Mark Silguero and Amy Wolfe v. Csl Plasma, Incorporated, 579 S.W.3d 53

CSL Plasma operates for‑profit plasma collection centers that screen potential donors, extract plasma, compensate eligible donors, and sell plasma byproducts; FDA regulations require medical eligibility screening.
Mark Silguero (uses a cane) and Amy Wolfe (uses a service dog for anxiety) are persons with disabilities who were deferred from donating and receiving compensation under CSL’s medical guidelines.
Silguero and Wolfe sued in federal court alleging disability discrimination under Title III of the ADA and Texas Human Resources Code (THRC) chapter 121; the district court granted summary judgment for CSL; Fifth Circuit affirmed ADA holding and certified two questions to the Texas Supreme Court about the THRC.
Certified questions: (1) whether a plasma collection center is a “public facility” under THRC §121.002(5); (2) if so, what standard governs when rejecting a person with a disability is impermissible under THRC §121.003(a).
Texas Supreme Court held that a plasma collection center is a “public facility” (a commercial establishment to which the general public is invited) and that the THRC permits certain defenses/exceptions analogous to ADA exceptions (e.g., necessary eligibility criteria and direct‑threat).
The Court declined to decide the merits as to Silguero and Wolfe’s specific claims and limited its answers to the certified statutory questions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is a plasma collection center a “public facility” under THRC §121.002(5)?	Plasma centers invite the general public to be screened and thus are commercial establishments inviting the public.	Plasma centers are different because they pay donors rather than provide services and only allow eligible screened persons to donate, so they are not public facilities.	Yes. A plasma center is a commercial establishment that invites the general public (screening qualifies as an invitation) and thus is a “public facility.”
What standard governs lawful exclusion of a person with a disability under THRC §121.003(a)?	Exclusion should be justified only if not pretextual and if serving the individual poses a direct threat, undue burden, or would require fundamental alteration.	CSL urged deference to legitimate business decisions—if a facility articulates a legitimate business purpose, exclusion should be lawful.	THRC allows exceptions analogous to ADA: exclusion is lawful when it does not meet THRC’s definition of discrimination or satisfies exceptions (e.g., necessary eligibility criteria) or when allowing participation would pose a direct threat to others; reasonable/necessary/undue burden/fundamental‑alteration concepts apply.

Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016) (concluded a plasma collection center is a “service establishment” under the ADA)
Beeman v. Livingston, 468 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2015) (construed ‘public facility’ in THRC and held ‘public’ denotes openness/accessibility, not mere public purpose)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for burden‑shifting in discrimination cases cited as background)
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (definition and proof requirements for ‘direct threat’ in disability context)
Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 197 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussed prohibition on pretextual or ruse‑based justifications in disability discrimination)