Seals v. State
S20G0931
| Ga. | Jun 18, 2021Background
- Grand jury indicted Demarquis Seals on two counts: rape and child molestation; jury convicted on child molestation and mistried on rape.
- Trial court entered a 20-year sentence on the child-molestation count and later placed the rape count on the dead docket.
- Seals filed (and amended) a motion for new trial; the trial court denied it and Seals timely appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the dead-docketed rape count left the case pending below, so Seals needed a certificate of immediate review.
- Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether dead-docketing an unresolved count prevents a direct appeal as a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Seals) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a multi-count criminal "case" is "no longer pending" for OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1) when at least one count remains unresolved | A dead-docketed count is inactive/removed and does not prevent the conviction on other counts from being final and directly appealable | A count placed on the dead docket remains undecided and may be reinstated, so the entire case remains pending and is not final | Court: A case is still pending if any count is unresolved; conviction is not a final judgment for immediate appeal when other counts remain pending |
| Whether dead-docketing changes the legal status of an unresolved count (i.e., is it effectively dismissed) | Dead-docketing severs or inactivates the count so it should not block finality | Dead-docketing is an administrative suspension, not a dismissal; the count remains pending and may be reinstated | Court: Dead-docketing does not dispose of a count; it remains pending and thus prevents finality |
| Whether federal severance/joinder precedent or other cited authorities require treating decided counts as independently final | Seals and State cite authorities suggesting decided counts may be treated separately (e.g., severance doctrine) | The State also cited some U.S. Supreme Court precedents, but those do not control the meaning of Georgia’s statute | Court: Federal joinder/severance cases are inapposite to construing OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1); Georgia precedent controls |
| Proper remedy/procedure when only dead-docketed counts remain unresolved | Seals argued direct appeal should be available | State: interlocutory procedures apply; defendant should seek certificate of immediate review | Court: Defendant must obtain a certificate of immediate review to appeal; the legislature may amend statute if it wants different results |
Key Cases Cited
- Zorn v. Lamar, 71 Ga. 80 (1883) (holding a defendant remains in the court below while issues remain untried)
- Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680 (2002) (multi-count indictment not final until written judgment entered on each count)
- Outen, State v., 289 Ga. 579 (2011) (order dismissing one count was not final while another count remained pending)
- Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581 (1972) (placing a case on the dead docket is neither a dismissal nor termination; matter remains subject to trial)
- Beam v. State, 265 Ga. 853 (1995) (describing dead-docketing as prosecution postponed indefinitely but capable of reinstatement)
- Phillips v. State, 279 Ga. 704 (2005) (dead-docketing does not terminate prosecution; court may return case to active docket)
- Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920) (to be appealable, a judgment must be final as to the whole subject-matter and all causes of action involved)