GARY CRAIN v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
Case No. 1:24-cv-00468-JLT-CDB (PC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 13, 2025
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (Docs. 7-2, 11); FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 7); 14-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE
I. BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff, a former inmate who is proceeding with counsel, initiated this action with the filing of a complaint in the Superior Court of Kern County, Case No. BCV-23-103996. (Doc. 1). The state action was removed to this Court on April 19, 2024. (Id.). Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on June 21, 2024, asserting five claims against Defendants State of California, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR“), inmate Melvin Simmons, Officer A. Lwin (“Officer Lwin“), and Does 1 to 10. (Doc. 6).1 Plaintiff alleges during
In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges against Officer Lwin and Does 1 to 10 (collectively, “Officer Defendants“) a violation of Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. (Doc. 6 at 5). Plaintiff alleges the force was unnecessary for several reasons, among them being that: Plaintiff was the victim of the inmate attack, not the suspect; Plaintiff was on the ground being attacked by inmate Simmons using a weapon; instead of attempting to stop Simmons who was using a manufactured knife and was heard yelling that he was attempting to rape Plaintiff, Officer Lwin engaged in using 40mm sponge bullets to strike Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 19-23). Further, Plaintiff alleges he did not have any weapons on him at the time of the incident, yet Officer Lwin used the launcher to shoot 40mm bullets at Plaintiff instead of subduing the attacker (Simmons) who was in possession of a knife. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges the force used was excessive given that no Officer Defendant attempted to use another less harmful or forceful method to subdue the altercation before the launcher was used. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Lwin intentionally attempted to
In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement and medical care against Officer Defendants. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff alleges that following the incident, he was bleeding from his head, had substantial injuries, and faced a serious medical need, namely a blunt head injury. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges he suffered a forehead laceration with active bleeding, nose laceration with active bleeding, chest laceration, left arm puncture, right side abdomen scratches, left knee abrasion, rear right shoulder laceration, back of left arm laceration, lower back puncture wounds, and a left cheek abrasion at the time of the incident. (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff alleges the Officer Defendants took no actions to render immediate medical attention to Plaintiff despite his obvious and active bleeding. (Id. ¶¶ 35-37). Plaintiff alleges that Officer Defendants, instead of assisting Plaintiff, deployed additional force, including the use of a launcher, further injuring him. (Id. ¶ 38). Plaintiff alleges Officer Defendants knew of his obvious medical need and apparent head injury and disregarded it by failing to take reasonable measures in summoning immediate medical aid. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 40).
In Claim III, Plaintiff asserts a claim under
In Claim IV, Plaintiff asserts assault and battery claims under state law against inmate Simmons arising from his attack with a manufactured weapon resembling a knife that was undertaken with the intent to harm Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 59). Plaintiff alleges he suffered stab wounds as a result of Simmons‘s attack. (Id. ¶ 61).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A motion to dismiss under
To survive a motion to dismiss under
“For a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally cannot consider material outside the complaint.” Hamilton v. Bank of Blue Valley, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Van Winkle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1162, n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2003)). However, a “court may consider evidence on which the complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff‘s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true all allegations put forth in the complaint and construe all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). The complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations,” but must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). The Court is “not ‘required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.‘” Seven Arts Filmed Entm‘t, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Daniels-Hall v. Nat‘l Educ. Ass‘n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)).
DISCUSSION
A. Requests for Judicial Notice (Docs. 7-2; 11 at 11-13)
Defendants make two requests for the Court to take judicial notice: (1) first, of the existence and content, although not the truth of any matters asserted, of Plaintiff‘s California Government Claim that is dated May 30, 2023 (Doc. 7-2, Ex. A); and (2) second, of the facts that on March 28, 2023, Plaintiff was released from state prison to parole, and remains on parole up to March 27, 2025, the anticipated end of his parole (Doc. 11 at 11-13); (see id. at 14-15 (“Hernandez Decl.“), 17 (Ex. A), 19 (Ex. B)).
In support of the first request for judicial notice of Plaintiff‘s California Government Form dated May 30, 2023 (Doc. 7-2, Ex. A), Defendants argue that this document is relevant to and supports moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 7-2 at 1). Specifically, Defendants contend that this document establishes that Plaintiff did not comply with the California Government Claim Act (“GCA“) claim-presentation requirement under
In support of the second request for judicial notice of facts regarding Plaintiff‘s parole, Defendants argue that these facts are relevant to support their reply to their motion to dismiss the FAC. (Doc. 11 at 11). Specifically, Defendants assert these facts are relevant to their argument that Plaintiff is subject to the State of California‘s requirement that he exhaust prison administrative remedies before bringing suit regarding prison conditions because the state exhaustion requirement applies to both incarcerated persons and parolees. (Id.). Defendants contend that these facts, provided through the Declaration of N. Hernandez (Id. at 14-15) and prison records documenting Plaintiff‘s date of release from state incarceration and his placement on parole (Id. at 16-19, Exhs. A, B) are judicially noticeable as matters of public record. (Id. at 12). Thus, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following: CDCR records reflecting that Plaintiff‘s
The undersigned has examined Defendants’ proffered information of the filing and contents of Plaintiff‘s Government Claim Form and finds the first request suitable for judicial notice as a matter of public record that can be readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
Further, the undersigned finds the second request regarding records of Plaintiff‘s parole status suitable for judicial notice as a matter of public record.
B. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. Claim I: Eighth Amendment Right Against Excessive Force
A correctional officer engages in excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment if he (1) uses excessive and unnecessary force under all the circumstances, and (2) “harms an inmate for the very purpose of causing harm,” and not “as part of a good-faith effort to maintain security.” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, when an officer is accused of using excessive force, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In making this determination, the court may consider (1) the need for application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, (4) the extent of injury suffered by the inmate, and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. (Id. at 7).
While de minimis uses of physical force generally do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant injury need not be evident in the context of an excessive force claim, because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” (Id. at 9).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state an excessive force claim against Officer Lwin. (Doc. 7-1 at 10). Defendants argue that there are no factual allegations sufficient to show that “Officer Lwin maliciously and sadistically used force in response to inmate Simmons‘s attack on [Plaintiff.]” (Id. at 11). Defendants contend that Officer Lwin‘s use of force was necessary and reasonable under the alleged circumstances involving the use of a deadly weapon as Plaintiff was the victim of a violent stabbing by inmate Simmons with a manufactured weapon. (Id.). Defendants contend Officer Lwin‘s decision to meet Simmons‘s continued deadly force towards Plaintiff with less-than-lethal force in the form of a sponge round establishes that Officer Lwin‘s use of the sponge round was proportional to the deadly and immediate threat Simmons posed to Plaintiff. (Id.). Defendants further contend that Plaintiff‘s FAC is devoid of any
The allegations of Plaintiff‘s complaint address each of the five Hudson factors courts consider in determining whether excessive force was used in violation of the Eighth Amendment and whether that force applied was in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or instead, maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). Those allegations are that Officer Lwin “intentionally” launched a 40mm sponge projectile at Plaintiff (the non-aggressor in a violent prison assault) hitting him in the head and causing him to fall and visibly bleed from his head. While Plaintiff was observable in a pool of his own blood, Officer Lwin purposefully launched a second 40mm projectile at Plaintiff as he continued to be victimized during the assault, causing further harm. Plaintiff pleads the Officer Lwin was unusually aggressive towards Plaintiff without provocation based on their prior interactions and had a “vendetta against” him. These pleadings are sufficient to establish a juror could infer Defendants acted maliciously to harm Plaintiff when Defendants launched and struck Plaintiff (the non-aggressor) with a sponge projectile a second time after the first projectile struck Plaintiff and caused him to bleed and fall. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22.
Defendants’ reliance and argument based on Simmons v. Arnett (supra) is not persuasive. That case came to the Court of Appeals on review of the district court‘s summary judgment ruling and the Court had the benefit of undisputed facts showing (1) the correctional officer was obscured and unable to target the aggressing inmate with his launcher, and (2) the officer acted to minimize harm to the non-aggressing inmate by aiming for his lower legs. Simmons, 47 F.4th at 931, 933.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff‘s factual allegations, taken in the light most favorable to him, plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Lwin as they raise more than a sheer possibility that the force used by Officer Lwin was excessive and unnecessary under the circumstances and was not applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (a complaint that “states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss” and the plausibility standard asks for “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully“); Prado v. Gastelo, No. 2:21-cv-05057-JAK (AFM), 2022 WL 20581969, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2022) (finding complaint plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officer based on allegations that officer shot plaintiff in the head with a sponge round while plaintiff was laying prone in a non-combative non-aggressive manner), R&R adopted by 2022 WL 20582023 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2022).
2. Claim 2: Eighth Amendment Right to Medical Care
The government has an obligation to provide medical care for “those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). A person who is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner‘s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 104). Under
Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim against Officer Lwin, specifically in failing to allege facts to show that Officer Lwin “could have done anything to respond to [Plaintiff‘s] claimed injury.” (Doc. 7-1 at 13). Defendants assert that the “only conduct [Plaintiff] appears to allege as being deliberately indifferent is Officer Lwin discharging a second sponge round, which supposedly further injured [Plaintiff].” (Id.). However, Defendants argue that allowing Plaintiff to “proceed on a claim based on these allegations ... would [] severely undermin[e] the deference correctional officers are entitled to when responding to injuries that occur during situations involving inmate violence.” (Id.). Defendants contend that under Plaintiff‘s allegations, if “Officer Lwin should not have acted in response to knowing that inmate Simmons was actively stabbing [Plaintiff,]” he “would likely be defending a lawsuit by [Plaintiff‘s] estate for failing to intervene and prevent [the attack].” (Id. at 13-14). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any alternative options Officer Defendants had available to prevent Simmons from continuing to stab Plaintiff. (Id. at 14). Defendants further contend that Plaintiff fails to allege that Officer Lwin “could provide immediate medical attention.” (Id.).
The undersigned finds Plaintiff‘s allegations sufficiently state a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1061 (“show[ing] his harm was substantial ... would provide additional support for the [plaintiff‘s] claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.“).
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants separately argue that Plaintiff‘s § 1983 claims should be dismissed because Officer Lwin is entitled to qualified immunity.
a. Applicable Law
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for § 1983 claims unless they violated a federal right and ‘the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.‘” Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims: (1) did the government official violate a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) was the unlawfulness of the official‘s conduct “clearly established at the time.” (Id.) (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018)).
Under the first prong of the analysis, “whether a constitutional right was violated ... is a question of fact.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep‘t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009);
“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent,” meaning “it is dictated by ‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.‘” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741-42 (2011)). Stated differently, “[a] right is clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.‘” Rosenbaum v. City of San Jose, 107 F.4th 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021)) (citation omitted). A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2023) (“There is no analogous burden on § 1983 defendants to find factually on-point cases clearly establishing the lawfulness of an officer‘s actions. Nor must § 1983 defendants come forward with precedent showing that the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established.“); Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).
“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, a court must define the right at issue with ‘specificity’ and ‘not ... at a high level of generality.‘” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). When identifying the right that was allegedly violated, a court must define the right more narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than all of the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 1998).
“The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly ... stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation.‘” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). However, the Ninth Circuit has found that “[d]etermining claims of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special
b. Analysis
As noted supra, the undersigned has found that Plaintiff‘s factual allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to plausibly allege Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Thus, the FAC passes the first step of the two-step inquiry for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis on both Eighth Amendment claims. Waid, 87 F.4th at 383. Accordingly, the undersigned proceeds to determine whether it would have been clear to any correctional officer, in the particular circumstances confronted by Defendants, that their actions were unconstitutional in light of the law that was “clearly established at the time” the actions were undertaken.
i. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
To defeat Defendants’ claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff‘s excessive force claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that it was clearly established Officer Lwin‘s
Insofar as Plaintiff relies on Bladen v. CDCR, No. 5:20-cv-00878-MEM-FGJS, 2023 WL 8590460 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2023) to defeat qualified immunity (Doc. 10 at 10), the undersigned disregards that case for two reasons. First, the case was decided after the alleged incident here on January 2, 2023 (Doc. 6 ¶ 13), and, thus, could not have made it sufficiently clear to Officer Lwin at the time of his conduct that what he did violated Plaintiff‘s rights. See City of Tahlequah, Oklahoma v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 13 (2021). Second, Bladen is an unpublished and nonbinding district court opinion that, standing by itself, does not constitute either “controlling authority” or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” necessary to satisfy the “clearly established” standard. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63.
Separately, while acknowledging it is not Defendants’ burden in seeking dismissal on qualified immunity grounds to identify precedent showing that their conduct was lawful (see Hopson, 71 F.4th at 708), the undersigned rejects Defendants’ argument that Simmons v. Arnett (supra) necessarily entitles them to qualified immunity. As noted above in finding Plaintiff plausibly alleges an excessive force claim, not only is Simmons factually distinguishable, but the issue of qualified immunity in that case (as with the other cases Defendants cite, see Doc. 7-1 at 10-11) was determined at the summary judgment stage and, thus, does not fully inform the undersigned‘s consideration of the issue in ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Keates, 883 F.3d at 1234; O‘Brien, 818 F.3d at 936.
Taking the facts pleaded as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Officer Lwin repeatedly and intentionally targeted a non-aggressing inmate with a projectile weapon against whom he had a vendetta, even after the first projectile volley caused an injury resulting in the inmate laying in a pool of his own blood. Just as a correctional officer may not take punitive actions against a prisoner in violation of his First Amendment rights, nor may an officer retaliate against an inmate for whom he as a “vendetta” by engaging in excessive force. See Chavez, 12 F.4th at 1000 (“in the prison context, the ‘prohibition against retaliatory punishment is ‘clearly established law’ in the Ninth Circuit for qualified immunity purposes.‘“) (quoting Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005)). Under Hudson v. McMillian (supra), it was “sufficiently clear” (see
At this early stage of the proceedings, the undersigned cannot determine, “based on the complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies.” O‘Brien, 818 F.3d at 936. “It would be premature for the Court to make a factual determination on qualified immunity because the factual record has [no]t yet been developed.” Rhinehart v. Montgomery, Case No. 22-CV-678-LAB-MDD, 2023 WL 2576773, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb 27, 2023), appeal dismissed 2023 WL 4056229 (9th Cir. 2023). “Once an evidentiary record has been developed through discovery, defendants will be free to move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” O‘Brien, 818 F.3d at 936.
ii. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim
To defeat Defendants’ claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff‘s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that it was clearly established Officer Lwin‘s denial, delay or interference with Plaintiff‘s medical care violated the Eighth Amendment.
Taking the facts pleaded as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Officer Lwin observed Plaintiff laying in a pool of his own blood following his intentional striking of Plaintiff with a projectile sponge round to Plaintiff‘s head. Officer Lwin thereafter launched a second projectile that impacted Plaintiff while he was being stabbed by another inmate. And Officer Lwin “took no actions” to render or facilitate the provision of immediate medical assistance.
At the time of the incident, it was clearly established that a correctional officer may not “purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner‘s pain or possible medical need.” See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (“A defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner‘s pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate indifference to be established.“).
Because Plaintiff‘s allegations squarely charge Officer Lwin with purposefully ignoring or failing to respond to his observable, serious physical injuries, and because there are plausible allegations that Officer Lwin acted will malicious intent (i.e., further to his “vendetta” against
C. Claim III: Government Code § 845.6 Failure to Obtain Medical Care
As a prerequisite to filing suit for “money or damages” against a public entity, the California Government Claim Act requires presentation of a claim to the public entity. General Sec. Services Corp. v. Cnty. of Fresno, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (citing
Plaintiff also must file the claim with the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board within six months of the cause of action accruing.
Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff‘s
Plaintiff contends he properly presented a government claim form. (Doc. 10 at 14). Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that he “presented a timely claim to the State of California on May 30, 2023
Plaintiff‘s government claim form dated May 30, 2023, which the undersigned has judicially noticed supra, provides in compliance with § 910‘s requirements: Plaintiff‘s name and relevant addresses; the date of the incident (“1-2-23“); place of the incident (CCI Tehachapi, “Facility ‘A‘; Housing Unit 4“); dollar amount of the claim (“$20,000,000.00“); and a brief description of injuries for which relief is sought (“brain damage; permanent injuries to head, body, psyche; vi[olation] of statutory & civil rights“). (Doc. 7-2, Ex. A). Plaintiff attaches to the form a document that details the state agencies and officials against whom the claim is filed, including Defendants State of California, CCI, Officer Lwin, and inmate Simmons, and other officers. (Id.). Plaintiff‘s attachment describes similar injuries as listed in the FAC and also the “deprivation of rights and protections under U.S. and California laws and constitutions” and “other unascertained injuries and damages.” (Id.). Plaintiff details the circumstances that led to damage or injury as his being “attacked by another inmate” and “indiscriminate and excessive force by prison guards.” (Id.). Plaintiff explains the State is responsible for his injuries because state personnel were working within the course and scope of their employment and at the direction of the state, and were negligent in the hiring, training, supervising, and disciplining of its personnel. (Id.).
However, merely alleging generally a “deprivation of rights and protections under the U.S. and California laws and Constitutions” cannot be said to “provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 738. Plaintiff‘s failure to allege any facts that establish any of the elements to state a claim under § 845.6, whether describing his need for immediate medical care or for Defendants’ failure to reasonably summon such care that resulted in his claimed injuries, is a “total omission of an essential element from the claim” such that Plaintiff fails “to comply meaningfully with the statute.” Sparks, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 800; see,
Here, Plaintiff‘s claim alleges only a general violation of his constitutional rights, and nothing related to the failure by any correctional officer to summons medical care. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the government claim statute‘s claim-presentation requirement. “Failure to meet this requirement subjects a claim to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.” Mohsin v. Cal. Dep‘t of Water Resources, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1018 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2014) (citing Yearby v. Cal. Dep‘t of Corr., No. 2:07–CV-02800, 2010 WL 2880180, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010)).
Given the deficiencies of Plaintiff‘s claim form, because it would be impossible to comply with the claim presentation requirement now given the time to submit the claim has run, the undersigned will recommend this claim be dismissed without leave to amend. See
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA“) does not apply to state law claims. See
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot assert a state law cause of action against Officer Defendants because he failed to plead exhaustion of state administrative remedies. (Doc. 7 at 20-21). Defendants contend Plaintiff‘s failure to affirmatively plead exhaustion therefore bars litigation of his state claims against the State of California and Officer Lwin. (Id.).
Plaintiff contends that he was no longer a prisoner at the time he filed suit and is therefore not required to plead exhaustion of state administrative remedies as a prerequisite to bringing suit on his state claims. (Doc. 10 at 15) (citing, inter alia, Fanaro v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, No. 3:19-CV-03247-WHO, 2021 WL 2207363 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2021)) (discussed infra).
In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff concedes that he failed to plead exhaustion. (Doc.
Under the version of § 3481(a) that was in effect at the relevant time, the statute provides for a claimant‘s ability to submit a written grievance to the department subject to the requirements in § 3482.
Taken together, these statutes demonstrate that administrative remedies are available to supervised persons, including parolees such as Plaintiff, who are subject to proscribed time constraints for submitting a grievance. In Fanaro, the Court stated: “Fanaro filed his complaint after he was released, so he was not required to exhaust. Neither [the Court] nor the parties have found a definitive decision on the issue, but all traditional considerations lead to the conclusion that the exhaustion requirement no longer applies once a plaintiff is no longer serving his sentence. The
Although Defendants do not cite any case where a court expressly held a parolee asserting state law causes of action was subject to state exhaustion requirements, the undersigned concludes that Fanaro is materially distinct and not persuasive here given the released inmate in that case was not on parole. As set forth above, California‘s regulatory scheme provides that supervised persons, including parolees, have available to them administrative remedies that they must exhaust. And as Defendants correctly contend, Plaintiff failed to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies or a valid excuse for his failure in doing so. Thus, for the same reasons the undersigned found above that amendment to Plaintiff‘s § 845.6 government claim is futile, the time has passed for Plaintiff to file a grievance such that amending these claims to plead exhaustion is futile. Thus, the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff‘s state claims be dismissed without leave to amend.
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For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
- Defendants’ requests for judicial notice (Docs. 7-2, 11 at 11-13) are GRANTED.
And IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
- Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, it is RECOMMENDED that:
- Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claims (Claims I & II) for failure to state a claim and on a qualified immunity grounds be DENIED;
- Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‘s claim pursuant to
Cal. Gov. Code § 845.6 (Claim III) be GRANTED and that claim be DISMISSED without leave to amend; - Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‘s state law negligence claim (Claim V) for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies be GRANTED and that claim be DISMISSED without leave to amend.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 13, 2025
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE