Dеfendant Marcus is charged by indictment with the offenses of trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A motion to suppress contraband found in a vehicle driven by defendant was denied on August 26, 1988, by Judge William Killian. Subsequently, a bench warrant for the arrest of defendant was issued for his failure to appear at a scheduled court appearance, but defendant was not arrested, and the case was placed on the dead docket on March 25, 1991. Following the arrest of defendant, the case was removed from the dead docket and returned to active status. Upon reinstatement of the case, it was apparently assigned to Judge Blenn Taylor. On June 5, 1992, defendant filed a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of his 1988 motion to suppress. Upon consideration of defendant’s motion, Judge Taylor granted defendant’s motion to suppress and the State appeals this ruling. Held:
1. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion for rehearing where the previous judge’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress was authorizеd by the evidence presented at the original hearing and where defendant presented neither new evidеnce nor new law in support of the motion for. rehearing. The trial court may, within its sound discretion, consider anew a suppression motion previously denied.
Chastain v. State,
*386
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering factual findings from the written record which were inconsistent with those implicit in the рrevious ruling on the motion to suppress evidence. Indeed, similar circumstances were examined and aрproved in
United States v. Raddatz,
Relying upon our decision in
Cook v. State,
2. The Statе’s remaining enumeration of error contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. While the State argues that defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the car hе was driving, we find this assertion to be without merit. The uncontroverted evidence is that the vehicle had been entrusted to defendant by its owner; he was the sole occupant and driver; and defendant had personalty in the vehicle.
State v. Combs,
The State’s evidence was that defendant was stopped by State Trooper Bennett, who observed thе vehicle driven by defendant to be traveling on the yellow line on the left side of the northbound lane of an interstаte highway. The trooper testified that defendant then changed to the right lane without giving a signal and then crossed thе white line on the right side of the roadway. Defendant produced a Florida driver’s license upon request and also the vehicle registration. The trooper testified that after he had talked to defendant for a while, he asked defendant “if he minded if I took a look in the trunk of his car and he said that he did not. And he opened the trunk for *387 mе.” Under the State’s evidence, the defendant went on to consent to the trooper looking in a suitcase in the trunk and eventually in a box in the suitcase where the contraband was found.
In contrast, the defendant testified that he was not weaving and had not crossed thе lines at the sides of the roadway. Defendant also testified that he had not given consent for the search оf the trunk of the car, nor the suitcase or box, and that he had opened the trunk only after the trooper hаd asserted that he had a right to it whether defendant wanted him to or not.
Unless clearly erroneous, the trial court’s ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted on appeal.
Dean v. State,
Judgment affirmed.