THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH LEON JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.
D077095
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 2/23/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Michael T. Smyth, Judge.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD127034)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Randall Einhorn and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Joseph Leon Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under
On appeal, defendant asserts
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
On the evening of January 30, 1997, defendant shot and killed Charles (Charles) Downing and Linda Lewis. He also shot James Robinson in the chest and Sonja (Sonja) Downing in the right and left thigh. Both Robinson and Sonja survived. All of the victims were inside an apartment that defendant and two accomplices entered at about 10:00 p.m., after learning
In 1998, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder (
As to both murder counts, the jury found true the special circumstances of multiple murder (
As noted, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of LWOP. Defendant also was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 27 years four months. Defendant appealed. After striking a parole revocation fine, this
court in January 2001 affirmed the judgment in defendant’s direct appeal. (See People v. Bowman et al. (Jan. 19, 2001, D032440) [nonpub. opn.].)2
As also noted, the trial court in November 2019 denied defendant’s motion seeking a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to
A. Youth Offender Parole Hearings
Enacted in 2013, the Legislature intended in
As originally enacted,
offenders who were under 23 years old when they committed their controlling offenses. (Stats. 2015, ch. 471 (Sen. Bill No. 261), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2016; see Trejo, at p. 981 & fn. 6.) By subsequent amendments, the Legislature further extended the availability of youth offender parole hearings to offenders who were 25 years old or younger when they committed their controlling offenses. (Stats. 2017, ch. 684 (Sen. Bill No. 394),
Under
Subdivision (h) of
possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.” (
Defendant recognizes he is statutorily ineligible for relief under the plain language of subdivisions (b)(4) and (h) of
B. Guiding Principles
We independently review defendant’s challenge to
“ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’
[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all
Where our Legislature fixes different punishments for different crimes, those differences do not violate equal protection unless the challenges show “ ‘there is no rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage); People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 (Wilkinson).) “This so-called ‘rational basis’ scrutiny is exceedingly deferential: A law will be upheld as long as a court can ‘speculat[e]’ any rational reason for the resulting differential treatment, regardless of whether the ‘speculation has “a foundation in the record,” ’ regardless of whether it can be ‘empirically substantiated,’ and regardless of whether the Legislature ever ‘articulated’ that reason when enacting the law.” (People v. Love (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 273, 287, quoting Turnage, supra, at pp. 74–75 and Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881; see also People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 195–196 (Edwards) [recognizing that to “mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity,” quoting Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320 (Heller), and that “[i]f a plausible basis exists for the disparity, ‘[e]qual protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law’ ”], quoting Turnage, supra, at p. 74.)
We separately examine each of defendant’s equal protection arguments.
C. Disparate Treatment of Youth Offenders and Juveniles Sentenced to LWOP
As noted, defendant argues that
murder and are sentenced to LWOP differently than juveniles (i.e., those under 18 years of age) who commit murder and receive the same sentence. As also noted, under the statute the former are not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing while the latter are. (
We conclude defendant’s equal protection challenge to this classification lacks merit because both the United States Supreme Court and our high court
In support of his equal protection argument, defendant relies on Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at page 183. In Edwards, the First District Court of Appeal addressed equal protection and the application of
unconstitutional the carve out of such offenders in subdivision (h) of that statute. (Edwards, at p. 197.) In reaching its conclusion, the Edwards court found “no rational relationship between the disparity of treatment [of one-strike offenders] and a legitimate governmental purpose” (ibid.), noting that
In its decision, the Edwards court relied heavily on People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras). In Contreras, our high court held the
Our high court in Contreras in particular relied on the Supreme Court’s Graham decision—a case involving a 17-year-old defendant who was sentenced in Florida to LWOP for a nonhomicide offense—in discussing the
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” ’; they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as well formed.” [Citation.] These salient characteristics mean that “ ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” (Graham, at p. 68, quoting Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 569–570, 573.)” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 365–366.)
We find Edwards reliance on Contreras misplaced for two reasons. First, Contreras involved a constitutional challenge to LWOP sentences under the
Second, and perhaps more important to the instant case, Contreras only addressed the constitutional implications of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. That is not our case here, as defendant Jackson was a 19-year-old adult when he committed the two first degree murders leading to two consecutive LWOP sentences. Thus, the “unique constraints” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359) and “ ‘constitutionally different’ ” standards (ibid., quoting Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471) applicable to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP are inapposite in the instant case. For these reasons, we do not find Contreras to be controlling, or Edwards to be persuasive, authority on our case.
Moreover, we also find Edwards inapposite here because unlike the defendant in that case, our defendant is unable to point to any more serious offense for which
is no crime as horrible as intentional first degree murder” and “case law has long distinguished between such murders and other crimes against persons, reserving the most draconian sentences for murderers alone.” (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 197; see Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 382 [“The parties point to no other provision of our Penal Code, and we are aware of none, that treats a nonhomicide offense more harshly than special circumstance murder”].) As there is no crime more serious than the special circumstance murders defendant committed in 1998, much less one for which
Defendant next argues that
But those sentenced to LWOP have also been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed that first degree murder under one—or as in this case, more than one—of the special circumstances that reflect that the particular first degree murder was in some manner aggravated or reflected a greater risk of harm to persons other than the immediate murder victim or victims. (See
first degree murder but done so in the absence of any such aggravating factors.
Consequently, we independently conclude the two groups of first degree murderers are not similarly situated. (In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 435–436 (Williams) [rejecting the argument that “youth offenders sentenced to LWOP and those youth offenders sentenced to parole-eligible life terms are similarly situated with respect to the Legislature’s first goal, which is to calibrate sentences in accordance with youthful offenders’ diminished culpability,” and noting that “ [w]hile a 21-year-old special circumstance murderer may, in fact, have diminished culpability compared with a 28 year old who commits the same crime, he [or she] is nonetheless more culpable and has committed a more serious crime than a 21 year old convicted of a nonspecial circumstance murder” for purposes of equal protection]; see also In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 481 [in which the majority concluded that “[b]ecause LWOP offenders who were between the ages of 18 and 25 when they committed their offenses are adult offenders, they are not similarly situated to juvenile offenders described in
And, assuming arguendo we accept defendant’s contention that all murderers are similarly situated vis-à-vis
p. 382 [noting that “special circumstance murder” is sentenced most “harshly”]; People v. Blackwell (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 166, 202 [noting that “[f]irst degree special circumstance murder, viewed in the abstract, is perhaps the most serious offense under California law. . . .”]; People v. Acosta (Feb. 9, 2021, G057136) _ Cal.App.5th _, 2021 LEXIS 116, at p. *16 [noting the severity of the crime committed provides a “rational basis for distinguishing between a young adult LWOP offender and a young adult offender serving a non-LWOP sentence”].)
“ ‘It is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the Legislature to recognize degrees of culpability when drafting a Penal Code.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘The decision of how long a particular term of punishment should be is left properly to the Legislature. The Legislature is responsible for determining which class of crimes deserves certain punishments and which crimes should be distinguished from others. As long as the Legislature acts rationally, such determinations should not be disturbed.’ [Citation.]” (Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 840; see In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [noting it is the “function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments, and . . . such questions are in the first instance for the judgment of the Legislature alone”].)
Given the deferential standard we apply in determining rationality for equal protection purposes, we conclude public safety, and the desire to punish those persons who commit first degree special circumstance murder more harshly than persons who commit first degree murder without aggravating circumstances, provide a plausible basis for our Legislature to treat these two classifications differently for purposes of
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant relief under
BENKE, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
Dato, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that the exception in
Like the court in Acosta, for purposes of an equal protection analysis I believe youthful offenders under the age of 25 who commit murder and are sentenced to LWOP are “similarly situated” to young adult defendants sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. (Acosta, supra, [2021 Cal.App. Lexis at pp. **13–15].) Some courts seem willing to peremptorily reject any equal protection challenge by concluding that these groups of youthful offenders are not “similarly situated.” (See, e.g., In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 435 (Williams) [“Where two groups of individuals are not similarly situated for purposes of the law being challenged, we need not proceed to the next step of the equal protection analysis.”].) They further suggest such a determination can be based on the mere fact that certain defendants were convicted of different crimes. (Id. at p. 435.) But where a facial classification is challenged there will always be differences between two groups, and to state that the relevant groups are not “similarly situated” is in many respects announcing the conclusion before performing the analysis. As the Supreme Court has explained, rejecting a constitutional challenge at the outset by finding that two groups are not “similarly situated” would have the effect of
“insulat[ing] the challenged . . . statute from any meaningful equal protection review.” (In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, 831, fn. 54; see Shay, Similarly Situated (2011) 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 581, 624 [“ ‘Similarly situated’ should not be used as an end-run around equal protection review.”].) In any event, “similar” does not mean “identical.” The groups here are “sufficiently similar” with respect to the purpose of the statute because, while they are alike in many respects, they are different in at least one significant way that is the basis for a disparity of treatment. (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200; quoting People v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, 715.) The question is “whether distinctions between the groups justify the unequal treatment.” (Nguyen, at p. 715.)
Also like the Acosta court, I have some reservations “whether the exclusion for young adult LWOP offenders from [the parole] process is consistent with the statute’s purpose and legislative history.” (Acosta, supra, [2021 Cal.App.Lexis, at p. *18].) I, too, would invite the Legislature to reconsider
DATO, J.