ROBERT J. SICIGNANO, JR. v. BARBARA PEARCE ET AL.
(AC 46370)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued May 20—officially released October 15, 2024
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Prescott, Js.
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The plaintiff attorney, who represented a will beneficiary in a probate matter, appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendants, a residuary beneficiary of the will, and its chief executive officer, who had sent a private email to other attorneys involved in the litigation that the plaintiff claimed was defamatory. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly granted the defendants’ special motions to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute (
The trial court properly concluded that the email was a protected communication made “in connection with” an issue under review by a judicial body pursuant to
The trial court correctly determined that
The trial court properly concluded that the email‘s content was a matter of public concern that related to economic or community well-being pursuant to
This court declined to review the plaintiff‘s unpreserved claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that he had failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe he would prevail on the merits of his complaint.
The trial court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine or the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution when it considered California law in interpreting and applying
Argued May 20—officially released October 15, 2024
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Stewart, J., granted the defendants’ special motions to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon,
John Kardaras, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Todd R. Michaelis, with whom were Eric J. Herst and, on the brief, Stephen J. Conover, for the appellee (named defendant).
Michelle M. Seery, with whom was Michael T. McCormack, for the appellee (defendant Connecticut Hospice, Inc.).
Opinion
BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, Robert J. Sicignano, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendants, Barbara Pearce and Connecticut Hospice, Inc. (Connecticut Hospice), pursuant to Connecticut‘s anti-SLAPP1 statute,
The following facts, either as set forth by the court in its memorandum of decision4 or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.5 “The plaintiff, who is both a Connecticut attorney and a licensed certified public
“The original will provided that each of the four beneficiaries would receive $50,000 and that Connecticut Hospice would receive the residue of the estate. While the matter was pending before the Probate Court, the executrix found an unsigned codicil that the decedent mailed to his previous counsel. That unsigned codicil increased the bequests to each of the beneficiaries from $50,000 to $100,000, thereby decreasing the share of the estate that would go to Connecticut Hospice. After much back and forth in 2018 and 2019, the individual beneficiaries moved to compel a settlement they claimed they had reached regarding the codicil. This resulted in a hearing in the Probate Court pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993). [The plaintiff alleges that], [a]t that hearing6
“After that hearing, the parties executed a document entitled Settlement Agreement, Mutual Distribution Agreement and Release [(settlement agreement)]. The Probate Court approved that agreement on October 31, 2019. The [settlement] agreement provided for distributions of an additional $23,000 to each of the individual beneficiaries and an interim distribution of $800,000 to Connecticut Hospice. It also included a nondisparagement clause that prevented the ‘parties’ to the agreement from making ‘[any negative or] disparaging oral or written statements about the other parties to this Settlement Agreement [to any parties who are not a party to the Settlement Agreement’ and from making ‘any false or misleading statements about any other party or their career, reputation, business finances, salaries, or clients].’ The agreement [identified the parties as] Connecticut Hospice and the individual beneficiaries.7 Pearce signed the [settlement] agreement, but only in her capacity as chief executive officer of Connecticut Hospice. The plaintiff did not sign the [settlement] agreement.
“Connecticut Hospice‘s counsel [Pepe] executed and filed a waiver of notice and hearing for final distribution
“[The plaintiff alleges that], ‘[a]t subsequent hearings,’ Connecticut Hospice‘s counsel ‘began knowingly and/or recklessly making false claims before the Probate Court concerning allegations of “irregularities [and] missing funds,” [and] falsely and maliciously accusing the plaintiff of “borrowing from the funds” of the estate without any evidence whatsoever.’ On or about April 9, 2020, Pearce sent an email to the individual beneficiaries’ counsel that stated in part: ‘I guess that means that the rumor I heard that [the plaintiff] was “borrowing” from the funds isn‘t true.’
“In November, 2020, after a hearing about the plaintiff‘s attorney‘s fees, the plaintiff, counsel for the individual beneficiaries, and [Pepe] held a settlement conference. [The plaintiff alleges that] [Pepe] demanded an additional distribution of $80,000 to Connecticut Hospice prior to the approval of the financial report. The plaintiff alleges that this payment would have been precluded by language in the agreement that any subsequent distribution after the interim distribution of $800,000 would be made after the conclusion of the final accounting and approval by the Probate Court. [The plaintiff further alleges that] [Pepe] then threatened to grieve the plaintiff if he did not make the $80,000 disbursement. On November 30, 2020, the plaintiff e-filed a letter with the Probate Court, requesting sanctions against [Pepe] for his threat to grieve the plaintiff and against Pearce for her threat to ‘extract a pound of flesh.’
“On December 18, 2020, Pearce, in her capacity as chief executive officer of Connecticut Hospice, filed a grievance against the plaintiff, [which the plaintiff
“In a separate grievance brought by the plaintiff against Pearce, the [grievance] panel found probable cause that Pearce had engaged in misconduct when she sent the email referring to the rumors about ‘borrowing from the [e]state funds’ and when she filed the grievance against the plaintiff.
“[The plaintiff alleges that], [i]n December, 2020, the defendants contacted the Office of the Attorney General, which filed another appearance in the Probate Court [in reliance on the defendants’ false claims].
“[The plaintiff further alleges that], [a]fter the plaintiff and the executrix consulted with Attorney Paul Knierim in January, 2021, [Knierim] [allegedly] called the executrix and then held a conference call with both the executrix and the plaintiff to tell them that [Knott] was alleging that funds were missing from the estate. Later that same month, [Knott] stated in a letter to the Probate Court that Connecticut Hospice had no other objections to the final account other than the plaintiff‘s attorney‘s fees.
“In addition to the grievance he filed against Pearce, the plaintiff also filed a grievance against [Knott]. The [grievance] panel found probable cause that [Knott] engaged in misconduct, including allegations that the plaintiff may have been involved in forging a signature and ‘inaction’ in connection with his client‘s ‘comments/innuendos’ as to the plaintiff borrowing estate funds. The litigation at issue in the grievance was the In re Spirito Estate Probate Court matter.
The plaintiff brought the underlying action against the defendants in September, 2022. In the operative five count complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ conduct during the pendency of the underlying probate matter constituted breach of the settlement agreement, defamation, defamation per se, fraud, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
The defendants filed separate special motions to dismiss the action pursuant to
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’ special motions to dismiss, to which Connecticut Hospice filed a reply. In his memorandum of law in support of his objection to the motions, the plaintiff argued that the defendants’ alleged conduct did not constitute the exercise of the defendants’ rights to petition the government. He also asserted that his complaint is not barred by the litigation privilege because (1) the complaint is not based on the defendants’ statements and conduct during a proceeding in the Probate Court, and (2) “[t]he defendants’ statements and conduct fall under an exception to absolute immunity for causes of action alleging an improper use of the judicial system.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
On January 19, 2023, following a hearing, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants’ special motions to dismiss. In its analysis, the court identified the defendants’ conduct and communications as alleged in the plaintiff‘s complaint. Specifically, as to Pearce, individually or on behalf of Connecticut Hospice, the court identified the following conduct and communications: “Pearce‘s statement . . . that she wanted to ‘extract a pound of flesh‘; Pearce‘s April 9, 2020 email to the individual beneficiaries’ counsel that stated in part: ‘I guess that means that the rumor I heard that [the plaintiff] was “borrowing” from the funds isn‘t true‘; and Pearce‘s filing of a grievance against the plaintiff.” As to communications made by counsel on behalf of Connecticut Hospice, the court highlighted the following: “Knott‘s filing of a petition to remove the fiduciary; counsel‘s making false claims of irregularities and missing funds and accusing the plaintiff of borrowing from the funds of the estate ‘at subsequent hearings’ before the Probate Court; [Pepe‘s] demand for $80,000 to be paid to Connecticut Hospice before the approval of the final accounting and his threat to grieve the plaintiff if the $80,000 was not paid;
The court determined that all of the communications alleged in the plaintiff‘s complaint “were [made] in connection with a matter of public concern” as defined in
As to the particular constitutional right at issue, the court concluded that only some of the communications constituted exercises of the defendants’ right of free speech as defined in
As to the first issue, the court concluded that the phrase “communication in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial . . . body” in
As to the second issue, the court noted that, although its research revealed no relevant Connecticut case law regarding whether the communications must be explicitly about the “issue under consideration or review“;
The court relied on Neville v. Chudacoff, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1266, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383 (2008), review denied, California Supreme Court, Docket No. S162917 (June 11, 2008), in which the California Court of Appeals held that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under [California‘s anti-SLAPP statute] if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” Noting that the test articulated in Neville “is consistent with Connecticut case law,” the court applied it in the present case and concluded that “the communications at issue here were made ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial or other governmental body.’ All of the communications, including
As to the plaintiff‘s burden, the court concluded that the plaintiff‘s breach of contract, fraud, and CUTPA counts were legally insufficient because he failed to plead essential elements of those causes of action. In particular, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for breach of the settlement agreement because he did not, and could not, allege that he was a party to it. As to his fraud count, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to allege “that any of [the defendants‘] communications . . . were made to him, that he relied on any of those communications, or that he suffered harm as a result of that reliance.” Finally, as to his CUTPA count, the court found that, even if the plaintiff could allege an unfair or deceptive act or practice that caused him to suffer an ascertainable loss, “he could not allege the trade or commerce element” because, inter alia, “the practice of law is not considered to be [a] trade or commerce, and attorneys may only be held liable under CUTPA for the ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of their practice.” In addition, the court concluded that “all five of the counts . . . are barred by the defense of absolute immunity based on the litigation privilege” because all of the communications alleged in the plaintiff‘s complaint “occurred in statements during Probate Court hearings, in filings made [in] the Probate
After noting that “[t]he privilege applies if the statement has some reference to the subject matter of the proposed or pending litigation, although it need not be strictly relevant to any issue involved in it,” the court reasoned that, “[e]ach of the communications here, including those that alleged that the plaintiff had borrowed funds from the estate or that funds were missing, all had some reference to the estate that was the subject of the probate litigation.” For that reason, the court concluded that all of the alleged communications are protected by the litigation privilege and that, consequently, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his complaint.15 Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint and
The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and reconsider the dismissal, asserting that “the court‘s decision deprive[d] [him] of his due process rights by relying upon and adopting California statutory language and case law . . . [on] which [he] could not rely . . . [at the] time of filing the complaint and [which he had] no opportunity to refute by brief or oral argument.” In a written order denying the plaintiff‘s motion, the court stated: “The plaintiff‘s motion to reargue does not identify any factual mistakes or inconsistencies with the court‘s decision. . . . Instead, [he] argues that he should be allowed to do additional research because the court relied on other states’ anti-SLAPP case law . . . . To determine whether the communications were within the scope of [§ 52-196a], the court had to construe the statutory definitions. Because Connecticut‘s anti-SLAPP statute was so recently enacted, Connecticut courts routinely refer to other states’ case law, including California and Nevada, to interpret the Connecticut statute. None of this should have been a surprise to the plaintiff. Nothing in the plaintiff‘s motion to reargue demonstrates that it was incorrect for the court to rely on this out-of-state case law or that there is any controlling authority that contradicts the case law on which the court relied. Therefore, the motion to reargue is denied.”17 This appeal followed.18
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly concluded that his “claims against the defendants fall within the ambit of protected constitutional conduct as defined by . . . § 52-196a.” More specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the defendants’ conduct constituted the exercise of their right to petition the government in connection with a matter of public concern within the meaning of
A
First, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the defendants satisfied “their threshold burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff‘s suit was based on the defendants’ exercise of their state or federal constitutional rights in connection with a matter of public concern.”
On appeal, the plaintiff does not address all of the conduct that was the basis for his complaint in the underlying action. Although he argues that “not all the conduct on which [his claims] are based . . . involve” protected communications, his arguments in his principal appellate brief focused exclusively on Pearce‘s private email that stated: “I guess that means that the rumor I heard that [the plaintiff] was ‘borrowing’ from the funds isn‘t true.” Thus, we consider any claim as to conduct other than Pearce‘s email abandoned.19
Nevertheless, we decline to consider arguments that the plaintiff raised for the first time in his reply brief. See State v. Griffin, 217 Conn. App. 358, 375 n.9, 288 A.3d 653 (2023) (“it is well established that we do not entertain arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief“), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 917, 290 A.3d 799 (2023). “Arguments must be raised in an appellant‘s original brief . . . so that the issue as framed . . . can be fully responded to by the appellee in its brief, and so that [an appellate court] can have the full benefit of that written argument.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Corasaniti, 341 Conn. 463, 476 n.8, 267 A.3d 108 (2021).
In his reply brief, the plaintiff argued for the first time that the court erred in concluding that he did not establish probable cause that he would prevail on the merits because he was a third-party beneficiary to the settlement agreement. He also argued that Pearce‘s statement that she would “extract a pound of flesh” is not an exercise of her right to petition the government in connection with a matter of public concern. In addition, the plaintiff rephrased his ex post facto claim in his reply brief, arguing that the “court erred by violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requirement of fair notice as to what conduct is prohibited when it adopted case law of sister jurisdictions and tests used by California courts to punish the plaintiff by the award of attorney‘s fees.” In support of that argument, the plaintiff cited the vagueness doctrine, which he did not apply in his principal appellate brief. During oral argument before this court, the plaintiff‘s counsel suggested that the ex post facto argument in his principal brief
The plaintiff argues in cursory fashion that “[a] private email does not fit within the ambit of the protected constitutional conduct as defined by the anti-SLAPP statute [and] is not connected to a matter of public concern.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He further argues that, “[t]o the extent that the trial court‘s decision can be interpreted as adopting the defendants’ position equating the knowingly false allegation in a private email that the plaintiff was ‘borrowing from the funds’ to the exercise of a constitutional right in connection with a matter of public concern, it is legally erroneous. The trial court cited no case supporting such a novel proposition, nor is there any credible argument that the defendants’ alleged conduct qualifies as protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
As previously noted in this opinion, the plaintiff alleged that Pearce “sent an email to Attorney David Crotta, Jr. [who represented the individual beneficiaries in the probate matter], which read in part, ‘I guess that means that the rumor I heard that [the plaintiff] was “borrowing” from the funds isn‘t true.‘” The subject line of the email is “RE: update on spirito estate,” and it was sent in response to Crotta‘s update about the status of the administration of the Spirito estate.
“The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
In accordance with
In order to satisfy this initial burden, the moving party must show that the complaint is based on the exercise of one of the constitutional rights defined in
Our reading of the plain language of
1
The statute defines “[r]ight to petition the government” as any “communication in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
We agree with the trial court that the phrase “in connection with” in
Similarly, in the present case, had the legislature intended to limit the protections afforded under the anti-SLAPP statute to communications made during an official proceeding, it could have used clarifying language to that effect. See Costanzo v. Plainfield, 344 Conn. 86, 108, 277 A.3d 772 (2022) (“the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do so” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, construing the phrase “in connection with” broadly in accordance with its plain meaning is consistent with our precedent applying the litigation privilege. As this court has observed, “[t]here is no requirement under Connecticut jurisprudence that to be considered part of a judicial proceeding, statements must be made in a courtroom or under oath or be contained in a pleading or other documents submitted to the court. Indeed, [t]he privilege extends beyond statements made during a judicial proceeding to preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding. . . . In addition . . . the absolute privilege that is granted to statements made in furtherance of a judicial proceeding extends to every step of the proceeding until final disposition.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenneson v. Eggert, 196 Conn. App. 773, 783, 230 A.3d 795 (2020); see also Hopkins v. O‘Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (“[t]he scope of privileged communication extends not merely to those made directly to a tribunal, but also to those preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the
As to whether Pearce‘s statement suggesting that the plaintiff was “borrowing funds” from the estate was made “in connection with” the issue under consideration or review by the Probate Court, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly relied on the California Court of Appeals’ construction of California‘s anti-SLAPP statute in Neville v. Chudacoff, supra, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1255. According to the plaintiff, “[w]hile the court may look to other states for guidance if the statute is unclear or case law is absent on certain meanings, the trial court cannot wholesale add meanings based on another state‘s interpretation of its statute, which contains different language and substantially broadens the [breadth] and scope of the Connecticut statute which was not intended by the legislature.” We conclude that the test adopted by the trial court is the proper construction of the statutory language.
Again, the statutory phrase “in connection with” is not defined, and the plain meaning of this phrase “necessarily includes any factual, contextual or causal relationship.” (Emphasis in original.) Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 294 Conn. 235. In rejecting the plaintiff‘s argument that the communication had to relate to the specific issue under consideration or review, the trial court considered whether a greater degree of relevancy was required in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute. Given the absence of any
As noted previously in this opinion, the court adopted the test employed by California courts, which provides that a communication is made “in connection with” an issue under consideration by a judicial body if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation. See Neville v. Chudacoff, supra, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1266. As the trial court noted in its decision, this test is consistent with Connecticut‘s application of the litigation privilege, which includes a similar relevancy requirement. See, e.g., Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 470, 935 A.2d 103 (2007) (“we consistently have held that a statement is absolutely privileged if it is made in the course of a judicial proceeding and relates to the subject matter of that proceeding” (emphasis added)); Kenneson v. Eggert, supra, 196 Conn. App. 782 (“[W]e first determine whether . . . the statements at issue in this case were made during a judicial proceeding. If so, we then consider whether . . . the alleged misrepresentation is sufficiently relevant to the issues involved in those proceedings.“). Accordingly, we adopt it for purposes of applying
When courts consider an issue of first impression, they routinely consider decisions from other state and federal jurisdictions. See, e.g., Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558, 573, 113 A.3d 932 (2015) (“[w]hen contemplating issues of first impression with regard to Connecticut‘s common law, we often have sought to benefit from the collective wisdom and experience of our sister states“); Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Educational Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 285 Conn. 240, 299, 990 A.2d 206 (2010) (“[a] review of the sister state decisions in this area is of paramount importance to . . . a question of first impression in an area of constitutional law that uniquely has been the province of the states“); Lovan C. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 86 Conn. App. 290, 299–300, 860 A.2d 1283 (2004) (“[t]o aid in our determination, we find the decisions of our sister states persuasive“). Moreover, in conducting an analysis of Connecticut‘s anti-SLAPP statute, our Supreme Court recently explained that “[a]n examination of federal and sister state case law is particularly instructive with respect to the jurisdictional issue before [it] because the legislative history of our anti-SLAPP statute signifies that it was modeled after anti-SLAPP statutes that came before it in other states.”
Consequently, we conclude that the court properly determined that a communication is made “in connection with” an issue under review by a judicial body pursuant to
2
The plaintiff also asserts that the court‘s conclusion that Pearce‘s email alleging that the “plaintiff was ‘borrowing from the [estate] funds’ [constituted] the exercise of a constitutional right in connection with a matter of public concern . . . is legally erroneous.” The plaintiff‘s unsupported assertion is unavailing.
“Matter of public concern” is statutorily defined as “an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C) the government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work . . . .”
The trial court concluded that the defendants’ alleged conduct and communications were made in connection
Although the plaintiff quotes the definition of “[m]atter of public concern,” he neither analyzes that statutory definition nor addresses the court‘s reasoning for its conclusion that Pearce‘s email concerned an issue related to economic or community well-being. In short, the plaintiff has failed to marshal any arguments as to why the court‘s determination that Pearce‘s email suggesting that he improperly borrowed estate funds
B
Second, the plaintiff claims that, even if the defendants satisfied their initial burden under
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
In support of this subclaim, the plaintiff argues that his complaint “sets forth with particularity the circumstances upon which the defendants breached the [settlement agreement] to which he is a party, defamed the plaintiff, are liable for defamation per se, committed fraud, and violated CUTPA. Clearly the plaintiff established facts strong enough to justify a reasonable [person] in the belief that [he] has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant[s] under any one of the five counts of his complaint.” As previously noted in this opinion, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert a breach of the settlement agreement because he was not a party to it and failed to allege the necessary elements of both his fraud and CUTPA claims. The plaintiff, however, does not address any of the court‘s reasoning as to those counts. Moreover, he fails to address the court‘s conclusion that “all five of the counts . . . are barred by the defense of absolute immunity based on the litigation privilege.”21
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred by (1) “adopting language in the California anti-SLAPP statute and California case law not contained in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute in violation of the separation of powers under the constitution“; and (2) “adopting definitions of language in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute based upon California case law interpretation of the California statute in violation of the rule against ex post facto legislation as applied to the courts through the due process clause.” The gravamen of both claims is that the court‘s consideration of persuasive authority from another state in construing a Connecticut statute somehow violates the separation of powers doctrine or the ex post facto clause under the federal constitution. Both claims are unavailing.
First, interpreting a statute is precisely within the power of the judiciary, as “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). As previously noted in part I A 1 of this opinion, when faced with an issue of first impression, courts routinely consider decisions from other state and federal jurisdictions and, in this particular context, “[a]n examination of federal and sister state case law is particularly instructive . . . because the legislative history of our anti-SLAPP statute signifies
Second, there is no ex post facto violation arising from the court‘s interpretation of
“[A]s the text of the [ex post facto] [c]lause makes clear, it is a limitation upon the powers of the [l]egislature, and does not of its own force apply to the [j]udicial
“It is well established that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them. . . . [I]n an ex post facto analysis, a court must first determine whether the challenged law is a penal statute . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rios v. Commissioner of Correction, 224 Conn. App. 350, 360, 312 A.3d 1059 (2024), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 910, 314 A.3d 601 (2024).
The anti-SLAPP statute is not a penal statute; rather,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.