TAMARA SKIDGEL,
S250149
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
August 19, 2021
First Appellate District, Division Five A151224; Alameda County Superior Court RG16810609
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, and Groban concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.
The In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program (
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2015, the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB) ruled in a Precedent Benefit Decision (PBD) — In re Caldera (2015) CUIAB Precedent Benefit Dec. No. P-B-507 — that an IHSS caregiver who was providing services to her son was not entitled to unemployment benefits. It based its conclusion on two provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Code: sections 631 and 683. The former provides: “‘Employment’ does not include service performed by a child under the age of 18 years in the employ of his father or mother, or service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse, except to the extent that the employer and the employee have, pursuant to Section 702.5, elected to make contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund.” (
Only one year earlier, the CUIAB had reached the opposite conclusion in a nonprecedential decision, ruling that a woman providing care to her son and receiving direct payments from a public entity qualified for unemployment benefits notwithstanding section 631 based on her joint employment by the public entity. (In re Ostapenko (2014) CUIAB Dec. No. AO-336919.) In December 2014, the State Department of Social Services and the Employment Development Department sent letters to the CUIAB disagreeing with Ostapenko, asserting that section 631 renders IHSS providers ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits in this context, and urging the CUIAB not to adopt Ostapenko as a PBD.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that “the relevant statutes,” though “not patently clear,” are “best read[] . . . in light of their plain language and legislative history” as establishing that IHSS recipients are “the sole employers of IHSS providers under” the Direct Hiring method “for purposes of unemployment insurance coverage. It follows that . . . section 631 excludes IHSS providers who serve close-family-member recipients.” (Skidgel, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 586, fn. omitted.)
We then granted plaintiff‘s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
PBDs “are akin to agency rulemaking, because they announce how governing law will be applied in future cases.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 109 (Pacific Legal Foundation).) Accordingly, in declaratory relief actions under section 409.2 challenging PBDs, courts “determine whether the [CUIAB‘s] decision accords with the law that would govern were the rule announced articulated as a regulation.” (Pacific Legal Foundation, at p. 111.) “[I]n light of the Board‘s expertise, its interpretation of a statutе [that] it routinely enforces is entitled to great weight . . . .” (American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017, 1027.) Ultimately, however, “[s]tatutory construction is a matter of law for the courts [citation], and administrative interpretations must be rejected where contrary to statutory intent.” ( Pacific Legal Foundation, at p. 111.) Thus, “[a]lthough” a PBD‘s interpretation of a statute is entitled to “great weight,‘” we will not “accept” it “if ‘[the CUIAB‘s] application of legislative intent is clearly unauthorized or erroneous.‘” (United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California Unempl. Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805, 820.)
The PBD at issue here relates to operation of the unemployment insurance law — principally sections 631 and 683 — in the context of the IHSS program. After summarizing that program and analyzing the relevant statutes within that context, we conclude, like the Court of Appeal, that IHSS caregivers who provide services to a family member specified in section 631 are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
A. The IHSS Program
IHSS is a social welfare program that, through a combination of state and federal funding, provides in-home supportive care for aged, blind, and disabled persons. (Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10 Cal.5th 583, 587-588 (Reilly).) It “is specifically ‘designed to avoid institutionalization of incapacitated persons.’ [Citation.] Providers perform nonmedical supportive services for IHSS recipients, such as domestic services, personal care services, protective supervision, and accompaniment to health-related appointments.” (Id. at p. 588.) “‘[T]he vast majority of home care is provided by family and friends.‘” (Id. at p. 589.) “The State Department of Social Services (Department) administers the IHSS program in compliance with state and federal law” and “promulgates regulations to implement the relevant statutes.” (Reilly, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 588.) Counties “administer[] the program locally on behalf of the state in accordance with the statutes and state regulations establishing a uniform range of services available to all eligible recipients.” (Service Employees Internat. Union v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 761, 765.) “Each county is obligated to ensure that services are provided to all eligible recipients during each month of the year in accordance with [a] county plan.” (
There are several authorized methods through which IHSS providers may be engaged. Counties “may hire” providers “in accordance with established county civil service requirements or” otherwise applicable “merit system requirements.” (
B. California‘s Unemployment Insurance Program
Since 1935, when Congress adopted the
For purposes of coverage, the original 1935 California law first broadly defined “‘employment‘” to “mean[] any employment by an employer” meeting specified criteria, “under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.” (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, § 7, p. 1227.) However, it also expressly excluded several types of work from covered “‘employment,‘” including, as here relevant, service performed (a) “by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse,” (b) “by a child under the age of twenty-one in the employ of his father or mother,” and (c) “in the employ of a State, a political subdivision” of a statе, or “any unit or agency of government.” (Id., at p. 1228.)
In 1953, the Legislature repealed the 1935 law and enacted the current Unemployment Insurance Code, with the unemployment insurance program contained in part 1 of division 1. (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, pp. 1457-1458, 1553.) In setting forth that program‘s “Scope or Coverage,” the Legislature first broadly defined “‘Employment‘” to “mean[] service performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.” (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, § 601, p. 1470 [adding
In the almost 70 years since section 631‘s enactment, the statute has been amended only twice. In 1971, it was revised in two ways: (1) the order of the services mentioned was reversed, such that the statute excluded from “‘Employment’ . . . service performed by a child under the age of 21 years in the employ of his father or mother, or service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse“; and (2) a clause was added to provide, “except to the extent that the employer and the employee have, pursuant to Section 702.5, elected to make contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund.” (Stats. 1971, ch. 1447, § 1, p. 2858.) The section to which the added clause referred — section 702.5 — was itself a new section enacted through the same legislation, which provided that services excluded by section 631 from the term “employment” would be “deemed to constitute еmployment” for purposes of unemployment compensation disability benefits upon the filing of “a written election, agreed to by both the employing unit and the individuals in its employ.” (Stats. 1971, ch. 1447, § 2, p. 2858.) The purpose and effect of these amendments were to “[p]ermit[] elective disability compensation coverage for individuals in [the] employ of specified relatives.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill. No. 1420, 3 Stats. 1971 (1971 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 213.)
The statute was amended again in 1972, lowering from 21 to 18 the limit on the age of the child whose services were excluded. (Stats. 1972, ch. 579, § 46, p. 1014.) Since then, the statute has provided: “‘Employment’ does not include service performed by a child under the age of 18 years in the employ of his father or mother, or service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse, except to the extent that the employer and the employee have, pursuant to Section 702.5, elected to make contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund.” (
The other provision at the center of this dispute — section 683 — was added to the Unemploymеnt Insurance Code in 1978 (Stats. 1978, ch. 463, § 3, p. 1571) and has never been amended. Unlike section 631, which appears in
C. The Meaning of the Statutes
“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) “We begin by examining the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the entire substance of the statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975.) And, as noted above, the CUIAB‘s interpretation of a statute “it enforces is entitled to great weight unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 111.)
According to plaintiff, the language of section 631, construed “[i]n accordance with” its “plain,” “usual, [and] ordinary meaning,” “does not preclude” coverage of IHSS providers in the Direct Hiring context. Shе reasons as follows: “The operative phrase” in the statute is “‘in the employ of,‘” and that phrase “can [under the law] include joint employment relationships.” “Joint employment exists when an employee is subject to the control of two or more employers.” In the Direct Hiring context, IHSS providers are “subject to the control of two employers, the recipient and the public entities — the county or the public authority and the state — that have direct control over the manner and payment of work.” In addition, because “the state and the county or public authority are intricately involved in paying
Section 683, plaintiff further asserts, confirms and reinforces this reading of section 631. By specifying that the word “‘Employer’ also means . . . [[] [t]he recipient of [IHSS] services‘” in the Direct Hiring context, section 683 “broadens the definition of ‘employer’ beyond the general definition[s]” set forth elsewhere in the Unemployment Insurance Code. The section‘s “plain language” thus makes the IHSS recipient “the employer” of the provider “in addition to the public entity.” In this way, the statute “supports a construction of section 631 under which IHSS providers for a spouse or child are eligible for unemployment insurance through their joint employment by a public entity.” “In short, [it] is a basis for . . . eligibility in addition to any other bases.”
We find plaintiff‘s dual-employment argument unpersuasive because we agree with the Court of Appeal that the language of section 683, read in context and with reference to the statutory framework of which it is a part, “designate[s] the recipient as the IHSS provider‘s sole employer for purposes of unemployment insurance coverage” in the Direct Hiring context. (Skidgel, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) As the Court of Appeal noted, section 683 “specifically addresses” what the term ““‘Employer‘“” means with respect to “IHSS service delivery.” (Skidgel, at p. 582.) It sets forth two criteria for defining the term. The first is that the person or entity pays a threshold amount of wages for IHSS services: $1,000 “during any calendar quarter in the calendar year or the preceding calendar year.” (
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that section 683, subdivision (a) makes the designation of the recipient as employer in the Direct Hiring context expressly “subject to the provisions of Section 12302.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” The latter section specifies that in the Direct Hiring context — i.e., when “the state or a county makes or provides for direct payment to [an IHSS] provider chosen by a recipient or to the recipient for the purchase of in-home supportive services” — the state, acting through the Department, “shall perform or ensure the performance of all rights, duties, and obligations of the recipient relating to [IHSS] services as required for [various] purposes,” including “unemployment compensation.” (
Several things are evident from these statutes read together. First, in the Direct Hiring context, the only designated employer is “[t]he recipient of [IHSS] services.” (
Relevant extrinsic sources confirm our interpretation. According to the legislative history of section 683 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2 — which the Legislature simultaneously enacted through passage of a single bill — eligibility for unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation benefits was expanded during the 1970s to include domestic employees, including IHSS providers. (Dept. of Finance, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1978, p. 1.) As to IHSS providers hired and paid directly by recipients, “it [was] not clear who [was] the ‘employer’ for the purposes of these programs” (Sen. Industrial Relations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, p. 2), with courts and enforcement agencies holding counties liable as “employers” (Health & Welf. Agency, Employment Development Dept., Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) July 10, 1978, p. 1) based on the “considerable control” they exercised “by providing the wages and determining the level of service and number of hours to be worked” (Sen. Industrial Relations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, p. 2). There was concern that counties, “in order to avoid paying” benefit costs “as the
The Legislature sought to address this concern through the 1978 legislation, by enacting several provisions — including section 683 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2 — to establish a less “expensive option” that would “save[] the State from having to assume” these increased costs. (Assem. Ways and Means Com., Staff Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, pp. 1-2.) The statutes were intended to achieve this goal by “resolv[ing] the [question] of who is the employer of” IHSS providers “selected by . . . recipients” in the following way: “designating the recipient[s] as the employer . . ., requiring the State to assure collection and payment of all contributions through a payrolling system, and requiring the State to pay the employer‘s share of mandated benefits.” (Health & Welf. Agency, Dept. of Social Services, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 1978, p. 2; see Sen. Industrial Relations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, pp. 2, 3 [legislation “would specify that the recipient of . . . services is the ‘employer’ of the provider” in the Direct Hiring context, with “the state . . . assum[ing] the cost of the recipients’ share of the taxes and premiums for these programs” and the department “responsible for performing, or assuming performance by contract, the recipients[‘] rights, duties and obligations under these programs“].) Although these provisions were expected to increase the state‘s annual costs by approximately $13 million, compared to the alternatives, they would actually “save the State either $67 million or $103 million” annually. (Assem. Ways and Means Com., Staff Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, p. 2.) In short, as plaintiff explains, the legislative history “shows” that the Legislature enacted section 683, in conjunction with Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2, in order “to relieve the state of the $103 million burden it [c]ould face” if counties abandoned the Direct Hiring method to avoid the costs they would incur “if . . . found to be employers of IHSS providers” in this context. The statutes accomplish this cost-savings purpose by making recipients the sole employer in the Direct Hiring context and shifting the costs of unemployment insurance to the state. Plaintiff‘s contrary reading of the statutes — that they make recipients employers in addition to counties and other public entities — could defeat this purpose and perpetuate the very problem the Legislature sought to solve.
The legislative history of
Plaintiff puts forth several textual arguments in support of her contrary reading of the statutes, but none proves persuasive. As noted earlier, regаrding section 683, she focuses on a single word in the statute - “also” - which, she asserts, “[d]ictionaries define . . . as ‘in addition.’ ” But this approach to interpreting the statute - “isolat[ing] one word and ignor[ing] the rest of the language” - “is contrary to bedrock principles of statutory construction.” (Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 647, 667.) As we have explained, “[t]he interpretation of a statute . . . should not end . . . with a dictionary definition of a single word used therein.” (Pearson v. State Social Welfare Bd. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 194.) Instead, to interpret a statute, we consider all of its language “in context” and with reference to “provisions relating to the same subject” and “the whole system of law of which [the statute] is a part.” (People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 776.) For reasons already explained, we conclude that the language of section 683, read in context and in light of its legislative history, makes the recipient the sole employer in the Direct Hiring context, rather than an employer in addition to a public agency, as plaintiff asserts.
Related provisions defining the term “employer” for purposes of the
This analysis also answеrs plaintiff‘s related textual argument that our reading of
Plaintiff also offers several arguments based on the language of
Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff‘s argument that because
We also reject a third argument plaintiff makes based on
We find plaintiff‘s remaining arguments also unconvincing. In urging us to interpret the statutes to provide coverage, plaintiff invokes the rule of liberal construction, which generally directs courts to “liberally construe[]” provisions of the
Nor does plaintiff‘s reliance on In-Home Supportive Services v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 720 (In-Home) alter our conclusion. There, the court held that IHSS providers who would be excluded by statute from workers’ compensation coverage based on their employment relationship with recipients are nevertheless eligible for workers’ compensation benefits because “the state is also the employer of” such providers and “[t]he workers’ compensation law provides for coverage based upon dual employment relationships.” (Id. at p. 725.) In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that in the Direct Hiring context, the recipient is the provider‘s sole employer by virtue of
For several reasons, In-Home is distinguishable. Although the statute there at issue -
Finally, we address plaintiff‘s assertion that weighty “policy” considerations warrant adopting her reading of the statutes. In her view, the cost of adopting the CUIAB‘s statutory construction - denying coverage to “approximately 135,000” IHSS providers who care for family members - cannot be “justif[ied]” in terms of
Although we appreciate the significance of plaintiff‘s policy arguments, they do not overcome the statutes’ evident meaning. Where “statutory language and legislative history are unclear” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1042), “[p]olicy considerations may of course be useful in interpreting” a statute (Taylor v. Board of Trustees (1984) 36 Cal.3d 500, 509, fn. 9). “[B]ut it is the Legislature‘s policy that ultimately must control, and in determining that policy we must pay heed to available evidence of legislative intent,” including “the history of the pertinent statutes.” (Ibid.) Where “the application of firmly established rules of statutory construction” establish a statute‘s meaning, we “may not rest” our decision “on the weighing and balancing of public policy considerations.” (Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 782.) Because, as explained above, “the statutory language, purpose, and context all point to [our] interpretation,” plaintiff‘s argument that the statutes could or “should have been written differently [is] more appropriately addressed to the Legislature.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 90, fn. 6.) That lawmaking branch of government, “which can study the various policy and factual questions and decide what rules are best for society” (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1132, 1140), cаn consider plaintiff‘s view that denying unemployment insurance benefits to close family caregivers comes at a steep cost: leaving people who have cared for their disabled family members - often forgoing better paying and less demanding employment - without a safety net when their family members die or can no longer safely be cared for at home.4
Indeed, the Legislature has, in fact, been focused on this very issue in recent years. In 2016, it passed a bill establishing an advisory committee to, among other things, recommend “steps the state can take to ensure that all IHSS providers who provide supportive services to a spouse or child have access to employment-based supports and protections, including . . . state unemployment insurance benefits.” (Assem. Bill No. 1930 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as enrolled Aug. 25, 2016.) Last year, it passed a bill amending
In light of our analysis, we also need not resolve the partiеs’ disagreement about the weight or deference to which the CUIAB‘s position, as set forth in the PBD, is entitled. As earlier noted, as a general principle, when a court reviews a PBD, the agency‘s “view of a statute [that] it enforces is entitled to great weight unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 111.) Plaintiff argues that the PBD here is “entitled to [no] deference” because the CUIAB‘s position on the coverage question in this case has been “inconsistent” and “vacillating,” with the agency reaching “the opposite conclusion in Ostapenko” just “a year prior to” issuing the PBD. The CUIAB responds that the inconsistency is irrelevant because Ostapenko was the decision of an “individual Appeals Board panel[],” whereas the PBD we are reviewing, like all PBDs, was “a decision of the Board ‘acting as a whole’ . . . after a full and public process, with input from stakeholders and other entities with relevant experience and expertise.” Because our conclusion that section 631‘s exclusion applies in the Direct Hiring context is consistent with the PBD and follows from the language and structure of the statutory scheme, viewed in light of relevant legislative history, we need not further discuss the deference question.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Court of Appeal‘s judgment.
JENKINS, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Skidgel v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 24 Cal.App.5th 574
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S250149
Date Filed: August 19, 2021
Court: Superior
County: Alameda
Judge: Robert B. Freedman
Counsel:
Legal Services of Northern California, Stephen E. Goldberg, Wade Askew; Downey Brand and Jay-Allen Eisen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carole Vigne, Katherine Fiester; Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Anthony R. Segall, Hannah Weinstein; Anna Kirsch; Jenna Lauter Miara; Daniela Urban; Anthony Mischel, Catherine Ruckelhaus and Nayantara Mehta for Bet Tzedek, Center for Workers’ Rights, Legal Aid at Work, National Employment Law Project, United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930, AFL-CIO and Women‘s Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate University School of Law as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Laurel R. Webb for Service Employees International Union Local 2015 as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward DuMont and Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitors General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez and Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorneys General, Susan M. Carson, Gregory D. Brown and Hadara R. Stanton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Stephen E. Goldberg
Legal Services of Northern California
517 12th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 551-2181
Janill L. Richards
Principal Deputy State Solicitor General
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 879-0958