228 Conn.App. 664
Conn. App. Ct.2024Background
- Robert J. Sicignano, Jr., an attorney and CPA, represented a will beneficiary in a contentious probate matter involving the Estate of Spirito.
- Connecticut Hospice, Inc., a charitable corporation, was the sole residuary beneficiary of the will. Barbara Pearce, CEO of Connecticut Hospice, and its counsel were involved in disputes with Sicignano and his client.
- During litigation, Pearce sent a private email suggesting Sicignano was "borrowing" estate funds and subsequently filed a grievance against him. Multiple contentious communications occurred among attorneys and the probate court.
- Sicignano sued Pearce and Connecticut Hospice for breach of contract, defamation (and defamation per se), fraud, and violation of CUTPA, alleging their conduct was actionable and not protected.
- The defendants moved to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing their conduct was protected petitioning activity related to a matter of public concern; the trial court granted dismissal and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants.
- Sicignano appealed, challenging both the application of the statute (especially to private emails), use of California case law, and the court’s privilege rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants’ conduct and communications, especially a private email, were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute | The private email was not protected ‘petitioning’ or on a matter of public concern; the court erred applying statute to it | All communications were related to issues before the Probate Court and thus protected petitioning conduct | Court found the email and other communications were "in connection with" a judicial issue and matter of public concern, so protected |
| Whether the trial court erred by adopting language and interpretations from California anti-SLAPP law | Reliance on California law broadened Connecticut statute contrary to legislative intent, violating separation of powers | Reference to persuasive authority is proper for unsettled statutory interpretation | Use of persuasive California law for interpretive guidance was proper and routine for novel statutes |
| Whether plaintiff established probable cause to prevail on merits despite anti-SLAPP protections | Complaint sufficiently alleged breach, defamation, fraud, and CUTPA, justifying denial of anti-SLAPP motion | Plaintiff was not a party to the contract, failed to allege required elements for fraud/CUTPA, and all conduct privileged | Plaintiff failed to show he’d likely prevail on merits; claims were legally insufficient or barred by litigation privilege |
| Whether court’s reliance on out-of-state law violated ex post facto clause or due process | Application of unexpected interpretation after filing deprived plaintiff of fair notice | Statute is procedural, not penal; such interpretation is not unexpected or indefensible | Anti-SLAPP statute is procedural, not penal, so ex post facto analysis does not apply; due process not violated |
Key Cases Cited
- Audubon Parking Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804 (interprets agreements in probate context; referenced as relevant to settlement disputes)
- Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394 (crime allegations are matters of public concern under free speech law)
- Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459 (litigation privilege attaches to statements made in judicial proceedings)
- Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (scope of litigation privilege in Connecticut)