MARK SILGUERO AND AMY WOLFE, APPELLANTS, v. CSL PLASMA, INCORPORATED, APPELLEE
No. 18-1022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
Argued March 13, 2019
ON CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
In this оpinion we consider two questions certified to this Court by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) Is a plasma collection center a “public facility” under
I. Background
CSL Plasma, Inc. operates plasma collection centers across the United States. At these centers, CSL extracts the donor‘s blood, separates the donor‘s plasma from the red blood cells, and then returns the red blood cells to the donor‘s bloodstream.1 After this extraction process, CSL compensates the donor,2 processes the plasma to create a marketable plasma byproduct, and ultimately sells this byproduct to pharmaceutical companies. The federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates this plasma extraction process. The FDA licenses and audits plasma collection centers.
Silguero suffers from bad knees and uses a cane. CSL and Silguero agree that Silguero qualifies as a person with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the THRC. Silguero had previously donated plasma at CSL between January and April 2014. Silguero attempted to donate again on January 2, 2015. At that time, the condition of Silguero‘s knees had worsened to the point of needing knee replacements. Silguero went through CSL‘s donor-screening process, and CSL informed him that he would be deferred and unable to donate that day. Silguero claims he was deferred because of his “unsteady gait” and because CSL believed that he could not transfer safely to and from the donation bed. Silguero became upset, shook his finger at the medical staff, and told them they would be sorry. As a result, CSL deferred Silguero permanently, banning him from donating at CSL.
Wolfe suffers from an anxiety disorder and utilizes a service dog to improve her symptoms. Having never donated at CSL before, Wolfe went to CSL to donate plasma on October 9, 2016. Both CSL and Wolfe agree that Wolfe qualifies as a person with a disability under the ADA and the THRC. CSL did not allow Wolfe to donate because she required a service animal to treat her anxiety. In deferring her, CSL relied on its guidelines that a person is ineligible to donate if they suffer from anxiety requiring the use of a service dog.
Silguero filed suit against CSL in federal court on August 24, 2016, alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of his disability. He sought injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA and both injunctive relief and damages under
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CSL. No. 2:16-CV-361, 2017 WL 6761818, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2017) (slip copy). The district court first concluded that a plasma collection center is not a place of “public accommodation” under
Having decided that the ADA does not apply, the district court elected to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims. See id. at *5 (citing Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 1994)). Explaining that the THRC provides for persons with disabilities to have full use and enjoyment of a public facility in Texas, the court analyzed whether a plasma collection center falls within the meaning of “public facility” under the THRC. Id.; see also
[A] plasma-donation сenter does not supply any good or service for convenience or need. Rather, the donor sells blood plasma to the center. Because the roles of seller and buyer are reversed in the plasma-donation context, plasma-donation centers such as CSL do not qualify as places of public accommodation under
Texas Human Resources Code § 121.002(5) .
Id. The district court also reasoned that the public is not generally invited to a plasma collection center. Id. at *6. It noted that although a plasma collection center is arguably a commercial business, it only purchases plasma from those who pass the screening, and it does not invite the general public, in its entirety, to donate; “[a]t most, it invites the general public to find out whether they meet the criteria for donating.” Id. Therefore, the district court determined that a plasma collection center does not represent the open and accessible nature of the establishments listed in
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s holding that a plasma collection center is not an “other service establishment” under the ADA. 907 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2018). After concluding that the ADA does not apply to a plasma collection center, the Fifth Circuit certified questions to this Court as to whether the THRC governs plasma collection centers such as CSL‘s. Id. at 333. Those questions are:
- Is a plasma collection center [like those operated by CSL] a “public facility” under
Texas Human Resources Code § 121.002(5) ? - If so, would Texas law allow the plasma collection center to reject a “person with a disability,” see
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 121.002(4) , based on the center‘s concerns for the individual‘s health that stem from the disability? What standard would apply to determining whether the plasma collection center properly rejected the person, rather than committed impermissible discrimination underTexas Human Resources Code § 121.003(a) ?
Id. We accepted the certified questions. 62 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 90 (Oct. 26, 2018).
II. Texas Human Resources Code Chapter 121
The THRC provides that “[p]ersons with disabilities have the same right as persons without disabilities to the full use and enjoyment of any public facility in the state.”
(c) No person with a disability may be denied admittance to any public facility in the state because of the person‘s disability. No person with a disability may be denied the use of a white cane, assistance animal, wheelchair, crutches, or other device of assistance.
(d) The discrimination prohibited by this section includes a refusal to allow a person with a disability to use or be admitted to any public facility, a ruse or subterfuge calculated to prevent or discourage a person with a disability from using or being admitted to a public facility, and a failure to:
- (1) comply with Chapter 469, Government Code;
- (2) make reasonable accommodations in policies, practices, and procedures; or
- (3) provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to allow the full use and enjoyment of the public facility.
a street, highway, sidewalk, walkway, common carrier, airplane, motor vehicle, railroad train, motor bus, streetcar, boat, or any other public conveyance or mode of transportation; a hotel, motel, or other place of lodging; a public building maintained by any unit or subdivision of government; a retail business, commerciаl establishment, or office building to which the general public is invited; a college dormitory or other educational facility; a restaurant or other place where food is offered for sale to the public; and any other place of public accommodation, amusement, convenience, or resort to which the general public or any classification of persons from the general public is regularly, normally, or customarily invited.
The THRC expressly requires that persons with disabilities have the same use and enjoyment of “public facilities” as non-disabled persons—more specifically, a public facility cannot deny admittance to a person with a disability because of his or her disability, deny a person with a disability use of a device of assistance, such as an assistance animal, and must make reasonable
In answering certified questions, we are limited to answering only the questions before us. See, e.g., Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1992) (“[A] certified question is a limited procedural device that constrains us to answer only the question certified ‘and nothing more.‘” (citation omitted)). Both certified questions present issues of statutory interpretation of
In interpreting statutes, we must look to the plain language, construing the text in light of the statute as a whole. See id. at 411 (citation omitted); see also Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560, 572 (Tex. 2016) (citation omitted). A statute‘s plain language is the most reliable guide to the Legislature‘s intent. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. 2012)). The statutory terms bear their common, ordinary meaning, unless the text provides a different meaning or the common meaning leads to an absurd result. See Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018) (citation omitted). This Court may not impose its own judicial meaning on a statute by adding words not contained in the statute‘s language. See Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 508. If the statute‘s plain language is unambiguous, we interpret its plain meaning, presuming that the Legislature intended for each of the statute‘s words to have a purpose and that the Legislature purposefully omitted words it did not include. See id. at 509 (citation omitted); Janvey, 487 S.W.3d at 572 (reviewing a certified question and explaining that the Court‘s “primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature‘s intent without unduly restricting or expanding the statute‘s scope” (citation omitted)). The statutory words must be determined considering the context in which they are used, not in isolation. See Greater Hous. P‘ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 59 (Tex. 2015) (citations omitted).
III. “Public Facility” Under the Texas Human Resources Code
We begin by considering the first certified question: Is a plasma collection center a “public facility” under THRC section
On the other hand, CSL argues that the Legislature did not intend to apply the THRC to a plasma collection center, such as CSL‘s, and that a plasma collection center differs from an establishment with an open invitation for the public to visit the premises and receive a product or service in exchange for payment. Although the ADA and THRC differ, CSL argues that the district court‘s and the Fifth Circuit‘s reasoning in determining that a plasma collection center is not a place of public accommodation should likewise lead to the conclusion that a plasma collection center is not a “public facility” under the THRC.
The Legislature‘s definition of “public facility” is broad. See
Two of the THRC‘s categories are potentially applicable to a plasma collection center: “a retail business, commercial establishment, or office building to which the general public is invited“; and “any other place of public accommodation, amusement, convenience, or resort to which the general public or any classification of persons from the general public is regularly, normally, or customarily invited.”
“Commercial” is not defined in the THRC, but it is generally defined as being
Although we conclude that a plasma collection center is a “commercial establishment,” the crux of the issue as to whether a plasma collection center is a “public facility” under the THRC is whether it is a facility to which the general public is ordinarily invited. There is no question that a plasma collection center invites the general public into its business to engage in the donation-screening process to determine donation eligibility. But CSL argues that because a plasma collection center allows only individuals who pass the screening process to donate and reserves the right to reject certain individuals, the general public is not invited to donate plasma. Therefore, we must determine whether, under the plain meaning of the THRC, a facility is public by virtue of its general invitation for anyone to enter and be screened, or whether such a facility is nevertheless excluded from the definition of “public facility” because its invitation to donate plasma is restricted and limited.
The plain language of the terms “invite,” “invitation,” and “invited” suggests that allowing any member of the general public to enter a facility and be present for, or participate in, a screening process is “inviting” the member of the public. See Invite, WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (meaning “to offer an incentive or inducement“; “to provide opportunity or occasion for“; “open the way“; “increase the likelihood of“; “open the door“); Invitation, WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (meaning “the requesting of a person‘s company or participation“; “a written or verbal request to be present or participate“; “a written or verbal request to do or undertake“); Invited, WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (meaning “present or done by invitation“). It follows that the plain language of the THRC‘s definition of “public facility“—specifically, a “commercial establishment to which the general public is invited“—means that a member of the general public is “invited” by a plasma collection center when it merely opens the door to them, allowing them to be present in the facility and providing them the opportunity to participate in the plasma donation process, beginning with screening. See
Here, CSL, like оther plasma collection centers, extends an invitation to all members of the public to enter its collection facilities and engage in the donor screening process. In fact, a plasma collection
In Beeman v. Livingston, in which deaf inmates at a state prison filed suit under the THRC, this Court held that the prison was not a “public facility” subject to the THRC. 468 S.W.3d at 543. The inmates claimed that the prison violated the THRC by denying deaf inmates an opportunity to participate in and benefit from certain programs available to inmates without disabilities. Id. at 536. They appealed to this Court, asserting that the court of appeals misconstrued the phrase “public building” within the THRC‘s definition of “public facility.” Id. at 537. The inmates argued that under the plain meaning of “public building” in
Beeman‘s plain language definition of “public“—open and accessible to the general population—applies with equal force
CSL argues that the THRC‘s definition of “public facility” should be construed in the same manner as the corresponding ADA definition of place of “public accommodation” in determining whether a plasma collection center qualifies as a “public facility.” Compare
We conclude that a business‘s selectivity as to whom it ultimately conducts business with does not take it out of the purview of the THRC‘s definition of “public facility.” The Legislature broadly defined “public facility,” and we cаnnot unduly restrict or expand the scope of the THRC. See Janvey, 487 S.W.3d at 572; see also Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 508 (explaining that a court may not impose its own judicial meaning onto a statute). The question of whether a plasma collection center discriminates unlawfully by screening out certain members of the general public, denying particular individuals the opportunity to donate plasma because of their specific disabilities, is relevant not to the applicability of the THRC‘s “public facility” definition, but to the standards that apply under the THRC.
IV. Texas Human Resources Code Discrimination Standards
Because we hold that a plasma collection center qualifies as a “public facility” under the THRC, we next must answer the question of what standard the THRC provides in determining whether a public facility unlawfully discriminates against a person with a disability. In other words, can a plasma collection center of the type operated by CSL ever justify excluding a potential donor based on health concerns related to the individual‘s disability?9 At the outset, we note that the answer to this question applies only to facilities that do not fall under the ADA‘s definition of “public accommodation” but meet the THRC‘s definition of “public facility.” Practically speaking, this situation is uncommon; the ADA applies to most public facilities, and therefore the potentiаl implications of the answer to this question are significant only insofar as they relate to the unusual public facility that is not subject to the ADA‘s standards.
In construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent. See, e.g., Janvey, 487 S.W.3d at 572 (citation omitted); Molinet, 356 S.W.3d at 411 (citation omitted). The THRC provides that “[p]ersons with disabilities have the same right as persons without disabilities
Regulations relating to the use of public facilities by any designated class of persons from the general public may not prohibit the use of particular public facilities by persons with disabilities who, except for their disabilities or use of assistance animals or other devices for assistance in travel, would fall within the designated class.
Silguero contends that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability when CSL did not allow him to donate plasma because he has bad knees, requiring use of a cane, and CSL believed that he might not be able to maneuver himself to and from the donation bed. He does not allege that CSL denied him use of his cane, nor does he allege that he was denied entrance into the facility. Wolfe claims that CSL discriminated against her on the basis of her anxiety, deferring her solely because her use of a service dog indicated that she was severely anxious. Wolfe does not allege that CSL rejected her because it could not accommodate her use of a service dog at the facility, nor does she allege that she was denied entrance into the facility because of her use of a service dog. And CSL points to its policy to defer potential donors who suffer from anxiety requiring the use of a service dog, citing sаfety concerns about a donor having an anxiety attack while undergoing the extraction process.
Whether CSL violated the THRC in discriminating against the plaintiffs turns on whether CSL can deny the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of a public facility by excluding them from donating plasma on the basis of their disabilities, citing safety concerns or difficulties in carrying out the plasma extraction process. Thus, the question is whether a plasma collection center violates the THRC when it concludes that a potential donor‘s disability makes him or her unfit, and therefore ineligible, to donate plasma. The Fifth Circuit asks specifically about the standard for determining whether a plasma collection center‘s rejection of a potential donor would violate the broad prohibition against discrimination in
Here, the parties agree that certain health concerns and disabilities can justify exclusion from the use and enjoyment of a public facility. The plaintiffs advocate for a standard under which an exclusion is justified if (1) thе reason given is not pretextual,
In interpreting the applicability of the THRC‘s anti-discrimination standards, we must be mindful of the statute‘s context and its meaning as a whole. See Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866–67 (Tex. 1999) (indicating that judicial interpretation of a statute involves using its context and any implicit meaning contained in the language). Unlike the ADA, the THRC does not contain specific exemptions that expressly allow for lawful discrimination under certain circumstances. Cf.
The plain language of the THRC indicates an intent to prohibit pretextual discrimination—since its enactment in 1969, section 102.003(d) has provided that the discrimination prohibited by the THRC includes “a ruse or subterfuge calculated to prevent or discourage a person with a disability from using or being admitted to a public facility.”
In addition to generally prohibiting discrimination that deprives persons with disabilities of the full use and enjoyment of public facilities, section 121.003(d) further defines the types of conduct that violate the THRC, including “a failure to . . . make reasonable accommodations in policies, practices, and procedures” and a failure to “provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to allow the full use and enjoyment of the public facility,” among others.
Unlike the ADA, the THRC is not explicit in laying out such circumstances. But
Cognizant of the fact that the Legislature enacted some of the discrimination standards in section 121.003 after Cоngress enacted the ADA, and that the purpose of the THRC aligns with the ADA‘s purpose, we find the ADA and the case law interpreting it helpful in analyzing the circumstances under which a public facility may lawfully discriminate by depriving a person with a disability of full use and enjoyment of the facility. See Grady v. City of Fort Worth, No. 4:00-CV-1871-A, 2002 WL 63010, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2002) (“[I]n interpreting Texas antidiscrimination laws, Texas courts consider how federal statutes covering similar subjects are implemented.” (citing Caballero v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 858 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. 1993))); see also
We observe that the THRC‘s structure is similar to the ADA‘s as to prohibited discrimination. Compare
The ADA provides that discrimination includes:
(i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered;
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations;
(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden . . . .
Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) of the ADA, in particular, is relevant in illustrating how we may draw on the ADA in interpreting the THRC. That ADA provision prohibits certain conduct that constitutes discrimination
The plaintiffs look to the THRC‘s reference to “reasonable accommodations” in THRC section 121.003(d)(2) as the basis for their proposed lawful discrimination standard, arguing that although the term is not defined in the THRC, it must be interpreted to have a meaning similar to that in the ADA‘s modification provision, particularly because the Legislature added this language after the enactment of the ADA. See generally
Similarly, a defendant will not be liable under the ADA for refusal to provide auxiliary aids and services that are not necessary to ensure that persons with disаbilities are not treated differently from others. See
Moreover, the ADA specifically provides that nothing in the ADA “shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”
The question certified to this Court asks specifically about deprivation of full use
Generally, a plaintiff alleging a THRC discrimination claim has the burden to establish that the defendant discriminatеd against the plaintiff due to the plaintiff‘s disability, and the plaintiff must satisfy that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. State Hotel, Inc. v. Heagy, 650 S.W.2d 503, 504–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no pet.) (holding that a blind plaintiff claiming a violation of the THRC failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant discriminated against him because he was blind). Analogous employment discrimination cases are relevant here in articulating the burden under the THRC. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied), abrogated on other grounds by Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. 2018); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting out the applicable burdens in the employment discrimination context). In the context of ADA claims for discrimination as to public accommodations, a defendant is not liable when the defendant‘s conduct does not meet the applicable ADA definition of “discrimination,” when an exception is satisfied, or when the defendant proves the direct-threat affirmative defense. See Bench, 2014 WL 12586743, at *8. We see no reason, and no authority, for a different framework for claims under the THRC.
We hold that a defendant‘s exclusion of a person with a disability from full use and enjoyment of a public facility, including services provided at the public facility, does not run afoul of the THRC‘s broad discrimination prohibition in section 121.003(a) when: (1) the defendant‘s conduct does not meet the definition of “discrimination” contemplated by the THRC or satisfies an exception, such as the exclusion that allows a defendant to use eligibility or screening criteria that exclude persons with disabilities from full use and enjoyment when such criteria are shown to
V. Conclusion
The Legislature broadly defined “public facility.” A commercial establishment that invites the general public into its doors for the opportunity to do business falls within the THRC‘s definition of “public facility.” Therefore, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative—that a plasma collection center, such as those operated by CSL, is a “public facility” under the THRC. The ADA‘s analogous provisions are informative as to the standards by which a facility may lawfully discriminate on the basis of a disability. Based on the plain language of the THRC and the relevant provisiоns of the ADA, we conclude that the Legislature intended the THRC to encompass exceptions to the requirement that persons with disabilities be afforded full use and enjoyment of a public facility to the same extent as the general public. We answer the second certified question that a defendant‘s exclusion of a person with a disability from full use and enjoyment of a public facility does not run afoul of the THRC‘s broad discrimination prohibition when: (1) the defendant‘s conduct does not meet the THRC‘s definition of “discrimination” or satisfies an exception to the definition of “discrimination,” such as the exception for use of eligibility criteria that screen out certain persons with disabilities, but are necessary for the public facility‘s provision of services; or (2) the defendant establishes that allowing the person with a disability full use and enjoyment of the public facility would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others. See
OPINION DELIVERED: June 28, 2019
Paul W. Green
Justice