SHANDS JACKSONVILLE MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Sylvia M. BURWELL, Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
Consolidated Civil Case Nos. 14-263, 14-503, 14-536, 14-607, 14-976, 14-1477
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
September 21, 2015
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ Joint Motion to Strike and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and it will deny Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will issue an order consistent with this opinion.
Daniel Edward Bensing, Jacqueline E. Coleman Snead, Matthew J.B. Lawrence, U.S. Department of Justice, Benjamin R. Dryden, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge
Under the Medicare system, participating hospitals are paid for services provided to Medicare-eligible patients. Medicare Part A provides compensation for services provided on an inpatient basis, while Medicare Part B provides compensation for outpatient services. In general, hospitals are paid more for inpatient stays.
Prior to 2013, Medicare guidance stated that it was generally appropriate for hospitals to admit a Medicare beneficiary as an inpatient if the patient was expected to stay for 24 hours or more. But the guidance also stressed that length of stay was not the only relevant factor in the “complex medical judgment” whether to admit a Medicare beneficiary for inpatient care.
Because this open-ended approach generated uncertainty among providers and, at times, discouraged hospitals from treating Medicare beneficiaries as inpatients, in May 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS” or “Department“) proposed a new standard for inpatient admissions. This new standard—the “2-midnight benchmark“—authorized inpatient admission if the patient‘s stay was expected to span at least two midnights. See Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Proposed Fiscal Year 2014 Rates, 78 Fed. Reg. 27486, 27645, 27648 (May 10, 2013) (proposed rules). To reduce uncertainty, the proposed rule then provided that “Medicare‘s external review contractors would presume that hospital inpatient admissions are reasonable and necessary for beneficiaries who” satisfy the 2-midnight benchmark. Id. at 27645.
The Secretary of HHS predicted that in fiscal year 2014 the new 2-midnight benchmark and the related presumption would result in “a net shift of 40,000 encounters” from outpatient status to inpatient status, id. at 27649, at an estimated cost of $220 million to the Medicare program, id. She proposed to offset this cost by making adjustments that would effect an across-the-board reduction in compensation for inpatient services. Id. at 27650, 27651. The final rule—including the 2-midnight benchmark, related policies, and the reduction in compensation for inpatient services—was published in August 2013. See Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems For Acute Care Hospitals Payment Policies Related to Patient Status, 78 Fed. Reg. 50496, 50965 (Aug. 19, 2013) (final rule), codified as amended at
This matter is presently before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, Dkts. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and the Secretary‘s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, Dkt. 23. For the reasons given below, the Secretary‘s motion is DENIED. The Plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and this matter is REMANDED to the Secretary for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The Medicare Act,
Under the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (“IPPS“), hospitals are prospectively compensated for inpatient services at a fixed rate that is not based on the actual cost of the services provided. See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining that Congress enacted the prospective payment system to promote efficiency and discourage the provision of unnecessary services); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 405-06, 406 n. 3, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993). The rates used to calculate these payments are set annually by the Secretary according to the Medicare Act‘s “complex statutory and regulatory regime.” Methodist Hosp., 38 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Good Samaritan, 508 U.S. at 404).
One important element in the statutory scheme is the “standardized amount,” which is set each year by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS“), acting on behalf of the Secretary. See
A minority of hospitals, including those providing treatment to underserved communities, are compensated based in part on “hospital-specific rates.” See Adirondack, 740 F.3d at 694-95;
The Medicare Act does not define the term “inpatient” or specify when inpatient admission is appropriate. The Secretary, however, has issued both formal and informal guidance on the subject. Her regulations specify that certain procedures should be provided on an inpatient basis. See
The Secretary became concerned, however, that there were systemic problems with inpatient admissions under the 24-hour benchmark. In 2012 she observed an increase in the number of Medicare beneficiaries who were kept as outpatients for long periods of observation. See Hospital Outpatient Prospective and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 45061, 45155 (July 30, 2012) (proposed rule). Admissions for long periods of outpatient observation may have “significant financial implications for Medicare beneficiaries,” because the patient‘s copayments, deductibles, and eligibility for certain post-hospitalization services will depend in part on whether the patient was admitted as an inpatient or an outpatient. Id. at 45156.1
Against this backdrop, the Secretary solicited public comments on “[p]otential policy changes . . . to improve clarity and consensus among providers, Medicare, and other stakeholders regarding the relationship between admission decisions and appropriate Medicare payment, such as when a Medicare beneficiary is appropriately admitted to the hospital as an inpatient and the cost to hospitals associated with making this decision.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 45155. She asked whether “alternative approaches to defining inpatient status” could provide clarity, “consider[ing] opportunities for inappropriately taking advantage of the Medicare system that time-based . . . criteria for patient status may create.” Id. at 45157. The Secretary received over three hundred public comments on this issue. 78 Fed. Reg. at 27649; see also Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 68210, 68430-68431 (Nov. 15, 2012) (summarizing comments).
In May 2013, the Secretary proposed a new rule “to clarify our longstanding policy on how Medicare review contractors review inpatient hospital admissions for payment under Medicare Part A [and] issue revised guidance to physicians and hospitals regarding when a hospital inpatient admission should be ordered.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 27647. She observed that “there [had] been considerable variation in the interpretation” of her prior inpatient admissions guidance and the 24-hour benchmark, see 78 Fed. Reg. at 27648, and that “[t]he majority of improper payments under Medicare Part A for short-stay inpatient hospital claims have been due to inappropriate patient status (that is, the services furnished were reasonable and necessary, but should have been furnished on a hospital outpatient, rather than hospital inpatient, basis),” id. at 27647. “Inpatient hospital short-stay claim errors are frequently related to minor surgical procedures or diagnostic tests. In such situations, the beneficiary is typically admitted as a hospital inpatient after the procedure is completed on an outpatient basis, monitored overnight as an inpatient, and discharged from the hospital in the morning. Medicare review contractors typically find that while the underlying services provided were reasonable and necessary, the inpatient hospitalization following the procedure was not.” Id. at 27647.
To address these issues, the Secretary proposed a new inpatient admissions policy based on a “2-midnight benchmark.” See id. at 27645-27649. Under the 2-midnight
To provide increased predictability, the Secretary also proposed a “2-midnight presumption” to be applied by Medicare reviewers. See id. at 27645-27649. It provided that reviewers “would presume that inpatient hospital admissions are reasonable and necessary for beneficiaries” whose hospital stay “cross[ed] 2 ‘midnights,‘” unless the hospital was found to be “abusing this 2-midnight presumption.” Id. at 27645; 27648-27649. For shorter stays, reviewers would consider whether the attending physician who authorized the inpatient admission reasonably expected the patient‘s stay to last at least two midnights. See
This action does not challenge the 2-midnight benchmark, the 2-midnight presumption, or the other aspects of the final rule that relate to the Secretary‘s inpatient admissions guidance. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge a different aspect of the final rule: an across-the-board reduction in payments to hospitals for inpatient services. This reduction was premised on the Secretary‘s expectation that, in fiscal year 2014, the new rule would result in “a net shift of 40,000 encounters” from outpatient to inpatient status. 78 Fed. Reg. at 27649.
As explained in the notice of proposed rulemaking,
Our actuaries have estimated that our proposed policy . . . would increase IPPS expenditures by approximately $220 million. These additional expenditures result from an expected net increase in hospital inpatient encounters due to some encounters spanning more than 2 midnights moving to the IPPS from the [Outpatient Prospective Payment System (“OPPS“)], and some encounters of less than 2 midnights moving from the IPPS to the OPPS. Specifically, our actuaries examined FY 2009 through FY 2011 Medicare claims data for extended hospital outpatient encounters and shorter stay hospital inpatient encounters and estimated that approximately 400,000 encounters would shift from outpatient to inpatient and approximately 360,000 encounters would shift from inpatient to outpatient, causing a net shift of 40,000 encounters.
78 Fed. Reg. at 27649. The predicted “net shift of 40,000 encounters” “represent[ed] an increase of approximately 1.2 percent in the number of shorter stay hospital inpatient encounters.” Id. Because hospitals are typically paid more for inpatient stays, the Secretary estimated that this “net shift
The Secretary reasoned that the additional cost of the new rule should be offset by an across-the-board reduction to payments for inpatient services. Thus, she proposed to use her “exceptions and adjustments authority” under the Medicare Act, see
“Commenters generally did not support the proposed -0.2% payment adjustment.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 50953. The comments raised two principal concerns of relevance here. First, they questioned whether the Secretary possessed the statutory authority to make the proposed across-the-board reductions. Id.; see AR 4411 (“it is questionable whether CMS has the authority to reduce the standardized amount by 0.2 percent“); AR 4998 (“these reductions are an inappropriate use of CMS‘s special exceptions and adjustments authority“); AR 4265 (same); AR 5672 (noting that this authority “has been used exceedingly sparingly” and its use “in this context, . . . seems unprecedented“); see also AR 4528, 4497, 4713, 5473. Second, they questioned the underlying basis for the reductions, specifically, the Secretary‘s prediction that the new policy would cause a net increase in inpatient cases at a cost of $220 million in 2014.
With respect to the latter concern, the commenters raised a number of different objections. As noted in the final rule, they argued that the Secretary‘s analysis was “unsupported and insufficiently explained to allow for meaningful comment.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 50953; see AR 5010 (“CMS has not been transparent in identifying the criteria used by the actuaries to identify the patient status shifts that would occur.“); AR 5312 (“we are very concerned that CMS has not released any data or even its methodology for determining that a -0.2% payment adjustment is warranted“); AR 4654-4655; 4411. Some commenters asked for additional information, see AR 4883-4884, 5672, while others attempted to replicate the Secretary‘s analysis without success, see AR 4653-4655; see also AR 4411 (observing that “it has not been possible to replicate the [Secretary‘s] finding[s]“), AR 5235 (similar). The commenters also criticized the prediction resulting from that analysis. They argued that “CMS has profoundly underestimated the volume of [outpatient] encounters” that would result from the two-midnight rule, see AR 4654; predicted that there would instead be a net increase in outpatient encounters, see
The notice of final rulemaking did not engage with these comments in detail. The Secretary expressed her view that in light of the “widespread impact” of the new 2-midnight policy, the proposed adjustments were an appropriate use of her statutory exceptions and adjustments authority. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50953. She explained that “while we generally agree with commenters that it is not necessary to routinely estimate utilization shifts to ensure appropriate IPPS payments, this is a unique situation. Policy clarifications such as this do not usually result in utiliza-
With respect to the methodology used to predict the net shift and its cost, the Secretary acknowledged that “there is a certain degree of uncertainty surrounding any cost estimate,” but maintained that “our actuaries have determined that the methodology, data, and assumptions used are reasonable for the purpose of estimating the overall impact of our proposed policy.” Id. at 50953. She further stated that “we specifically discussed the methodology used and the components of the estimate” and “[i]n addition to the opportunity to comment on the estimate, any component of the estimate, or the methodology, commenters had an opportunity to provide alternative estimates for us to consider.” Id.
In addition, the Secretary revealed two aspects of her methodology that were not disclosed in the notice of proposed rulemaking. First, she explained that when estimating the number of cases expected to shift from outpatient to inpatient status under the new rule, her actuaries excluded “[c]laims not containing observation or a major procedure“:
In determining the estimate of the number of encounters that would shift from outpatient to inpatient, our actuaries examined outpatient claims for observation or a major procedure. Claims not containing observation or a major procedure were excluded . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). Second, when calculating the number of cases expected to shift in the opposite direction, her actuaries excluded different claims. In particular, they examined claims involving surgical MS-DRGs, and excluded claims involving medical MS-DRGs:
In determining the estimate of the number of encounters that would shift from inpatient to outpatient, our actuaries examined inpatient claims containing a surgical MS-DRG. Claims containing medical MS-DRGs were excluded . . . .
On the same day that the final rule was published, the CMS Office of the Actuary issued a memorandum entitled “Estimated Financial Effects of Two Midnight Policy,” which “summarizes [its] financial estimate for clarifying inpatient vs. outpatient hospital services when all stays which span two midnights will be presumed to be inpatient.” AR 2046-2048. The memorandum explains that “[s]everal assumptions were made to estimate the financial impact of this policy change.” AR 2047 (describing these “key assumptions“). Notably, when calculating the number of cases expected to shift from outpatient to inpatient status, “stays . . . not for observation care or for a major procedure were excluded because it was assumed that these cases would be unaffected by the policy change,”
The notice of final rulemaking confirmed that “after consideration of the comments we received . . . we are finalizing a reduction to the standardized amount, the hospital specific rates, and the Puerto Rico-specific standardized amount of -0.2 per-
After the final rule was published, the Plaintiff hospitals timely challenged the 0.2 percent reduction “to the . . . standardized amount, the hospital-specific rates, and the Puerto Rico-specific standardized amount” (collectively, “the 0.2 percent reduction“). 78 Fed. Reg. at 50746. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board granted Plaintiffs’ requests for expedited judicial review pursuant to
The Court consolidated the actions and set a schedule for dispositive briefing. See May 23, 2014, Minute Order; July 23, 2014, Minute Order; Aug. 13, 2014, Scheduling Order; Sept. 9, 2014, Minute Order. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, see Dkts. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and the Secretary cross-moved for summary judgment, and—with respect to the St. Helena Plaintiffs only—moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Dkt. 23.
On August 3, 2015, the Court held oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions. At the oral argument, the Court raised the issue of appropriate remedy should it conclude that the Secretary promulgated the 0.2 percent reduction in violation of the APA, and it invited the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on that issue. The parties filed supplemental briefs, see Dkts. 42, 43, and replies, see Dkts. 44, 45, 47. The Secretary moved for leave to file a surreply, Dkt. 49, which the Court granted, see Sept. 21, 2015, Minute Order.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment present three principal arguments. First, they argue that the Medicare Act does not authorize the Secretary to make an across-the-board 0.2 percent reduction to compensation for inpatient services. Second, they argue that the Secretary failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the APA,
A. The Secretary‘s “Exceptions And Adjustments” Authority
The Medicare inpatient prospective payment system is governed by a complex statutory scheme. See
The provision at issue in this case,
The Secretary shall provide by regulation for such other exceptions and adjustments to such payment amounts under this subsection as the Secretary deems appropriate.
Plaintiffs, for their part, argue that this provision does not authorize the Secretary to make an across-the-board reduction by adjusting the standardized amount. They concede that
In reviewing the Secretary‘s interpretation of the Medicare Act, the Court follows the two-step framework set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat‘l Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), see, e.g., Cape Cod Hosp. v. Sebelius, 630 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and first asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If so, the Court
1. Whether The “Exceptions And Adjustments” Provision Is Ambiguous
“In evaluating the first Chevron inquiry, [courts] use ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to determine whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent.” Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778). To this end, the Court looks to the statute as a whole, recognizing that “[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000); see also Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Under Chevron step one, [courts] consider not only the language of the particular provision under scrutiny, but also the structure and context of the statutory scheme of which it is a part.“) (quotation marks omitted).
The plain language of the general exceptions and adjustments provision is sweeping. As long as she acts by regulation, the Secretary is authorized to make “such other exceptions and adjustments to [the] payment amounts under this subsection as [she] deems appropriate.”
Notwithstanding this broad language, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary‘s authority is more limited. In particular, they seek to turn the contrast between the broad language of
It is difficult to reconcile Plaintiffs’ characterization of the general exceptions and adjustments authority as the final item on a list of specific terms with the actual hodgepodge of provisions gathered under the umbrella of
Second, and more persuasively, Plaintiffs rely on the canon against surplusage. But they still fail to show that Congress unambiguously foreclosed the Secretary‘s interpretation. See
(ii) In making adjustments under clause (i) for transfer cases (as defined by the Secretary) in a fiscal year, not taking in account the effect of subparagraph (J), the Secretary may make adjustments to each of the average standardized amounts determined under paragraph (3) to assure that the aggregate payments made under this subsection for such fiscal year are not greater or lesser than those that would have otherwise been made in such fiscal year.
Although the parties do not cite to any legislative history that sheds light on Congress‘s intent in enacting the second clause of
This history shows that the Secretary was not prepared to adopt a change in the methodology for calculating transfer payments, along with adjustments in the standardized amount to achieve budget neutrality, without specific congressional authorization. But nowhere along the way did the Secretary expressly disavow the authority that she now asserts under the first clause of
The Court of Appeals’ analysis of
Hospitals reimbursed pursuant to the hospital-specific rate sued, arguing that the Secretary exceeded her authority under
Adirondack goes on, moreover, to offer guidance directly responsive to the Plaintiffs’ surplusage argument. As Plaintiffs do here, the Adirondack plaintiffs argued that the Secretary‘s broad construction of
A similar conclusion follows here. The Court of Appeals has not only held that
The Court also concludes that the scant legislative history cited by the parties is equivocal. As originally enacted in 1983, the general exceptions and adjustments provision stated:
The Secretary shall provide by regulation for such other exceptions and adjustments to such payment amounts under this subsection as the Secretary deems appropriate (including exceptions and adjustments that may be appropriate with respect to hospitals involved extensively in treatment for and research on cancer).
Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. VI, § 601, 97 Stat. 158 (originally codified as
The parenthetical relating to cancer hospitals was deleted in 1989, when cancer hospitals were removed from the prospective payment system. See Pub. L. No. 101-239, tit. VI, § 6004, 103 Stat. 2159. The Secretary argues that this amendment had, if anything, a broadening effect, but because the amendment did not reflect legislative attention to the scope of the Secretary‘s adjustments authority, it does not cut either way.
Congress has also added provisions expressly authorizing adjustments to the standardized amounts. For example, as discussed above, in 1984 Congress provided the Secretary with authority to adjust the standardized amounts to offset trans-
Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals held in Adirondack, see
Finally, the St. Helena and Bakersfield Plaintiffs separately contend that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority under
2. Whether The Secretary‘s Interpretation Is Reasonable
At Chevron‘s second step the question for the reviewing court is whether the agency‘s interpretation is a reasonable one. The court, accordingly, will “uphold the Secretary‘s judgment as long as it is a permissible construction of the statute,
An agency is “not estopped from changing” its interpretation of a statute, Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass‘n, 575 U.S. 92, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1207-09, 191 L.Ed.2d 186 (2015). When it does so, however, the reviewing court should consider that change in position as “a factor in assessing the weight that” the agency‘s new position is due. Good Samaritan Hosp., 508 U.S. at 417. At times, the change may require that the court accord the new interpretation “considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). But, this proviso is not absolute, and its application turns on “the facts of individual cases.” Good Samaritan Hosp., 508 U.S. at 417.
Here, the Court concludes that the prior occasions when the Secretary declined to rely on her general adjustment and exception authority, and where she, instead, waited for specific congressional authorization to act, do not undercut her current claim to deference. First, unlike the cases on which they rely, Plaintiffs have not identified any prior actions in which the Secretary expressly interpreted or applied
Plaintiffs invoke Dillmon v. Nat‘l Transp. Safety Bd., 588 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 2009), where the Court of Appeals held that an agency must explain its changed interpretation in order “to ensure [that] the agency‘s ‘prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.‘” see Dkt. 17-1 at 27. And they assert, correctly, that an agency may not “‘depart from a prior policy sub silentio, or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.‘” Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1089 (quoting FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009)). Here, however, it is far from clear that the Secretary previously articulated a policy or interpretation from which she now departs. There certainly was no reasoned explanation of how the Secretary construed
Plaintiffs further argue that, even if entitled to deference, the Secretary‘s use of her adjustment authority to adopt “an across-the-board reduction” cannot be reconciled with the overall statutory scheme. See, e.g., Dkt. 17-1 at 30. They argue that “the Secretary has made no attempt to explain how this system wide payment reduction serves any statutory purposes, rendering her interpretation unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis added). This contention, however, merely repeats the arguments already rejected at Chevron step one—and, for that matter, already rejected in Adirondack, 740 F.3d at 700. It is true that the Secretary‘s reading of
Plaintiffs also argue that the 0.2 percent reduction effectively negates payment for the additional inpatients that hospitals are expected to treat and that this violates the Medicare Act. See, e.g., Dkt. 17-1 at 23-24. In this respect, Plaintiffs argue that this case is unlike Adirondack, which involved the Secretary‘s effort to address an “artificial” increase in payments to hospitals. 740 F.3d at 700. The Secretary correctly responds that nothing in the final rule departs from the per-discharge structure of the payment scheme—providers are paid for each patient treated and discharged, and providers who treat additional inpatients are reimbursed pursuant to the inpatient prospective payment system. See Dkt. 23-1 at 25-27. It is, of course, possible that the 0.2 percent reduction does deny providers reimbursement in the aggregate for the additional inpatient stays. But, Plaintiffs point to no evidence in the record supporting actual increased provider costs, and, in any event, to the extent those additional costs exist, they are shared across the inpatient prospective payment system. As a result, the 0.2 percent reduction does not differ in application from the numerous other adjustments made to the standardized rate. The Secretary‘s use of her general exceptions and adjustments authority in this manner may be unusual, but it is not unreasonable.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue with some force that any interpretation of the Act that grants the Secretary unfettered adjustment authority would conflict with the overall statutory scheme. The Court agrees that the “exceptions and adjust-
ments” provision does not give the Secretary carte blanche to override the rest of the Act. The Court is not persuaded, however, that the reduction at issue in this case raises that concern. Cf. Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that “[t]he Secretary may” invoke her exceptions and adjustments authority to “vary the definition” of “urban areas” under the prospective payment system, even though it was possible to “hypothesize forms of regulatory amendments that could be thought unreasonable in light of the statute“). In Amgen Inc. v. Smith, for example, the Court of Appeals held that an “adjustment . . . involving only the payment amount for a single drug[] does not work ‘basic and fundamental changes in the scheme’ Congress created in the Medicare Act.” Id. at 118 (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994)). The Court of Appeals reasoned that “the statutory requirement that the Secretary ‘shall’ develop certain aspects of the payment system is qualified by the Secretary‘s authority to ‘adjust[]’ those payment amounts.” Id. (modifications in original) (quoting
The same is true here. Nothing in this case requires the Court “to engage in line drawing to determine when ‘adjustments’ cease being ‘adjustments.‘” Amgen, 357 F.3d at 117. The challenged 0.2 percent reduction, which is smaller than the 2.9 percent reduction upheld in Adirondack, see 740 F.3d at 700, does not present a fundamental conflict with the Act‘s inpatient prospective payment scheme. For present purposes, it therefore suffices to conclude that the Secretary‘s interpretation of the exceptions and adjustments provision is a reasonable one.
B. APA Challenges To The 0.2 Percent Reduction
Plaintiffs further argue that, even if the Secretary had the statutory authority to make the across-the-board 0.2 percent reduction, the process she employed was riddled with procedural and other errors. As already discussed, the Secretary estimated that the new 2-midnight rule would result in a net shift of 40,000 cases to inpatient status in fiscal year 2014, at a cost of $220 million. On this basis, she adjusted the standardized amount, the hospital-specific rates, and the Puerto Rico-specific standardized amount downward by 0.2 percent, effecting an across-the-board 0.2 percent reduction to compensation for inpatient services. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50746. Plaintiffs contend that the notice of proposed rulemaking omitted important information about the Secretary‘s methodology, thereby depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to comment. They further argue that the Secretary failed to provide a reasoned response to the relevant comments that they were able to make and that the final rule fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the agency‘s action.7
Pursuant to the Medicare Act,
As explained below, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Secretary did not provide sufficient notice of the actuarial assumptions and methodology she employed and that disclosure of this information was essential to communicate the basis for the proposed adjustments and to permit meaningful public comment. The Court further concludes that this error was not harmless. Finally, in light of these conclusions, the Court determines that it need not reach Plaintiffs’ remaining challenges.
1. Opportunity For Meaningful Notice And Comment
“The APA sets forth several steps an agency must take when engaged in rulemaking: it must publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register; give an opportunity for interested persons to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments; and issue publication of a concise general statement of the rule‘s basis and purpose.” Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “[T]he opportunity for interested parties to participate in a meaningful way in the discussion and final formulation of rules” is a “particularly important component” of this process. Connecticut Light & Power, 673 F.2d at 528. “The purpose of the comment period is to allow interested members of the public to communicate information, concerns, and criticisms to the agency during the rule-making process. If the notice of proposed rule-making fails to provide an accurate picture of the reasoning that has
Given the APA‘s requirement that an agency “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action,” see Dist. Hosp. Partners, 786 F.3d at 56-57 (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted), “it is especially important for the agency to identify and make available technical studies and data that it has employed” prior to the comment period, see Connecticut Light & Power, 673 F.2d at 530. “[A]n agency cannot rest a rule on data that, in critical degree, is known only to the agency.” Time Warner Entm‘t Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Rather, “[t]he most critical factual material that is used to support the agency‘s position on review must have been made public in the proceeding and exposed to refutation.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Ass‘n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (emphasis omitted); see also Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 453, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
The “critical factual material” that the agency must disclose and “expose[] to refutation” includes the models and methodology used by an agency to support its action. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers, 494 F.3d at 199, 201. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers, the Court of Appeals invalidated a final rule because the agency had failed to disclose “the model and methodology” it used “to determine the benefits and costs of [the] regulatory options.” 494 F.3d at 201. As the Court of Appeals explained, “because the output of that model was central to [the agency‘s] decision to adopt the [final] [r]ule . . . , the model and its methodology were unquestionably among the most critical factual material that was used to support the agency‘s position.” 494 F.3d at 201 (quotation marks, citation and alterations omitted); see also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (where an agency chooses to use a predictive model, it “must explain the assumptions and methodology used in preparing the model and, if the methodology is challenged, must provide a complete analytic defense.“) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Borrowing a metaphor from the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary engaged in a game of “hunt the peanut” by failing to disclose critical aspects of her methodology until after the comment period. See Dkt. 16 at 24 (quoting Connecticut Light & Power, 673 F.2d at 530); see also Dkt. 19-1 at 26, Dkt. 18-1 at 33. In particular, they contend that she failed to reveal key assumptions applied by the HHS actuaries in concluding that the change from the 24-hour rule to the 2-midnight rule would actually increase the number of inpatient stays, and that it would do so by 40,000 stays in fiscal year 2014. Most significantly, according to Plaintiffs, see Dkt. 16 at 24; Dkt. 19-1 at 19; Dkt. 18-1 at 31-33, it was not until the final rule was announced that the Secretary disclosed that (1) in estimating the number of “encounters” that would likely shift from outpatient to inpatient status, the actuaries examined only “outpatient claims for observation or a major procedure,” and (2) in estimating the number of “encounters” likely to shift from inpatient
The Court agrees that the Secretary‘s failure to disclose the critical assumptions relied upon by the HHS actuaries deprived Plaintiffs and other members of the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment on the proposed 0.2 percent reduction. The undisclosed information was central to the analysis that led to the Secretary‘s conclusion that 40,000 discharges would shift to inpatient status in 2014, and, without that information, commenters had no basis to understand or to critique the Secretary‘s conclusion.
In the final rule, the Secretary asserted that the proposed rule “specifically discussed the methodology used and the components of the estimate.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 50953. That is incorrect. The proposed rule stated only that the Secretary analyzed “FY 2009 through FY 2011 Medicare claims data for extended hospital outpatient encounters and shorter stay hospital inpatient encounters.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 27649. That was far from sufficient to permit meaningful comment on the actuarial predictions or to put the public on notice of the basis for the proposed adjustments. Where an agency disregards a significant portion of the information on which it claims to have based its analysis, the APA requires some disclosure and explanation. Cf. Dist. Hosp. Partners, 786 F.3d at 56-57 (“If an agency fails to examine the relevant data . . . it has failed to comply with the APA.“).
Even accepting the fact that she did not disclose the key assumptions applied by the actuaries, the Secretary contends that the proposed rule satisfied APA standards because interested parties had access to all of the information that, in her view, they needed. In particular, the notice of proposed rulemaking identified the data set the Secretary used in her analysis—“FY 2009 through FY 2011 Medicare claims data for extended hospital outpatient encounters and shorter stay hospital inpatient encounters,” 78 Fed. Reg. at 27649—and this data set was publicly available, see Dkt. 23-1 at 38-39. Thus, she argues, interested parties could perform their own analyses of the same data and, to the extent they obtained different results, submit comments to that effect. See, e.g., AR 4653-4655.
The Secretary is correct that an agency is not invariably required to disclose information on which it relies, at least as long as the public already has that information.
The circumstances here, however, are very different. Plaintiffs are not arguing that the Secretary needed to disclose the publicly available Medicare claims data the actuaries used in their analysis. They are arguing that she was required to disclose what the actuaries did with that data. It is that deficiency that precluded meaningful public comment, and, unlike in Connecticut Light & Power, the Secretary offers no reason to believe that commenters had any idea what the actuaries did. Indeed, at least one commenter endeavored—without success—to recreate the Secretary‘s conclusions. See AR 4653-4655; see also AR 4411 (observing that “it has not been possible to replicate the [Secretary‘s] find-ing[s]“), AR 5235 (similar). Under these circumstances, public access to the underlying data does not save the rule.
Nor does public awareness regarding the longstanding agency concern about inpatient admissions alter this result. The Secretary, for example, points to discussion contained in the proposed rule itself, the Secretary‘s 2012 request for comment on inpatient admissions, and a 2013 report by the HHS Office of Inspector General addressing “Hospitals’ Use of Observation Stays and Short Inpatient Stays.”8 Although the public may have been aware of the various considerations that prompted the Secretary to propose the 2-midnight rule, the basis for that rule is not the question. The question is whether the public was aware of the methodology the HHS actuaries used to predict the effects of that policy. And that is where the Secretary‘s argument falls short.
At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary argued for the first time that it should have been “self-evident” that the medical MS-DRG cases would be unaffected by the new rule and, accordingly, could be excluded. See Dkt. 40 at 38-41. Given the ample evidence that interested parties did not find that assumption self-evident, see AR 4653-4655; 4883-4884; 4411; 5010; 5235; 5672, the Court is not persuaded. This is not a case where a “decision of less than ideal clarity” may be upheld because “the agency‘s path may reasonably be discerned.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. To the contrary, there is no hint of this “self-evident” rationale in the administrative record—or elsewhere.
2. Harmless Error
The Secretary further argues that any flaw in the notice and comment process was “harmless” and that, accordingly, the rule should be sustained under the prejudicial-error doctrine. The Secretary is correct that the APA “instructs reviewing courts to take ‘due account . . . of the rule of prejudicial error.‘” PDK Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Although this case does not involve an “utter failure” to provide notice and an opportunity for comment, see Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 96, it does involve a significant defect. The 0.2 percent reduction was the product of the Secretary‘s conclusion that the 2-midnight rule would result in an increase of 40,000 inpatient stays. Until the actuarial assumptions were disclosed, however, the Secretary‘s thought process was a black box—and even then, her analysis was not fully explained. The Secretary, once again, insists that her “alleged failure to disclose additional details about her actuaries’ estimates” “did not preclude the submission of comments” on those estimates. Dkt. 23-1 at 46. But there is a vast difference between announcing a conclusion and articulating the reasons for that conclusion. One can disagree with a conclusion, but, absent some insight into how the conclusion was reached, it is not possible to explain where and why the agency went wrong.
To the extent the Secretary argues that her undisclosed assumptions made no difference to the outcome, the Court also disagrees. The assumptions the HHS actuaries applied substantially curtailed the universe of hospital stays the Secretary considered and likely affected the outcome
To be clear, this is not to say that the Court has concluded that the Secretary‘s assumptions and methodology were unreasonable. Plaintiffs contend that the predicted increase in inpatient cases “defies reason” and “common sense” because it will be harder to satisfy the new 2-midnight benchmark than the old 24-hour benchmark. See Dkt. 29 at 18; Dkt. 15 at 32; Dkt. 17-1 at 35-36. That likely overstates their case. They ignore the fact, for example, that the increased predictability supplied by the 2-midnight presumption might lead to an increase in inpatient stays. The reasonableness of the Secretary‘s assumptions and methodology, however, is a question that should be considered first, if at all, on remand. For present purposes, it is sufficient to conclude that the Secretary‘s failure to provide an opportunity for meaningful comment “created enough uncertainty as to its possible effect on the agency‘s disposition,” Allina Health Servs., 746 F.3d at 1110 (quotation marks omitted), to preclude reliance on the prejudicial-error doctrine. As in Owner-Operator Independent Drivers, 494 F.3d at 202, the Court has “no difficulty in concluding that the agency‘s failure to disclose the methodology of [its] model in time for comment was prejudicial.”
3. Remaining APA Challenges
A number of Plaintiffs’ other APA-style challenges are closely related to the Secretary‘s failure to provide an opportunity for meaningful comment on her actuarial assumptions. Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that after the Secretary unjustifiably excluded certain claims in estimating the outpatient-to-inpatient and inpatient-to-outpatient shift, she also made inappropriate comparisons of estimates based on different types of claims, failed to grapple with the uncertainties in her analysis, and improperly calculated the cost of the net increase in inpatient cases. Because commenters were not able to raise all these concerns in response to the deficient notice of proposed rulemaking, however, no administrative record was ever developed for the Court to review. Thus, the Court concludes that these arguments should be addressed, if at all, after further proceedings at the administrative level and an opportunity for additional comment.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Secretary failed to provide meaningful responses to the substantial comments they did make and that her final conclusions are not accompanied by a reasoned explanation of her methodology. In addition, they argue that the 0.2 percent reduction is invalid because it was announced in the preamble to the rule, and not in a separate “regulation.” In light of the Court‘s conclusion that the Secretary failed to provide adequate notice of the underlying basis for the proposed reduction, and thereby deprived the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment on that proposal, it is unnecessary to reach these additional grounds. The Secretary‘s decision and accompanying explanation may change on remand, and she will have an opportunity to address whatever comments are made, to explain whatever decision she reaches, and to decide whether to include any adjustment in the body of a regulation.
C. The Appropriate Remedy
There remains the question of appropriate remedy. Where a rule is adopted
Although acknowledging this general rule, Plaintiffs contend that it has no application here, since the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that “[f]ailure to provide the required notice and to invite public comment . . . is a fundamental flaw that ‘normally’ requires vacatur of the rule.” Heartland Reg‘l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 566 F.3d 193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 97). That proposition, however, is not absolute. The Court of Appeals has, at times, remanded without vacatur despite a failure to provide adequate notice or opportunity for comment. See Am. Radio Relay League, 524 F.3d at 242 (remanding for the agency to “afford a reasonable opportunity for public comment on the unredacted studies on which it relied in promulgating the rule, make the studies part of the rulemaking record, and provide a reasoned explanation of its choice“); Am. Med. Ass‘n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1135 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Because the inadequately explained rules are imposing an immediate monetary burden on fee-payers, we assume that the agency will act with due haste to provide the requisite opportunity for meaningful comment and explanation.“).9
In the absence of a per se rule, the Court must turn to the standard articulated by the Court of Appeals in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see, e.g.,
1. The Final Rule‘s Deficiencies
The first Allied-Signal factor is “the seriousness of the [rule‘s] deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly).” 988 F.2d at 150-51. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]here is a fine line between agency reasoning that is ‘so crippled as to be unlawful’ and action that is potentially lawful but insufficiently or inappropriately explained.” Radio-Television News Directors Ass‘n v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (separate opinion of Silberman, J.)). “In the former circumstance, the court‘s practice is to vacate the agency‘s order, while in the latter the court frequently remands for further explanation (including discussion of relevant factors and precedents) while withholding judgment on the lawfulness of the agency‘s proposed action.” Id. As Plaintiffs stress, “the court typically vacates when an agency ‘entirely fails’ to provide notice and comment.” Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. EPA, 737 F.3d 95, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (alteration omitted). That is presumably because, where an agency has completely bypassed the notice and comment procedure, there is substantial basis to “doubt whether the agency chose correctly,” Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150-51, and the agency‘s decision lacks the legitimacy that comes with following the APA-mandated procedures for creating binding legal obligations.
The flaws present here do not rise to that level, but they are nonetheless substantial. This is not a case where the agency simply failed to provide sufficient detail in its explanation for its action or failed to address a discrete comment. See, e.g., La. Fed. Land Bank Ass‘n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Rather, the Secretary omitted “critical material on which it relied,” and thus “deprive[d] commenters of a right under [the APA] ‘to participate in rulemaking.‘” Allina Health Servs., 746 F.3d at 1110. In this respect, the case is similar to Owner-Operator Independent Drivers, where the Court of Appeals vacated a rule on the ground that the agency failed “to disclose the methodology of the model” on which it relied “in time for comment,” 494 F.3d at 202. At the same time, the Court is not convinced that the Secretary would be unable to “justify” her decision on remand, see Heartland, 566 F.3d at 197—nor is the Court convinced that she would be able to do so. But the Court‘s uncertainty on that point merely highlights the magnitude of the procedural violation. The Court is unable to evaluate whether the Secretary‘s decision was reasonable because her omission prevented the public from offering meaningful comments.10 The Plaintiffs never had the opportunity to explain where, in their view, she went wrong, and, thus, the Secretary never had to provide a reasoned justification of her position.
With respect to the first Allied-Signal factor, all that the Court can conclude is that the flaw in the notice and comment process was substantial and that it is possible that the procedural error affected the Secretary‘s final decision to adopt the 0.2 percent reduction. To the extent the Secretary bears the burden of demonstrating that the “normal remedy” of vacatur does not apply, Allina Health Servs., 746 F.3d at 1110, she has failed to show that the flaw in the rule was not serious.
Plaintiffs further argue that the deficiencies in the rule are exacerbated by the addition of other errors that they have alleged, including the failure of the Secretary to respond to significant comments or to offer an adequate explanation for the final rule containing the 0.2 percent reduction. Given the Court‘s conclusion that the failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for public comment was “serious” for pur-
2. Disruptive Consequences
That does not end the inquiry. The Court must also consider “the disruptive consequences” of vacating the 0.2 percent reduction. Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 97 (quoting Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 151). The Court of Appeals’ decision in Heartland Regional Medical Center is particularly instructive. And, for the reasons given in that decision, the Secretary fares better on this factor.
In Heartland, a district court had concluded in a prior action that the Secretary‘s “rural local rule” was invalid, but did not expressly address whether the ensuing remand was with or without vacatur. 566 F.3d at 196-97. In light of intervening events, the Court of Appeals was called upon to characterize the remand in retrospect. 566 F.3d at 197. Applying Allied-Signal, the Court first concluded that the administrative error identified in the earlier case—failure to respond to reasonable alternatives—could be cured on remand. See id. at 197-98. Turning to the second factor, the Court of Appeals noted that vacatur “likely would have required HHS to make payments to [certain] hospitals for [the relevant] years . . . until the agency repromulgated the same rule and gave an adequate reason for rejecting the alternatives.” Id. at 198. This posed a significant consequence: in light of the presumption against retroactive rulemaking, see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 207, 215 (1988) (rejecting the Secretary‘s attempt to promulgate a retroactive rule that would allow her to recoup payments made in response to vacatur of a rule), “vacatur . . . would have raised substantial doubt about HHS‘s ability to recoup payments it made for years prior to reinstatement of that requirement,” 566 F.3d at 198. That “substantial doubt” was sufficient, in the view of the Court of Appeals, to conclude that vacatur would have had “disruptive consequences” under Allied-Signal. Id.
The consequences of remand in the present action do not rise to the level of the “scrambled egg” at issue in Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 97, where “crops were plowed under” and there was no “way to restore the status quo ante,” id. The consequences are, however, very similar to the disruptive consequences relied upon in Heartland, 566 F.3d at 198. As in Heartland, it is unclear whether the presumption against retroactive rulemaking would apply. Plaintiffs say it would, see Dkt. 42 at 9, 14, while the Secretary disputes that, see Dkt. 43 at 20-22. But even the Secretary expresses substantial doubt that, if the rule were vacated, she would attempt to reinstate the reduction for fiscal year 2014—particularly in light of the same “reliance” interests that animate the presumption against retroactive rulemaking in circumstances where it applies, see Dkt. 43 at 21.
Plaintiffs attempt to turn the presumption against retroactive rulemaking to their favor, arguing that the inability of the Secretary to reissue the rule means that there will be little “disruption” on remand—there is no risk, in Plaintiffs’ view, that hospitals will receive additional
Plaintiffs also argue that the potential costs to the Medicare program of providing further reimbursement to providers do not counsel against vacatur. See Dkt. 42 at 15. They cite In re Medicare Reimbursement Litigation, 414 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in which the Court of Appeals observed that “[h]aving to pay a sum one owes can hardly amount to an equitable reason for not requiring payment,” id. at 13. That language, however, was addressed to a very different situation; it involved the Secretary‘s refusal to reopen past proceedings that would have allowed the plaintiff hospitals to recover certain funds. See id. Counsel for the Secretary had “rightly conceded at oral argument” that the Secretary had “a clear statutory duty to pay [plaintiff] hospitals [those] funds.” Id. But the Secretary nonetheless opposed reopening the proceedings, citing “the extraordinary sums at stake.” Id. Here, in contrast, the Secretary has not conceded that the hospitals have a right to additional inpatient compensation for fiscal year 2014, but rather maintains that the 0.2 percent reduction is justified and that it would be contrary to the public interest to pay hospitals at the pre-reduction level.
The Court, accordingly, concludes that the second Allied-Signal factor supports remand without vacatur.
* * *
Having concluded that the first Allied-Signal factor favors Plaintiffs, while the second favors the Secretary, the Court must weigh these competing considerations. There is no rule requiring either the proponent or opponent of vacatur to prevail on both factors. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (remanding without vacatur, despite serious flaws in rule, where vacatur would be disruptive); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding without vacatur even though “the disruptive consequences of vacatur might not be great“), amended in other respects by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 537, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2002); U.S. Telecom Ass‘n v. FBI, 276 F.3d 620, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding several rules but vacating only one in light of the first Allied-Signal factor). Rather, resolution of the question turns on the Court‘s assessment of the overall equities and practicality of the alternatives. Taking the parties at their word, the Court assumes that a remand with vacatur would, in effect, dictate a substantive outcome based on a procedural error, and thus concludes that the disruptive consequences would be considerable. Although the deficiencies in the rule are serious, the Court is not convinced that they are so grave that the Secretary should be precluded from taking corrective steps with respect to the 2014 inpatient prospective payment system. In addition, the Secretary has indicated her willingness to abide by a timetable and to expedite proceedings on remand. See Dkt. 43 at 10-11. If the Secretary fails to comply with that timetable, her failure may counsel in favor of vacatur of the rule at a future time. Similarly, to the extent the Secretary fails on remand to give meaning-
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the remand should be without vacatur. The parties are directed to confer and to propose to the Court no later than October 1, 2015, a timetable for repromulgation of the proposed rule and an opportunity for further comment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Secretary‘s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and this matter is REMANDED to the Secretary for further proceedings. The parties are ORDERED to confer and propose, no later than October 1, 2015, a timetable for administrative proceedings on remand.
An appropriate Order will issue after the parties have submitted a proposed timetable.
Shana FREEDMAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v.
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. and Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., Defendants
Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-01575 (CKK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed September 21, 2015