JEWERELENE STEEN, Petitioner, v. APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
No. S174773
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 11, 2014.
1045
Michael P. Judge and Ronald L. Brown, Public Defenders, Ilya Alekseyeff and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Debbie Lew, Assistant City Attorney, Eric Shannon and Katharine H. MacKenzie, Deputy City Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Irene T. Wakabayashi, Head Deputy District Attorney, and Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorney, for District Attorney of Los Angeles County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
WERDEGAR, J.—In this case we consider the validity of a misdemeanor complaint issued by a superior court clerk under the authority of
We conclude petitioner is not entitled to relief. A legislative enactment that permitted a judicial branch employee to commence criminal prosecutions without the prosecutor‘s approval would present a serious constitutional question by impairing a core function of the executive branch—the discretionary power to initiate criminal prosecutions. (See People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].) But
I. BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2002, a police officer cited petitioner Jewerelene Steen for three infractions of the Vehicle Code: driving a vehicle with an expired registration (
About five years later, on July 27, 2007, petitioner appeared with counsel before a court commissioner. Respondent informs us that the vast majority of offenses charged under
Rejecting petitioner‘s arguments, the court overruled the demurrer, accepted her plea of no contest, found her guilty of violating
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner, as noted, challenges her conviction as impairing the separation of powers (
A. Separation of Powers.
Petitioner contends
In describing the role the clerk is to play with respect to accusatory pleadings, the language added to
Solely as a matter of form, and putting other considerations aside for the moment, the 1990 language might conceivably be read to permit the accusatory pleadings designated in
This conclusion is consistent with the statute‘s legislative history. Originally proposed by the Association of Municipal Court Clerks of California and unanimously adopted by both houses of the Legislature, Assembly Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) was presented as a measure to “increase court efficiency by streamlining the filing of pleadings by court clerks” through taking advantage of “automated systems that eliminate the need for hard paper.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 17, 1990, p. 1.) Legislative committee reports explained that “[e]xisting law permits accusatory pleadings to be filed electronically by prosecutors and law enforcement agencies. . . . [¶] This bill would allow court clerks to file electronically complaints issued for the offenses of failure to appear, failure to pay a fine, or failure to comply with an order of the court.” (Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) June 21, 1990, p. 1; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) June 19, 1990, pp. 1–2 [same].) The reports’ imprecise use of the word “file” does not obscure the Legislature‘s understanding that the bill would allow clerks to perform a function previously performed only by executive branch officers: the generation of electronic pleadings. There was no need in 1990 to amend
The potential constitutional issue raised by permitting court clerks to generate accusatory pleadings did not go entirely unnoticed in the Legislature, but it did go without documented analysis or resolution. While Assembly Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) was under consideration, the Legislative Counsel advised its author that the bill “might be . . . deemed to be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine . . . ” (Legis. Counsel, letter to Assemblymember Robert Frazee regarding Assem. Bill No. 3168 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 5, 1990, p. 1.) Five months later,
We undertake that analysis now. The separation of powers doctrine owes its existence in California to
California law leaves no doubt that the initiation of criminal proceedings is a core, inherent function of the executive branch. The state Constitution, in an article defining the powers and responsibilities of the executive branch and its principal officers, appoints the Attorney General as “the chief law [enforcement] officer of the State” with “direct supervision over every district attorney . . . ” (
Against that background we turn to the dispositive question: Does
To construe
Petitioner suggests a separation of powers problem would arise if the clerk issued a complaint without the prosecutor‘s approval and the court thereafter denied the People‘s motion to dismiss. This scenario, petitioner suggests, might lead to misdemeanor convictions being entered without executive branch involvement. Because nolle prosequi is abolished in California, the prosecutor may not unilaterally abandon a prosecution (
B. Due Process.
While the prosecutor‘s decision here to approve the clerk‘s issuance of complaints under
Petitioner relies mainly on Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d 193. In that case two private citizens, Pellegrino and Bishop, filed in the municipal court documents purporting to be criminal complaints against each other for assaultive conduct during a Fourth of July celebration. When the prosecutor refused to concur in Pellegrino‘s complaint, the municipal court entered
Concerning due process, the court in Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d 193, made two observations of relevance here. First, the court noted, “[d]ue process of law requires that criminal prosecutions be instituted through the regular processes of law. These regular processes include the requirement that the institution of any criminal proceeding be authorized and approved by the district attorney.” (Id. at p. 206.) This observation is self-evidently correct and entirely consistent with recognizing the validity of complaints approved by the prosecutor and issued by the clerk in accordance with
The Pellegrino court also observed that “the theme which runs throughout the criminal procedure in this state is that all persons should be protected from having to defend against frivolous prosecutions and that one major safeguard against such prosecutions is the function of the district attorney in screening criminal cases prior to instituting a prosecution.” (Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at pp. 205–206.) In that statement, the court correctly identified an important general concern underlying the rules of criminal procedure and responded appropriately to a lower court‘s erroneous refusal to dismiss a purported complaint the prosecutor had consistently disapproved, filed by a private party with no constitutional or statutory power to represent the People. The same statement does not compel the conclusion that the prosecutor is forbidden to approve the filing of charges in an entire category of relatively minor offenses, such as the three categories of offenses subject to
In Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101 [232 Cal.Rptr. 814, 729 P.2d 80] (Sundance), the court addressed a variety of claims arising from the mass issuance in Los Angeles County of citations for public inebriation. Even while granting relief to the plaintiffs on some theories, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that due process forbade the city attorney to file such charges routinely and “without attempting to screen out cases that could not be successfully prosecuted.” (Id. at p. 1132.) We reasoned that, except in cases of selective or vindictive prosecution, “[p]rosecutors have broad decisionmaking power in charging crimes” and that ” ‘[t]he judiciary historically
The best practice under
C. Statute of Limitations.
Finally, petitioner contends her conviction cannot stand because the prosecution was not commenced within the statute of limitations. A prosecution for the misdemeanor of which she was convicted (
Invoking the same arguments discussed and rejected above, petitioner contends the complaint generated by the clerk under
III. DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
LIU, J., Concurring.—There is much in today‘s opinion I agree with. I agree that Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101 [232 Cal.Rptr. 814, 729 P.2d 80] forecloses petitioner‘s due process claim. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1056–1057.) As to petitioner‘s separation of powers claim, I agree that “the initiation of criminal proceedings is a core, inherent function of the executive branch” (id. at p. 1053); that
The problem, however, is that the complaint in this case was issued by a court clerk, an official with no authority to prosecute a criminal action in the name of the People of California. Although the signature of the “DECLARANT AND COMPLAINANT” is hard to make out, the parties agree that the signature belongs to a court clerk. Nowhere on the complaint does there appear the name of a prosecuting official. (The complaint is reprinted at the end of this opinion. The initials “LAPD” appear above a line that says, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY FILING COMPLAINT,” but that seems to indicate that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) issued the underlying traffic citation. The LAPD is not a prosecutorial entity.)
According to declarations of a senior administrator of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the court clerk issues approximately 8,000 similar
It is rare for this court to hear an appeal in a failure-to-appear case. But, as the numbers suggest, this is one of the most common ways that ordinary citizens come into contact with the criminal justice system. The official process that leads to a misdemeanor complaint is, as far as I can tell, entirely automated after a deputy clerk enters data noting a person‘s failure to appear for a traffic citation. At no point does a prosecuting official engage in any review, exercise any discretion, or otherwise have any role. I do not see how this practice can be squared with the principle of separation of powers.
Although the separation of powers doctrine under the California Constitution is not identical to its federal counterpart (see Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 28–31 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 113 P.3d 1062]), the principle throughout American history has reflected the concern that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” (Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 47 (Cooke ed. 1961) p. 324; see Parker v. Riley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 83, 89 [113 P.2d 873].) This does “not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over, the acts of each other.” (Madison, at p. 325; see Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 297–298 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 20 P.3d 533].) But it does mean that the core functions of each branch may not be allocated to or usurped by another branch. Thus, for example, “[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock . . . ” (Madison, at p. 326, italics added.)
This concern is not merely theoretical in the context here. Imagine how things would look if the Los Angeles City Attorney or his designate had to sign his name as the “DECLARANT AND COMPLAINANT” on each of the 8,000 failure-to-appear complaints issued to Los Angeles County residents each week. That‘s over 400,000 complaints each year. Given the mass processing of these complaints, it is all but certain that some fraction of the charges will be found erroneous or will otherwise result in dismissal, but not until each defendant has been put to significant hassle or expense. Wouldn‘t the prospect of disgruntled citizens on such a scale induce a degree of discretion or oversight before an electorally accountable official is willing to affix his name to a complaint? And even if not, shouldn‘t each complaint—as with any other criminal complaint—be issued in a form that entitles the citizenry to judge whether their elected law enforcement officials are setting priorities and allocating resources in an optimal way?
Today‘s opinion says this problem of accountability is cured by the fact that a deputy city attorney told the superior court in this case that ” ‘we approve and concur of this complaint as well as all the other complaints that are filed in all the other cases in this courthouse. We know the practice exists where a complaint is generated via a notice to appear in which a person cited in the notice to appear has failed to appear. We have not asked the Court and/or its clerk to stop.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1049–1050.) Even if I were to agree that a court clerk may sign a complaint as the declarant and complainant so long as the prosecutor approves (id. at p. 1054), I do not believe an unsworn, post hoc statement made in the course of litigation suffices to confer such approval. As every elected official knows, there is often a difference in perception if not reality between deciding to undertake a course of action oneself and simply going along with or not stopping a course of action decided by others. This case might be different if the city attorney had earlier adopted a policy statement that established or expressly approved the current practice. But no such statement appears here.
Although efficiency and good government are laudable objectives, they must be pursued in conformity with our constitutional structure. That structure requires accountability in all governmental functions, including the
This conclusion does not require invalidating the thousands of judgments under the current scheme that are not yet final today. In virtually all of those cases, even if the participation of a public prosecutor does not cure the separation of powers violation, we may readily conclude that the defendants likely suffered no prejudice. (See Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 372 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 58 P.3d 367] [nonretroactive application of a judicial decision may be justified by ” ‘[c]onsiderations of fairness and public policy,’ ” including ” ‘retroactivity‘s effect on the administration of justice’ “].) But lack of prejudice to individual defendants does not justify use of the present scheme going forward. If the city attorney wants to continue automatically generating these complaints, the separation of powers problem is easily remedied. And if the remedy were to cause the city attorney to hesitate, that would tend to confirm the present need for better alignment between prosecutorial action and accountability.
For the reasons above, I concur only in today‘s judgment.
Siggins, J.,* concurred.
*Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to