Seals v. StateSeals v. State
Defendants in criminal cases may take immediate appeals from final judgments, which
The relevant facts are not disputed. In June 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment against Seals charging him with one count of rape and one count of child molestation. He was tried before a jury in October 2018. The jury found Seals guilty of child molestation but could not reach a verdict on the rape count, prompting the trial court to declare a mistrial as to that count. On the disposition sheet filed on November 5, 2018, the trial court entered a 20-year sentence of imprisonment on the child molestation count, and noted that the rape count had been mistried аnd was to be “re-tried.” Less than a month later, the trial court entered a separate order placing the rape count on the dead-docket.
Seals filed a motion for new trial on November 5, 2018, and subsequently amended it.1 The trial court denied Seals‘s motion in August 2019, and Seals filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in February 2020, concluding that the dead-docketed rape count caused the case to remain pending in the trial court and that Seals was therefore required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures to appeal his conviction and sentence on the child molestation count. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Seals‘s appeal.2
This appeal turns on what it means for a “case” to become “no longer рending in the court below.” In answering that question, we apply the familiar principles by which we construe statutes. “When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). That presumption means that “we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
The ordinary public meaning of statutory text that matters is the meaning the statutory text had at the time it was enacted. See FDIC v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 589-590 (2) & n.8 (761 SE2d 332) (2014) (considering original public meaning of statute); cf. Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235 (2) (c) (i) (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (“original
In applying these principles to this case, we confront several questions. First, is a “case” with multiple counts still “pending” when some of those counts remain unresolved? As we explain below,
2. A case with multiple counts is still pending when one of those counts remains undisposed.
(a) The original public meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) leads us to conclude that a case is not final and is still pending below if one or more counts are unresolved.
The right of immediate review under
No cause shall be carried to the Supreme Court upon any bill of exceptions, so long as the same is pending in the Court below, unless the decision or judgment complained of, if it had been rendered as claimed by the plaintiff in error, would have been a final disposition of the cause.
The language of this provision was materially the same for almost 100 years until the Appellate Practice Act was enacted in 1965. See Ga. L. 1965, p. 18, § 1. The Appellate Practice Act changed the language to say that there was a right to an immediate appeal “[w]here the judgment is final ⸺ that is to say ⸺ where the cause is no longer pending in the court below[.]” Id. Despite the rewording, we concluded that the law regarding reviewable judgments did not “materially change.” O‘Kelley v. Evans, 223 Ga. 512, 513 (156 SE2d 450) (1967). This Court and the Court of Appeals continued to hold that a judgment was not final if there were claims that remained pending below. See, e.g., Gorrell v. Fowler, 247 Ga. 67, 67 (273 SE2d 852) (1981); Farmers Co-op. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 227 Ga. 755, 755 (182 SE2d 895) (1971); Register v. Kandlbinder, 132 Ga. App. 435, 435 (208 SE2d 565) (1974); Spell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 398, 399 (170 SE2d 701) (1969).
In 1984, the language of what is now
Seals argues that Keller applies only when a trial court fails to enter a disposition on a count for which the jury reached a verdict, and argues that Keller does not apply because the jury in this case did not reach a verdict on the rape count. But there is no principled reason for that factual distinction to make a legal difference. Keller and Outen demonstrate that when at least one count of a multi-count indictment remains pending below, no count may be appealed as a final judgment. This principle applies equally to civil cases. See,
This precedent is consistent with the ordinary public meanings of “case” and “pending” as they relate to legal proceedings. The most natural ordinary meaning of “case” is a single proceeding, regardless of whether the proceeding involves one or multiple counts. See
Similarly, when a count has not been resolved, we think of that count as “pending.” See Webster‘s New World Dictionary of the American Language 1050 (2d College ed. 1980) (defining “pending” as “not decided, determined, or established“); see also Black‘s Law Dictionary 1134 (6th ed. 1990) (providing set of definitions for “pending” that includes: “Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in the process of settlement or adjustment. Awaiting
Under the ordinary meaning of
(b) The authority cited by the parties does not inform the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) .
Longstanding precedent provides that declaring a mistrial does not finally dispose of a case. See Oliveros v. State, 118 Ga. 776, 779 (45 SE 596) (1903); see also Nickles v. State, 86 Ga. App. 284, 284 (1) (71 SE2d 574) (1952) (citing Oliveros and Starnes v. State, 138 Ga. 341 (75 SE 104) (1912)). Despite this precedent, Seals and the State
Citing a footnote in Keller, Seals argues that the situation here is like the multiple trials of severed counts such that the conviction on the child molestation count was separately appealable. See Keller, 275 Ga. at 681 n.3 (noting case law hоlding that when a count is severed from a multi-count indictment, and separate trials are held on the severed counts, each conviction on the severed counts is separately appealable when the sentence is entered on the severed count). But this is not a situation in which there were multiple trials held on severed counts. There was only one trial on one indictment.
For its part, the State relies on precedent from the United States Supreme Court to argue that a single indictment involving multiple counts is really multiple indictments that have been joined together, such that the indictments are severed from each other when there is a verdict and sentence entered on at least one count. The State also cites several Georgia cases in which an appeal was
The State‘s reliance on Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (14 SCt 410, 38 LE 208) (1894), is misplaced because the relevant portion of that case merely concerned whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to quash the indictment where it charged two different murders. See id. at 400. After noting the common law preference for an indictment charging only a single count, the Court concluded that joinder of different felonies in separate counts was not “necessarily fatal to the indictment” and that a trial court‘s decision to permit that action was a matter of “prudence and discretion.” Id. at 401-403. Nothing about Pointer‘s discussion regarding the joinder and severance of offenses is relevant to our consideration here.
The State also relies on Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262 (18 SCt 580, 42 LE 1029) (1898), to argue that a jury‘s inability to
This conclusion has no bearing here, because this is not a case about whether the jury must reach an agreement on all counts in order for the verdict on the counts decided to be valid. The question
Moreover, the State ignores the more relevant and persuasive precedent from that Court regarding what constitutes a final judgment. That precedent aligns with our construction of what constitutes a final judgment under state law. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (40 SCt 347, 64 LE 616) (1920) (“To be appealable the judgment must be not only final, but complete[,]” which requires that the judgment be “final not only as to all the parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved.” (citations omitted)).
The State (like the dissent) also points to several cases from this Court and the Court of Appeals that have considered the merits of an аppeal despite a count remaining pending below. But in none of those cases was there any discussion of jurisdiction at all, much less analysis and a holding on the issue. Decisions of this Court and of the Court of Appeals “do not stand for points that were neither raised by the parties nor actually decided in the resulting opinion,” and “questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Palmer v. State, 282 Ga. 466, 468 (651 SE2d 86) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). Those cases provide no authority for the State‘s position.
3. There is no legal authority for treating cases with dead-docketed counts differently.
Declaring a mistrial on the rape count meant the case was not final under our precedent, and placing that count on the dead-docket did not change the status of the case. The parties gеnerally refer to the trial court‘s discretion to dead-docket cases, but no such
(a) None of the few statutory references to dead-docketing supports different treatment.
Placing cases on the dead-docket is a procedural tool by which “the prosecution is postponed indefinitely but may be reinstated any time at the pleasure of the court.” Beam v. State, 265 Ga. 853, 855 (3) n.3 (463 SE2d 347) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted). This practice, while common, is mentioned only in passing in the Georgia Code. And what scant statutory authority does exist on the subject – thrеe references – offers nothing to demonstrate that the effect of dead-docketing a count results in a final judgment on that count and thus on the case under
The first statute merely describes a superior court clerk‘s duty to maintain a criminal case management system that will reflect “entries of cases which are ordered dead docketed.”
Nothing about these statutes reveals that a dead-docketed count is to be treated as a final disposition. Indeed, the treatment of dead-docketed counts under
(b) Extensive Georgia case law treats dead-docketed counts as pending below.
The term “dead-docketed” is really a misnomer; it refers to a procedural, administrative device, not to the termination of a matter. As mentioned above, a dead-docketed count may be reinstated to the active docket any time at the trial court‘s direction. Inactive and final are not the same thing. As this Court explained before, placing a count or counts on the dead-docket “certainly constitute[s] neither a dismissal nor a termination of the prosecution in the accused‘s favor. A case is still pending which can be called for trial at the judge‘s pleasure, or upon which the accused can make a demand for trial.” Phillips v. State, 279 Ga. 704, 705 (1) (620 SE2d 367) (2005) (quoting Beam, 265 Ga. at 855 (3) n.3; emphasis added; punctuation omitted) (relying on this principle to hold that a defendant was not entitled to any special notice when his case was removed from the dead-docket for retrial). Because the trial
Regardless of the practical necessities a trial court may have for placing a count on the dead-docket, those reasons do not change the plain meaning of a statute governing when an appeal may be pursued. The language of
When the legislature enacted the current version of
The dissent thinks our conclusion — one reached through ordinary application of long-standing principles of statutory
Moreover, as mentioned above, long-standing precedent from the Court of Appeals (which, although not binding on us, has never been overruled and has been the law of Georgia for some time) bars malicious prosecution and malicious arrest lawsuits predicated on dead-docketed counts precisely because those counts remain undecided. The dissent’s view would uproot this settled law and our own decision in Phillips, but it does not engage in an analysis of why those decisions should be abandoned. As we explain below, we share some (but not all) of the dissent’s concerns about the practical implications of our decision today. But the judicial power the Georgia Constitution vests in us does not include the power to rewrite statutes in ways we believe would achieve better outcomes; that power is vested solely in the General Assembly.
4. The General Assembly may wish to amend
Allowing an immediate appeal in a case like Seals’s could expedite resolution, without first requiring either (1) the trial court to dismiss or nolle pros a count charging a serious crime without certainty that the defendant will end up serving a significant sentence on other counts, or (2) a retrial that might not result in any
But any constitutional claims that might arise from such abuse would be as-applied, are not present here where Seals never requested a certificate of immediate review, and offer no basis for a thumb on the scale of the interpretive question before us today.7 And other concerns the dissent articulates are less well-founded. In particular, we do not share the dissent’s concern that certificates of
In any event, generalized concerns about potential abuse of statutory language are for the General Assembly to address. When Georgia law is clear — and here it is — our task is merely to apply it. As the United States Supreme Court recently observed, a “[c]ourt’s task is to discern and apply the law’s plain meaning as faithfully as we can, not ‘to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief.’” BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. ____, slip op. at 13 (May 17, 2021) (quoting Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 217 (130 SCt 2191, 176 LE2d 967) (2010)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Melton, C. J., and LaGrua, J., who dissent.
The majority’s conclusion that “dead” means “pending” is illogical. Once a count is moved to the dead docket, the count is dead. I have grave concerns about the majority’s opinion in this case, and thus, I must respectfully dissent.
1.
2. Before our consideration of this granted cert, the majority of cases addressing the dead doсket procedure originated from our Court of Appeals and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, neither of which are binding on this Court.9 See, e.g., Howard v. Warden, 776 F3d 772 (11th Cir. 2015); State v. Creel, 216 Ga. App. 394, 394-395 (454 SE2d 804) (1995); State v. Marcus, 206 Ga. App. 385 (425 SE2d 351) (1992); McCord v. State, 168 Ga. App. 891 (311 SE2d 209) (1983); Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581 (188 SE2d 396) (1972); Newman v. State, 121 Ga. App. 692 (175 SE2d 144) (1970). And, in these cases, the court made no effort to reconcile the idea that something could be “dead” with the notion that it could somehow simultaneously be “pending,” as well. See Courtenay, 125 Ga. App. at 583. In addition, while the court determined that “statutory authority for the criminal dead docket is contained in”
The dead docket was an existing administrative procedure used by trial courts when it was incorporated by the legislature into
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion in Newman and its progeny (and of this Court in reliance thereon) that a dead-docketed count is a pending count defies reason. As a practical and procedural matter, when a case/count is moved to the dead docket, it has simultaneously been removed from the active docket. See Marcus, 206 Ga. App. at 385 (“Following the arrest of the defendant, the case was removed from the dead docket and returned to active status.”). See also Howard v. Warden, 776 F3d 772, 775-776 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that because the trial court moved the defendant’s indictment to the Georgia “dead docket”, “[b]y definition, the indictment is not active, see
3. This conclusion comрorts with how a dead-docketed case/count has been consistently treated in our trial courts, where the procedure was first adopted and continues to be utilized. And, to conclude otherwise would render the dead-docket meaningless,
Under our current ruling, whenever a criminal trial results in a conviction on one or more counts and a mistrial on others, the defendant cannot directly appeal his conviction – even when a written disposition has been filed of record – if the defendant’s mistried counts are placed on the dead docket. Instead, in these circumstances, which are common, the defendant must ask the trial court for a certificate of immediate review within just ten days of the
I fear that our trial and appellate courts will not view a defendant’s request for immediate review of his conviction, where he also has a dead-docketed count, as a matter of such importance that immediate review must be had. And, even if they do, the time period for seeking and filing an interlocutory appeal in this context is unrealistic given that the defendant has a constitutional right to retain or be appointed conflict-free appellate counsel to represent
While I recognize that “Georgia law is well settled that the
The majority opinion holds that these cases provide no authority for our consideration of a case in this posture because:
[I]n none of those cases was there any discussion of jurisdiction at all, much less analysis and a holding on the issue. Decisions of this Court and of the Court of Appeals do not stand for points that were neither raised by the parties nor actually decided in the resulting opinion, and questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.
(Citation and punctuation omitted).
However, I am not relying on these cases for their authority. I cite these cases to demonstrate that we have rightly considered direct appeals of cases in this posture for more than 20 years (and possibly longer given that the cases noted above are not an exhaustive account).
5. I conclude that the dead-docketing of Seals’s rape charge
Noting that my view is not the prevailing one, I strongly urge our legislature to take affirmative steps to change the language of
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Melton joins in this dissent.