Molinet v. KimbrellMolinet v. Kimbrell
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court,
In this case we consider a statutory conflict regarding whether limitations bars Jeremy Molinet’s health care liability claims against two doctors he sued after they had been designated as responsible third parties pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.004. See
We hold that section 74.251(a) prevails and Molinet’s claims against the doctors are barred by its two-year limitations period.
I. Background
On July 15, 2004, Jeremy Molinet injured his Achilles tendon. On July 18, 2004, Dr. John Horan surgically repaired the tendon, after which Molinet re-injured it. Dr. Marque Allen performed a second operation later that year. Dr. Patrick Kimbrell, a wound treatment specialist, treated Molinet for several weeks beginning in early November 2004.
In September 2005, Molinet filed suit against several parties seеking damages related to his injury and medical treatment. He sued Dr. Allen and various health care providers, but did not sue either Dr. Horan or Dr. Kimbrell. In both May and September 2006, Molinet amended his pleadings and added additional healthcare providers as defendants but still did not sue Dr. Horan or Dr. Kim-brell. On August 1, 2007, more than two- and-a-half years after either Dr. Horan or Dr. Kimbrell last treated Molinet, Dr. Allen moved to designate them as responsible third parties pursuant to
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the court authorized an interlocutory appeal. See id. § 51.014(d) (permitting a trial court to issue a written order for interlocutory appeal in a civil action if the parties agree to the order and agree that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation).
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment dis
In this Court, Molinet argues that sections 74.251(a) and 33.004(e) do not truly conflict and both can be given effect. Alternatively, he argues that even if the statutes conflict, the language of
Drs. Horan and Kimbrell contest our jurisdiction to review the court of appeals’ judgment because this is an interlocutory appeal. Alternatively, they urge that the court of appeals correctly resolved the issue.
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to clarify the issue and that section 74.251(a) controls. Thus, we affirm the court of appeаls’ judgment.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals if the justices of the court of appeals disagree on a material question of law or if the court of appeals’ decision conflicts with a prior decision of this Court or another court of appeals. Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.225(c); In re H.V.,
In Moreno v. Palomino-Hernandez,
The court of appeals held that an expert report had been timely served. Id. at 242. It also held that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the defendant to designate a responsible third party and yet refusing to allow the plaintiffs’ timely join-der of that party pursuant to
The ostensible effect of Moreno and the court of appeals’ decision in this case are
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne,
B. The Statutory Provisions
If a person is designated under this section as a responsible third party, a claimant is not barred by limitations from seeking to join that person, even though such joinder would otherwise be barred by limitations, if the claimant seeks to join that person not later than 60 days after that person is designated as a responsible third party.
(a) Notwithstanding any other law and subject to Subsection (b), no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed....
(b) A claimant must bring a health care liability claim not later than 10 years after the date of the act or omission that gives rise to the claim. This subsection is intended as a statute of repose so that all claims must be brought within 10 years or they are time barred.
Molinet first argues that sections 74.251(a) and 33.004(e) do not conflict. He urges that
In support of this argument, Molinet cites Chilkewitz v. Hyson,
In reaching our decision we recognized that several cases had interpreted section 10.01 and held that the “notwithstanding any other law” language prevented the tolling of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases. Id. at 829-30. But as Molinet points out, we also held that rule 28 was not a tolling рrovision that extended limitations. Id. at 830. We stated:
But in all the foregoing cases, the issue was either when limitations began to run or whether limitations could be tolled or interrupted.Rule 28 concerns none of those issues. That procedural rule simply provides that if an entity conducts business under an assumed or common name, it may be sued in that name. Limitations is not tolled.
Id.
Although his argument is not entirely clear, Molinet asserts that, like rule 28,
In contrast, the effect of chapter 33 is not to statutorily determine when a suit is commenced against parties designated as responsible third parties. The filing and granting of a motion for leave to designate a person as a responsible third party does not artificially establish the “commencement” of the case against a party as of some date before the party was in fact joined. See
In short, the plaintiff in Chilkewitz was allowed to amend his pleadings to reflect the defendant’s proper legal name, but that defendant was a party to the lawsuit before limitations expired. Here, we are dealing with whether
We disagree with Molinet’s argument that the statutes are not in conflict as to the issue presented. The limitations provision of section 74.251(a) would bar Moli-net’s action against Drs. Horan and Kim-brell, while
C. Construing the Statutes
We recently considered a similar situation in Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen,
Similarly, chapter 74’s language reflects legislative intent for seсtion 74.251(a) to be the controlling statute as to claims such as Molinet’s against Drs. Horan and Kim-brell. First, section 74.251(a) explicitly states that “notwithstanding any other law” a health care liability claim must be commenced within two years after “the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed.”
In Chilkewitz, we held that
The dissent argues that our analysis in Lottery Commission is not applicable here because in that case “strong policy considerations” dictated that the use of canons of construction was inappropriate.
Policy considerations involving the UCC were not the basis of our holding in Lottery Commission. In Lottery Commission, we discussed in depth the language of the UCC provision in dispute and concluded that canons of construction were not necessary because the express provision was unambiguous. See Tex. Lottery Comm’n,
We also disagree with the court of appeals’ statement that section 74.002(a) is not instructive on the issue presented as to Molinet’s claims against Drs. Horan and Kimbrell because the provision was neutralized by chapter 33’s own conflict-of-law provision.
Section 33.017 states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect any rights of indemnity granted by any statute, by contract, or common law. To the extent of any conflict between this chapter and any right to indemnifiсation granted by statute, contract, or common law, those rights of indemnification shall prevail over the provisions of this chapter.
Section 33.017 is not applicable in this situation for two reasons. First, while it preserves indemnity rights, it does not provide that chapter 33 generally controls over conflicting laws. Second, even if section 33.017 were a general conflict-of-law provision, this case does not concern the rights of indemnified parties.
Thus, both section 74.002(a) and
D. Legislative History
In support of their arguments that
It is the Legislature’s prerogative to enact statutes; it is the judiciary’s responsibility to interpret those statutes according to the language the Legislature used, absent a context indicating a different meaning or the result of the plain meaning of the lаnguage yielding absurd or nonsen
Molinet could have avoided the limitations difficulty in which he finds himself by taking action such as seeking a scheduling order requiring responsible third parties to be designated in time to allow their joinder as parties before limitations expired. If that failed, he could have added the doctors as defendants within the limitations period, just as he timely named several other healthcare providers as defendants. He did not do so, however, and it is not absurd or nonsensical for him to bear the consequences of his decisions.
E. Is an Exception to
Molinet argues that even if
Thus, he notes, we have recognized exceptions to
Molinet argues that our cases applying former section 10.01 are not instructive to the application of 74.251(a). But the language in
The dissent also argues that the Legislature’s enactment of
Before the Legislature enacted the statute of repose in 2003,
We are mindful of concerns expressed by the dissent and Molinet that not permitting a plaintiff to join designated responsible third parties outside the limitations period may create an imbalance in the proportionate responsibility framework. But to the extent it does so, that balancing — or unbalancing — has been accomplished by the Legislature. The statute of limitations in health care liability claims “reflect[s] a considered legislative judgment in favor of the prompt resolution of such claims.” Yancy v. United Surgical Partners Int’l,
IV. Conclusion
The court of appeals correctly concluded that
Notes
. Further references to provisions of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code will generally be by reference to section and number.
. Act of May 30, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, § 10.01, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2052, 2058, repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 884.
. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.01, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 864-82 (current version at Tex Civ Prac. & Rem.Code
Dissenting Opinion
joined by Justice MEDINA, dissenting.
As the Court acknowledges, we have repeatedly recognized that certain constitutional restrictions and common law doctrines may override the two-year limitations period established by
Before the 2003 amendments to chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, adopted as part of the sweeping tort reform implemented by House Bill 4,
The 2003 amendments to chapter 33, however, dramatically altered this third-party practice. Under the current version of the statute, the trier of fact may allocate a percentage of responsibility to a third party designated by a defendant, even if the party has not been made a party to the lawsuit.
In construing a statute, our ultimate goal is to determine the meaning the Legislature intended. Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc.,
The Court grounds its decision on the assumption that the language of
This Court has been reluctant to look to legislative history to divine the Legislature’s meaning, and rightly so when the statute’s words clearly convey legislative intent. See In re Collins,
In the Senate proceedings to consider the Conference Committee Report on House Bill 4, the following exchange between Senator Hinojosa and Senator Ratliff, House Bill 4’s sponsor and a member of the conference committee that crafted the substitute that was ultimately enacted, is recorded in the Senate Journal:
Senator Hinojosa: When a defendant names a responsible third party, as I understand it, the plaintiff has 60 days to bring the third party into the suit, even if limitations would otherwise have run against that person.... Is that true in a medical malpractice claim too, because on page 63 of the bill it seems to say that the two-year statute in those cases applies notwithstanding any other law?
Senator Ratliff: Yes, if health care providers are going to have the benefit of the designation of responsible third parties, then they have to abide by the same rules as everyonе else. This 60-day provision would apply in health care liability claims.
78th Leg., R.S., Journal of the Texas Senate 5005 (citations omitted). That exchange, which addresses the precise issue before the Court, was “ordered reduced to writing and printed in the Senate Journal” by unanimous consent “to establish legislative intent regarding HB4.” Id. at 5003.
According to the Court, its reading of the statute does not create an absurd or nonsensical result, and if it does, it is the Legislature’s doing.
“A plaintiff ... has no knowledge, possession, or control of evidence that a [responsible third party] could use to protect himself from a finger-pointing defendant. The empty chair defense, therefore ... places an impossible burden upon plaintiffs to represent [the responsible third party’s] interests as well as their own, while giving defendants a great advantage in diminishing their own liability by allowing them to allocate fаult to [the responsible third party]. The result would likely be an inaccurate diminution of fault allocated to defendants and an increase of fault attributed to unrepresented [responsible third party]”
Id. at 124 (quoting Nancy A. Costello, Allocating Fault to the Empty Chair: Tort Reform or Deform, 76 U. Det. Mercy L.Rev. 571, 597 (1999)). According to the sponsor of House Bill 4, Representative Joe Nixon, the bill’s purpose was “ ‘to establish an equitable and efficient system of justice in Texas that provides meaningful remedies for those who have been wronged while protecting the rights of those who have done no wrong.’ ” Carlson
Moreover, contrary to the fundamental purposes of the reforms implemented in House Bill 4, the Court’s reading of the statute will have the unintended consequence of encouraging lawsuits against health care providers. In the wake of today’s decision, cautious health care liability claimants will be motivated to sue every health care provider involved in the patient’s care, no matter hоw minimal their involvement, in order to circumvent an empty-chair defense by more likely responsible defendants.
Finally, the posture of this case differs significantly from Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen,
Further, strong policy considerations dictated by the Legislature necessarily shape our decisions interpreting the UCC; while our opinion did not discuss them, those considerations made the application of otherwise-applicable canons of construction inappropriate in Lottery Commission. The UCC is intended to simplify, clarify, and modernize commercial practices. See Sw. Bank v. Info. Support Concepts, Inc.,
It is apparent from the context in which
. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 4.03, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 855-56.
. That section provides:
(b) A claimant must bring a health care liability claim not later than 10 years after the date of the act or omission that gives rise to the claim. This subsection is intended as a statute of repose so that all claims must be brought within 10 years or they are time barred. Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code§ 74.251(b) .