NANCY MARKS v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; COLORADO DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; SUSAN KELLER, Cоmmunity Parole Office, Colorado Department of Corrections, in her official capacity; RICK RAEMISCH, Executive Director Colorado Department of Corrections, in his official capacity
No. 19-1114
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
September 18, 2020
September 18, 2020
D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01577-RPM (D. Colo.)
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 18, 2020
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
DISABILITY LAW COLORADO; COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COALITION; DISABILITY RIGHTS CENTER OF KANSAS; DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES; DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF COLORADO; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW MEXICO; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KANSAS; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OKLAHOMA; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Amici Curiae.
ORDER
Before BACHARACH and CARSON,* Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on the Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc ( “Petition”). As an initial matter, we sua sponte grant panel rehearing only to the extent of the changes to the original opinion that are reflected in the attached revised opinion. The original opinion is withdrawn and replaced by the attached revised opinion. Because the revised opinion contains only non-substantive changes that do not affect the outcome of this appeal, it shall be filed nunc pro tunc to the date the original opinion was filed. Appellees may not file a second or successive rehearing petition. See
The Petition was transmitted to all judges of the court who are in regular active service. As no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service requested that the court be polled, the request for en banc review is denied. See
Entered for the Court
CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk
NANCY MARKS v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; COLORADO DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; SUSAN KELLER, Community Parole Office, Colorado Department of Corrections, in her official capacity; RICK RAEMISCH, Executive Director Colorado Department of Corrections, in his official capacity
Case No. 19-1114
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
May 12, 2020
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 12, 2020
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
DISABILITY LAW COLORADO; COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COALITION; DISABILITY RIGHTS CENTER OF KANSAS; DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES; DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01577-RPM)
Michael Fairhurst (David Lane, with him on the briefs), Killmer, Lane & Newman LLP, Denver, Colorado, on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant.
Cathern H. Smith, Assistant Attorney General (Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General for the State of Colorado, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, on bеhalf of the Defendants-Appellees.
Amy Farr Robertson, Co-Executive Director, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Denver, Colorado, and Claudia Center, Senior Staff Attorney, Disability Rights Program, American Civil Liberties Union, San Francisco, California, filed an Amici Curiae brief, in support of Appellant.
Before BACHARACH and CARSON,* Circuit Judges.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
Ms. Nancy Marks was serving a prison term in Colorado when she entered a community corrections program operated by Intervention Community Corrections Services. To stay in the program, Ms. Marks needed to remain employed. But while participating in the program, she aggravated a previous disability, and Intervention deemed her unable to work. So Intervention terminated Ms. Marks from the program and returned her to prison. (This is called “regression” to prison.)
Ms. Marks sued, blaming her regression on two Colorado agencies: the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and the Colorado Department of Criminal Justice (CDCJ).1 In the suit, Ms. Marks sought damages and prospective relief based on
- violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act and
- a denial of equal protection.
- the Rehabilitation Act did not apply because Intervention had not received federal funding,
- neither the CDOC nor the CDCJ could incur liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act for Intervention’s decision to regress Ms. Marks, and
- the equal-protection claim failed because Ms. Marks did not show that the regression decision had lacked a rational basis.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. We agree with the district court that (1) thе claims for prospective relief were moot and (2) neither the CDOC nor CDCJ violated Ms. Marks’s right to equal protection. But we reverse the award of summary judgment on the claims involving the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. On these claims, the district court made two errors.
First, the court mistakenly concluded that the Rehabilitation Act didn’t apply because Intervention hadn’t received federal funding. The court should have considered whether the federal government had funded the CDOC and CDCJ, not Intervention.
Second, the court mistakenly focused оn whether the CDOC and CDCJ could incur liability under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act for a regression decision unilaterally made by
1. The Colorado Community Corrections System
In Colorado, local governments operate community corrections programs under state oversight.
With this authority, Jefferson County entered into a contract with CDOC and the Board of Commissioners entered into a contract with the CDCJ. In turn, Jefferson County contracted with Intervention to run the community corrections program where Ms. Marks was placed.
The CDCJ contract specified that any subcontractors had to adhere to the CDCJ’s standards.2
2. Aggravation of Ms. Marks’s Injury and Her Regression to Prison
Ms. Marks suffers from spinal stenosis, which limits her ability to walk and requires her to use a wheelchair. While participating in community corrections, she fell in the shower and aggravated her disability.
The incident prompted Ms. Marks’s physician to send two letters to Intervention. The first letter described Ms. Marks’s injuries, told
Although Ms. Marks alleges that she could have continued working despite her disability, Intervention decided that she couldn’t and terminated her from the program:
Six of the eleven Conditions of Placement require physical activity on the part of the client: one of the more important conditions is that she is emрloyed at a phone location. [Ms.] Marks’s medical conditions make it apparent that she will not be able to obtain employment in the foreseeable future, as is required by the ICCS residential program. . . . ICCS has rejected placement after acceptance as her medical conditions no longer make her appropriate to remain in the ICCS residential program.
Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2, at 401. Ms. Marks completed her sentence in prison rather than in the community corrections program.
3. Mootness of the Claims for Prospective Relief
In part, Ms. Marks sought
- a declaration that her rights had been violated under Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution,
- an injunction against future discrimination, and
- an injunction ordering the CDOC and CDCJ to reasonably accommodate her disability.
The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, reasoning that Ms. Marks had completed her sentence. On appeal, Ms. Marks invokes an exception to mootness, arguing that the defendants’ conduct was capable of repetition yet evading review.
We engage in de novo review of Ms. Marks’s challenge to the determination of mootness. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010). Exercising de novo review, we agree that the claims for prospective relief are moot.
Federal jurisdiction exists only if the court could grant relief affecting the plaintiff’s rights. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (noting that courts may not “decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them” (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971))). The grounds for jurisdiction must exist throughout the litigation, even as circumstances change. See Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1024 (10th Cir. 2011). When circumstances change and the court can no longer affect the plaintiff’s rights, thе case ordinarily becomes moot. Id.
To satisfy this burden, Ms. Marks must establish that
- the challenged action ended too quickly to be fully litigated and
- “a reasonable expectation” exists for Ms. Marks to again experience the same misconduct.
Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)).
We assume without deciding that Ms. Marks has proven that her regression ended too quickly to be litigated. Even with this assumption, the exception would not apply because Ms. Marks is unlikely to experience the same wrongdoing in the future. Ms. Marks does not allege that she may return to prison, that she may reenter a community corrections program, or that she may again face regression from a program based on her inability to work. Ms. Marks instead concedes that “the probability of recurrence against [herself] is not high.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 63.
We disagree with Ms. Marks’s characterization of these cases, for they all stress the requirement that the same plaintiff face a risk of encountering the same conduct in the future. In Roe v. Wade, for example, the Supreme Court applied the mootness exception because “[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the same woman.” 410 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also applied the exception in Norman v. Reed becausе “[t]here would [otherwise] be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar, future controversy.” 502 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added). And in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court applied the exception because the “petitioner [might] be subjected to a similar . . . order” again in the future. 478 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added). None of Ms. Marks’s cases imply that plaintiffs can invoke the exception if they face little chance of encountering the same conduct in the future.
Ms. Marks also argues that even though she’s unlikely to be regressed again, the case is not moot because the defendants’ wrongful
Again, none of Ms. Marks’s cases support her proposition. Ms. Marks relies in part on United States v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 2005), but she disregards Howard’s subsequent history. Howard was withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by United States v. Howard, 463 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2006). The new opinion was also withdrawn. United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.). We decline to follow another circuit court’s opinion that was withdrawn.
Ms. Marks also relies on Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2009). There the D.C. Circuit concluded that the claims did not become moot because the same plaintiff would likely encounter the same conduct in the future. 570 F.3d at 324–25. Del Monte Fresh does not suggest that the mootness exception applies whenever the same conduct could injure others.
Other circuits aside, our cases prevent us from applying the mootness excеption based on a risk to others. See, e.g., White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that claims for prospective injunctive relief became moot when the inmate plaintiff obtained parole). Given these
4. Correctness of the Summary-Judgment Rulings
On summary judgment, the district court ruled that
- the Rehabilitation Act didn’t apply because Intervention hadn’t received federal funding,
- the CDOC and CDCJ couldn’t incur liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act for Intervention’s decision to regress Ms. Marks, and
- the equal-protection claim failed because Ms. Marks had not shown the absence of a rational basis to treat her differently than non-disabled inmates.
A. Standard of Review
For these rulings, we conduct de novo review, drawing all reasonable inferences favorably to Ms. Marks. See May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2019) (de novo review); Murphy v. City of Tulsa, 950 F.3d 641, 643 (10th Cir. 2019) (draw reasonable inferences favorably to non-movant). With these inferences, we consider whether the CDOC and CDCJ have shown the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
B. The Applicability of the Rehabilitation Act
The district court rejected Ms. Mаrks’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act in part because Intervention had not received federal funds. We disagree with this ruling because the district court should have
The Rehabilitation Act applies only if the defendant received federal funds.
In district court, the parties agreed that the CDOC and CDCJ had received federal funding. The district court nonеtheless concluded sua sponte that the Rehabilitation Act didn’t apply because Intervention hadn’t received federal funds.
Ms. Marks challenges this ruling, arguing that
- the district court should have focused on whether the CDOC and CDCJ had received federal funds,
- the CDOC and CDCJ were subject to the Rehabilitation Act regardless of whether the federal funds had been used for community corrections, and
- the CDOC and CDCJ admitted in district court that they had received federal funding.
We agree with Ms. Marks. The district court should have considered whether the CDOC and CDCJ had received federal funds. The court had no
C. Statutory Liability of the CDOC and CDCJ for Discrimination
The district court also reasoned that (1) Intervention had unilaterally decided to regress Ms. Marks and (2) the CDOC and CDCJ could not unravel that decision. For these reasons, the district court concluded that the community corrections program could not be considered a program of the CDOC or CDCJ, preventing liability even if Ms. Marks could satisfy the elements of statutory liability. We disagree.
Under the statutes, the CDOC and CDCJ could incur liability for disability discrimination in their own programs. See
As long as the CDOC and CDCJ complied with the prohibition against discrimination, they could choose how to operate the community corrections program. For example, the CDOC and CDCJ could operate the program themselves or farm out operations to a local or private entity. But
Because this prohibition applies, the statutes and related regulations do not allow public or federally-funded entities to contract away their liability for discrimination. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination when it is either direct or committed “through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.”
The CDOC and CDCJ characterize the community corrections program as the exclusive province of Jefferson County and Intervention. But a factfinder could reasonably regard the program as the state’s. Indeed, a state regulation assigns administration of residential community
* * *
The parties agree that intentional discrimination is required for a plaintiff to obtain compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009) (“To recover compensatory damages under § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act], a plaintiff must establish that the agency’s discrimination was intentional.”); see also Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093, 1108–09 (10th Cir. 2019) (suggesting that intentional discrimination is required to recover compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act), cert. denied sub nom. City of Trinidad v. Hamer, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 644 (2019); Hans v. Bd. of Shawnee Cty. Comm’rs, 775 F. App’x 953, 956 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (concluding that intentional disсrimination is required to recover compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act). So in the absence of intentional discrimination against Ms. Marks, the parties agree that CDOC and CDCJ would not incur statutory liability for compensatory damages. But the district court didn’t decide the issue.
The court did conclude that the CDOC and CDCJ weren’t liable for compensatory damages because they couldn’t prevent Intervention from regressing Ms. Marks. But that conclusion pertained to the agencies’ responsibility for the program—not the existence of intentional conduct.
On appeal, the CDOC and CDCJ conflate the issues involving (1) responsibility for the program with (2) the element of intentional discrimination: “The State Defendants cannot be liable for intentional discrimination against Marks, because the decision to regress Marks from ICCS was made without the authority or consent of the State Defendants.” Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 17. But responsibility for the program and intentional discrimination are separate issues, and the district court didn’t decide whether the CDOC or CDCJ had intentionally discriminated against Ms. Mаrks. So we express no opinion on whether the existing evidence would create a factual issue on the element of intentional conduct.
D. The Equal-Protection Claim
Ms. Marks also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her equal-protection claim, which involves discrimination based on her disability. This ruling was correct.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims of disability discrimination trigger rational-basis review. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). Ms. Marks admits that precedent requires rational-basis review but maintains that disability discrimination should trigger stricter scrutiny. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 64 n.24; see also Oral Arg. at 30:47 (“What we acknowledged is that under caselaw which we believe is incorrect, it’s rational basis review.”). But even if we agreed, we could not buck Supreme Court precedent. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (“[A] precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”).
The CDOC and CDCJ argue that regression of Ms. Marks was rational because
- her continued housing in community corrections was unsafe because Intervention lacked medical staff and could not provide extended bedrest or medical care and
- Ms. Marks had violated her conditions by failing to attend job training and educational programs or work at a telephone location.
We reach only the first reason and conclude that it satisfies rational-basis review. Intervеntion lacked on-site medical staff, and the CDOC and CDCJ could reasonably consider the facilities unsafe for Ms. Marks. Indeed, she had already fallen in the shower because of the absence of a grab bar or shower chair. And a physician had said that Ms. Marks’s
At oral argument, Ms. Marks contended that she could have been transferred to other community corrections facilities. Oral Arg. at 33:15. But this argument did not appear in the appellate briefs, and we do not consider arguments newly hatched at oral argument. Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002, 1017 (10th Cir. 2015).
Concluding that a rational basis existed for the decision to order Ms. Marks’s regression, we uphold the award of summary judgment to the CDOC and CDCJ on the equal-protection claim.12
5. Conclusion
In our view, the district court correctly
- granted summary judgment to the CDOC and CDCJ on the equal-protection claim and
- dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot.
But we also conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDOC and CDCJ on the claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. The Rehabilitation Act applies because the CDOC and CDCJ received federal funding. And a factfinder could reasonably view the community corrections program as the CDOC and CDCJ’s, rendering them liable for the alleged discrimination against Ms. Marks.13 We thus reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.