THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PATTY ANN LAMOUREUX, Defendant and Appellant.
D075794
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 11/19/19
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. SWF1101646)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Reversed.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437), legislation that prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons who were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the courts that sentenced them to vacate their murder convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining counts. (Id., § 3.)
Patty Ann Lamoureux appeals an order denying her petition to vacate a first degree murder conviction and obtain resentencing under the procedures established by Senate Bill 1437. The trial court denied the petition after concluding the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7, a voter initiative that increased the punishments for persons convicted of murder. (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) (Proposition 7).) The People urge us to affirm the denial order on grounds that: (1) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7; (2) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 115, a voter initiative that augmented the list of predicate offenses for first degree felony-murder liability (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) (Proposition 115)); (3) the resentencing provision violates the separation of powers doctrine; and/or (4) the resentencing provision deprives crime victims the rights afforded them by the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, commonly known as Marsy‘s Law (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) (Proposition 9)).
In People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (Nov. 19, 2019, D075787) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ (Gooden), a companion case issued concurrently herewith, we concluded Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidly amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. For the reasons discussed more fully in the Gooden opinion, we reach the same determination here. Further, we conclude the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 does not contravene separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime victims. Therefore, we find no constitutional infirmity with Senate Bill 1437, and we reverse the order denying Lamoureux‘s petition.
BACKGROUND
A
In 2013, a jury convicted Lamoureux of conspiracy to commit robbery (
This court affirmed the murder and conspiracy convictions, but concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that Lamoureux had an intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Miller (Sept. 15, 2015, D067451) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Dec. 9, 2015.) Therefore, we concluded she was not eligible for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, reversed the judgment, in part, and remanded the matter for resentencing. (Ibid.) On January 5, 2016, the trial court resentenced Lamoureux to a prison term of 25 years to life.
B
In 2018, after Lamoureux‘s judgment of conviction became final, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) An uncodified section of the law expressing the Legislature‘s findings and declarations states the law was “necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id., § 1, subd. (f).) It further provides that the legislation was needed “to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of the individual.” (Id., § 1, subd. (e).)
Under the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill 1437, a defendant who intended to commit a specified felony could be convicted of
Independent of the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161–162.) ” ‘Because the nontarget offense [was] unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to that offense [was] irrelevant and culpability [was] imposed simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the nontarget crime.’ ” (People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 867.)
Senate Bill 1437 restricted the application of the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as applied to murder, by amending section 189, which defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) Section 189, subdivision (e), as amended, provides that a participant in a specified felony is liable for murder for a death during the commission of the offense only if one of the following is proven: “(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life ....”2
Senate Bill 1437 also “added a crucial limitation” to section 188, the statutory provision that defines malice for purposes of murder. (People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 (Lopez).) As amended, section 188 provides
Finally, Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code. Section 1170.95 permits a person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the person on any remaining counts if the following conditions are met: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of [the] changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Id., subd. (a).)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver and stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (
If the petitioner is found eligible for relief, the murder conviction must be vacated and the petitioner resentenced “on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been [sic] previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (
C
On January 11, 2019, Lamoureux filed a resentencing petition under section 1170.95. The People opposed the petition on grounds that the amendments effectuated by Senate Bill 1437 were unconstitutional, in whole or part, for four reasons.
The trial court concluded section 1170.95 invalidly amended Proposition 7 and denied Lamoureux‘s petition on that basis without addressing the People‘s remaining arguments. In pertinent part, the court reasoned as follows: “[T]he voters’ intent in enacting Proposition 7 was straightforward: if you are lawfully convicted of murder, then your minimum sentence is 25 [years]to[]life or 15 [years]to[]life, depending on degree. This intent doesn‘t necessarily preclude the Legislature from prospectively modifying the law of murder around the margins ... but it does preclude the Legislature from retroactively redefining murder to vacate convictions that were unquestionably lawful at the time they were entered, thus effectively granting a legislative commutation and reducing the punishment that the electorate mandated for murder....”
Lamoureux appealed the order denying her resentencing petition. The Attorney General permitted the Office of the District Attorney of Riverside County to represent the People‘s interests in this appeal and, for its part, filed an amicus curiae brief defending the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1437.
III
DISCUSSION
A
Under
The
As we explained in the Gooden decision, Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 7 because it did not “address the same subject matter [as Proposition 7]. It did not prohibit what Proposition 7 authorizes by, for example, prohibiting a punishment of 25 years to life for first degree murder or 15 years to life for second degree murder. Nor did it authorize what Proposition 7 prohibits by, for instance, permitting a punishment of less than 25 years for first degree murder or less than 15 years for second degree murder. In short, it did not address punishment at all.” (Gooden, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __ [p. 14].) Because Senate Bill 1437 and Proposition 7 concerned different subjects, we concluded Proposition 7 did not foreclose the Legislature from enacting Senate Bill 1437 to amend the mental state requirements for murder under the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. __ [pp. 12–21].) Our analysis applied to all the legislative amendments effectuated by Senate Bill 1437, including section 1170.95. (Id. at p. __ [pp. 20–21].)
Gooden also concluded Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 115. (Gooden, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at pp. __ [pp. 21–24].) As we explained in that case, Senate Bill 1437 “addresse[d] a matter related to the subject” matter of Proposition 115
because both measures altered the circumstances under which a person may be liable for felony murder. (Id. at pp. __ [pp. 21–22].) However, Senate Bill 1437 “did not augment or restrict the list of predicate felonies on which felony murder may be based, which [was] the pertinent subject matter of Proposition 115.” (Id. at p. __ [p. 22].) On this basis, we determined Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition.
For the foregoing reasons, which are discussed more fully in the Gooden decision, we conclude Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidly amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115.4
As noted ante, the People assert additional challenges to the constitutionality of the resentencing procedure created by section 1170.95—arguments not asserted or addressed in the Gooden appeal. They contend section 1170.95 usurps the executive‘s clemency power in contravention of separation of powers principles because it “legally erases” petitioners’ murder convictions and the penalties attached thereto. Additionally, they contend section 1170.95 impairs a core function of the judiciary because it provides for the retroactive reopening of final judgments. We address these separation of powers arguments in the following sections.
1
“The California Constitution establishes a system of state government in which power is divided among three coequal branches (
To determine whether one branch of government has misappropriated a core or essential function of another in the case at hand, we must first review the pertinent roles of each government branch. “The core functions of the legislative branch include passing laws, levying taxes, and making appropriations.” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Cal. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 299.) Encompassed within the Legislature‘s core function of passing laws is the responsibility of defining crimes and prescribing punishments. (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 118–119; see People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533, 538 [” ‘Only the Legislature ... may make conduct criminal.’ “].)
The Constitution vests “supreme executive power” in the Governor. (
Finally, the judiciary “resolve[s] ‘specific controversies’ between parties. [Citation.] In such proceedings, existing laws ... are interpreted and applied.” (Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 15; see Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1104 [“Courts are empowered to decide controversies, a power derived from the state constitution.“].) The function of resolving specific controversies between parties includes the power to dispose of criminal charges filed by and on behalf of the People. (People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 66 [“[W]hen the jurisdiction of a court has been properly invoked by the filing of a criminal charge, the [d]isposition of that charge becomes a judicial responsibility.“].)
” ‘Although
Therefore, “the separation of powers doctrine has never been applied rigidly.” (Case v. Lazben Financial Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 172, 183, 184; see Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 662 [” ‘[T]he separation of powers principle does not command “a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another.” ’ “].) Instead, it is violated “only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.” (Rosenkrantz, at p. 662.) Further, it ” ‘recognizes that the three branches of government are interdependent, and it permits actions of one branch that may “significantly affect those of another branch.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see, e.g., Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 43–52
2
With these principles in mind, we begin with the People‘s contention that section 1170.95 is an improper legislative encroachment upon the executive clemency power. “One recognized function of the clemency power is the exercise of mercy—a value that has generally been thought to be peculiarly the province of the executive.” (Procedures for Considering Requests for Recommendations Concerning Applications for Pardon or Commutation (2018) 4 Cal.5th 897, 898.) The People contend section 1170.95 intrudes upon the executive‘s clemency authority by establishing a means to “erase[]” convictions and reduce punishment. Based on the following authorities addressing the separation of powers doctrine in the clemency context, we disagree.
In Way v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 165 (Way), plaintiffs consisting of superior court judges, district attorneys, and other interested individuals sought to enjoin the implementation of a provision in the newly-enacted Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 (the UDSA; Stats. 1976, ch. 1139). The provision applied retroactively and, in most cases, permitted prisoners sentenced under the since-repealed Indeterminate Sentence Law to obtain early parole release dates if their prison terms would have been shorter under the new UDSA. (Way, at p. 172.) The plaintiffs argued the retroactive application of the UDSA violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing on the Governor‘s clemency authority. (Id. at p. 169.)
The Way court disagreed. (Way, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at pp. 176–177.) Although the parole provision had “the effect of commutation in certain cases,” the Way court concluded this outcome was “purely incidental to the main legislative purpose” of the provision, which was to ensure “felons concurrently serving sentences for identical offenses [were not] subject to disparate terms solely because of the time when they committed their crimes.” (Id. at p. 177.) Because the Legislature did not enact the provision to extend an “act of mercy, grace, or forgiveness,” and the reduction of final sentences was “incidental” to a “comprehensive reformation of California‘s penal system,” the Way court determined the Legislature did not impermissibly “exercise[] the complete power constitutionally delegated” to the executive. (Id. at pp. 177, 178; see In re Chavez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 989, 1001 (Chavez) [following the Way decision and rejecting separation of powers challenge to legislation changing punishment from indeterminate term to determinate term].)
The Supreme Court cited the Way decision with approval in Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 (Younger). At issue in Younger was a statute permitting an application to be submitted to the Department of Justice for the destruction of arrest and conviction records for marijuana possession. (Id. at p. 111.) The petitioner in Younger filed an application in accordance with the statute, the Attorney General declined to act citing separation of powers concerns, and the petitioner sought writ relief to compel the Attorney General to comply with his statutory obligations. (Id. at pp. 108, 112.)
The Younger court ordered issuance of the writ. It acknowledged “the effects of [a records destruction] order [were] similar to certain effects of a gubernatorial pardon for the same offense,” but nevertheless held there was no separation of powers violation. (Younger, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 117.) The Younger court reasoned the records destruction law was not enacted “as an act of grace,” but rather to “implement[] the Legislature‘s principal objective of reducing the adverse social and personal effects of [a] conviction which linger long after the prescribed punishment has been completed.” (Id. at p. 118.) Borrowing language from Way, the Younger court concluded “[a]ny infringement on the power of executive clemency [was] ... purely incidental to the main purpose of the statute ... and hence [did] not violate the separation of powers.” (Ibid.)
We conclude the rationale of the Way and Younger decisions is directly applicable here. Like the challenged laws in the Younger and Way cases, section 1170.95 can produce outcomes resembling the consequences of an executive commutation. Specifically, in cases where a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief (
However, the objective of the Legislature in approving section 1170.95—like the legislative aims underpinning the challenged laws in the Way and Younger cases—was not to extend “an act of grace” to petitioners. (Younger, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 118; Way, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at pp. 177–178.)
The outcome of a successful petition under section 1170.95 further underscores the fact that section 1170.95 is not merely an act of grace akin to an exercise of executive clemency. As noted ante, “[a] successful Senate Bill 1437 petitioner‘s criminal culpability does not simply evaporate; a meritorious section 1170.95 petition is not a get-out-of-jail free card. Instead, the petitioner is resentenced on the remaining convictions. If the murder was charged ‘generically’ and the target offense was not charged, the murder conviction must be redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes.” (Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 764–765.) Thus, while some qualifying petitioners certainly may obtain reduced prison sentences under section 1170.95, there is no guarantee of such an outcome.
In accordance with the Younger and Way decisions, it is clear to us that section 1170.95‘s interference with the executive‘s clemency authority, if any, is merely incidental to the main legislative purpose of Senate Bill 1437. Therefore, we conclude section 1170.95 does not impermissibly encroach upon the core functions of the executive.
3
The People claim section 1170.95 violates the separation of powers doctrine in a second respect. They argue section 1170.95 does not distinguish between prisoners serving final and nonfinal sentences as of the effective date of the legislation (January 1, 2019), thus entitling both categories of prisoners to petition for relief. They contend the Legislature impaired the judiciary‘s core function of resolving controversies between parties insofar as section 1170.95 permits prisoners serving final sentences to seek relief.
a
As an initial matter, we agree with the People‘s reading of the scope of section 1170.95. Under section 1170.95, petitioners may seek retroactive relief entitling them to vacate qualifying murder convictions and obtain
b
Relying principally on Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1, the People contend the retroactive application of section 1170.95 to prisoners serving final sentences constitutes a separation of powers violation because it permits final judgments of conviction to be reopened. According to the People, this feature intrudes upon a core function of the judiciary—resolving specific controversies between parties. The California Supreme Court issued the Bunn decision together with a companion case, People v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 29 (King). Because the Bunn and King decisions draw heavily from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 (Plaut), we will first address the Plaut decision before discussing the Bunn and King decisions.
In Plaut, plaintiffs filed a fraud action in federal court based on alleged violations of the federal securities laws. (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 213.) At the time, federal courts were required to ” ‘borrow[]’ ” the analogous state statute of limitations in the jurisdiction in which the action was pending. (Id. at p. 250 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) However, after the plaintiffs filed their case, the United States Supreme Court issued Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson (1991) 501 U.S. 350 (Lampf), which—together with a companion case—adopted a uniform federal limitations rule shorter than the one on which the plaintiffs relied and applied the new statute of limitations retroactively. (Plaut, at pp. 213–214; id. at pp. 249–250 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Based on Lampf, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ action as untimely and the judgment ultimately became final. (Id. at p. 214.)
Congress responded to the Lampf decision by passing legislation repudiating the retroactive effect of the new limitations period. (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 214–215.) The new legislation restored the pre-Lampf limitations period for two types of cases filed before the Lampf decision was issued—(1) cases pending when the new legislation went into effect; and (2) cases dismissed as time-barred between the filing of the Lampf decision and the effective date of the new legislation. (Ibid.) Further, the new
The high court began its separation of powers analysis with a declaration that the judicial power exercised by article III courts includes the power to ” ‘render dispositive judgments’ “—a power Congress violated when it commanded courts to reopen final judgments. (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 219, 223.) The Plaut court engaged in an
extensive discussion of the historical roots animating the federal constitutional principle limiting legislative interference with final judgments. (Id. at pp. 219–225.) As the Plaut court explained, early colonial assemblies and legislatures routinely functioned as courts of equity of last resort or otherwise corrected the judicial process by enacting special bills to set aside judgments and order new trials or appeals. (Id. at pp. 219–223.) According to the Plaut court, the ratification of the federal Constitution fundamentally altered these practices by separating “the legislative power to make general law from the judicial power to apply that law in particular cases ....” (Id. at pp. 224, 225.)
The Plaut court concluded the refiling provision at issue violated these federal separation of powers principles, reasoning in pertinent part as follows: “When retroactive legislation requires its own application in a case already finally adjudicated, it does no more and no less than ‘reverse a determination once made, in a particular case.’ ” (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 225.) According to the Plaut court, the separation of powers violation existed even though the refiling provision at issue affected “a whole class of cases rather than ... a particular suit.” (Id. at p. 227.)
However, the Plaut court set limits on the scope of its ruling. Because the judicial branch consists of a hierarchy of courts, the Plaut court explained a judgment does not achieve finality for federal separation of powers purposes until the time for an appeal has passed or an appeal has been pursued and the review process has been completed. (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 226–227.) Further, it held that separation of powers principles would not be violated if a statute authorizing the reopening of a judgment was already in effect when a judgment became final because the reopening law would, in effect, be “built into the judgment itself, and its finality ... so conditioned.” (Id. at p. 234.) Because the judgment against the Plaut plaintiffs was final before Congress enacted the refiling provision, the plaintiffs were precluded from invoking the refiling provision.
In Bunn, a defendant obtained a judgment of dismissal as to charges of sex offenses committed against a child, but was reprosecuted under the new statute of limitations and refiling provision. The Supreme Court granted review to assess the constitutionality of the refiling provision under state separation of powers principles and concluded ”Plaut [was] persuasive for purposes of interpreting California‘s separation of powers clause....” (Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 22, 23.) Applying the Plaut court‘s holding, our Supreme Court concluded “a refiling provision ... cannot be retroactively applied to subvert judgments that became final before the provision took effect, and before the law of finality changed.” (Id. at p. 24.) In the Bunn case, the Legislature enacted the refiling provision before the judgment of dismissal became final. Therefore, separation of powers principles did not prohibit the prosecution from refiling criminal charges against the defendant under the new limitations period. (Id. at pp. 26–27.)
In King—a companion decision issued concurrently with Bunn—a defendant also obtained a judgment of dismissal in a case involving alleged sex offenses committed against children. (King, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 32.) But, unlike Bunn, the Legislature enacted the refiling provision after the King defendant‘s judgment of dismissal became final. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the refiling provision could not be retroactively applied to the defendant in the King case. (Id. at pp. 36–37.)
Relying on the Bunn and King decisions, the People claim
The Bunn and King courts addressed a situation starkly different than the one before us. In those cases, the issue as framed by the Supreme Court was as follows: “[The Legislature] authorize[d] ... the filing of a molestation charge even where an accusatory pleading involving the same offense was previously dismissed as time-barred by the courts. The question is whether, and to what extent, the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution (
The answer reached by the Supreme Court is unsurprising in view of the fundamental purposes underlying the separation of powers doctrine. Power is diffused between coequal branches of government not as an end to itself, but rather to protect the liberty of individuals. (Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, 122; see Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1060 [“Separation of powers protects liberty ....“] (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171, 188 (Perez) [separation of powers “is ultimately about the competing rights of individual parties“]; Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty (1991) 139 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1513, 1514 [“[T]he structure of the government is a vital part of a constitutional organism whose final cause is the protection of individual rights.“].) A bright-line rule prohibiting interference with final judgments of dismissal in favor of criminal defendants dovetails with this aim, as it eliminates the risk criminal defendants will be subject to retrial for the same offenses of which they were acquitted and—if convicted the second time around—deprived of their individual liberty interests by means of incarceration.
The case at hand stands on different footing. Unlike legislation authorizing the refiling of criminal charges against a previously-acquitted defendant, or the refiling of actions between private parties,
Quite the opposite. While the Way decision did not directly address whether the legislation at issue intruded upon the core function of the judiciary, it strongly rejected the claim there was anything inherently problematic with legislation permitting the reopening of final judgments of conviction. (Way, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 180 [“[I]n this case final judgments will be reduced .... In view of the legislative objective, the final judgment rule must yield.“]; id. at p. 181 [“There is nothing sacred about a final judgment of imprisonment which immunizes it from the Legislature‘s power to achieve equality among past and new offenders.“] (conc. opn. of Friedman, J.).) Courts following the Way decision have ruled similarly. (Chavez, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000 [“A] final judgment is not immune from the Legislature‘s power to adjust prison sentences for a legitimate public purpose.“]; People v. Community Release Bd. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 792, 800 [“[L]egislation reducing punishment for crime may constitutionally be applied to prisoners whose judgments have become final.“].) In accordance with these authorities, we conclude the separation of powers concerns discussed in Bunn and King do not apply to
For instance, a court must resentence a petitioner “on any remaining counts” of which the petitioner was found guilty in the original judgment. (
Further underscoring our conclusion today is the fact that there is substantial precedent for remedial legislation authorizing the ameliorative reopening of final judgments of conviction to benefit criminal defendants. One key example is the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)), which amended the Three Strikes Law to reduce the punishment for certain third strike defendants. (
Another example is the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which redefined common theft- and drug-related felonies as misdemeanors for many offenders. (Prop. 47, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014).) It permits eligible persons serving a felony sentence for redefined offenses as of the legislation‘s effective date to “petition for a recall of sentence before the
Although these are perhaps the most well-known examples of legislation allowing petitioners to reopen final judgments of conviction without regard to their finality as of the effective date of the legislation, they are not the only such instances of which we are aware. (See
The prevalence of such legislation is not a sufficient reason on its own to affirm the constitutionality of
C
Next, the People contend
When determining whether Marsy‘s Law has been violated, our task is to interpret and apply the initiative‘s language to effectuate the voters’ intent. (Estate of Casserley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 824, 833.) ” ‘We therefore first look to “the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context.” ’ [Citations.] ’ ” ‘When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The People argue
Marsy‘s Law established a victim‘s right to a “prompt and final conclusion” to postjudgment proceedings. (
Both the Legislature and courts have recognized that victims may exercise these rights during postjudgment proceedings that existed at the time the electorate approved Marsy‘s Law, as well as postjudgment proceedings that did not exist when Marsy‘s Law was approved. (
The People also argue
The People are correct that the safety of the victim and the public are not pertinent to whether a court may vacate the petitioner‘s murder conviction and resentence the petitioner. As noted ante, that determination turns on whether the original charging document permitted the prosecution to proceed under the felony-murder rule or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the petitioner was convicted or accepted a plea offer of murder, and the petitioner could not be liable for murder as a result of the legislative amendments to
Next, the People argue
Finally, the People claim
The People raise one final set of challenges to Senate Bill 1437. They caution the hearing procedures and remedies established by
We note there is authority calling into question the merits of at least some of the People‘s arguments. (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1114–1115 [rejecting defendants’ arguments that
However, we need not decide these matters to resolve this appeal. The People are the individuals on whose behalf violations of criminal laws are prosecuted. (Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 18.) But they do not represent the particularized interests of persons who have been accused of criminal offenses or petitioners seeking relief from convictions. Therefore, the People lack standing to challenge the hearing and remedy provisions of
IV
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed.7
McCONNELL, P.J.
I CONCUR:
IRION, J.
I respectfully dissent. Senate Bill No. 1437 is an unconstitutional amendment to Proposition 7, in which the voters increased the punishment for first degree murder from an indeterminate term of life to a term of 25 years to life and for second degree murder from a term of five, six or seven years to 15 years to life. (See People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 41-42.) “The purpose of [Proposition 7] was to substantially increase the punishment for persons convicted of first and second degree murder.” (Cooper, at p. 42.) Proposition 7 did not authorize the Legislature to amend its provision without voter approval. (Id. at p. 44.) Senate Bill No. 1437 addresses sentencing for first and second degree murder,1 the very same subject matter encompassed by Proposition 7, by undoing application of the penalties the voters designated in Proposition 7 to those defendants coming within Senate Bill No. 1437‘s reforms. In short, the Legislature decided among other things that certain categories of felony murder should not be punished and enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to eliminate them. This is the case even though the Legislature does not directly refer to sentencing in the revised Penal Code sections. “What the Legislature is prohibited from doing directly it cannot do indirectly.” (Rainey v. Michel (1936) 6 Cal.2d 259, 282-283; accord, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Fresno Metropolitan Projects Authority (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375.) By narrowing the scope of liability for felony murder and murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, the law eliminates all punishment for some defendants whom the Proposition 7 voters had decided should be punished by the specified prison terms. Stated simply, Senate Bill No. 1437 now “prohibits what the initiative authorizes . . . .” (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571.)
Thus, the revisions put into place by Senate Bill No. 1437 are an impermissible exercise of legislative authority. Under the
Though courts generally accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to the Legislature‘s acts (Amwest Surety Insurance. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1253; B.M. v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 742, 748), the presumption cannot apply here, where Senate Bill No. 1437 changes definitions that were integral to the increased penalties for murder enacted by the voters in Proposition 7. The voters are presumed to have been aware of definitions of first and second degree murder, including felony murder, when they enacted that initiative. (See People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 869-871 [electorate is presumed to be aware of existing laws and their judicial construction in effect at the time legislation is enacted, including legislation enacted by initiative]; People v. Bloomfield (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 647, 653 [same].) Such an overruling of the People‘s wishes “violates the well settled rule that the Legislature may not enact a law that thwarts the initiative process without the consent of the people.” (O.G. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 630.)
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court‘s order denying Lamoureux‘s
O‘ROURKE, J.