People v. Prudholme, 531 P.3d 341

In November 2018 Prudholme was arrested after loading >$4,100 in electronics; originally charged with second-degree robbery but, by plea, pleaded to second-degree burglary.
Plea agreement: robbery dismissed; defendant received one year county jail (already served) and three years probation with other standard conditions; defendant filed a notice of appeal before judgment became final.
Assembly Bill 1950 (effective Jan. 1, 2021) amended Penal Code §1203.1 to cap most felony probation at two years; no express statement on retroactivity.
The Court of Appeal held AB 1950 applied retroactively but remanded under People v. Stamps to permit the People/trial court to withdraw from the plea; Supreme Court granted review.
Supreme Court held AB 1950 applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases and the appropriate remedy for an existing plea with a longer probation term is to modify the judgment to the new two-year maximum while leaving the remainder of the plea intact.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does AB 1950 apply retroactively to cases not final on appeal?	AB 1950 applies retroactively (AG agreed).	AB 1950 applies retroactively; defendant seeks relief.	Yes — Estrada presumption: ameliorative changes apply to nonfinal cases.
If retroactive, must courts remand under Stamps to permit withdrawal/renegotiation of plea?	Parties should be allowed to withdraw/renegotiate (Stamps procedure).	Remedy should be simple modification of probation term to two years, leave plea otherwise intact.	No remand required here; modify probation to two years and keep remaining plea terms.
Does Penal Code §1192.5 bar judicial modification of plea terms to conform to new statutory limits?	§1192.5 generally prohibits courts from altering plea terms; thus Stamps remand is appropriate.	§1192.5 does not shield plea bargains from ameliorative legislative changes intended to apply retroactively.	Section 1192.5 creates an ambiguity here, but legislative intent favors applying AB 1950 to nonfinal pleas and modifying probation terms.
Would reducing probation from three to two years fundamentally alter the bargain (entitling People to withdraw under Collins)?	Shortening may substantially alter the bargain; People should be able to withdraw.	A one-year reduction does not substantially deprive People of the bargain; Collins does not require withdrawal.	The reduction did not fundamentally alter the character of the bargain; People not entitled to withdraw.

In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Cal. 1965) (ameliorative criminal-law changes apply to convictions not yet final absent clear contrary intent)
People v. Stamps, 9 Cal.5th 685 (Cal. 2020) (remand procedure where legislative change grants trial courts new discretion that could affect plea bargains)
People v. Harris, 1 Cal.5th 984 (Cal. 2016) (electorate/legislature may expressly provide retroactive relief for pleas; plea bargains not insulated from clearly intended changes)
People v. Collins, 21 Cal.3d 208 (Cal. 1978) (when defendant gets total relief that deprives the state of bargained-for benefits, People may reinstate dismissed counts)
People v. Segura, 44 Cal.4th 921 (Cal. 2008) (describing limits on a court’s ability to alter accepted plea bargains)
People v. Sims, 59 Cal.App.5th 943 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (characterizing AB 1950 as providing ameliorative benefits by reducing exposure to onerous probation conditions)