THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JAMES LAMONT BAGSBY, Defendant and Appellant.
D083358
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 11/21/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. FSB056642)
Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Robert Luby, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to a total prison term of 107 years to life for violent crimes he committed when he was 15 years old. In 2023, after serving more than 15 years of his sentence, he filed
The trial court agreed with Bagsby that Heard was controlling and granted his petition for recall and resentencing. Although the People opposed granting Bagsby‘s petition, the People conceded, and the trial court agreed, that upon resentencing, Bagsby was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of recent changes in juvenile law. The court ruled the consequence of granting resentencing was that Bagsby had to be released because he could not be transferred to adult criminal court and fell outside the jurisdiction of juvenile court. However, the court stayed the release order pending this appeal.
On appeal, the People ask us to remedy the equal protection violation we found in Heard by striking down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision. If we decline, they alternatively ask us to reconsider Heard. The People further contend the trial court possessed jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release, a reversal of the position they took
Here, we observe that many of the People‘s concerns, although legitimate, are not for this court to resolve. For example, they question whether there is still a need for the section 1170(d) resentencing provision now that the Legislature has afforded youth offender parole hearings even to juveniles with life without parole sentences, and they argue that it would be more appropriate, or “fitting,” for the resentencing provision to be stricken. The People‘s opinions about the wisdom of allowing the provision to remain in place reflect policy concerns that are the domain of the Legislature and would appropriately be directed at that body.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
The Underlying Convictions and Sentence
In June 2006, Bagsby and three of his friends were sitting in the bleachers of a middle school. All four boys were members of the Magnolia Estates street gang. A group of young men, mostly Hispanic, arrived at the school to play basketball. Bagsby approached the group and asked where they were from. Although each in the group answered they were from “nowhere,” meaning they were not affiliated with any gang, Bagsby apparently suspected at least one belonged to a rival gang. He pulled a semiautomatic pistol from his waistband and began shooting at the group of young men on the basketball court. He killed an 11-year-old boy and hit another youth in the hand. Bagsby testified at trial that he was afraid someone would shoot him so he pulled out his gun and began shooting without looking. Bagsby was arrested shortly after the shooting and has
A jury convicted Bagsby of second degree murder with the use of a firearm (
In 2011, this court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. Bagsby, who had a mild intellectual disability,4 challenged only his sentence, contending it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. We concluded the cumulative sentence imposed for second degree murder and 10 counts of assault with a firearm and the attached enhancements, though “harsh,” was not unconstitutional. (People v. Bagsby (Sept. 20, 2011, D058197) [nonpub. opn.].)
II.
Changes in the Law Governing Juvenile Prosecution and Punishment
After Bagsby was convicted and sentenced, there was a seismic shift in the law governing juvenile punishment. (See O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 88 (O.G.) [describing the shift as a ” ‘sea change in penology’ “]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 615-620 [summarizing the “sea change”
Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 triggered this shift. In Roper, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that the
In response to Miller, the Legislature enacted section 1170(d), effective January 1, 2013, the resentencing provision at issue here. (Stats. 2012,
In the petition, “the defendant must describe his or her remorse, relate his or her work toward rehabilitation, and state that a qualifying circumstance is true.” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049 (Kirchner), citing
Then, in Kirchner, our high court held that section 1170(d) was inadequate to cure Miller error. (See Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1054-1055 [stating
In 2022, this court interpreted section 1170(d) to limit eligibility for recall and resentencing to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicitly designated life without parole terms. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
In addition to granting relief to juvenile offenders who were already imprisoned, the shift in approach to juvenile punishment that started with Roper prompted changes to laws that allowed minors to be prosecuted as adults. Historically, offenders younger than 16 could not be prosecuted in adult criminal court. (O.G., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 88.) “In 1995, California began to move away from the historical rule when the Legislature permitted some 14 and 15 year olds to be transferred to criminal court. . . . This trend . . . culminated with Proposition 21 in 2000. For specified murders and sex crimes, Proposition 21 required prosecutors to charge minors 14 years old or older directly in criminal court[, commonly referred to as direct filing]. . . . For other specified serious offenses, Proposition 21 provided prosecutors with discretion to charge minors 14 or older directly in criminal court instead of juvenile court.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) Bagsby was charged and convicted during this period.
Then, in 2016, California voters “implemented a series of criminal justice reforms through the passage of Proposition 57.” (O.G., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 88.) Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the
Effective January 1, 2019, Proposition 57 was amended by the Legislature through Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391). The amendment “eliminat[ed] the transfer of juveniles accused of committing crimes when they are 14 or 15 years old, unless they are first apprehended after the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.” (O.G., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 89, citing
III.
Bagsby Petitions for Recall and Resentencing
In August 2023, after more than 15 years of incarceration, Bagsby filed a petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d). Although he was not sentenced to an explicitly designated term of life without parole, he argued his 107-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, and that he was therefore eligible to petition for resentencing under the equal protection holding of Heard. He argued his petition was
The People opposed Bagsby‘s petition. They did not dispute that a 107-year-to-life sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole or argue that Bagsby failed to meet section 1170(d)‘s other eligibility requirements. Instead, they argued that Heard was “improperly decided.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) They also urged the court to deny relief based on the consequences of granting Bagsby‘s petition. They argued that “[r]ecalling and resentencing [Bagsby] will make his judgment nonfinal which will result in the trial court regaining jurisdiction and a duty to consider changes in the law,” including changes to
At the hearing on Bagsby‘s petition, the prosecutor submitted an abstract of judgment showing that in 2019, while he was in custody, Bagsby was convicted of two new drug offenses for which he was sentenced to a consecutive term of six years and a concurrent term of four years.5 The court stated it intended to grant the petition and order Bagsby‘s release, but that it understood Bagsby would not be released from “all of his charges, only these
IV.
The Trial Court Enters an Order Recalling Bagsby‘s Sentence and Releasing Him from Custody “On These Charges”
The trial court granted Bagsby‘s petition for recall and resentencing in a formal written order entered on November 3, 2023. In the order, the court rejected the People‘s invitation to disregard Heard. It also declined to be influenced by the People‘s invocation of the specter of Bagsby‘s release, stating, “[T]he consequence of following the law is not an argument not to adhere to the law this court is obligated to follow.” Because the People‘s legal arguments were unavailing and they had not challenged the factual bases for the petition, the court determined it was required to grant the petition and recall Bagsby‘s sentence.
The trial court then considered the law that governed resentencing. It stated that “Proposition 57 was enacted in 2016 to eliminate direct filing of cases against juveniles in adult court,” and that in People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152 (Padilla), “the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 57 applies to a resentencing when a criminal court sentence imposed on a juvenile offender before the passage of Proposition 57 has been vacated. That is the case here.” The court continued, “In order to move a case to adult court the prosecution would have to make a motion under
At the People‘s request, the trial court also subsequently clarified that although its November 3 order did not say so explicitly, under Proposition 57, Bagsby‘s convictions for second degree murder and assault were converted to juvenile adjudications as a matter of law.7
V.
The Trial Court Stays the Order
At the request of the People, the trial court stayed its November 3, 2023 order for one week. During that week, the People filed a notice of appeal of the November 3 order. They also filed a brief in which they asked the court to stay the November 3 order pending their appeal. On November
DISCUSSION
I.
Because Heard Was Correctly Decided, We Reject the People‘s Challenges to the November 3, 2023 Order
The People raise three challenges to the trial court‘s November 3, 2023 order granting Bagsby‘s petition for recall and resentencing and directing his release from custody “on these charges.” In their first (and primary) challenge, they ask us to remedy the equal protection violation found in Heard by striking the resentencing provision from section 1170. If we decline to strike down the resentencing provision, in their second challenge, they alternatively ask us to reconsider Heard. In their third challenge, they contend the trial court erred when it ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby. These challenges raise claims of legal error that we review de novo. (People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 941.) We take up their request to reconsider Heard first.
A. Heard Was Correctly Decided
To put the People‘s first challenge in context, we will start by summarizing Heard.
Heard involved an equal protection challenge to
On appeal, the defendant argued that section 1170(d)(1), properly interpreted, applied to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.) He alternatively argued that a contrary interpretation would violate his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. (Ibid.) We rejected the defendant‘s interpretation of section 1170(d)(1) based on the plain language of the statute. (Heard, at pp. 612, 622-626.) However, we agreed with him that to deny juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole the opportunity to petition for resentencing violated the equal protection guarantee. (Id. at pp. 612, 626-634.)
Because we considered the defendant‘s appeal before our Supreme Court clarified the standard for equal protection challenges in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), we analyzed the defendant‘s equal protection claim under the then-existing two-step framework. (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 627-633 [considering first whether ” ’ ” ‘two or more similarly situated groups’ ” ’ ” were being treated in an unequal manner, and second whether there was a rational basis for the differential treatment].) At the first step, we concluded that because the defendant was sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, he was similarly situated with the juvenile offenders who were eligible to petition for
At the second step, we tried to identify a rational basis “for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 632.) We considered and rejected the only justification offered by the People, which was: “[T]he Legislature ‘could have reasonably concluded’ ” life without parole was excessive, and the statutory resentencing opportunity was ” ‘an appropriate means of reform.’ ” (Ibid.) We found this justification inadequate because “the same concern applies equally to juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole.” (Ibid.)
Next, we considered on our own two additional possibilities. We explored whether the differential treatment could be justified by the relative culpability of each group. But after observing that section 1170(d)(1) made resentencing available to juvenile offenders convicted of special circumstance murders, which “are considered ‘the most heinous acts’ proscribed by law,’ ” we determined that the “gravity of the crimes committed by the two groups of juvenile offenders . . . fails to explain their differential treatment.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.) Finally, we considered whether the Legislature “might have viewed a juvenile offender whose multiple offenses cause him to receive a lengthy term-of-years sentence as more culpable, and more deserving of severe punishment, than an offender who commits a single, albeit more serious offense.” (Ibid.) But we rejected this as a justification, too, after recognizing that section 1170(d)(1) did not prohibit juveniles sentenced to a term of life without parole “plus additional terms imposed for
“[U]nable to identify a rational basis for making juveniles sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole term, but not juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, eligible to petition for resentencing under section [1170(d)(1)],” we concluded that denying the defendant “the opportunity to petition for resentencing under this provision violates his right to equal protection of the laws.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 633-634.)
The People offer three reasons why we should reconsider Heard. But because Heard is a decision of this court, the People must provide us with a compelling reason to depart from it. (See Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9. [“[a]bsent a compelling reason, the Courts of Appeal are normally loath to overrule prior decisions from another panel of the same undivided district or from the same division“]; accord In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470, fn. 13.) As we will explain, they fail to do so.
1. Franklin Is Consistent with Heard
The People‘s first argument is based on People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. In Franklin, a juvenile offender claimed his 50-year-to-life sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence that was unconstitutional under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460. (Franklin, at pp. 268, 271-273.) Our high court found it did not need to decide this issue because section 3051, which was enacted after the defendant was sentenced, had rendered it moot. (Id. at pp. 268, 278.) The court took care to clarify that the defendant‘s original sentence had not been vacated and continued to remain binding. (See id. at p. 278 [explaining that even after the enactment of
The People argue the holding of Franklin means the nature of Bagsby‘s sentence was changed by section 3051 so that it was no longer the functional equivalent of life without parole by the time he petitioned for resentencing, making Bagsby “not similarly situated with those defendants who are eligible to petition for resentencing.” This does not give us a compelling reason to overturn Heard. We considered and rejected this very argument in Heard.
There, as here, the People claimed the defendant was not similarly situated with resentencing-eligible offenders.8 As here, they relied on Franklin and argued that “section 3051 has ’ “reformed” ’ [the defendant‘s] sentence so that it is no longer the functional equivalent of life without parole.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) We rejected this argument based on the plain language of section 1170(d)(1). We explained this
Thus, we concluded the statute explicitly made eligibility to petition for resentencing contingent on the nature of the defendant‘s original sentence. We observed that in Franklin our high court stated section 3051 “did not alter the defendant‘s original sentence.” (Heard, at p. 629.) We explained, “[a]lthough under Franklin, [the defendant‘s] sentence as it currently operates is no longer the functional equivalent of life without parole, this does not change the fact that the sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence at the time it was imposed. Because [section 1170(d)(1)(A)] refers to the ‘offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole’ (italics added), and [the defendant] was sentenced to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, he is similarly situated with the juvenile offenders whose sentences make them eligible to seek resentencing.” (Ibid.)
The People acknowledge that in Heard we rejected their current argument based on the plain language of section 1170(d)(1). And they do not dispute that Heard carries authoritative weight because it is a decision of this court. They simply state: “Although the People are cognizant that this court has spoken . . . and that the plain language ‘was sentenced’ is law of the case . . . , the People respectfully request that the court reconsider whether the nature of sentence now, as articulated in Franklin, should be applied
Moreover, in three published decisions, the appellate courts have now agreed on the proper interpretation of section 1170(d). The first was Lopez, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at page 654, on which we relied in Heard. (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) In Lopez, two defendants sentenced to life without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles filed habeas petitions based on Graham and had their sentences reduced to life with the possibility of parole. (Lopez, at p. 652.) The defendants then filed petitions for recall and resentencing, which the trial court granted. The People argued on appeal that the defendants were not eligible for resentencing because they were no longer serving life without parole terms. The Court of Appeal disagreed based on the plain language of the statute, which “uses the phrase ‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past.” (Id. at p. 654.) Because the defendants “were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole . . . the literal and ‘plain meaning’ of the statute was satisfied.” (Id. at pp. 653-654.) The court further noted that if the Legislature “intended to exclude defendants whose [life without parole] sentence were modified to cure an
The third was Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 435, a recent decision of Division Three of the Second Appellate District. In Sorto, a defendant sentenced to 10 years plus 130 years to life for crimes he committed in 2005, when he was 15 years old, petitioned for resentencing under section 1170(d). The trial court denied the petition even though the defendant met all of the statute‘s eligibility requirements, per Heard. (Sorto, at pp. 440-441.) On appeal, the People urged the appellate court to affirm by arguing that Heard was wrongly decided for a variety of reasons. The court rejected all of the People‘s arguments and reversed. Among other things, the court agreed with the interpretation given to section 1170(d) in Lopez and Heard, and it concluded the plain language of section 1170(d) “does not require that the defendant currently be serving [a life without parole] sentence.” (Sorto, at pp. 447-448.) In reaching this conclusion, the court added a significant observation of its own: “This interpretation finds further support in the fact that the Legislature amended section 1170(d) several times after Lopez was decided, but it has never clarified that an offender must currently be serving [a life without parole] term to be eligible for relief. . . . Because we may presume the Legislature is aware of existing laws and judicial decisions when it enacts and amends statutes . . . , this history strongly suggests the Legislature agreed with Lopez.” (Sorto, at p. 448, citations omitted.) We agree with this observation, which lends further support to the conclusion we reached in Heard.
In short, the People fail to argue let alone establish that our interpretation of the text of section 1170(d)(1) in Heard was incorrect. Their inability to identify a compelling reason for disagreeing with this aspect of Heard is fatal to their effort to have us overturn it. (Estate of Sapp, supra, 36
2. Hardin Is Consistent with Heard
The second basis on which the People ask us to reconsider Heard is based on Hardin, in which the California Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to
First, the People raised this argument for the first time in their reply brief, even though Hardin was decided before the People filed their opening brief on appeal. ” ‘[P]oints raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before.’ ” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, fn. 26 (Smithey).) No such showing of good cause has been presented here; the People simply
The argument also lacks merit. Contrary to the People‘s contention, Hardin does not provide “ample reason” for reconsidering Heard. Instead, Hardin is consistent with Heard. In Sorto, the Court of Appeal recently had the opportunity to explain why Hardin and Heard are consistent, albeit in response to a slightly different argument. There, the court stated: ”Hardin holds the Legislature reasonably may disfavor explicit [life without parole] offenders based on the rationale that they are more culpable than functionally equivalent [life without parole] offenders. . . . In Heard . . . the
3. The People Fail To Show That the Disparity in Section 1170(d) Is Justified by the Availability of Youth Offender Parole Hearings Under Section 3051
The People‘s third argument in support of reconsidering Heard is based on “statutory changes,” specifically, the enactment of
This argument, too, has been forfeited. The People have asserted it for the first time in reply without showing good cause for the delay. (Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1017, fn. 26.)
It is also unpersuasive. The People‘s point appears to be that for at least some period of time after
Furthermore, as the People acknowledge, the Legislature has now “exten[ded]
B. The People Fail To Show the Legislature Would Prefer for Section 1170(d) To Be Stricken
As noted, the People‘s first and primary contention on appeal is that we should reconsider the remedy for the equal protection violation. Namely, they ask us to find that
We decline the invitation. It is true that “[w]hen a court concludes that a statutory classification violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, it has a choice of remedies.” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1207, overruled on other grounds in Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 888; see Hofsheier, at p. 1207 [observing parenthetically that the available remedies include invalidating the statute].) However, in making that choice we must be guided by the Legislature‘s preference. “In choosing the proper remedy for an equal protection violation, our primary concern is to ascertain, as best we can, which alternative the Legislature would prefer.” (Hofsheier, at p. 1207; accord People v. Fisher (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 745, 759.)
The People fail to demonstrate that the remedy they urge us to adopt is the one the Legislature would prefer. They claim that striking the resentencing provision would be “fitting” because it was held in Kirchner to be inadequate to cure Miller error. They also express the view that deleting the provision would be “fitting” because “there exists another law, [
We are not persuaded. If anything, the circumstances the People identify undermine, rather than support, their extraordinary request. Both of the developments they rely on—the addition of
In Sorto, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Legislature‘s failure to “repeal
In addition, because the People have brought their request to strike the resentencing provision more than two years after we decided Heard, we have additional evidence of legislative intent in the Legislature‘s response to Heard. Since 2022, when Heard was decided, the Legislature has continued to amend
C. The People Do Not Establish That the Trial Court Erred When It Concluded That Bagsby Exceeded Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
The People‘s final challenge is to the trial court‘s finding that Bagsby “exceeds juvenile court jurisdiction.” The People claim this finding was incorrect and the court did possess jurisdiction to resentence him. They assert that if a trial court “has jurisdiction” to recall a defendant‘s sentence on equal protection grounds under
Bagsby contends the People have forfeited this challenge by taking the opposite position in the trial court. Specifically, he points out the People argued that if the trial court granted his petition, it would result in his release because the court would lack jurisdiction to impose a new criminal punishment. The People do not dispute Bagsby‘s claim of forfeiture. Their reply brief is silent on the topic. Indeed their reply brief is devoid of any argument at all in support of their claim that the trial court possessed jurisdiction to “resentence” Bagsby. We take the People‘s silence as an implicit concession the challenge is forfeited, and we accept that concession. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590 [claims not raised in the trial court generally may not be raised for the first time on appeal].) As we will explain, the challenge also lacks merit.
The trial court‘s conclusion that Bagsby “exceeds juvenile court jurisdiction” was the consequence of its determination that once it recalled his sentence, he was entitled to the retroactive benefits of Proposition 57.
Whether the trial court reached the correct conclusion about the scope of its jurisdiction therefore “depends on whether [Bagsby‘s] resentencing under
On review, the Attorney General conceded the vacatur of the defendant‘s sentence made the judgment in his case nonfinal. (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 161.) Our high court agreed, stating, “When [the defendant‘s] sentence was vacated, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and [the defendant] regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture[.]” (Id. at pp. 161-162; see id. at p. 163 [“once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate sentence“].) Because the defendant‘s judgment became nonfinal after his sentence was vacated, “Proposition 57 applies to his resentencing.” (Id. at p. 170.)
The trial court‘s conclusion that Padilla was controlling, if correct, is outcome determinative. And yet the People make almost no effort to distinguish Padilla. They offer nothing more than the bare observation that Padilla did not “deal[ ] with a situation where resentencing was triggered by an equal protection claim” that resulted in the defendant being permitted to seek resentencing under
The People‘s remaining efforts to establish error are just as unavailing. They appear to argue that the Estrada rule of retroactivity does not apply where it would result in no new punishment. This is incorrect. The ameliorative laws that have been held to be retroactive under Estrada include laws that allow criminal defendants to avoid criminal punishment altogether. (See e.g., People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 630-636 [holding that newly enacted mental health diversion statutes,
The People also argue the trial court‘s ruling conflicted with
Next, the People contend the trial court‘s ruling does not “reflect the wider case law,” by which they mean the decisions that include Miller and end with Franklin and Kirchner. (Capitalization, boldface and underlining omitted.) They assert that in these cases, “the defendant who received relief was remanded to a lower court for resentencing.” But most of these cases were decided before Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 took effect, and none of them considered the retroactive effect of these enactments.11 “A case is not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Chavez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 480.)
The People additionally argue “the trial court‘s ruling finding no jurisdiction to resentence [Bagsby] does not follow the written requirements of [section] 1170(d).” (Capitalization, boldface and underlining omitted.) Although their argument is difficult to follow, it appears to rest on the
Finally, the People contend the trial court‘s ruling “does not treat [Bagsby] equally with other similarly situated defendant[s] who are resentenced under that statute” (Capitalization, boldface and underlining omitted.) They assert that “equal protection of the laws requires that the statute should be applied completely, as it would to a juvenile offender, who had been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and fell squarely within the operation of
II.
We Decline To Reverse the November 13, 2023 Stay Order
Bagsby cross-appeals the trial court‘s November 13, 2023 order granting the People‘s request for a stay of its November 3, 2023 release order “to the filing of the remittitur.” He contends the stay order is unauthorized and imposes a “serious restraint on his liberty” in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the People contend that (1) the stay order is not appealable, (2) granting the stay was within the trial court‘s inherent powers, and (3) the stay was properly issued.
We decline to reverse the stay order because Bagsby fails to show it is causing harm that can be remedied through his cross-appeal. We see no
Bagsby also fails to establish either a due process violation or resulting prejudice. (See People v. Talhelm (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 400, 408, fn. 5 [a violation of state law rights amounts to a due process violation only where it implicates a protected interest in life, liberty, or property]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [when an asserted error is one of state law rather than federal constitutional dimension, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice “based upon reasonable probabilities rather than upon mere possibilities“].) He expresses concern that the stay order may have “unknown effects on his credit computation to his other case,” and he therefore asks us to order his release effective “as of the original release date
DISPOSITION
The trial court‘s orders are affirmed. As a consequence, upon remittitur of this matter to the trial court, the November 13, 2023 stay order will expire automatically and the November 3, 2023 release order will take effect, entitling Bagsby to be considered released from the charges in San
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, J.
RUBIN, J.