FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Restitution Award and Original Abstract
Decedent and Paul Blazevich were once neighbors. A conflict arose between them
About 10 years later, on October 9, 2007, Blazevich obtained an "order for restitution and abstract of judgment" (capitalization omitted; hereafter, Original Abstract) from the court and recorded it.
Amended Abstract
About one week later, on October 17, 2007, Blazevich obtained an "amended order for restitution and abstract of judgment" (capitalization omitted; hereafter, Amended Abstract). The Amended Abstract reflected an additional $27,000 restitution award, bringing the total to $44,796. The record does not indicate the basis for the additional award. In addition to the new $27,000 award, the Amended Abstract indicated the balance then due under the Original Abstract had grown from $17,796 to $36,532.93 (presumably due to accrued interest on the $17,796).
Blazevich did not immediately record the Amended Abstract.
Assignment of Judgment
On February 8, 2008, Blazevich executed and recorded an assignment of judgment (Assignment) in favor of his wife, Joya. The Assignment referred
Probate Estate
On July 3, 2015, Decedent died intestate, with no surviving spouse, children, parents, or grandparents. The respondent in this appeal, Theresa Hawkins (Administrator), filed a probate petition seeking issuance of letters of administration and appointment as the estate's personal representative.
The San Diego County Public Administrator and the California Department of Health Care Services-each an unsecured creditor-filed claims against the estate for $1,379.50 and $147,766.69, respectively.
Joya's Claim
About one week into the escrow period, Blazevich contacted Administrator and explained that he had obtained an Amended Abstract but was unable to locate it. Blazevich asked that the Administrator accept a retired judge's
Neither Blazevich nor Joya immediately submitted a creditor's claim, which delayed the close of escrow. To encourage them to submit an appropriate claim, Administrator agreed not to distribute the sale proceeds to other creditors until the probate court resolved the parties' claims regarding the Amended Abstract.
On June 10, 2016, Joya filed a creditor's claim for $178,000. She acknowledged in her claim that only the Original Abstract had been recorded, and, thus, a dispute existed as to whether the entire restitution award was secured.
On June 22, 2016-nearly one year after Decedent's death-the Amended Abstract was recorded.
Escrow closed on July 8, 2016, and Joya received $51,867.04 from the sale proceeds.
One week later, Joya filed an amended creditor's claim for $93,358.22. On the Original Abstract, Joya acknowledged receipt of the funds from escrow, as well as an additional payment of $2,064.92 (the details of which are unclear from the record), but Joya claimed there was still a balance due of $14,569.72.
Administrator's Final Accounting and Joya's Objection
On September 20, 2016, Administrator filed her "First and Final Account and Report of Administrator and Petition for Settlement" (Final Accounting). In it, Administrator proposed treating Joya's, the county's, and the state's
Second, Administrator argued the amended claim's provenance as a criminal restitution order did not entitle it to preference under the California Constitution's restitution provision, which states: "All monetary payments, monies, and property collected from any person who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(C).)
Joya filed an objection to the Final Accounting. She maintained the postdeath recordation of the Amended Abstract created a lien on probate estate assets, irrespective of Code of Civil Procedure section 686.020. She also insisted her claim was entitled to priority under the Constitution's restitution provision.
Probate Court's Ruling
The probate court found Joya's claim was unsecured and, therefore, not entitled to priority over the county's or the state's claims. The court rejected Joya's lien theory, reasoning that Joya's creation of a lien against probate estate assets was tantamount to enforcing a judgment because the only reason Joya created the lien was to establish higher claim-distribution priority.
The court also rejected Joya's constitutional priority argument, explaining that because restitution orders are "enforceable by a victim as if [they] ...
Joya appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Standing
Each party contends the other lacks standing to participate in this appeal. We disagree.
A. Joya's Standing
Administrator contends Joya lacks standing because this appeal concerns only the Amended Abstract, and Blazevich assigned to Joya only his interest in the Original Abstract. Administrator reasons Blazevich must not have intended to assign his rights under the Amended Abstract to Joya because he was aware of the Amended Abstract when he executed the Assignment, yet he did not expressly refer to it.
Joya counters that Administrator forfeited this challenge by failing to raise it in the probate court. Alternatively, Joya maintains she has standing because the Assignment expressly states it conveys all of Blazevich's interest in the Original Abstract,
Administrator's challenge to Joya's standing raises a factual issue regarding Blazevich's intent. Because Administrator did not raise this issue in the probate court, we will not consider it on appeal and reject Administrator's lack-of-standing argument. (See Krechuniak v. Noorzoy (2017)
B. Administrator's Standing
Joya contends Administrator lacks "standing to participate in this appeal" because she is not "aggrieved." We disagree.
Administrator was responsible for ensuring the proper distribution of estate assets to creditors with bona fide claims. Allowing Joya's disputed claim to attain priority would have been detrimental to the estate because it would have left insufficient funds to satisfy the county's and the state's undisputed claims. Thus, Administrator has standing to represent the estate's interests in this appeal.
II. Postdeath Recordation of the Amended Abstract Did Not Create a Lien
We easily dispose of Joya's claim that the recordation of the Amended Abstract after Decedent's death created a lien against his probate estate assets. Section 686.020 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: "After the death of the judgment debtor, enforcement of a judgment against property in the judgment debtor's estate is governed by the Probate Code, and not by this title." The Law Revision Commission Comments to this section-which are " 'deemed to express the Legislature's intent' " ( Guardianship of Ann S . (2009)
A. Relevant Legal Principles
We review de novo the interpretation of a constitutional provision. ( People v. Arroyo (2016)
"In 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, also known as The Victims' Bill of Rights," which "added article I, section 28, subdivision (b) to the California Constitution[.]" ( People v. Giordano (2007)
In response, " '[t]he Legislature has enacted, and frequently amended, a bewildering array of responsive statutes.' " ( Giordano , supra ,
In 2008, voters passed Proposition 9, also known as Marsy's Law, which "provides for a broad spectrum of victims' rights, including restitution." (
"(b) In order to preserve and protect a victim's rights to justice and due process, a victim shall be entitled to the following rights: [¶] ... [¶]
"(13) To restitution.
"(A) It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.
"(B) Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.
"(C) All monetary payments , monies , and property collected from any person who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim. " (Italics added.)
The voter information materials regarding Marsy's Law include a four-page analysis by the Legislative Analyst. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) analysis, pp. 58-61
"This measure requires that, without exception, restitution be ordered from offenders who have been convicted, in every case in which a victim suffers a loss. The measure also requires that any funds collected by a court or law enforcement agencies from a person ordered to pay restitution would go to pay that restitution first, in effect prioritizing those payments over other fines and obligations an offender may legally owe." (Pamphlet, supra , analysis, at p. 58, italics added.)
Within the Legislative Analyst's two-page analysis of the fiscal impact of Marsy's Law, only the following two paragraphs address the measure's restitution provision:
"The changes to the restitution process contained in this measure could affect state and local programs. Currently, a number of different state and local agencies receive funding from the fines and penalties collected from criminal offenders. For example, revenues collected from offenders go to counties' general funds, the state Fish and Game Preservation Fund for support of a variety of wildlife conservation programs, theTraumatic Brain Injury Fund to help adults recover from brain injuries, and the Restitution Fund for support of crime victim programs. Because this initiative requires that all monies collected from a defendant first be applied to pay restitution orders directly to the victim , it is possible that the payments of fine and penalty revenues to various funds , including the Restitution Fund , could decline.
"However, any loss of Restitution Fund revenues may be offset to the extent that certain provisions of this initiative increase the amount of restitution received directly by victims, thereby reducing their reliance on assistance from the Restitution Fund. Similarly, this initiative may also generate some savings for state and local agencies to the extent that increases in payments of restitution to crime victims cause them to need less assistance from other state and local government programs, such as health and social services programs." (Pamphlet, supra , analysis, p. 61, italics added.)
By its express terms, the restitution priority provision of Marsy's Law grants priority to a victim's claim when money is "collected from any person who has been ordered to make restitution ...." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(C), italics added.) This phrase is ambiguous-although it makes clear whose funds must be collected, it does not make clear what it means to collect . Based on the overall statutory scheme regarding restitution orders, the information before the voters, and consideration of the consequences of the parties' proffered interpretations, we conclude that, for purposes of Marsy's Law, the marshalling of a decedent's assets by a court-appointed administrator operating under the Independent Administration of Estates Act does not constitute collection of money from a person who has been ordered to pay victim restitution.
Within the overall statutory scheme of restitution orders, several statutes directly address affirmative, active measures government entities may (or, in some instances, must ) take to collect money from an offender who has been ordered to pay victim restitution or a restitution fine. For example, section 2085.5, subdivision (c) requires the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to deduct funds from a prisoner's wages and trust account deposits and to transfer those funds to the California Victim Compensation Board (Board) "for direct payment to the victim."
Similar provisions apply when a prisoner released from custody has not yet fully paid a restitution order or fine. The obligation to pay the unpaid balance survives
The Franchise Tax Board (FTB) is also authorized to "collect[ ]" delinquent restitution orders and fines. ( Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19280, subd. (a).) Upon
The statutory scheme regarding restitution also addresses collection activities by courts. For example, section 1202.42 directs courts, "[u]pon entry of a restitution order," to "enter a separate order for income deduction" that will be stayed until the "agency ... responsible for collection of restitution" informs the court "that the defendant has failed to meet his or her obligation under the restitution order" without good cause. (§ 1202.42, subds. (a)-(b).) "The income deduction order shall direct a payer to deduct from all income due and payable to the defendant the amount required by the court to meet the defendant's obligation." (§ 1202.42, subd. (c).)
Courts are also authorized to grant prosecuting attorneys authority to use lien procedures, including writs of attachment of property, "[i]f the defendant has failed to meet his or her obligation under the restitution order and the defendant has not provided good cause for the failure ...." (§ 1202.42, subd. (g).)
Finally, when a criminal defendant has deposited cash bail with the court, upon exoneration of the bail the court is authorized to "apply the money in satisfaction" of any amounts owing for restitution orders or fines before "refund[ing] the surplus, if any, to the defendant." (§ 1297.)
From these examples, we observe that statutory references to the collection of money to satisfy restitution orders (or fines) contemplate active, affirmative steps to secure the funds-deducting them from an inmate's wages, levying them as if they were a delinquent income tax liability, deducting them from an offender's income, or depositing them in a court account as security for a defendant's liberty pending trial. The probate court's involvement in Decedent's estate does not rise to this level of affirmative activity.
The court granted Administrator "full authority ... to administer the estate without court supervision under the Independent Administration of Estates Act." As noted (see fns. 1 and 2, ante ), this included the obligation to marshal Decedent's assets, and included the authority to sell property and approve or reject claims without court approval. Under such a broad delegation of authority, the court's attenuated connection to Decedent's estate property is unlike the degree of direct, affirmative conduct exercised by government entities under the statutory framework set out above. The cases
Finally, Joya's interpretation of the measure would, as Administrator contends, lead to "strange consequences." (See Valencia , supra ,
DISPOSITION
Affirmed. Appellant to pay respondent's costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
Notes
" 'The "personal representative" is the person or firm appointed by the probate court to administer the probate of a decedent's estate. [Citation.] The personal representative may be the executor, who is the person named as such in the decedent's will, or it may be the successor to the executor, or an administrator appointed by the court where the decedent died without a will naming an executor [citation].' " (Estate of Wong (2012)
Administrator described herself to the probate court as "a private professional fiduciary" licensed by the Professional Fiduciaries Bureau. She sought appointment as the administrator inasmuch as she was unable to locate any of Decedent's next of kin, and the county's public administrator declined to exercise priority. (See Prob. Code, § 8461 [specifying the order of priority for persons entitled to appointment as administrator].)
Full authority under the Independent Administration of Estates Act includes (among other things) the authority to sell real property and to allow or reject creditors' claims without prior court approval. (Prob. Code, §§ 10511, 10552, subd. (a).)
The funds released to Joya from escrow appear to approximate 10 percent interest accruing from the date restitution of $17,796 was ordered (May 21, 1997) to the date escrow closed (July 8, 2016).
In light of the funds released to Joya from escrow, the record does not make clear Joya's basis for this additional claim on the Original Abstract.
The record does not make clear how Joya calculated this amount.
Probate Code section 11420, subdivision (a) specifies the following order of priority for payment of creditors' claims: (1) administrative expenses; (2) secured debts; (3) funeral expenses; (4) expenses of last illness; (5) family allowance; (6) wage claims; and (7) "[g]eneral debts, including judgments not secured by a lien ...."
Code of Civil Procedure section 686.020 states: "After the death of the judgment debtor, enforcement of a judgment against property in the judgment debtor's estate is governed by the Probate Code, and not [Title 9 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure]."
Probate Code section 9300 states: "[A]fter the death of the decedent all money judgments against the decedent or against the personal representative on a claim against the decedent or estate are payable in the course of administration and are not enforceable against property in the estate of the decedent under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Title 9 (commencing with Section 680.010 ) of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure)."
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Joya cites a different passage in Kessler , in which the court recites the general rule that the administrator of an estate is not an interested party. (Kessler , supra ,
Apart from restitution, Marsy's Law recognizes victims' rights by (among other things) granting them additional rights of notice and participation in criminal proceedings, and by reforming the "excessive" parole process. (See, e.g., Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subds. (b)(1)-(13), (f)(6); People v. Hannon (2016)
The Legislature, likewise, subsequently amended section 1202.4 to eliminate trial courts' discretion to not order direct victim restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f); Stats. 2016, ch. 37 (Assem. Bill No. 2295), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2017.) However, courts retain that discretion with respect to restitution fines . (§ 1202.4, subds. (b), (c).)
In her reply brief, Joya "objects" to Administrator's appending of the Pamphlet to her respondent's brief. The objection is not well-taken inasmuch as courts are authorized to consider such material when construing an ambiguous ballot measure. (Arroyo , supra ,
Section 2085.5, subdivision (c) states in part: "If a prisoner owes a restitution order imposed pursuant to ... Section 1202.4 ..., the secretary shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the order amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment shall be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance pursuant to that program. ..."
For example, Blythe Co. v. Bankers' Inv. Co. (1905)