People v. JacksonPeople v. Jackson
On appeal, defendant asserts
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
On the evening of January 30, 1997, defendant shot and killed Charles (Charles) Downing and Linda Lewis. He also shot James Robinson in the chest and Sonja (Sonja) Downing in the right and left thigh. Both Robinson and Sonja survived. All of the victims were inside an apartment that defendant and two accomplices entered at about 10:00 p.m., after learning
In 1998, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder (
As to both murder counts, the jury found true the special circumstances of multiple murder (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); murder during an attempted robbery (
As noted, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of LWOP. Defendant also was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 27 years four months. Defendant appealed. After striking a parole revocation fine, this
As also noted, the trial court in November 2019 denied defendant‘s motion seeking a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to
DISCUSSION
A. Youth Offender Parole Hearings
Enacted in 2013, the Legislature intended in
As originally enacted,
Under
Subdivision (h) of
Defendant recognizes he is statutorily ineligible for relief under the plain language of
B. Guiding Principles
We independently review defendant‘s challenge to
” ’ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”
Where our Legislature fixes different punishments for different crimes, those differences do not violate equal protection unless the challenges show “there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage); People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 (Wilkinson).) “This so-called ‘rational basis’ scrutiny is exceedingly deferential: A law will be upheld as long as a court can ‘speculat[e]’ any rational reason for the resulting differential treatment, regardless of whether the ‘speculation has “a foundation in the record,” ’ regardless of whether it can be ‘empirically substantiated,’ and regardless of whether the Legislature ever ‘articulated’ that reason when enacting the law.” (People v. Love (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 273, 287, quoting Turnage, at pp. 74–75 and Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881; see also People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 195–196 (Edwards) [recognizing that to “mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must ’ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity,” quoting Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320 (Heller), and that “[i]f a plausible basis exists for the disparity, ‘[e]qual protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law’ “], quoting Turnage, supra, at p. 74.)
We separately examine each of defendant‘s equal protection arguments.
C. Disparate Treatment of Youth Offenders and Juveniles Sentenced to LWOP
As noted, defendant argues that
We conclude defendant‘s equal protection challenge to this classification lacks merit because both the United States Supreme Court and our high court have repeatedly found the bright-line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one when it comes to criminal sentencing. (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 (Miller) [“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing“]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 (Roper) [“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood“]; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1380 [the age of 18 “is the line the [United States Supreme Court] has drawn in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence“]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 405 [“We previously have rejected the argument that a death penalty scheme that treats differently those who are 18 years of age and older, and those younger than 18, violates equal protection“].)
In support of his equal protection argument, defendant relies on Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at page 183. In Edwards, the First District Court of Appeal addressed equal protection and the application of
In its decision, the Edwards court relied heavily on People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras). In Contreras, our high court held the Eighth Amendment‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishment was violated by the imposition of sentences of 50 years to life, and 58 years to life, on two 16-year-old nonhomicide offenders. (Id. at p. 356.) In support of its holding, Contreras in turn relied on United States Supreme Court authority including Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at page 460, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham), and Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at page 560. From such authority, Contreras recognized that the Eighth Amendment “impose[d] unique constraints on the sentencing of juveniles who commit serious crimes” (Contreras, at p. 359); and that children therefore ” ‘are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Miller, at p. 471.)
Our high court in Contreras in particular relied on the Supreme Court‘s Graham decision—a case involving a 17-year-old defendant who was sentenced in Florida to LWOP for a nonhomicide offense—in discussing the sentencing differences between juvenile and adult offenders: “Central to the high court‘s analysis was its ‘consideration of the culpability of the [juvenile] offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.’ (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 67.) As for culpability, the high court reiterated its observations in Roper that ‘[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have a ” ‘lack of maturity and an
We find Edwards reliance on Contreras misplaced for two reasons. First, Contreras involved a constitutional challenge to LWOP sentences under the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Contreras did not analyze whether such sentences violated the equal protection clause, as the opinion expressly recognized. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 382.)
Second, and perhaps more important to the instant case, Contreras only addressed the constitutional implications of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. That is not our case here, as defendant Jackson was a 19-year-old adult when he committed the two first degree murders leading to two consecutive LWOP sentences. Thus, the “unique constraints” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359) and ” ‘constitutionally different’ ” standards (ibid., quoting Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471) applicable to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP are inapposite in the instant case. For these reasons, we do not find Contreras to be controlling, or Edwards to be persuasive, authority on our case.
Moreover, we also find Edwards inapposite here because unlike the defendant in that case, our defendant is unable to point to any more serious offense for which
D. Disparate Treatment of Youthful Offenders Convicted of First Degree Murder
Defendant next argues that
But those sentenced to LWOP have also been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed that first degree murder under one—or as in this case, more than one—of the special circumstances that reflect that the particular first degree murder was in some manner aggravated or reflected a greater risk of harm to persons other than the immediate murder victim or victims. (See
Consequently, we independently conclude the two groups of first degree murderers are not similarly situated. (In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 435–436 (Williams) [rejecting the argument that “youth offenders sentenced to LWOP and those youth offenders sentenced to parole-eligible life terms are similarly situated with respect to the Legislature‘s first goal, which is to calibrate sentences in accordance with youthful offenders’ diminished culpability,” and noting that “[w]hile a 21-year-old special circumstance murderer may, in fact, have diminished culpability compared with a 28 year old who commits the same crime, he [or she] is nonetheless more culpable and has committed a more serious crime than a 21 year old convicted of a nonspecial circumstance murder” for purposes of equal protection]; see also In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 481 [in which the majority concluded that “[b]ecause LWOP offenders who were between the ages of 18 and 25 when they committed their offenses are adult offenders, they are not similarly situated to juvenile offenders described in section 1170(d)(2)“]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 797, 803 [recognizing that ” ‘[p]ersons convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes,’ ” italics omitted].)
And, assuming arguendo we accept defendant‘s contention that all murderers are similarly situated vis-à-vis
” ‘It is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the Legislature to recognize degrees of culpability when drafting a Penal Code.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘The decision of how long a particular term of punishment should be is left properly to the Legislature. The Legislature is responsible for determining which class of crimes deserves certain punishments and which crimes should be distinguished from others. As long as the Legislature acts rationally, such determinations should not be disturbed.’ [Citation.]” (Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 840; see In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [noting it is the “function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments, and . . . such questions are in the first instance for the judgment of the Legislature alone“].)
Given the deferential standard we apply in determining rationality for equal protection purposes, we conclude public safety, and the desire to punish those persons who commit first degree special circumstance murder more harshly than persons who commit first degree murder without aggravating circumstances, provide a plausible basis for our Legislature to treat these two classifications differently for purposes of
The order denying defendant relief under
BENKE, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:
O‘ROURKE, J.
I agree with the majority that the exception in Penal Code
Like the court in Acosta, for purposes of an equal protection analysis I believe youthful offenders under the age of 25 who commit murder and are sentenced to LWOP are “similarly situated” to young adult defendants sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. (Acosta, supra, [2021 Cal.App. Lexis at pp. **13‒15].) Some courts seem willing to peremptorily reject any equal protection challenge by concluding that these groups of youthful offenders are not “similarly situated.” (See, e.g., In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 435 (Williams) [“Where two groups of individuals are not similarly situated for purposes of the law being challenged, we need not proceed to the next step of the equal protection analysis.“].) They further suggest such a determination can be based on the mere fact that certain defendants were convicted of different crimes. (Id. at p. 435.) But where a facial classification is challenged there will always be differences between two groups, and to state that the relevant groups are not “similarly situated” is in many respects announcing the conclusion before performing the analysis. As the Supreme Court has explained, rejecting a constitutional challenge at the outset by finding that two groups are not “similarly situated” would have the effect of
Also like the Acosta court, I have some reservations “whether the exclusion for young adult LWOP offenders from [the parole] process is consistent with the statute‘s purpose and legislative history.” (Acosta, supra, [2021 Cal.App.Lexis, at p. *18].) I, too, would invite the Legislature to reconsider whether our evolving knowledge of brain development suggests that unalterable judgments about individuals based on what they did between age 18 and 25 may be unjustifiable. (See also People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1040 (conc. opn. of Segal, J.); In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 486‒487 (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).) But while it might be more reasonable to allow youthful LWOP offenders the possibility of parole at some point in time beyond 25 years in prison, giving appropriate deference to the Legislature I cannot say the current judgment implicit in section Penal Code
DATO, J.