THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; MARIANO VALDEZ, Real Party in Interest.
E084222
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Filed 2/10/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION;
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. John D. Molloy, Judge. Petition granted.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney and W. Matthew Murray, Deputy District Attorney for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, William A. Meronek and Nicholas A. Kross, Deputy Public Defenders for Real Party in Interest.
Real party in interest Mariano Albert Valdez was originally sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under
In 2022, People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard) held that it would violate equal protection to deny resentencing relief under
In 2024, Valdez again petitioned for resentencing under
The People petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez resentencing relief under
We publish this opinion in order to clarify that Heard‘s reasoning does not apply to a request for resentencing under
BACKGROUND
I. The conviction and sentence
Valdez was born in April 1981. In 2000, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (
II. Resentencing under section 1170(d)(1)
In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under
III. Resentencing under section 1170(d)(10)
In November 2022, Valdez became eligible under
In October 2023, Valdez, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing under
Valdez filed a supplemental petition for resentencing under
The trial court found the petition to be a successive petition filed under
The trial court granted a three-week stay to allow the People to file a petition for writ of mandate to seek review of the court‘s ruling, which the People did. We stayed proceedings in the trial court pending our decision on the writ petition.
DISCUSSION
The People contend that the trial court erred by granting Valdez‘s resentencing petition because (1) Heard was wrongly decided, and (2) Valdez‘s
We need not decide whether we agree with the equal protection analysis in Heard as it applies to
I. Juvenile sentencing law
Over the last two decades, both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have recognized that the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment limits “the punishment that may constitutionally be imposed on juvenile offenders.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 615.) In 2010, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham) held that the Eighth Amendment categorically “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” (Graham, at p. 82; id. at p. 74; see also Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568, 572, 578 [Eighth Amendment categorically exempts imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under age 18 when the crime was committed].) Graham explained that a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime need not be guaranteed eventual release, but if a sentence of life is imposed on such a juvenile offender, then that offender must be provided “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” (Graham, at p. 75; id. at p. 82.)
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) extended Graham‘s reasoning (but not its categorical ban) to juvenile offenders who commit homicide. (Miller, at pp. 476-477, 480, 489.) Miller held “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments‘” (id. at p. 465) and that a judge or jury sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide crime must have the opportunity to consider
In 2012, the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero) held that “a 110-year-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses contravenes Graham‘s mandate against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 265.) Because the juvenile defendant was not eligible for parole for 100 years, the court reasoned that the indeterminate sentence “with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender‘s natural life expectancy” amounted to the “functional equivalent” of a sentence to LWOP, which the Eighth Amendment prohibits for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide crimes. (Caballero, at p. 268.)
In order to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller, and Caballero, our Legislature added sections
In 2016, our Supreme Court held in Franklin that the reasoning of Caballero applies to juvenile homicide offenders and that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP “without the protections outlined in Miller.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 276.) The juvenile homicide offender in Franklin was sentenced to 50 years to life and argued that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Franklin, at p. 268Franklin concluded that the defendant‘s challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence was rendered moot by section 3051, which became effective after the defendant was sentenced. (id. at pp. 276-277.) Franklin explained that section 3051 “changed the manner in which the juvenile offender‘s original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole.” (id. at p. 278.) The court described the defendant‘s sentence, as transformed by the retroactive application of section 3051, as “a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration, when he will be 41 years old.” (id. at p. 279.) Franklin “conclude[d] that such a sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP” (ibid.), reasoning that the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing meant that the defendant was “serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration” (id. at pp. 279-280).
Two years later, in Contreras, our Supreme Court concluded that sentences of 50 years to life and 58 years to life for two 16-year-old defendants who were not convicted of homicide offenses were the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 356, 368-369.) Both defendants were convicted under the one strike law (
II. Resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)
“If the sentence is not recalled or the defendant is resentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, the defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing” after at least 20 years of incarceration, and another after 24 years. (
“‘The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.‘” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.) We interpret a statute to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent by first looking to the statute‘s language, giving the words a commonsense and plain meaning. (Ibid.) Whether Valdez‘s sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP presents a question of law on undisputed facts, which we independently review. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 518.)
By its terms,
Both Heard and Sorto rejected the argument. (Heard, at pp. 628-629; Sorto, at pp. 447-448.) Heard explained that because
In granting Valdez resentencing relief under
Heard and Sorto concluded that the sentences of the defendants in those cases were the functional equivalent of LWOP despite youth offender parole under
In 2018, Valdez was resentenced to 50 years to life, and his offenses did not exclude him from youth offender parole eligibility. Valdez was resentenced after the enactment of
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Valdez was not resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that equal protection requires that resentencing under
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court (1) to vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief under
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.