THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAMIRO MUNOZ, Defendant and Appellant.
B336656
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN
Filed 4/8/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA052535)
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan Grossman and Mi Kim for Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Ramiro Munoz appeals from the superior court‘s order denying his petition for recall and resentencing under
In 2023 Munoz filed a petition under
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. A Jury Convicts Munoz of Murder, and the Trial Court Sentences and Resentences Him
In 2006 Munoz, a member of a criminal street gang, killed Marcos Juarez by shooting him in the head and neck, for no apparent reason other than Munoz thought Juarez belonged to a (presumably, rival) gang. Juarez was not a member of a gang; he was just driving with his cousins to a family gathering. (People v. Munoz (Apr. 13, 2009, B207341) [nonpub. opn.].)
A jury found Munoz guilty of first degree murder (
B. Munoz Files a Petition Under Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(1), and the Superior Court Denies It
In 2023, after serving 15 years of his sentence, Munoz filed a petition for resentencing under
At oral argument the People agreed with Munoz that his sentence is the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and that denying his petition would violate his equal protection rights. We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on whether the Legislature,
DISCUSSION
Munoz argues that his sentence of 50 years to life is “a de facto LWOP sentence under the law” and that he “was therefore entitled to petition to recall his sentence” under
A. Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(1), and Section 3051
Soon after Miller the California Supreme Court decided People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262. In Caballero the trial court sentenced the defendant, who had been convicted on three counts of attempted murder, to an aggregate prison term of 110 years to life. (Id. at p. 265.) Relying on Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 48, the California Supreme Court held “sentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender‘s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (Caballero, at p. 268.)4
Echoing language from Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at page 68, the author of Senate Bill No. 9 stated: “The sentence of life without parole is a sentence intended for the worst of the worst criminals and crimes. As such, it is inappropriate for juveniles.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra, p. 7.) The legislative analyses concluded “sentencing minors to die in prison is barbaric” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 15, 2011, p. 2), оbserved there was “no system of review for these cases” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra,
The same year Senate Bill No. 9 became law (2013), the Legislature enacted
B. Rules of Statutory Construction and Standard of Review
“Statutory construction begins with the plain, commonsense meaning of the words in the statute, ‘because it is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and purpose.’ [Citation.] A statute is not to be read in isolation, but construed in context and ‘with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ [Citation.] ‘If there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and we need not resort to legislative history to determine the statute‘s true meaning.‘” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 622-623; see Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.)
“The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. [Citation.] When the trial court applies its factual findings
C. Munoz Is Not Eligible fоr Relief Under Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(1), and 50 Years to Life Is Not the Functional Equivalent of Life Without the Possibility of Parole
In Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 the defendant argued that he was eligible for relief under
The minimum parole eligibility of Munoz‘s sentence (50 years), however, is less than half the defendant‘s in Heard (103 years). The other cases Munoz cites also involved sentences with minimum parole eligibility dates much greater than 50 years. (See People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047, [67 years, plus 40 years to life]; People v. Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440 [10 years, plus 130 years to life]; People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 63 [sentence where the defendant would not be eligible for parole until he was 88 years old was “materially indistinguishable” from a sentence of life without parole].) Munoz‘s sentence is quantitatively different from the sentences in those cases.
Moreover, other than citing Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 268 and presumably recognizing that most people (let alone most inmates) do not live to 103 (or, in the case of the 15-year-old defendant in Heard, 118), the court in Heard did not discuss how to calculate whether a defendant‘s sentence is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (or whether, in non-obvious cases, a court should be making that calculation). (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) The Supreme Court in Caballero, however, gave some guidance, although in an Eighth Amendment, nonhomicide context. In Caballero the Supreme Court, concluding a defendant who “will become parole eligible over 100 years from now” was serving “the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence,” stated that the defendant “would have no opportunity to ‘demonstrate growth and maturity’ to try to secure his release” and that, under Graham “a state must provide a juvenile offender ‘with some realistic opportunity to obtain release’ from prison during his or her expected lifetime.” (Caballero, at p. 268.) In contrast to the defendant in Caballero, Munoz will be 65 years old when he becomes eligible for parole (putting aside any hearing he may receive under
Munoz, supporting amicus, and the dissent cite from a range of studies, statistical analyses, law review articles, “social science research studies,” and online publications and reports by private and public entities and authors. Based on the “empirical evidence” in these studies and articles, Munoz claims his sentence of 50 years to life “means that [he] will likely die in prison before reaching his normal parole eligibility date.” Because Munoz did not present these data in the superior court, we cannot evaluate their untested validity and do not consider them. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 862 [“To strike down an act of the Legislature as irrational based on a set of untested empirical findings would be antithetical to multiple settled principles of judicial review.“]; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 58 [The concept of “life in prison with no possibility of parole is clear. [Citation.] We are not persuaded by empirical claims made outside the appellate record and untested at trial suggesting the contrary is true.“].) Even People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), on which Munoz and the dissent
should turn on the niceties of epidemiology, genetic analysis, or actuarial sciences in determining precise mortality dates.“].)8
In addition, it is typically the function of the Legislature, not the courts, to sift through studies and research and to make policy decisions. (See Michael Leslie Productions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1026 [“It is a legislative function to consider data, opinion, and arguments, and then to exercise discretion guided by considerations of the public welfare.“]; see also People v. Raybon (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1056, 1084 [“the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function“].) Indeed, before enacting
development“]; Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra, pp. 7-8 [citing research by Human Rights Watch that approximately 45 percent of youth offenders serving sentences of life without the possibility of parole “were convicted of murder but were not the ones to actually commit the murder” and that, in nearly 70 percent of cases where the youth offender was not acting alone, at least one codefendant was an adult]; id. at p. 8 [citing a “national study” that estimated 59 percent of youth offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole have no prior criminal history].)
some but not all defendants serving lengthy prison sentences. (See People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 205 [“When the Legislature reforms one area of the law, it is not required to reform other areas of the law.“]; Cervantes, at p. 888 [the Legislature “may elect to make reforms ‘one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problеm which seems most acute to the legislative mind‘“]; People v. Acosta (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 521, 528 [“Nothing compels the state ‘to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.‘“].) In enacting
Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th 349 is not to the contrary. In Contreras two juvenile defendants were convicted of kidnapping and sexual offenses, and the trial court sentenced one of them to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life and the other to eight years, plus two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. (Id. at pp. 358, 415.) In evaluating whether the defendants’ sentences violated the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court held “the proper starting point is not a life expectancy table but the reasoning of the high court in Graham.” (Id. at p. 364Graham prohibits states from “making the judgment at the outset” that juvenile offenders “who commit truly horrifying crimes” will never “be fit to reenter society.” (Id. at p. 367Graham.” (Id. at pp. 369, 379.)
The defendants in Contreras, however, did not commit murder, which was an integral part of the Supreme Court‘s
analysis. (See, e.g., Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 365 [“Central to [Graham‘s] analysis was its ‘consideration of the culpability of thе offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.‘“]; id. at p. 369 [sentence of 50 years to life was “a highly severe punishment for a juvenile nonhomicide offender” who, “when compared to an adult murderer,’ has ‘a twice diminished moral culpability‘“]; see also Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 69 [“There is a line ‘between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual.‘“].)
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Contreras considered only whether the defendants’ sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. (See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 360 [“The question here is whether [the] sentence of 50 years to life or [the] sentence of 58 years to life for nonhomicide offenses violates the same Eighth Amendment principles that bar the imposition of LWOP for their crimes.“].) Munoz does not argue his sentence is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.9 The Supreme Court in Contreras did not address whether a sentence of 50 years to life for a juvenile offender who committed homicide is the functional equivalent of life without parole for purposes of eligibility under
parole sentence” in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has “not held that a lengthy term-of-years sentence is necessarily equivalent to a life without parole sentence for all purposes“].)
Munoz also argues there is an “evolving Legislative intent” to include defendants sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole among those eligible for relief under
as the statutory language reflects, the Legislature decided (first in 2013, and then in 2017) not to make such juvenile offenders eligible (yet, anyway) for relief under
Munoz argues that, if this court concludes “the Legislature did not intend to include those with de facto LWOP, it should nevertheless find the statute‘s exclusion of juvenile offenders with de facto LWOP is an equal protection violation.” Munoz‘s sentence, however, is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. Munoz does not argue that, even if his sentencе is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, denying defendants like him sentenced to 50 years to life the right to petition under
DISPOSITION
The order denying Munoz‘s petition under
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
I concur:
STONE, J.
FEUER, J., Dissenting
The majority concludes that Munoz‘s 50-years-to-life sentence is not the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) based on its assumption that Munoz “will have a realistic opportunity to obtain release from prison during his expected lifetime” after serving 50 years in prison (i.e., at the age of 65). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) In reaching this conclusion, the majority declines to apply the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 359, 369 (Contreras) that “a sentence of 50 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP” with respect to an Eighth
That sentences of 50 or more years to life are functionally equivalent to LWOP sentences does not, however, resolve the question whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature to distinguish between explicit LWOP sentences and functionally equivalent LWOP sentences. The majority is correct that the
Legislature may proceed incrementally in addressing a problem, for example, initially providing relief only to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP or equivalent terms that with certainty would result in the juvenile offenders never being released from prison. But given the Legislature’s stated intent in enacting
I. A 50-Years-to-Life Sentence Is Functionally Equivalent to LWOP
The Supreme Court’s holding in Contreras hinged on its rejection of the argument made by the Attorney General (adopted by the majority here) that “any term of imprisonment that provides a juvenile offender with an opportunity for parole within his or her expected natural lifetime is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 360.) Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion thаt a 76.9-year life expectancy of a 16-year-old male living in the United States in 2010 (according to a vital statistics report published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) meant a juvenile offender sentenced in 2010 to 50
The Contreras court continued, “[E]ven if there were a legally and empirically sound approach to estimating life expectancy, it must be noted that a life expectancy is an average. [Citation.] In a normal distribution, about half of a population reaches or exceeds its life expectancy, while the other half does not. . . . An opportunity to obtain release does not seem ‘meaningful’ or ‘realistic’ within the meaning of Graham if the chance of living long enough to make use of that opportunity is roughly the same as a coin toss.” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 363-364, citing Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 82.) Thus, the court explained, “[W]e do not believe the outer boundary of a lawful sentence can be fixed by a concept that by definition would not afford a realistic opportunity for release to a substantial fraction of juvenile offenders.” (Contreras, at p. 364.)
Munoz relies on raw data collected by the California prison system’s health care services agency on recorded inmate deaths (not statistical estimates of life expectancies) that underscore the point made in Contreras that a substantial fraction of juvenile offenders facing sentences of 50 years to life will never be released from prison, or will be released at a time late in their lives when they will no longer have “a sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a productive and respected member of the citizenry” as envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in Graham. (See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 368.)
Specifically, Munoz cites to inmate mortality reviews prepared by the California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS2) that state the total number of deaths each year of inmates in California prisons and the ages of
The majority declines to consider these data because they were introduced on appeal and their validity was “untested” in the trial court. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.) The majority relies principally on People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), in which the Supreme Court, in addressing an equal protection challenge to
The average ages at death of California inmаtes in 2010, 2011, and 2012 reported by CCHCS are demographic facts reported by a state agency that are unchallenged by the People, require no further validation, and are relevant to
In addition to CCHCS data, amicus curiae Pacific Juvenile Defender Center (PJDC) points out that serious and violent juvenile offenders are “disproportionately victims of trauma, abuse, neglect, and maltreatment during childhood, as compared to the less severe or non-offending juvenile population,” citing Fox, et al., Trauma Changes Everything: Examining the Relationship Between Adverse Childhood Experiences and Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders (2015) 46 Child Abuse & Neglect, at pp. 1-2. Further, a 2020 study cited by PJDC rеports that children who experience multiple adverse experiences (such as trauma) “had a 4.54 times higher all-cause mortality risk . . . than that of children with a low adversity trajectory.” (Rod, et al., Trajectories of childhood adversity and mortality in early adulthood: a population-based cohort study 396 (No. 10249) Lancet (2020) 489-497.)
The CCHCS reports showing that from 2010 to 2012 the average age at death of inmates in California prisons was between 54 and 55 years old and the studies cited by PJDC concerning juvenile offenders’ increased mortality risk buttress a conclusion that a sentence for a 15- to 16-year-old juvenile offender of 50-years-to-life is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence because a substantial percentage of juvenile offenders will die in prison or be released at the end of their lifetimes, without a meaningful opportunity to become productive members of society.6 In this case, Munoz was sentenced to a prison term that, at the time of sentencing, would not have afforded him an opportunity for parole until thе age of 65.7 And as the Contreras court observed, given that life expectancy depends on an individual’s race and
Moreover, as the Contreras court reasoned, “Even assuming defendants’ parole eligibility dates are within their expected lifespans, the chance for release would come near the end of their lives.” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 368.) Therefore, the sentences “‘fall[] short of giving them the realistic chance for release’” that would enable them to be rehabilitated and become “a productive and respected member of the citizenry.” (Ibid.) The court relied on the teaching in Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 48, that a “lawful sentence must recognize ‘a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability,’” “‘hope of restoration,’” “‘a chance tо demonstrate maturity and reform,’” a “‘chance for fulfillment outside prison walls,’” a “‘chance for reconciliation with society,’” “‘the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential,’” and an “incentive to become a responsible individual.” (Contreras, at p. 367.)
The majority distinguishes Contreras on the basis the defendants there, in contrast to Munoz, did not commit murder. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-16.) But the crimes the defendants in Contreras committed were egregious, including multiple counts of forcible rape and other sex crimes against two minor victims. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 357; see People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 119-120, 129 (Williams) [rejecting equal protection challenge to exclusion of One Strike law sex offenders from relief under
In sum, 50-years-to-life sentences for juvenile offenders, which will result in a substantial percentage of juvenile offenders dying before their parole eligibility dates set at sentencing, and others being released toward the end of their lifetimes with no realistic opportunity to become productive members of society, are the functional equivalent of explicit LWOP sentences for purposes of an equal protection challenge.
II. Exclusion of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to 50 Years to Life from Resentencing Relief Under Section 1170(d)(1) Violates Equal Protection
Both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. (
Because
In Hardin, the Supreme Court held
The majority suggests, albeit in the context of functional equivalence, that the Legislature could have taken an incremental approach in deciding where to draw the line for which juvenile offenders are eligible for resentencing relief by first addressing juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit LWOP sentences (who with certainty will die in prison without any chance of release). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.) As the Supreme Court explained in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 866 with respect to the defendant’s equal protection challenge to
Excluding functionally equivalent LWOP sentences from
Further, the legislative history addresses the evolution of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions concerning juvenile offender sentences, citing Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 and Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at page 75 and emphasizing the language in Graham that a juvenile offender must have “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rеhabilitation.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 9, as amended May 27, 2011, p. 10, italics omitted.) As discussed, at the time
Moreover, we do not simply consider whether it is possible the Legislature had a purpose in distinguishing between juvenile offenders who will certainly die in prison and those who are likely to die in prison or be released at the end of their lifetimes, but rather, whether it is plausible the Legislature intended to make this distinction consistent with the Legislature’s intent in enacting
In light of the Legislature’s intent in enacting
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
FEUER, J.
Notes
Moreover,