Lead Opinion
In September of 1996, the voters of Henry County passed a referendum authorizing the imposition of a Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) for a period of five years. The tax was intended to raise not more than $60 million for road and street repair, as well as for specified capital projects. During the five-year period, the tax generated more than $71.8 million in revenue. Although $60 million was spent for the stated purposes, certain of the projects remained incomplete. When the County proposed to expend the additional SPLOST funds on the unfinished projects, James L. Haugen, who is a resident and taxpayer of the County, instituted an action seeking mandamus and injunctive relief. He alleged that, pursuant to OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B) and (g) (2), any “excess proceeds” must be used to reduce ad valorem taxes.
The County moved to dismiss and the trial court granted the
1. Under OCGA § 9-11-4 (k), “ordinary process” may be used in a mandamus action as an alternative method of service to that authorized by OCGA § 9-6-27 (a). DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill,
[t]he methods of service provided in this Code section may be used as alternative methods of service ... in any other special statutory proceedings . . . and, in any such proceeding, service shall be sufficient when made in accordance with the statutes relating particularly to the proceeding or in accordance with this Code section.
See In the Matter of: Inquiry Concerning a Judge,
2. The tax was in effect for the full five-year period. See Jackson v. Shadix,
“The natural meaning of ‘or,’ where used as a connective, is “ ‘to mark an alternative and present choice, implying an election to do
There is nothing in the statute to support the conclusion that the estimated cost invariably controls over the actual cost. By using the word “or,” the General Assembly anticipated that, on occasion, actual cost would be the applicable standard for determining “excess proceeds.” The construction of the statute advanced by the dissent leads to the anomalous result that the County cannot use available SPLOST revenues to complete those very projects for which the tax was expressly proposed, approved and imposed. However, one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction requires the courts to “consider the consequences of any proposed interpretation and not construe the statute to reach an unreasonable result unintended by the legislature. [Cit.]” Trust Co. Bank v. Ga. Superior Court Clerks’ Cooperative Auth.,
*
is bound ... to complete all projects . . . unless circumstances arise which dictate that projects which initially seemed feasible are no longer so. In this regard the governing authority has discretion to make adjustments in the plans for these projects, but may not abandon the projects altogether.
Dickey v. Storey,
Accordingly, the only construction of OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B) which comports with sound reasoning and the entirety of the statute of which it is a part is that the actual cost, rather than estimated cost, establishes the maximum amount of SPLOST revenue that can be expended. While estimated “or” actual cost are the applicable standards for determining “excess proceeds,” on those occasions when actual cost exceeds estimated cost, actual cost is the determinative standard. Thus, even though the tax proceeds received by the taxing authority may exceed the estimated cost of any given unfinished project, no “excess” proceeds exist so long as the project remains incomplete. To hold otherwise would render OCGA § 48-8-121 (a) (1) meaningless and sanction the unnecessary abandonment of projects based upon a good-faith, but incorrect estimate as to the effect of inflation or other variables on the actual cost to complete them.
The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature. General Electric Credit Corp. of Ga. v. Brooks,
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion that OCGA § 9-
The pivotal question in this case is whether the $11.8 million in net tax revenues, collected over and above the $60 million amount specified in both the authorizing resolution and the referendum voted on by the taxpayers of Henry County, qualifies as “excess proceeds” under OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B), and therefore, is required to be used to reduce ad valorem taxes. See OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (2).
OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (1) (B) plainly defines “excess proceeds” as net tax proceeds “in excess of the maximum cost of the project or projects stated in the resolution or ordinance calling for the imposition of the tax or in excess of the actual cost of such project or projects.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute is not ambiguous. As the majority acknowledges, the statutory language is in the disjunctive, and the well-settled meaning of the connective “or” is that it presents an alternative choice, that is, an election of one of two things. Gearinger v. Lee,
The statute provides that there are “excess proceeds” in two instances - when the net tax revenues exceed the maximum cost of the project or projects specified in the resolution or ordinance, or
Even if the forthright language of the statute could be characterized as ambiguous, and thus susceptible of judicial construction, basic rules of statutory construction will produce the same result. This Court must give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part of the statute. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended that any part of a statute would be without meaning and mere surplus-age. Transportation Ins. Co. v. El Chico Restaurants,
Last, but certainly not least, the majority’s decision works a grave injustice to the taxpayers of Henry County. The result is that the burden of the uncompleted county projects is shifted to the unwitting taxpayer, rather than holding the taxing authority accountable for a seemingly unrealistic assessment of cost and/or project scope. It forces the taxpayers of Henry County to fund county projects in an amount which was never disclosed, and certainly never approved by them. In the final analysis, it is simply that the taxing authority should say what it means and mean what it says. The taxpayers deserve no less.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.
Notes
OCGA § 48-8-121 (g) (2) provides:
Excess proceeds subject to this subsection shall be used solely for the purpose of reducing any indebtedness of the county other than indebtedness incurred pursuant to this article. If there is no such other indebtedness or, if the excess proceeds exceed the amount of any such other indebtedness, then the excess proceeds shall then next be paid into the general fund of the county, it being the intent that any funds so paid into the general fund of the county be used for the purpose of reducing ad valorem taxes.