
had been
plaintiff
used
arrest”
time,
had to
period
distinguish
short
and the court
and the later date of
between
earlier date
*20
arrest/release
the
New
or dismissal of
See Michaels v.
acquittal
charges.
(D.N.J.1996)
315,
(distinguishing
327
date
Jersey, 955 F.Supp.
terminated);
proceedings
from
that court
Pisa
of arrest
date
588,
1296
City
City,
N.J.Super.
v.
Union
198
no
of
Div.1984) (claimant
(Law
bail); Deary
was
on
v.
released
(3rd Cir.1984)
Officers,
Three
Police
false arrest or false
claim accrues. See
266-69,
475
imprisonment
guided by false arrest and
are also
We
for the
of limitations.
the accrual date
statute
involving
cases
of limitations
requirement statute
Although the notice
protecting
their
of
perfectly
policies
convergent,17
are
Compare Philip
are similar.
stale claims
against
defendants
Christensen,
227, 247-48, 905
USA,
Inc. v.
Moms
(2006)
340,
American
& Construction
(citing
Pipe
A.2d
352
(1974))
Utah,
538,
756,
713
414
38 L.Ed.2d
Co. v.
U.S.
94 S.Ct.
(Statutes
of
give
of limitations “are intended
notice
suit
prevent
loss
a reasonable amount of time
defendants within
memories[.]”)
of witnesses’
fading
of evidence and
795,
(2007)
98,112,
400
A.2d
804
Danielczyk,
Smith v.
Md.
928
“to
requirement
apprise
of
notice
is
(purpose
the LGTCA’s
can
governments
possible liability
they
local
of
a time when
facts,
their own
into the relevant
while
investigation
conduct
fresh.”).
of
are still
evidence and the recollection
witnesses
reason,
date for a
of limitations
For this
the accrual
statute
of
determining
is
the accrual date
a notice
period
relevant
Louisville,
See, e.g.,
v.
Roehrig
for the same claims.
period
(notice
703,
for contri
(Ky.Ct.App.1970)
period
454 S.W.2d
704
for
claim
when
of limitations
such
begins
bution
statute
would);
499
Bryant
City
Lafayette,
v.
946 P.2d
claim
of
(like
limitations, tort
a statute of
claims
(Colo.Ct.App.1997)
by “discovery
notice
automobile accident was tolled
period for
unconsciousness);
during plaintiffs prolonged period
rule”
G,
I,
140,
Idaho
75
Canyon
& Inc.
Dist. No.
139
Highway
C
v.
(2003)
194, 198
period”
“notice
cases to identi
(examining
P.3d
condemnation);
fy
Española
statute of limitations for inverse
Atencio,
1233,
Housing Authority v.
90 N.M.
568 P.2d
similarity
between notice statutes
(recognizing
limitation); Emery
University
v.
New
and statutes of
Ctr.,
1140 (App.1981)
Mexico Medical
N.M.
P.2d
every
jurisprudence
applicable to the
17. Not
contour of limitations
Strader,
example,
requirements.
v.
LGTCA’snotice
For
in Heron
(2000),
favorably
Md.
(linking period start of notice to start of statute of limitations case); Adams v. State period Oregon malpractice medical Police, 233, 1153, (1980) (in 289 Or. 611 P.2d 1156 tort case car, involving damaged a the 180-day period notice and two- period year of limitations on the day). commenced same general
The
rule
false
imprisonment
arrest and
in which
person
cases
a
is arrested and released
to trial
prior
is that “the
run
begins
only
statute
to
the imprisonment
when
ends, since the
period
imprisonment
is treated as a unit.” 4
(Second)
see
899,
§
also
c;
Restatement
of Torts
Comment
Miller,
v.
(1907) (“The
Hackler
206,
79 Neb.
When, however, imprisoned is a defendant commencing for tried, policy there is sound trial, never ing but A from prison.19 release upon plaintiffs a period the notice initiate a immediately failure to person’s falsely imprisoned imprudence, usually by neglect caused tort claim is civil may not be able reality that the victim “the instead but Kato, 549 imprisoned.” Wallace v. he is still to sue while (2007). 166 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. ability a prisoner’s on (rightfully) placed limitations are Severe contrast, policy perverse approach would create dissent’s 19. appropriate action When the State takes incentives for the State. disappeared, prisoner probable cause has a after and releases indistinguishable our "release dissipation’’ from “date of dissent’s however, rule, State is dissipation” the "date of date” rule. Under legal justification it has lost Us keeping prisoner a rewarded for after point, imprisonment past that doing so. State continues the false If the period, prisoner’s and it is less notice clock continues to run timely rule could The dissent's likely prisoner will file notice. that the encourage such action. world, communicate the outside and his first few in prison presumably spent months are for the preparation proceedings. period—or criminal To the extent that a notice a statute of limitations—is directed at those who sit on their rights, during pretrial it should not run imprisonment.20
Moreover, months, when plaintiff is held for weeks or trial, but commencing released before the notice period on release not endanger policy preserving does a munici pality’s ability to their investigation “conduct own into the facts, while relevant evidence and the recollection witnesses are periods still fresh.” Notice are concerned with the poten municipality tial that a forced will be to defend itself against existed, injuries it did not know at a time it when is unable to generate in that evidence assist defense. There is less risk imprisonment a false which case has not arrest/false dissent, approach adopted by although adhering The to the 20. action, general regarding of a rule accrual cause of causes more problems attempts identify than it solves. The dissent the moment at “legal justification which the dissipated.” arrest] [for dissent readily Longtin’s dissipation,” identifies "date but in other cases this Here, approach may be an unsustainable endeavor. the exclusion of conclusive, Longtin's might DNA have been but other cases the identify may DNA failure to Furthermore, defendant’s at the scene crime not be. *24 police may justifies non-DNA have evidence which a imprisonment, continued no scientific or have evidence whatsoever. cases, issue, probable destroyed those is cause is a fact-intensive when requiring weighing inappropriate appellate of evidence is for an Moreover, dissipation” heavily disputed by court. the "date of will be State, may always provide theory justify who be able to a to imprisonment. continued case, evidence, Even in this which has definitive scientific the "dissi- pation” murky. identify probable test becomes To the moment cause arose, record, the dissent selects certain facts from the none of which were included in the State’s own Statement of Probable Cause. The probable prior Longtin’s dissent then concludes that cause arose to interrogation, contradicting Troublingly, even the State’s account. disputed way dissent has resolved factual these issues in unfavorable See, Longtin, e.g., Stamper, who victorious at trial. Hoffman (2005) ("We must view that evidence light part(ies) prevailed in a most favorable to the who on the issues to relates[J”). disregarded which it The has our dissent standard of attempted review and to resolve contested issues in a factual manner contrary jury's verdict. arrest, yet gone to trial. From the police moment of officers are required to document their actions and create evidence cause). (e.g., the statement of probable person is While imprisoned, municipality is presumably gathering evi dence, facts, organizing its and identifying potential witnesses justify that arrest and detention. Notice periods serve to open up the flow of evidence potential plaintiff from a to a government, local jump government’s and start legal defense mechanism. a party falsely imprisoned, When is already locked in an proceeding adversarial with that govern (indeed, stakes), ment one with much higher government’s laws, is engine up. revved Because of the trial speedy com mencing period notice on the end of pretrial imprisonment evidence, lengthy delays will risk the that render claims, stale.21 arrested,
We hold that a person when imprisoned, trial, but released before order to file a false arrest and claim, imprisonment he must file his notice of claim within 180 days did, prison. his release from and he therefore complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements. conclusion,
The dissent reaches the same although through application of the “good LGTCA’s cause” exception. See Dissenting Op. A.3d at 894. Allowing “good cause” for incarceration problems creates even more in future cases. First, it is unclear how long imprisonment will continue to be “good cause” for filing; late should forgive courts longer imprisonments, and allow late notice from defendants who are years freed after If conviction? incarceration is not always cause”, “good how will the court determine which imprison- are, Moreover, ments and which are not? if the defendant is imprisoned on another charge, is his failure to file any notice less forgivable Longtin’s? than many issues raised dissent’s “good approach cause” long have since been solved *25 trial, 21. As this case never reached point, we need not decide at what trial, person imprisoned after the who is must initiate a civil law suit. imprison- false arrest and common law’s treatment of by the claims. ment Longtin’s
B. Notice For
Other Claims
the notice issue for false arrest and
Our resolution of
Longtin’s
notice issue for most of
resolves the
imprisonment
from a false
arising
In
constitutional claims
general,
claims.
pattern
practice
imprisonment—including
arrest
of limitations accrual date with
claims—share
statute
Kato,
law torts. See
v.
549 U.S.
related common
Wallace
(2007) (statute
In a recent the Seventh Circuit distin guished Johnson on grounds IIED plaintiffs claim was occurring throughout based events imprison Elkhart, (7th ment. Parish City 614 F.3d Cir.2010). After a criminal defendant’s conviction was over turned, he sued the for, officers and the police department alia, inter intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that the claim did not accrue until the conviction: allegedly officers took steps through all stages
investigation and trial that cumulatively amounted to the tort of IIED. Additionally, the conviction was an essential piece of this tort because it was the wrongful conviction that led to the emotional strain and anguish mental that Parish faced.... Parish’s claim of IIED was not complete prior to the time of conviction because the conviction was the crux of the claim.
Id. Parish clarifies that the accrual date of an IIED claim can range, depending upon alleged case, actions. inas Parish, the claim is not based entirely on the police officers’ during Rather, actions the arrest. Longtin alleged that his emotional distress was the result of continuing actions by the police department him keep wrongfully imprisoned. His continued wrongful imprisonment “crux of his claim.” The notice period claim, therefore, for the IIED did not accrue until his release.
A question closer is the accrual date for Longtin’s false light claim. Some courts considering the statute of limitations for an array of claims similar to Longtin’s have distinguished privacy between claims and the false arrest and See, imprisonment claims. e.g., Antonio, Price v. City San (5th Cir.2005) (invasion 431 F.3d 893-94 privacy claim arrest, imprisonment arrest and on date of while false accrued (same). Johnson, later); N.E.2d at 31 accrued claims in some factual may meaningful this distinction be Although circumstances, the notice period we decline to differentiate from a false light” arising a “false claim accrual date for from cause. The false claim arises probable light statement of of Probable Cause. assertions contained the Statement counts, including other multiple This same event underlies claims, the notice for which imprisonment false arrest circumstances, release. Under these period upon commenced *27 requirement by the notice is not further served policy the of to file earlier notice of requiring falsely imprisoned person a decline, therefore, distinguish the light the false claim. We Long- for the false claim from applicable period light notice tin’s other claims. Caps Damage
II. LGTCA’s an limit predictability, provide upper To increase and liability, the limits government’s potential to a local LGTCA govern can recover from a local plaintiff the amount a tort $500,000 $200,000 per claim and total per ment to individual § 5- from the same occurrence. See CJP arising claims 303(a)(1). $5,025,000,a well in jury The awarded sum in trial provided the limits the LGTCA. The court excess of award, challenge the an issue the Defendants refused to lower therefore, decide, the on must whether LGTCA’s appeal. We in the permissi this case so as to limit cap damages applies on award. ble detention, release, arrest, and civil Longtin’s
The timeline of
suit,
the
significant development
of
overlays
period
damage cap provisions, beginning with this Court’s
LGTCA’s
Bennett,
in
Auth. v.
opinion Housing
(2000). There,
Housing Authority
sued the
plaintiff
by
caused
her childhood lead
City
damages
Baltimore
for
Authority
plaintiff alleged
Housing
The
poisoning.
flaking
paint
in
lead-based
to remain
“negligent
allowing
home,]”
damages.
million dollars of
sought
her
several
[in
filed a motion
Authority
The version of the LGTCA front this Court contained damages following limitation: (a) ... of a local liability—(1) liability Limitation $200,000
government may per not exceed an individual claim, $500,000 claims that from the per total arise damages resulting same occurrence for from tortious omissions, including arising liability under acts or (b) of this section.... subsection (b) liable—(1) When ... a government government local any employee
shall be for judgment against liable its resulting from or damages tortious acts omissions com- employee mitted scope employment within government. the local (1974, Repl.Vol, § Md.Code Cum.Supp.), 5-303 CJP added). (a) (emphasis Section capped damages thus avail- against government, able a local including respondeat superi- (b). liability, which was identified subsection Because Bennett did not deal with a suit respondeat under superior, but instead involved a direct suit against Hous- ing Authority, parties disputed whether the word “includ- ing” signified damages caps *28 that were to apply intended Bennett, outside of respondeat liability. claims of See 374. Housing A.2d at The Authority argued a cap which respondeat superior “includes” within liability its coverage necessarily liability, includes some other type such as direct Not liability. persuaded by this argument, this adopted plaintiffs interpretation, Court the holding that the did apply statute not to direct suits:
In LGTCA, context we do not believe that the limitation, monetary by “including” use of the word reference liability to for judgments against employees, should be judgments construed as also to applying all tort directly against governments agencies regardless local discussed, of the such judgments. basis for As previously only liability §§ in mentioned 5-301 5-303 is through liability to a provide defense tort actions against employ- against actions em-
ees, tort pay judgments to liability Further- indemnify employees. liability to ployees, tort claims liability governmental more, upon limitations expressly created liability to the ordinarily relate act act. in that tort claims dealt with would not concluded that “[i]t A.2d at 376. We Id. at ... to statutory language a reasonable construction be directly against local to tort actions monetary caps apply Id. governments[.]” govern- local among caused alarm
The Bennett decision action from the ments, corrective immediately sought who session, in early following Assembly. General “[clarify] legislation Assembly passed emergency General local liability government of a monetary limits on that the governments local against to claims apply the [LGTCA] under limits monetary defendants [and] when named as local gov- for which judgments to tort apply under [LGTCA] of 2001. 286 of the Acts Chapter liable....” ernments are April on legislation into effect signed Governor gave this revision Assembly the General Importantly, 2001. effect, in an uncodified stating a retroactive to the LGTCA damages claim for any Act shall apply that: “[The] section Proceedings Article and Judicial § under 5-303 of the Courts arising of this Act and the effective date pending in a case July 1, occurring after 1987.” (Emphasis on or from events added). after one week prison exactly from
Longtin was released Thus, holding—that its local was filed. the Bennett decision for direct suits—was liability faced unlimited governments then is question release. The upon law his status of the retro apply revisions to the LGTCA subsequent whether the limit direct claims.23 actively Longtin’s that retroac our jurisprudence
It
a hallmark of
right.”
of a “vested
may
deprive
person
legislation
tive
*29
Special Appeals, we believe the issue of
of
23. Like the Court
caps
by determining
can be
damage caps
whether
can be resolved
grounds
Deciding
retroactively
the issue on these
applied
to his claims.
Md., Inc.,
604, 625-630,
Md.
See Dua v. Comcast Cable
of
(detailing
years
805 A.2d
1073-1077
over 150
of
Maryland
legislation
cases which invalidated retroactive
to
right
of
rights”).
deprivation
“vested
Retroactive
a vested
“Article 24
Rights
violates
of the Declaration of
and Article
III,
629-630,
§
Id. at
at
Constitution.”
805 A.2d
decide, therefore,
1076. We must
whether Longtin possessed
jail.
“vested
at the
of his
from
rights”
time
release
See State
Amecom,
Comm’n Human
Relations
(1976) (there
1, 4
prohibition
is “no
against
absolute
statute.”).
application
retroactive
of a
case,
In this
of Special Appeals
Court
ruled that the
“right”
Longtin
at issue for Mr.
was
of
his cause
action for
“Here,
full
of damages:
amount
at
what was
stake was a fully
accrued cause of action
complete recovery
for constitution
al
that were
previously subject
violations
to an
assertion
partial
either all
government
Longtin,
or
local
immunity.”
Md.App.
In a seminal case Judge Eldridge, written we were called to consider whether two statutes with retroactive effect caps allows us to avoid the damage constitutional issue of whether the apply damages
can
awarded for constitutional violations.
classification,
object
classifying
24. The Defendants
to this
the LGTCA's
"defense,”
damage caps
right
government,
as a
of a local
which
suit,
remained inchoate until
filed his
after the
LGTCA
ignores
argument
reality
revised. The
any depriva-
Defendants
tion of a
alternatively
cause
action could
be cast as the creation of a
defense,
depriving plaintiffs
rights
thus
of their
with a
turn of
tongue.
*30
a “vested
party deprived
recovery by
potential
limited
Dua,
Dua,
604,
the
Holding that Dua said: Court constitutionally protected, right” constitutionally ordinarily be “a may there Although ... in a cause of right particular property vested protected the cause abrogates limits or accruing a statute action” after Police, action, Maryland State Johnson v. (1993), normally is a vested 298-99, there 628 A.2d prior has accrued of action which right a cause property consistently has held action. This Court legislative to the ordinarily precludes Maryland Constitution (1) retroactively abolishing an accrued from Legislature a vested action, plaintiff thereby depriving cause of action, retroactively a cause creating from right, action, thereby violating cause of reviving barred of the defendant. right vested concluded 632-33, at 1073. The Dua Court Id. at statutes, to limit of the new so as application that retroactive was unconstitutional: liability, abrogating as statutes are viewed statutes] [the
Whether
money,
or as statutes
sums
right
particular
petitioners’
cases,
abrogating causes of action in pending
or as both
(which probably
description),
most accurate
the retro-
spective portions of both statutes clearly deprived petition-
ers of
rights.
vested
Consequently,
portions
those
are
invalid under Article 24
Maryland
Declaration of
III,
Rights
§
and Article
of the Maryland Constitution.
Dua,
Id. at
Here,
the trier of fact has determined that
the plaintiff
injuries
suffered
and deserved compensation in amount that
was many multiples of the amount allowed under the statutory
damages cap. Application of a damages cap deprives person
a
compensation,
of
just as abrogating a cause of action does.
reason,
For this
most courts that have considered the issue
disallowed
application
retroactive
statutory
of a
damages cap.
Orleans,
(La.1991)
See Socorro v. New
N.W.2d 89-92 impermissibly before enactment would plaintiffs injured to cap Indeed, of Tennes Supreme that Court impair right);26 favorably see, already has cited position, adopting Bell, Estate Appeal’s opinion. Special the Court (“The Appeals Court of Maryland Special at 832 n. 16 S.W.3d applying pro constitutional reached the same conclusion [has] laws.”).27 retrospective expressly proscribing visions sure, cap does not vitiate a applying damage To be Moreover, “particu- there was no remedy altogether. person’s had when statute right was lar” sum yet jury. it not been determined We are changed; had Long- disqualify distinctions persuaded, though, these recover from the constitutional damages tin’s accrued right As application of laws. one against retroactive protections Florida court concluded: Twentier, 76 damage See Commonwealth v. Pa. statute’s limitations. (1983) (affirming that Gibson also Cmwlth. damage provision). application prohibits limitation retroactive issues, effects, regarding jurisdictional practical One of Gibson’s statute, Rank, Balshy superseded by as 507 Pa. described in later *32 (1985). however, 415, retroactivity analysis, 419 Gibson’s See, Assocs., 55, v. Pa. e.g., Konidaris Law 598 953 survives. Portnoff 1231, (2008) (citing approvingly a to Gibson in vested
A.2d 1241-42 rights analysis). application damages rejected cap of a 26. Other courts have retroactive retroactivity specifically legislature’s of the failure to include in because distinguishable Although the statute. these statutes are from instant one, helpful they in these is insofar as demonstrate the discussion cases damage any application judicial retroactive of a a wariness towards See, Store, Inc., e.g., So.2d cap. Brewton v. White’s Auto 362 226 1978) (Ala. damages against retroactivity (applying presumption to a favor, stating judicial cap, such statutes are "excluded from construction"); judicial Daley, subjected of State v. 165 to this strictness 845, 513, (1975) (observing legislative Ind.App. 332 N.E.2d 848-49 dicta, allowing retroactivity, stating, retroactive as to in silence Daley portion application deprive existing, of an "would substantial right[.]"). vested County, Angeles Superior Angeles Ct. County 27. But see Los v. Los 796, 868, (1965) (allowing Cal.Rptr. 871-72 62 Cal.2d 44 402 P.2d liability). municipal application of a law which limited retroactive 489 see why We no reason a different result should obtain [with regard to damage caps] because merely the retroactive law limits the amount of recovery and does not completely abolish the cause of action. A right any vested is not less impaired eyes merely law the impair- because ment partial. is Kolb, (Fla.1989).28
Kaisner v. 543 So.2d 739 Nor can we discern any logical rationale why, under our constitution, we should permit retroactive application of a statute requiring a reduction damages recovered plaintiff successful deny when we retroactive abolishment of the cause of action. Our precedent constitutional recognizes person’s that a rights shall not be “impaired” by later-enacted Kim, legislation. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. (2003) (“As clear,
A.2d Dua makes the standard for determining whether retroactive legislation violates Art. 24 of Maryland Ill, § Declaration of Rights or Art. 40 of the Maryland abrogates signifi- Constitution is whether it cantly impairs ”) added). Vested rights.’ (emphasis It patent that the loss enormous from application of the statutory cap would “impair” his cause of action. Accord- ingly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Longtin regarding 28. Florida’s retroactivity permissive rule is more than most legislature states in that it allows retroactively abrogate causes of which, accrued, although action upon. have not Weingrad been acted Miles, (right So.3d 412-16 bring cause of action in expectation.”) the future is a "mere (citing Corp., Clausell v. Hobart (Fla.1987)). So.2d Weingrad’s important exceptions: rule has two plaintiff right first is that a statutory has a vested causes of action law, that are not may based on the common retroactively which not be 415-16; abrogated. Kolb, Id. at see also Kaisner v. 543 So.2d (Fla.1989) (waiver sovereign immunity statutory and thus could retroactively impaired). not be exception The second is when the claim already included, has Weingrad been filed. Id. The implicitly decision category, in this plaintiff second cases in which the had filed his notice (“because Appellees of claim. See id. did not file their notice of intent *33 litigation, complaint, to initiate file their judgment prior or obtain a statute, they the enactment expectation' had at most a 'mere or a prospect they added). might damages[.]") (emphasis recover Longtin, revision, who had filed his statutory notice the time of the protected, would therefore be even under Florida's rule. action—with no right bringing his cause of had a vested to the enactment of the statutory cap damages—prior legislature may, its wis- Although revisions. LGTCA see, e.g., Murphy v. dom, prospectively, limit tort damages Edmonds (upholding Md. A.2d statuto- damages prospec- applied on noneconomic tort which ry cap against application retroactive protects the constitution tively), limits, therefore, do limitations. The LGTCA’s of these jury in this case. to the award apply Longtin’s or Practice” III. “Pattern Claim Maryland
The third issue was whether law certiorari govern claim local “pattern against or a recognizes practice” and, so, Longtin if whether policies ment for unconstitutional claim. enough support evidence to such a produced complaint—titled count “Pattern or eighth Longtin’s The of Conduct,” then-police was directed at the Improper Practice alleged It Investigations and the Criminal Division. chief policy “maintained a unconstitutional and parties these and that his arrest and interrogation” unlawful detention and isolated, accidental, peculiar single were not “a detention alia: inter alleged, event[.]” detention, counsel, denial wrongful right ... rights other as the coercion of confessions and as well has an frequently accepted occurs so that it become manner This of Prince by the result Department.] [Police George’s County’s procedures, failure to establish effective rules, orders, that such guidelines, practices and to ensure allegations do not and to ensure that of such violations occur investigated be and thoroughly appropriately violations will result of when found to have occurred. As a punished failure, pattern practice and regular there has been a pattern This complained conduct similar to that of here. has manifested in incidents practice prior been other officers, of the Prince involving employees George’s County Department. Police *34 sought thus to hold the Department directly Police
responsible for those actions. trial,
At Longtin attempted to establish “pattern this and practice” by introducing variety Longtin’s of evidence. counsel elicited testimony from officers their regarding questionable investigation techniques, including makeup of room, interrogation the guidelines allowing suspects for eat, sleep and violations of the rule under which an arrestee must be taken to a Commissioner within 24 hours. Longtin’s counsel elicited testimony from officers about “other interrogation marathon they participated sessions” had in, including the interrogation controversial of a developmen- tally disabled minor in 1998 who was incarcerated for ten charges months before were dropped. Longtin also intro- manual, duced a Community Police Policy Institute a CID Manual, and training documents, other and policy materials which contained constitutionally suspect directives. Longtin argued that the policies were motivated a desire to lower the Department’s “closing rate”:
In these Officers only percent solved 49 of homi- cides. 1999 when this and similar cases occurred where they were keeping people up night, they all were up to 70 percent. There was articles the paper significant pressure from the Chief for these Officers to increase their rate, closure and it led to the problem we have today. here trial, At the close of jury entered a verdict favor of Longtin on the “pattern or practice” claim.
On appeal, the argued Defendants that allowing this claim to go to the jury legal error. The Defendants argued that not, Article of the Maryland Constitution does and should not, support a “pattern practice” or type-claim. The Defen- argue dants pattern claim, that a or practice or “Monell” claim, law, is a creature federal and is unnecessary Maryland context, or inconsistent with Supreme prece- Court dent. The Court of Special rejected claim, Appeals that, stating “given the almost uniquely expansive reach Maryland’s constitutional tort remedy, where no official or think it immunity possible highly ... we governmental
local any from exemption liability 24 contains unlikely that Article Longtin, practice.” or pattern an unconstitutional 130-31, A.2d at 40. Md.App. claim in “pattern practice” of a origin
Monell is Servs., 436 U.S. Dep’t law. See Monell Soc. federal (1978). 2018, 56 concerned a L.Ed.2d Monell 98 S.Ct. *35 Act, 1983, § Rights by 42 U.S.C. claim under the federal Civil that employees claiming of female federal federal a class to unpaid women take leaves of required pregnant agencies their claim had been dis- during pregnancy. The absence under Court’s by Supreme the Second Circuit missed Pape, Monroe v. 365 U.S. 81 S.Ct. 5 holding of (1961), that municipal corporations which held L.Ed.2d § and could be not under U.S.C.A. not “people” were sued, theory directly superior. under a of respondeat either or Monroe, and called to re-examine The Monell Court was a could be liable for constitutional municipality extent to which violations. analysis legislative history,
After a detailed
Court
that a
did not
holding
municipality
qualify
Monroe’s
overruled
under
1983:
“person”
as a
Section
bodies, therefore,
sued directly
Local
can be
governing
monetary, declaratory,
injunctive
§ 1983 for
or
relief
under
here,
where,
that is alleged
as
the action
to be unconstitu-
statement, ordinance,
executes a
implements
policy
tional
or
officially adopted
by
regulation,
promulgated
decision
and
deprivations
constitutional
visit-
body’s
for]
that
officers [or
governmental
though
“custom” even
such a
pursuant
ed
approval through
not
formal
the body’s
custom has
received
channels.
decisionmaking
official
Court,
690-91,
however,
at 2035-36. The
Id. at
S.Ct.
from respondeat
were still free
municipalities
confirmed
§
“a
liability
concluding:
municipality
under
superior
it
a
solely
employs
held liable
because
tortfeasor[.]”
cannot be
in
The Monell
(emphasis
original).
Id. at
In
Maryland’s constitution
more of
requires
its
municipalities,
accordingly
this Court has declined to
shield
from the
municipalities
unconstitutional acts
its offi-
Davis,
(1999).
cials. See DiPino v.
One set of
themselves
easy
applies
*36
§
1983 claims ... Those rules have been established by
the United
Supreme
States
Court as a matter of Federal
A
law.
second set of rules applies to the State Constitution-
al claims. Notwithstanding that
the Federal and State
rights are essentially parallel, the
relating
rules
to redress
rights
violation of those
are very different. We have
consistently declined to adopt
approach.
the Federal
Rit-
344,
chie v. Donnelly,
(1991);
324 Md.
Id. at
DiPino then Monell; considered an issue similar to that whether a municipality should be held through liable respon- superior deat for the acts of its and employees, concluded:
Although we consistently have applied respondeat superi- or liability governmental to local entities for Constitutional
494 officials, have never actual their we by
violations committed
The Court of
in that context.
doctrine
articulated the
ly
City
a footnote
Clea v.
has looked to
Special Appeals
[1303,]
3,
662,
541 A.2d
Baltimore,
667-68 n.
312 Md.
supra,
of the
acceptance
our
indicating
as
n. 3 [
][29]
401,
Petetit, 113 Md.App.
Deposit
Port
See
doctrine.
27,
denied,
694 A.2d
422-23,
cert.
330,
(1996 [1997]);
McGeeney,
Md.App.
Branch v.
(1998).
in the
dispel any doubt
shall now
A.2d 631
We
law,
clear,
as a matter of common
make
matter and
do, indeed,
respondeat
have
entities
governmental
local
from State
damages resulting
civil
liability for
superior
and
by
agents
their
committed
violations
Constitutional
employment.
scope
within the
employees
51-52,
As the Court of
DiPino,
Id. at
(1996)).
1142-43
674 N.E.2d
652 N.Y.S.2d
caution that
on this issue
arguments
The Defendants’
burdens on
imposes
claim
“pattern
practice”
allowing
follows:
in Clea read as
29. The footnote
applied, how
has not been
governmental-proprietary
distinction
*37
The
ever,
governments
for violations of consti
have been sued
when local
situation,
govern
ordinarily no local
rights.
there is
In that
tutional
See,
Salisbury,
City
e.g.,
Bk. v.
immunity.
Hebron Sav.
mental
(1970);
City, 248 Md.
v. Baltimore
The Defendants also
that a
claim
“deprive
legal
would
the courts of its role to determine the
of the threshold
question
qualified immunity.]”
issues [of
Defendants argue
provide
that such a claim would not
same
in
procedural protections
municipalities
for
a state con-
in
they
stitutional claim “as
would for this same fact scenario
§ 1983 cause of
argument
upon
This
is based
action[.]”
tort
faulty assumption
Maryland constitutional
law tracks
procedure
and standards
Rights
federal Civil
Act.
consistently
adopt
approach
“We have
declined to
the Federal
DiPino,
§in
[used
[T]his Court common suits, qualified immunity public law tort officials acts, performing discretionary application has no tort upon alleged actions based violations of state constitutional rights upon or tort actions based most so-called “intentional Maryland public immunity torts.” The official doctrine is generally only negligence limited and is quite applicable *38 allegedly negligent actions or defamation actions based on conduct. Cline, 297,
Lee v. 384 Md. 863 A.2d See also (emphasis supplied). Harper, Okwa (2000) (“A public alleged state official Maryland or article any have violated Article qualified immunity.”). Declaration of is not entitled to Rights, DiPino, clearly As stated in consti Maryland’s we tutional more from officials and protections require public § municipalities procedures than and the rules and applying divergent them are from the federal rules. Like find our rife Special Appeals, jurisprudence Court of we Article 24 to individuals provides protection evidence that “pattern practices” unconstitutional or against municipali ties. argue “pattern
The Defendants further that even if a exists, practice” Longtin provide or claim failed to sufficient jury’s finding: support evidence ... court allowed objection, over [the Defendants’] trial [Longtin] to introduce evidence of an interview and interro- criminal gation by completely unrelated [the officers] liability or pattern practice against defendant to show [ ] County. jury The trial court also instructed the not to any pattern consider this evidence for other reason than the ... jury or claim Because the was instructed not to practice consider whether the individual caused [Defendants] [Longtin’s] right constitutional based on evi- deprivation interrogation completely dence of an interview and of a ... pattern prac- unrelated criminal defendant to show liability could liability against County, Monell-type tice County. not attach to the prima
The Defendants conclude that proving “[w]ithout caused the individ- deprivation case of a constitutional facie [Defendants,] [Longtin] prove County ual failed to moving deprivation.” itself was the force behind the argument unconvincing, The Defendants’ and almost inco- clearly introduced of unconstitu- herent. evidence He called as witnesses against him. actions committed tional testimony regarding elicited officers and interrogating his interrogating him. arresting took in illegal they actions tests, DNA exculpatory He introduced evidence about little, if after learn- anything, did that the officers established support sufficient to he excluded. This evidence was ing was case. deprivation his a verdict of constitutional *39 Longtin then appellate explained, our intermediate court As was not experience multitudinous evidence that his introduced an isolated incident: Detective Herndon
LLongtin] through set forth evidence investigation that he sleep deprivation that was a “tool” evidence was an had been trained to use. Admitted into of the Prince interrogation training manual interview Community Police Institute that told offi- George’s County rights cers read a his “or wait until after they suspect could The that the should interrogator he admits.” manual stated the wall “and let handcuffing angry suspect consider an to “wait out” a sit a while.” Officers were advised [him] it If a passive suspect people keep up.” because “few can starting are to believe suspect convincing you “is so that go you him ... back unless [and] [d]on’t room [l]eave re-fortify your guilty.” conviction that he is Detective departmental policy testified that it was Kerry Jerningan necessarily suspect that did not have to take the police if a district court commissioner within hours before information, and suspect continuously providing con- 4- training firmed that a manual described Md. Rule police 212(f)(1) rule, law” that Maryland procedural as “[a] could be waived. lengthy interrogations
He introduced evidence of other (of hours); another individuals 60 hours and 72 dubious incarceration; an official police confession and erroneous training urging constitutionally questionable manual actions respect interrogations, to the conduct of Miranda counsel, and the which the individual warnings, right book”; appeared “by expert officers to have followed testimony regarding commonly-accepted police violations of serial violations of constitu- practices, multiple evidence officers; blurring and a rights by tional number pre-determined line innocence and presumptive between guilt. 132-133, 113-14, at 29-
Longtin, Md.App. jury’s court limited the consideration of properly 30. The trial claim, pattern practice batch of evidence to the or second that Longtin’s rights and not as evidence were violated. this evidence jury concluding was not unreasonable police or of unconstitutional pattern practice demonstrated Accordingly, any conduct. Defendants have failed to show legal or error in the evidence insufficiency supporting pattern practice claim.- Exculpatory Admission of Evidence
IY. argument The final raised the Defendants is (1) court erred in evidence of introducing Longtin’s the trial results, subsequent DNA conviction of exculpatory *40 the of the crime. The perpetrator Special Appeals Court claims, rejected reasoning they these that were not preserved for appeal: court,
In the circuit filed a motion in limine to appellants prohibit introduction of the DNA evidence because it was indepen- not available when the district court commissioner that dently probable determined cause existed to arrest and Longtin. hold This motion was denied. When the evidence in testimony, appellants was later disclosed made no further the in limine objection. Under these circumstances motion preserve appellants’ objection. Corp. will not Pulte Home Parex, Inc.], [681,] 971, 1017, Md.App. 763 A.2d [v. [923 (2007)].
It the attack appear appellants’ would that on the intro- Oesby’s duction of evidence of arrest and conviction for reasons, murder not for the preserved Zinetti’s was same [above]. discussed Alterna
Longtin, 134-35, at 41-42. Md.App. evidentiary rejected these Appeals Special tively, the Court the merits.30 claims on issues that these argument make no
Here,
Defendants
Instead,
that
they state
review.
for appellate
preserved
were
merit. The
without
simply
“is
argument
preservation
opinion.”
an
rendered
and
CSA
preserved
issues were
Appeal’s
Special
the Court of
reliance on
The Defendants’
appellate
the intermediate
given
mystifying,
opinion
not
instance,
the issues were
held,
in the first
court
rejec-
alternative
Appeals’
of Special
The Court
preserved.
preserva-
Defendants’
remedy
the merits does
tion on
issue,
on the
reasoning
the Court’s sound
tion
Given
problem.
evidence,
Appeals
Special
Court of
regard to
DNA
30. With
stated:
Longtin
that the
preserved,
contends
issue had been
Even if the
probable cause was
to show that
evidence was admissible
DNA
destroyed....
view,
have
bases that would
is one of a number of
In our
was
results. The DNA evidence
justified
admission of the DNA
evi
to disclose this
exculpatory.
of Detective Herndon
The failure
Maryland
delay
providing
January
of 2000 and his
dence in
clearly
Oesby’s
relevant to
Laboratory
DNA was
Crime
Police
Williams,
392 Md.
Longtin’s
claim. State v.
constitutional
(2006) (stating
process requires the State to
that due
A.2d 973
evidence).
exculpatory
Finally, we do not believe that the
disclose
determi
district court commissioner's
appellants’ contention that the
when
has
probable cause remains unassailable
nation of
misleading
proven
charging
alleged
that the
document
supra pp. 111-
testimony
was false. See
before the commissioner
DiPino,
Md.App.
pp.
See Davis v.
CONCLUSION provisions Neither the notice nor the of the damages cap limit, Local Government Tort Claims Act to eliminate apply or in this case. The respectively, jury 180-day award notice run period begin Longtin did not until was released from notice, thereafter, and filed prison, days therefore his Moreover, timely. retroactive application damages cap, action, enacted in cause Longtin’s fully which was accrued the end of Maryland would violate the Declaration of Rights. Finally, Maryland Constitution or claim recognizes “pattern practice” part as of its protec- against tions of citizens unconstitutional gov- actions of local ernment and its employees. THE
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AND THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. TO BE PAID BY COSTS PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY. BARBERA, JJ.,
HARRELL and Concur and Dissent. HARRELL, J., concurring dissenting, which BARBERA, J., joins.
After being charged criminally, incorrectly, but as it turned out, wife, for the murder Longtin (“Longtin”) of his Keith asserted thirteen different civil against causes of action1 George’s County Prince and certain of its police officers. The jury in the Circuit for Prince George’s County Court (1) following complaint: 1. advanced the counts in his civil (2) Maryland Rights, of Article violation 21 of the Declaration of (3) Maryland Rights, violation of Article 24 of the Declaration of false arrest; (4) (5) (6) imprisonment, prosecution, false malicious intentional distress, (7) (8) privacy/false light, infliction of invasion emotional conduct, (9) pattern practice improper misrepresenta- intentional tion, (10) detention, (11) (12) negligent conspiracy, request civil declaratory judgment, negligence. *42 than of more $5 returned verdict the evidence considered asked, questions pre- among we are appeal, On million. accrued, triggering of action the causes sented, to decide when Tort of the Local Government requirement notice 180-day (“LGTCA”). determine are asked also to We Act Claims verdict, to the applies in the LGTCA damages cap whether the accordingly. award jury to reduce the so as that each claim concluding neatly opinion, Majority The detention, from Longtin’s date of release on the accrued notice ques- of the LGTCA analysis employs a one-size-fits-all constitutional to address an unavoidable It also declines tion. damages cap application of associated with challenge tort violation. verdict, constitutional included State which Majority opinion conclusion of the I with the Although agree frustrated the circum- should not be Longtin’s that claims his regarding of notice surrounding Longtin’s giving stances Majority explains—all claims, opinion it is not because—as different, fundamentally causes distinct, some of his (the date, date of his 13 June on the same action accrued center), he gave after which detention County release from the Moreover, I with the although agree days. notice within Majority that opinion principle articulated isolated impair- from Legislature prevents Maryland Constitution unliqui- I that the right, disagree a vested retrospectively ing damages claims associated dated, and unknown unspecified, (whenever of their accrual at the time Longtin’s claims occurred) or vested protected a substantive represented that of this case. under the circumstances right in Part 1 of the only result reached Thus, concur with the I: 2; and, with the as to Part concur dissent Majority opinion; of Parts 3 and 4. reasoning and results Requirement.2 I. The Notice liter- Longtin satisfied concludes Majority opinion attaining In of the LGTCA. ally requirement the notice Special pause note that neither the Court proceeding, I 2. Before Longtin's Majority opinion address Appeals in this Court nor the result, that, it determines while asserted many differ- action, ent causes of trigger commencement of the notice as to all of them period began at the running same essence, time—his release from detention. the Majority opinion analysis crafts a one-size-fits-all holding for not just the false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action *43 discussed in the bulk the opinion, but also the largely neglected other A causes of action. closer and compre- more hensive examination suggests to me a different analysis sup- plies the better course of reasoning, albeit the same outcome. Applicable
A. Law. The relevant of the provision § LGTCA is codified at 5-304 “[ajctions Article, Courts and Judicial Proceedings titled for unliquidated damages.” Maryland (1974, Code 2006 Repl. Vol.), Article, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § In 5-304. pertinent part, provides it that “an unliquidated action for damages may not be brought against government a local or its employees unless the notice of the claim required this given section is within 180 days § the injury.” 5- after 304(b)(1) added). (emphasis Strader, In Heron v. 361 Md. 258, 263-64, (2000), 761 A.2d we interpreted phrase 5-304(b)(l) § injury” “after the synonymous as with “after Therefore, the cause of action accrued.” post-Heron, a court determines whether notice timely by first identifying the accrual date or event.
The Majority opinion approaches
analysis
in Longtin’s
largely by
case
analogizing
LGTCA notice requirement
to
argument
County’s
"effectively
notice contentions
are
County protested
reviewable.”
observes that the
in the Circuit
provide timely
only
Court
summary
his failure to
notice
in a motion for
judgment, which the trial
Metropolitan Mortgage
court denied.
Fund,
Basiliko,
(1980),
Inc. v.
3.
ordinarily
not be used as
quite different and
one should
ments—are
Montgom
our
of the other. Rios
persuasive evidence in
*44
construction
104, 139,
1,
("The
(2005)
County,
A.2d
21
notice
ery
Md.
872
386
action;
right
precedent
of
is a
to the
of
provision
the LGTCA
condition
two, i.e., notice
create
The focus of the
limitations statutes
defenses.
different.”);
limitations,
very
also White v. Prince
á vis
is
see
vis
144,
1129,
129,
(2005)
George’s County,
Md.App.
877 A.2d
1137
163
denied,
401,
(2005) ("The
require
A.2d 825
notice
cert.
389 Md.
885
applies gener
period
operates independent
limitations
that
ment
of the
filing
Serving timely
preserve
to
a
ally to the
of suit.
notice is essential
during
any
period.
right to file suit at
time
the limitations
claimant's
limitations, nothing
expressly
tolling
to
of
in
LGTCA
contrast
the
the
States,
tolling
period.”);
v. United
244
provides for
the notice
Simon
703,
(5th Cir.1957) (declining
"exception[]
to extend an
to
F.2d
704-05
operation
notice of claims
of a statute of limitations” to the
("FTCA”)
provision
"[a]
in
Act
because
statute
the Federal Tort Claims
are an
should be differentiated from conditions which
of limitations
by
right
a
action
statute. A statute which in itself
nexed to
of
created
gives
liability,
action to
it unknown to the
creates a new
an
enforce
law,
may be
fixes the
within which that action
common
and
time
commenced,
provision
Such a
will
is not a statute of limitations....
control,
(internal
brought”)
is
no matter in what form the action
omitted);
quotation marks and citation
3-14
Longstreth,
Jayson
&
(2007) (observing
§
"the
Handling
14.01
Federal
Tort Claims
Kubrick,
Supreme
adopted
United
444 U.S.
[Simon
Court
in
States
("The
111,
352,
(1979)]”);
id.
100 S.Ct.
Thus, legally we should ask “when the operative facts permitting filing his claims [or came into exis her] Heron, 59; see Hecht 264, tence.” Md. at at also 361 761 A.2d v. Resolution 324, 334, Corp., Trust 394, 635 399 A.2d (1994) (“This adopted [has] Court what is known as discovery rule, actions, applies which now in all generally civil provides and which that a cause of action a accrues when plaintiff fact knows or should reasonably know of the Builders, Design Inc., Lumsden v. Tech wrong.”); Md. 358 (“[W]e now hold discovery rule to applicable generally be all actions and cause of action accrues when the claimant fact knew reasonably should have known of the wrong.”).4 each Because immunity, United States’ jurisdictional pre- waiver and therefore limitations, requisite recovery to rather than a true statute been has by courts.”); universally applied almost Casey, Felder v. 487 U.S. 131, 140, 2302, 2308, (1988) (distin- 108 S.Ct. 101 L.Ed.2d guishing sharply between statutes of limitations the notice-of-claim provisions grounds on the are "universally the former familiar aspects litigation indispensable any justice,” considered to scheme of universally whereas the latter neither any "are familiar nor in sense indispensable prerequisites litigation,” though they may "significant-
ly
actions”) (internal
bring
ability
inhibit the
quotation
federal
marks
omitted).
and citation
Majority opinion
4. The
grounds
assails this
on the
conclusion
that the
provides
exception
common law
an
imprisonment
for false arrest and
general
legal
claims to the
rule that "a
accrues
claim
when the
476, ,
Majority op.
elements materialize.”
A.3d at 875
n. 18.
Kato,
Majority opinion
388-89,
looks Wallace v.
U.S.
(2007),
S.Ct.
166 L.Ed.2d
the contention that:
is, however,
considered,
There
arising
refinement to be
from
common law’s distinctive treatment of the torts of
false arrest
imprisonment----The
running
false
of the statute of
limitations
rule—dictated,
imprisonment
subject
false
to a
perhaps,
distinctive
reality
may
that the victim
not be able to sue while he is still
imprisoned:
begin
against
"Limitations
to run
an action for false
*45
imprisonment
alleged
imprisonment
the
when
false
H.
ends.” 2
Wood,
187d(4),
(rev.
ed.1916);
§
p
Limitation of Actions
4th
see
899,
(Second)
(1977);
also 4
Underhill,
§
Restatement
of Torts
Comment c
A.
Thus,
(1881).
Principles of Law of Torts 202
to determine
case,
beginning
the
period
of
limitations
the
in this
we
deter-
must
petitioner’s
imprisonment
mine when
false
came to an end.
My reading
language
of this
leads
Supreme
me to conclude that the
provides
exception,
Court did not hold
the
that
common law
an
the
for
(usually), we should
elements
possesses
of action
distinct
cause
surprisingly,
Not
separately.
cause of action
examine each
may
unique
a
accrual
claim
have
approach,
under such an
each
(“[T]o
Heron,
the
at
The devotes false the torts of false arrest and (understandably perhaps) to lynchpins guiding to be These torts seem the imprisonment. Longtin’s of other the accrual dates the Court’s treatment (“Our 480, A.3d at resolution of op. at Majority claims. imprisonment false and resolves the notice issue for arrest claims.”). I will of focus Longtin’s issue for most notice proper analysis applying likewise on these torts because I reasoning Majority opinion. of reproves alone them majority that of this Court opinion nonetheless submit more examination for each comprehensive conduct a should action, than shortcuts.5 employ cause of rather imprisonment, general and to the rule that "a claim torts of false arrest Rather, legal it accrues elements materialize.” held that when the general provides exception that “[l ]imita- an to the rule common law begin against legal an action” when the elements material- tions to run point, Supreme making After cited three sources— ize. Court Actions, 187d(4) § c of Limitations of comment of Restatement Torts, (Second) Principles page of of 202 of of Law Torts—all limitation, provisions. which notice concern statutes every Majority opinion “[n]ot contour of limita- concedes jurisprudence applicable require- LGTCA[] to the notice tions ment!],” op. policies Majority at A.3d at 874 and that the n. provisions perfectly and notice “are not behind statutes limitation op. convergent,” merely Majority A.3d I similar. at 874. legal agree, supra. concepts as mentioned in footnote These two relevant, long Maryland relating interpretive thereto line of caselaw collapsed By holding respected, be rather one. should than into some, jurisprudence” apply but to the "contour[s] not all of limitations opinion provision, Majority future LGTCA notice invites host of so, understand, reasonably litigation parties trying just where from consequences. that line is have drawn. Shortcuts analysis (explained purposes only, I 5. For of ratification extend the pleaded Longtin, infra) one other cause of action invasion *46 506 the false
Unusually, imprison “elements of arrest and false identical”; thus, they ment are may be considered together. Heron, 264, at A.2d at 361 Md. 761 59. The elements are: (1) (2) another[,] liberty “[ of the of deprivation ] [ without ] ” (3) Heron, legal justification. without consentí,] and [ ] 361 added). 264, Md. at 761 (emphasis A.2d at 59 “Whatever may technical distinction there be between an ‘arrest’ and a legal detentionf,]’ justification existed the test whether in a particular by has been judged applicable case principles Paul, & Great Atl. Pac. Tea the law of arrest.” Co. 256 Md. 643, 655, 731, (1970) added) 261 A.2d (emphasis (reviewing 738 the distinction between the of false imprison torts arrest and ment). legal
A police justification “to make possesses officer a probable warrantless arrest where he has cause to believe that a felony committed, has and that been the arrestee perpetrat- Brown, ed the offense.” Ashton v. 70, 120, 339 Md. 660 A.2d (citations 447, (1995) omitted); Montgomery see also Wilson, Ward v. 701, 721, (1995) 916, Md. A.2d privacy. light prove privacy, plaintiff To false invasion of a must show intrude[d], otherwise, "intentionally physically the defendant or upon private the ... seclusion another his affairs or ... concerns way highly person.” [in that] would be offensive to a reasonable Exch., 1375, Bailer Ins. v. Erie 344 Md. 687 A.2d 1380-81 (1997) (internal omitted). quotation marks citation In the case sub judice, alleged police placed by light that the in a him false statements, making representations, "public public false via documents ” public press releases .... Longtin's regard, Majority opinion crux of claim this as the acknowledges, probable Majority op. the statement of See cause. ("Longtin’s light at 878 19 A.3d false arises claim from the Cause.”). such, assertions contained in the Statement of Probable As publication date be claim's accrual should the date of (1) continuing statement—7 October 1999. Even if we held that applies requirements, opposed harm rule in the context notice as legal origin—and press statutes of limitation—its field releas- es, cause, probable "continuing issued after statement of constituted harm,” publication, date accrual should be latter’s not the date Pishvaian, Longtin's custody. release from See MacBride v. 402 Md. (2007) ("Under continuing th[e harm] theory, continuing that are violations nature are not barred merely statute of limitations because one or of them more occurred time.”) (citation omitted). earlier in not liable ... ... an arrest (“[A] out carrying officer police if the that arrest connection imprisonment for false circum under the to arrest [justification] legal had ... officer however, arrest,” omitted). stances.”) (citation act of “[T]he Dett, State v. momentary event.” ordinarily “is *47 (2006). result: 1113, 1121 As a A.2d dissipate ... can for the arrest justification legal “[T]he posses- come into authority may detaining over time. or not time of arrest information, at the not known sion ... detention, may in which the point at some earlier known The stan- disappear. ... justification legal the cause same, remain the legal justification to determine dards used detention, application their but, continuing course of a the factual changes the whenever to be reexamined needs known.” become application of their underpinning added).6 (emphasis See id. arrested case, arguably moment police at the Longtin’s p.m. room at 1:30
him, viz., interrogation him an into placed i.e., cause, legal justifica 1999,7they probable had 5 October identity—a was Although motorist Dett involved a case of mistaken 6. open pertaining to another an warrant stopped and arrested under legal justification regarding possibility individual—its conclusions applicable broadly. arresVimprisonment are waning tort actions in false (2006). Dett, A.2d 1113 391 Md. State v. See claim, did, Longtin not “arrested” may police that was One as the 7. police Longtin station and interrogation. came to until after the Indeed, during argument voluntarily, went. gave a or so the statement Longtin, against a trial stages prosecution early of the criminal Long- arguments that judge—considering and offered—found the facts therefore, interrogation; during voluntarily tin acted before was admissi- him and his statement police did not need to “Mirandize” my analysis—although the impact the substance of ble. This does not time, dissipated over time. probable one it police possessed cause at hand, argue Longtin “arrested” at may was other one On the driving Longtin to the p.m., police cruiser commenced 12:40 when a incident, that, argues during he department. Longtin the entire police however, trial, conflicting acting against At the civil his will. was accompanied police Longtin as to whether evidence was adduced Testimony suggested at some involuntarily voluntarily. officer belt, wallet, Longtin’s shoe- during interrogation, police point took Thus, laces, custody. p.m. 1:30 seems to phone—indicators and cell tion, murder, to do so. On the day of the 4 October police discovered the victim her pants with and underwear at her feet and multiple with stab wounds. day On the interrogation, “marathon” learned, October the police Longtin (1) placed room, the interrogation that: before police called the to report estranged his missing, wife (2) (3) victim, asked, he knew where to locate the he at the scene, wife, (4) crime if the victim was his he allegedly knife,” carried well,” a “buck “used very and had [it] been “very abusive” to his past Herndon, two ex-wives. Detective Primary Investigator, Notes from Telephone Conversation Office, County Charles Sheriffs p.m.; 12:45 see also State, Mobley
(“[W]hether probable cause is shown to may exist be meas ured in terms of the collective information demonstrated the record to be possession within the police the entire team.”) (citations omitted).8 time, however,
Over probable cause/legal justification *48 dissipated, which at some point the continuum Longtin’s cause of action Specifically, accrued. in February Long- tin was excluded as a possible donor of DNA taken from the victim, wit, vaginal a swab. Taken together the fact that the police knew the victim was raped9 and then mur- settling point
be a better perhaps p.m., as to the time of arrest or 2:30 when (perhaps Longtin) Longtin’s records reflect someone last used cell phone. scene, Longtin may If was "arrested” say simply at the crime we then, arrest/imprisonment his false police causes of action accrued as probable did not moment—according have cause at that to Detective notes, telephone Herndon’s County the call with the Charles Sheriff's Office p.m., did not occur until Longtin 12:45 5 minutes after initially. detained During interrogation, 8. the questioning Longtin, but extrinsic to the that, murder, day Detective Herndon learned on the before the heated, engaged argument. public the victim in a He learned also that allegedly Longtin gym. once choked a female at the local During proceedings, 9. foregone the civil it was taken as a conclusion police raped. that the knew the victim had been She was discovered murder, pants with her and underwear at her feet. After the the neighbor detectives became aware that reported another had an at- justifica cause/legal dered, longer probable no had police Thus, arrest/imprisonment the false Longtin.10 to detain tion February 200011—when actually of action accrued causes the torts.12 each element of to support facts existed description that did vicinity provided a rape tempted in the same statement of application for the Longtin's appearance. The match killer, Oesby, the victim stated that charges against Antonio the actual assaulted,” sexually and the statement ... “appeared to have been Moreover, the DNA degree rape. to retrieve charges first included victim, rape presumably a kit. police employed from Longtin's specimen DNA on 5 October police a 10. The took against DNA interrogation. police lab tested the day The period February unreasonable This was not an vaginal swab in 2000. however, good might delay, provide additional of time. Unreasonable require- to the LGTCA notice a waiver of strict adherence cause for ment. per- suggests analysis "would create Majority opinion that this 11. The " State,” for, dissipa- under the 'date of policy incentives for the verse keeping prisoner it has rewarded for tion’ rule ... the State is after op. at legal justification doing Majority at so.” lost its for imprisonment past that the false 875 n. 19. “If the State continues period, prisoner's notice and it point, the clock continues to run on the likely timely prisoner file notice.” Id. is less that the will likely, Majority opinion focusing is most Instead of on that which likely. preoccupied by least The "date of becomes that which is strong dissipation” approach provides State with a and undeniable probable dissipat- prisoner cause has to release a the moment incentive so, doing prevents element in the torts of ed—by the State a critical materializing, namely, imprisonment detention false arrest and from result, legal eliminates the justification.” As a the State "without imprison- being against it false arrest or possibility of an action filed Moreover, incentive, longer State adequate I think. ment—an good beyond dissipation,” the more cause prisoner the "date of holds requirement. compliance with the notice waiver of strict exists for analysis more Majority opinion perceives "causes 12. op. 876 n. 20. It Majority 19 A.3d at problems than it solves.” " *49 dissipation’ ... a fact-intensive identifying ‘date of is avers that issue, the inappropriate for an requiring weighing that of evidence Moreover, ascertaining Majority predicts that appellate the court.” Id. heavily disputed by Id. The any the State....” such date "will be February for the opinion my Majority describes conclusion "[tjroublingly” because I dissipation” present case as "date of in the Longtin, way disputed unfavorable to ... factual issues in "resolved Stamper, (quoting Id. who was victorious at trial.” Hoffman (2005), proposition "[w]e must for the light part(ies) who most favorable to the view that evidence in C. Heron.
In
at
arriving
its determination that all of Longtin’s causes
detention,
of action accrued
on his date
release from
the
Heron.
In Her-
Majority opinion
distinguishes
discusses and
on,
plaintiff
was “arrested and charged with resisting
arrest,
obstructing
police
performance
their
Heron,
duties,
disorderly
and
conduct.”
361 Md. at
and,
A.2d at 57. He was acquitted eventually of all charges
subsequently,
filed a civil suit for
prosecution,
malicious
false
arrest,
See id. We held that Her-
imprisonment.
and false
on’s false
false imprisonment claims accrued upon
arrest.and
Heron,
his arrest. See
In particular, Majority claims that was no need Heron distinguish between the date [in ] of arrest and the release; used, date of whichever was the notice was too late.” Majority fact, op. that, A.3d at 873. it observes Heron, we cited approval multiple “with decisions which relates”). prevailed on the issues to which it "The [concurrence] has disregarded attempted our standard of review and to resolve contested contrary jury’s factual issues in a manner to the verdict.” Id. Majority’s argument highlights frequent division between bright legal bright advocates and critics of line tests. While lines have virtues, application, they their such as ease of deployed should not be convenience; merely Here, they must be consistent with the law. cloth, Majority bright endeavoring creates a line from whole while unpersuasively distinguish contrary controlling caselaw. unpersuaded by Majority's critique procedural I am burden demonstrate, my analytical approach. Our state trial courts on a basis, daily capacity myriad to tackle a of "fact-intensive issue[s]”— Indeed, "heavily disputed by even those that are the State....” include, Maryland Jury Civil Pattern Instructions for use in false arrest cases, imprisonment probable Although an instruction for cause. I engaged probable analysis supra, in a cause as the DNA tests uncontested, left, inquiry associated dates were such an is best in most instances, Regarding to the trial courts. the standard of review—and notwithstanding agrees Longtin the fact that this concurrence should pursue only charge have been able to his claims—I observe that our light "view evidence in a [prevailing] th[e] most favorable to the partly]” compel appellate does not courts to reach otherwise incorrect conclusions of law.
5H or as the date a false arrest identified the date of release 473-74,19 at Majority op. claim accrues.” imprisonment false 241 Angeles, Los (citing County A.3d at 873 Collins v. of 586, (1966); 451, Ragland 588 v. New Cal.Rptr. 50 Cal.App.2d Auth., 937, 201 A.D.2d 613 N.Y.S.2d 939 City York Hous. Rochester, 59, 421 v. 71 A.D.2d (App.Div.1994); Boose York, (1979); v. New 42 A.D.2d 347 N.Y.S.2d 740 Alice foreign In each of the cases (App.Div.1973)). N.Y.S.2d 708 “[tjhere opinion, [similarly] relied was no by Majority distinguish need to between the date of arrest and the date of used, release; Major whichever was the notice was too late.” 473,19 Indeed, all of the involved ity op. at A.3d 873. cases who, Heron, plaintiffs very like were detained for a brief ie., time, period day. Majority’s of one Given the reason for Heron for deeming unenlightening, why one wonders these more to the than Heron eign persuasive Majority cases were seemed to be. (ie., Collins)
Three of
cases
all but
foreign
appear
those
unanalyzed
in Heron.
I find
string citations
more relevant
and persuasive the cases the Heron Court cites and fleshes
Collins;
Columbia,
They
out.
include
Allen v. District
533
A.2d
1263 (D.C.App.1987); Livingston v. Consolidated
N.E.2d
City
Indianapolis,
(Ind.App.1979);
Pisano
City
City,
N.J.Super.
v.
Union
Div.1984);
(N.J.Super.Law
Michaels v. New
Jersey,
(D.N.J.1996);
F.Supp. 315
Deary
Three Un-Named
(3rd Cir.1984).
Police
1263 n. 9 notice within six months “after the required statute which sustained”). Livingston, the Indiana injury damage *51 for Appeals plaintiffs] concluded that claims “[the Court arrest, ac- imprisonment, battery false false assault arrested, ... single] day”—when crued on was [a “[she] N.E.2d custody.” Livingston, and released from charged, omitted). (citation at 1303 Pisano, of New held that a Superior Jersey
In
the
Court
of the
cause of action for false arrest accrued as
“plaintiffs
arrest____” Pisano,
(citing
date of
D. Substantial Compliance or Waiver Good Cause for
under the LGTCA? Because, view, in my Longtin’s arrest/imprisonment false in February causes of action accrued his October 2000 If, however, County untimely. notice to the was complied notice substantially requirement the LGTCA or cause, good permitted demonstrated he should be nonetheless pursue his civil compliance possible claims. Substantial is notice, ordinarily when a but fails to plaintiff timely files abide procedural some other a requirement, e.g., proper service on recipient. See Faulk v. Ewing, (2002) (“[Sjubstantial
1262, 1272-73 compliance is such com- munication that ... provides requisite timely notice of claim.”) (internal facts and circumstances rise to the giving omitted). case, In present marks and citation quotation and, thus, untimely poor fit for substan- notice was Longtin’s compliance. tial cause, § 5-304 notice in the context good for
Waiver
his
prosecuted
“the claimant
where
requirement,
possible
ordinarily
that an
diligence
degree
claim with
[or her]
or
have exercised under
same
person would
prudent
Heron,
A.2d at
361 Md. at
circumstances.”
similar
in
we
survey
jurisdictions,
recognized
on a
of other
63. Based
“fit
justifying good
[normally]
cause
Heron that circumstances
mistake,
or
categories:
neglect
excusable
into several broad
N.J.Super.
e.g.,
City,
... Kleinke v. Ocean
see
physical
serious
or mental
A.2d 785 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1977);
out-of-state;
to retain
inability
location
injury and/or
complex litigation;
ignorance
involving
counsel
cases
Heron,
272-
361 Md. at
statutory
requirement____”
notice
(citations omitted).
plaintiff
A
is not
ble
“incapaci-
for two months” and was
hospital
to a
“confine[d]
” Kleinke, 147
of an embolism....
complication]
tated
plaintiff
oned a substantial while the notice period(s) (were) for his causes of action was running. It was a notice; matter time to it simply finding finding file the to file notice way “incapacitat[ed],” while “confine[d]” bottom, then, like in plaintiff KleinJce. At I would con- diligence clude that acted with the due of a reasonable months, isolated in a person eight detention center for such neglect that his qualify category should under the first Heron for waiver of compliance strict with the LGTCA notice re- quirement. Damages Cap.
II. The A. Rights Analysis Vested Is Inapposite. Maryland prohibits Legislature Constitution from
impairing retrospectively
asks,
vested
One
rights.
necessarily
such an
performing
analysis, what constitutes a protected
right?
infancy,
vested
From its
our vested rights jurispru-
(or
dence focused on a plaintiffs ability
inability)
bring
to
Thus,
cause of action.
years
in Thistle v. The
ago
Co.,
Frostburg
(1856),
Coal
10 Md.
we confronted a
purported retrospective legislative provision which enabled
adverse possessors of real
to
property
challenge paper title
use,
holders on the
then-law,
basis of mere
rather than the
actual enclosure.
the statutory provision
Because
“changed
the elements of
possession”
adverse
to make it easier for
possessors
adverse
to challenge successfully paper title hold-
ers,
Md., Inc.,
we deemed it invalid. Dua v. Comcast Cable of
Thistle);
(citing
Thistle,
(“Hence,
see also
145
we concluded that
holding,
our Thistle
in Dua on
Reflecting
Dua,
accrued cause of action.”
an
right
“there is a vested
Thistle,
recognized
632,
1077. As
we
at
A.2d at
370 Md.
805
abrogating
Legislature
between the
there is a difference
that
action,
Legislature
and the
a cause of
bring
to
right
the
a
upon,
conferred
by,
yet
but not
remedy sought
altering
Nelson,
v.
et al.
Baugher,
In
we relied
particular,
plaintiff.
(1850),
retrospective provision
a
upheld
which
9 Gill
legislative
the exercise of the
no more than
because “[i]t [was]
remediesf,
power which
subject of
authority
a]
over the
in relation
pleasure
exercise
may unquestionably
legislative
also to WSSC
contracts.” We looked
as well as future
past
Co.,
556, 564,
Fire
308 Md.
v. Riverdale
[only]
(1987),
governing
that “a statute
in which we observed
cases,”
applied to
whether
remedy
[all]
or
will be
procedure
” WSSC, 308 Md. at
“accrued,
future....
pending or
they be
addition,
In
we invoked Allen
We
but, in the
right,
remedy and substantive
distinction between
holding
further the ultimate
strengthened
process,
circumstances,
many
the for-
change, under
Legislature may
effect,
particu-
the latter.
In
but not
retrospective
mer with
State,
Jones,
lar,
from
use
Isaac
quoted
we
“
suspen-
‘abrogation
the contention that
an
obligation
enforce the
necessary
remedy,
sion of
” Duet,
A.2d
contract,
370 Md. at
...
is void.’
existing
added).
Allen, 193 Md. at
relied on
(emphasis
at 1079
We
off all
363-64,
by “cut[ting]
underscore that
B. Dua. Majority opinion heavily
The
relies
on Dua to bolster its
conclusion that
Maryland
protects against
the
Constitution
the
legislative
of
impairment
recovery
any
the
amount of dam
ages associated with causes of action.
upon
See id.
It seizes
description
the Dua Court’s
of the statute there
one
as
the
abrogates
plaintiffs’ rights
“particular
to
of mon
sum[s]
Dua,
ey....”
642,
underlying LGTCA, the amount of cution, through the By limiting, etc. recover, Legislature Longtin could possible damages in the his claims ability bring pursue his affecting context, punitive in a As we stated related first instance. damages: damages noneconomic tort recoverable upon limitation
[T]he Proceedings and Judicial § 11-108 of Courts under access to the upon to a restriction Article does not amount negli- cause of action based on The plaintiffs’ courts.... Instead, § 11-108 §by abolished 11-108. gence was not Instead, opinion constitutionally. Majority appropriate lation—is valid, retrospective damages cap becomes more or less implies that a oscillating approach award. Such an depending the size of the trial caselaw, Constitution, and commonsense. State is inconsistent with our simply modifies the law of damages to be applied tort cases. Edmonds,
Murphy 601 A.2d added).14 (emphasis C. Does the Damages LGTCA Cap Effectively Vitiate Right?
Substantive
Having concluded
Legislature
that the
may limit retrospec-
tively
amount of damages to some extent and under
circumstances,
certain
I now ask (rhetorically) whether the
LGTCA damages cap limits recovery effectively “in such a
suit____”
way
preclude
Allen,
as to
any opportunity to bring
363-64,
Prior
(but
to the
governments
local
not their
officers or employees) enjoyed immunity against most non-
constitutional tort claims.
Bennett,
See Housing Auth. v.
356, 359-60,
Md.
(2000).
368-69
Through the
LGTCA,
Legislature
law,
altered the
plain-
common
giving
tiffs limited access to the often sizable assets of
govern-
local
ment, which
satisfy
must
the awards
by juries.
returned
Ashton,
107-08,
339 Md. 660 A.2d at
(stating
465-66
the Legislature, through
LGTCA,
provided
remedy
“a
injured by
those
government
...,
local
officers
while ensuring
the financial burden ...
carried
the [ultimately
responsible] local government”).
In the process, it encour-
II.A-B,
that,
supra,
In Part
I
although
Maryland
conclude
14.
*57
protects only plaintiffs
Constitution
right
bring
a
to
an accrued cause
action,
ability
(i.e.,
his or her
unliquidated
yet
to recover
awarded) damages
protected
determined or
quite
is not
sweepingly.
so
Majority opinion
The
is unfazed
'particu-
the fact that there was "no
lar' sum” to which
was entitled "when the statute changed!.]”
Cooper
Id. at
19 A.3d
County,
at 882. In
v. Wicomico
576, 584,
(1979), however,
284 Md.
398 A.2d
highlighted
we
important
the
distinction
constitutionally-protected liquidated
between
unprotected unliquidated
sums and
Legisla-
sums. We stated that the
may
retrospectively
ture
not alter
compensation
the amount of workers’
employer already
pay
an
employee.
had to
an
Cooper,
See
At common local directly against claim a constitutional tort bring could employ- as well as their employees, government officers passage After governments. local ers—the lost, however, to recover ability LGTCA, plaintiff his/her/its tortfeasors those employees, provided from the officers restric- The LGTCA scope employment. acted within the non- constitutional and ultimately applies liability tion on Cooper, 284 Md. at and vested. "speculative,” but was known A.2d at 1241.
521 alike, constitutional tort claims such that a plaintiff bringing a constitutional may only employing-local claim recover from the Davis, 18, 52, government. See DiPino v. 354 Md. (1999) (“[LJocal
354,
do, indeed,
371
governmental entities
respondeat superior liability
damages
have
for civil
resulting
from State
agents
Constitutional violations committed
their
Ashton,
employees
scope
within the
of the employment.”);
(“[T]here
19,
Moreover,
recognize,
we
implicitly,
least
that the LGTCA
notice)
procedural requirements (e.g.,
apply also to constitu
Ashton,
19,
tional tort claims.
A.2d at 465 n. we observed that “there is no exception Therefore, for constitutional torts.” [LGTCA] long “[a]s as government the local employee acting in the scope of his malice, employment and without government local is re- quired pay judgment against employee to the extent it represents compensatory damages, up statutory certain Ashton, added); 339 Md. at see also (emphasis
limits.” Id. to a are entitled (holding “plaintiffs 660 A.2d at “[a]ny judg- claims and their constitutional tort trial” for *59 [LGTCA], should, paid by be under the ment rendered added). (emphasis City”) dam- on noneconomic relevantly cap that the also held
We Proceedings and the Courts Judicial §in 11-108 of ages Specifically, claims. Green to constitutional applies Article 279, (2009), Inc., we N.B.S., that: Appeals of Special the Court agreed with suggests § history 11-108] [Njothing legislative [of of the difference Assembly thought even General common injury due to claiming personal between actions claiming personal of action to causes opposed law torts as And, or constitutional torts. statutory out of injury arising statute, that the presume a court must interpreting when than any make alteration other did not intend to legislature Also, in light of pronounced. specified plainly what statute, amendment, its original cap for the the reasons intended legislature to believe that impossible it is so that way appellant suggests in the narrow the statute damages have to cover non-economic would now insurers injury long personal so as the cap that exceeded awards or a constitu- a statute arose out the violation action provision. tional added). omitted)
(citation (emphasis Maryland Tort by the damages cap provided Regarding State, Md. Act, in Benson v. we observed Claims (2005), tort claims that not “all constitutional A.2d reasoned the ... MTCA.” We [necessarily] comply with must however, provision at issue— thus, because the constitutional Rights—was Maryland Declaration Article Presumably, there damages.” Id. monetary “compensable in mone compensable that are fore, violations constitutional are the MTCA.15 damages governed tary cap why damages LGTCA Longtin argues is another reason there 15. fully "employee shall be apply. provides that an The LGTCA should not sum, I would hold that good cause existed to waive Longtin’s strictly failure to with the comply LGTCA notice I requirement. would damages conclude also that the LGTCA Longtin’s limits In all other I cap recovery. respects, overall agree Majority opinion.
Judge BARBERA joins authorizes me to state that she views in this expressed concurring and dissenting opinion. *60 damages liable for all awarded in an action in which it is found that the circumstances, employee acted with actual malice.” "In such the Rule continues, judgement may against ‘the employee be executed government may the local any seek indemnification for sums it is (1974, required pay....’” Maryland Repl.Vol.), Code Courts Article, 5-302(b)(2)(i)-(ii); Proceedings § and Judicial Housing see also Bennett, (2000) (same).
Auth. v. jury employees-defendants found here that all of the acted with ruling actual malice. After that "there was insufficient evidence of jury actual malice to submit the issue to Harding, as to Detectives Clerk,” judge, Frankenfield and post-verdict rulings, the trial in his found nonetheless that Detective Herdon acted with actual malice. The court, however, trial personal reduced judgment Detective Herdon's S350,000 $50,000, considering from mitigating after various factors. George’s County Longtin, See Prince Md.App. 143 n. (2010). 5-302(b)(i)- According Longtin, § A.2d n. 60 under (ii), $50,000 pay only Detective judgment, Herdon should his but judgment against $5 George’s also the million County. Prince Neither Special Appeals the trial court nor the Court of confronted this issue. Moreover, grant precise we did not question. certiorari on this I suspect question may get need to sorted-out as efforts to collect the proceeds. award