TUOLUMNE JOBS & SMALL BUSINESS ALLIANCE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TUOLUMNE COUNTY, Respondent; WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest.
No. S207173
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 7, 2014
59 Cal. 4th 1029
Counsel
Herum Crabtree, Brett S. Jolley; Dongell Lawrence Finney and John A. Lawrence for Petitioner.
Briggs Law Corporation, Cory J. Briggs and Mekaela M. Gladden for CREED-21 as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
K&L Gates, Edward P. Sangster, Megan Cesare-Eastman and Daniel W. Fox for Real Party in Interest Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Roger A. Brown; Rutan & Tucker, John A. Ramirez, Robert S. Bower and Peter J. Howell for Real Party in Interest James Grinnell.
Richard Matranga, City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest City of Sonora.
Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai, Randy Riddle and Ivan Delventhal for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest City of Sonora.
Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay for Citizens in Charge as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
M. Reed Hopper and Anthony L. Francois for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
Opinion
CORRIGAN, J.—When a city council receives a voter initiative petition meeting Elections Code requirements, it must do one of three things: (1) adopt the initiative without alteration; (2) submit it to a special election; or (3) order an abbreviated report on the initiative. Upon receipt of the report, it must then either adopt the initiative or hold a special election. (
The question here is whether the result should be different if a city chooses to directly adopt a voter-sponsored initiative rather than hold a special
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are undisputed. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart), operates a 130,166-square-foot store in the City of Sonora (City). In 2007, Wal-Mart sought to expand its store by approximately 27,491 square feet. The new Wal-Mart “Supercenter” would sell groceries and be open 24 hours every day. In December 2009, the City circulated for public comment a draft environmental impact report (EIR) for the expansion. After a hearing, the City’s planning commission unanimously recommended that the EIR be certified and the project approved.
Less than a week later, before the project was called for a vote, the City Council (Council) was served with a notice of intent to circulate an initiative petition. The “Wal-Mart Initiative” proposed to adopt a specific plan for the contemplated expansion. Its apparent purpose was to streamline approval for construction and operation of the Supercenter. The Council postponed its vote while the initiative petition circulated. The petition was ultimately signed by over 20 percent of the City’s 2,489 registered voters.
On September 20, 2010, the Council ordered that a
The Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance (TJSBA) then sought a writ of mandate based on four causes of action. The petition’s first claim, which is the subject of this appeal, asserted that the Council violated CEQA by adopting the ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review. TJSBA also challenged the validity of the initiative itself, on the grounds that it conflicted with the City’s general plan, improperly limited the City’s legislative power, and was impermissibly administrative, rather than legislative, in nature.
Wal-Mart, the City, and initiative proponent James Grinnell demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to all causes of action except TJSBA’s claim that the initiative improperly conflicted with the general plan. TJSBA challenged these adverse rulings by writ petition in the
II. DISCUSSION
This case explores the intersection between the constitutional power of voters to enact laws by initiative and the environmental review generally required for laws potentially having a significant environmental impact. Because we must decide a city government’s obligations in adopting a land use initiative proposed by voters,2 we begin our analysis with the laws governing initiatives.
A. Elections Code Provides the Exclusive Procedures for Voter Initiatives.
In 1911, Californians amended our Constitution, reserving to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum. (
The procedures for municipal voter initiatives are found in
It is well established that CEQA compliance is not required before a legislative body submits an initiative to voters under
B. Statutory Language Precludes Application of CEQA.
Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 283 P.3d 1160] (Greg F.).) We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529 [120 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 246 P.3d 612].) “‘Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.’ [Citation.] Interpretations that lead to absurd results or render words surplusage are to be avoided. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313].)
The language of
Requiring CEQA review before direct adoption would essentially nullify both subdivisions (a) and (c) of
In contrast to these condensed deadlines, CEQA review typically takes months. The process starts with a preliminary review, in which the lead agency has 30 days to determine whether the proposed activity constitutes a “[p]roject” subject to CEQA. (
Considering the time necessary for agencies to review the potential environmental impacts of a project and allow public review and comment, it would be impossible for a city to complete CEQA review within 10 days before adopting a voter initiative. (
Requiring CEQA compliance before direct adoption would thus effectively nullify
“The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it passes or amends a statute. [Citations.]” (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 407.) When the Legislature enacted CEQA in 1970, the statutory procedures for enacting voter initiatives were firmly in place, having been codified at
Moreover, although CEQA is the later enacted and arguably more specific statute, a conclusion that CEQA prevails over contrary Elections Code procedures would impliedly repeal
Finally, even if time constraints permitted CEQA review, cities would be powerless to reject the proposed project or to require alterations in the project that would lessen its environmental impact, no matter what the review showed.
C. Application of CEQA to Voter Initiatives Is Contrary to Legislative Intent.
To the extent statutory language is ambiguous or open to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may turn to legislative history for guidance. (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103–1105 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 155 P.3d 284].) Here, legislative history confirms that ordinances enacted by initiative, either directly or by election, are not subject to CEQA review.
DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 794–795, discussed two Assembly bills that would have subjected initiative measures to environmental review. One would have required environmental review after the approval of any initiative that proposed activity constituting a project under CEQA. The initiative could then take effect only upon filing of an EIR or other CEQA document. (See DeVita, at p. 794 [discussing Assem. Bill No. 4678 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 1, 1988].) Another bill would have required an extensive environmental review and economic analysis by the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research before any local land use initiative could be submitted to voters. (See DeVita, at p. 794 [discussing Assem. Bill No. 628 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.)].) Neither bill was enacted. (DeVita, at pp. 794–795.)
Although proposed legislation may fail for many reasons, and only limited inferences can be drawn when a bill fails (see Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 746 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 889 P.2d 970]), we found this legislative history telling. The repeated “defeat of attempts to impose more stringent environmental review requirements on land use initiatives provide[d] . . . corroboration that the Legislature did not intend such requirements to obstruct the exercise of the right to amend general plans by initiative.” (DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 795.) Instead, we concluded the
The Legislature’s treatment of two other Assembly bills directly supports the conclusion in DeVita that local initiatives are subject to environmental review under
As originally written, Assembly Bill 2003 would have prevented a city or county clerk from “examin[ing]” a land use initiative petition unless it was accompanied by an EIR or negative declaration. (Assem. Bill 2003, as introduced Mar. 6, 1987, p. 2.) Later amendments required that local agencies conduct CEQA review and produce an EIR or negative declaration within 210 days. (Assem. Bill 2003, as amended May 4, 1987, p. 5.) Only after this review could a local government adopt the initiative or submit it to an election. (Ibid.) The Assembly Natural Resources Committee opposed the bill because it would have imposed time-consuming and costly procedural requirements on land use initiatives and potentially inhibited the initiative power. It would also have expanded CEQA’s application to encompass measures proposed by citizens. (Assem. Natural Resources Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill 2003, as amended Jan. 1, 1988, p. 3.) The priority treatment of initiatives contemplated in the bill would also have interfered with ongoing local planning. Its timelines for environmental review would have been difficult to satisfy, leading to potential litigation over the review’s adequacy along with further delay and expense. (Ibid.) After this opposition was registered, Assembly Bill 2003 died in committee.
Assembly Bill 2202, by contrast, passed handily. Among other things, Assembly Bill 2202 enacted the predecessor to
Thus, when faced with competing bills, the Legislature enacted the bill that gave local governments the option of obtaining an abbreviated review to be completed within the short timeframe required for action on initiatives. This option is now codified for municipal initiatives in sections
D. Direct Adoption Without CEQA Review Does Not Offend Public Policy.
Finally, if statutory language and legislative history are unclear, courts may look to public policy as an aid in determining legislative intent. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563].) Direct adoption of a voter initiative without prior CEQA review does not so offend public policy that we must reconsider our analysis.
Ever since the initiative power was added to the Constitution, the Legislature has given local governments the option to directly adopt voter initiatives rather than hold an election. The original implementing statute stated that, when presented with a qualified voter initiative, “the legislative body shall either: (a) pass such ordinance without alteration at the regular session at which it is presented and within ten days after it is presented; or (b) forthwith, . . . call a special election at which such ordinance, without alteration, shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the city or town.” (Stats. 1911, Ex. Sess. 1911, ch. 33, § 1, pp. 131–132.) The government’s
Direct adoption has thus been available to local governments from the outset of legislation by initiative. The voters who amended the Constitution intended to empower their government to enact a qualified initiative immediately, without the need for an election and its attendant delay and cost. The Legislature has consistently provided that option in statutes implementing the amendment.
CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election. Appellants warn that developers could potentially use the initiative process to evade CEQA review, and that direct adoption by a friendly city council could be pursued as a way to avoid even the need for an election. Of course, the initiative power may also be used to thwart development. (See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 589–590 [initiative prohibited issuance of residential building permits until certain standards were met].) However, these concerns are appropriately addressed to the Legislature. The process itself is neutral. The possibility that interested parties may attempt to use initiatives to advance their own aims is part of the democratic process.
Finally, voters have statutory remedies if direct adoption of an initiative results in the enactment of an undesirable law.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal issuing a writ of mandate is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Liu, J., and Blease, J.,* concurred.
*Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
