Lead Opinion
Sоme statutes are so “enigmatic” that we must resort to diagraming their clauses in an effort to discern their meanings. See, e.g., United States v. Rentz,
But the statute we are tasked with interpreting here, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), isn’t one of those statutes. Section 12181(7)(F) makes “service establishments” public accommodations for purposes of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Title III, in turn, generally prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Here, the district court
We find this superficial distinction irrelevant. Under the plain language of § 12181(7)(F), a PDC is a “service establishment” for two exceedingly simple reasons: It’s an establishment. And it provides a service. This straightforward conclusion •is entirely consistent with the goal and purpose of Title III. Thus, we need not look beyond the plain language of § 12181(7)(F) to determine that a PDC constitutes a public accommodation. Because the district court erred in concluding otherwise — and in dismissing the underlying action on that basis — we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Background
Brent Levorsen suffers from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia.
Octapharma operates multiple PDCs, including the one at issue in this case. At those facilities, Octapharma collects donors’ plasma using a process called plas-mapheresis. During that process, Octap-harma draws and mechanically processes each donor’s blood, separating and reserving the plasma before returning the red blood cells to the donor. Octapharma pays its donors for this рlasma, which it then sells to pharmaceutical companies.
When an Octapharma employee learned that Levorsen suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that Levorsen might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee thus advised Levorsen that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Levorsen then provided Octapharma with a signed form from his psychiatrists, who both indicated that Levorsen is medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week. When Octap-harma maintained its refusal to allow Le-vorsen to donate, he brought this action under Title III of the ADA.
Title III generally prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. § 12182(a). For purposes of Title III, “service establishment^]” constitute public accommodations. § 12181(7)(F). In his complaint, Levorsen alleged that PDCs like Octapharma are public accommodations because they are service establishments. And he maintained that when it dеnied him the opportunity to donate plasma in exchange for payment based solely on his
Octapharma moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Octapharma didn’t dispute that Levorsen’s borderline schizophrenia constitutes a disability for purposes of Title III. Nor did it dispute that Octapharma prohibited Levorsen from donating plasma based on that disability. Instead, it argued only that PDCs like Oc-tapharma are not public accommodations for purposes of Title III. More specifically, Octapharma argued that PDCs are not service establishments because — unlike § 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated entities— PDCs don’t provide a service to the public in exchange for a fee.
The district court agreed. It reasoned that rather than accepting payment from the public in exchange for a service that PDCs provide, PDCs instead offer payment to the public in exchange for a service that PDCs receive. And because PDCs differ from § 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated entities in that regard, the district court concluded that PDCs arе not service establishments. Consequently, it ruled, PDCs are not public accommodations for purposes of Title III.
Based on this conclusion, the district court granted Octapharma’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. Levorsen appeals.
Discussion
“Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
Section 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated examples aren’t exhaustive, see 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, at 893; rather, they serve as mere illustrations, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities § III-1.2000, www.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited June 29, 2016). Moreover, courts must construe § 12181(7)(F) liberally to afford individuals with disabilities access to the same establishments available to those without disabilities. PGA Tour,
Citing these dictates, Levorsen argues that the district court erred in failing to liberally construe the term “service establishment” to encompass PDCs. According to Levorsen, the district court unneeessari
Exercising de novo review, see Smith v. United States,
We begin, as we must, with the plain language of § 12181(7)(F). See St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Comm’r,
An establishment is a “place of business” or “a public or private institution ([such] as a school or hospital).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 778 (2002) [hereinafter Webster’s]. And a service is “conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something,” or “useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity.” Id. at 2075. Accordingly, we conclude that a service establishment is a place of business or a public or private institution that, by its conduct or performance, assists or benefits someone or something or provides useful labor without producing a tangible good for a customer or client. See Brune,
Octapharma resists this straightforward conclusion. It insists that rather than simply combining the ordinary meanings of the terms “service” and “establishment,” we must instead apply two canons of statutory interpretation: ejusdem gener-is and noscitur a sociis. These canons counsel, respectively, that (1) “when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration,” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n,
As the district court pointed out below, the specific entities listed in § 12181(7)(F) — laundromats, dry-cleaners,
But giving the term “service establishment” its ordinary meaning (i.e., an establishment that provides a service) yields neither ambiguity nor an irrational result. See Edwards v. Valdez,
Under these circumstances, we won’t bend over backwards to give the term “service establishment” a definition that is more- narrow than the plain meaning of its component parts. In fact, such interpretative gymnastics are not only unnecessary here, they’re inappropriate given our duty to liberally construe § 12181(7)(F). See id. Accordingly, we decline to apply ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis. Instead, we begin and end with the plain meaning of the words that Congress- employed. A service establishment is an “establishment” that provides a “service” as we define those terms above. See Woods v. Standard Ins. Co.,
In any event, even if giving the phrase “service establishment” its ordinary meaning did result in a definition we found to be ambiguous or irrational, employing the canons of statutory interpretation that Oc-tapharma cites wouldn’t clarify matters. True, applying ejusdem generis and nosci-tur a sociis might indicate that we should refrain from treating PDCs as service establishments because — unlike § 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated examples— they provide compensation to, rather than accept compensation from, their customers. However, another rule of statutory interpretation counsels against reading such a direction-of-compensation requirement into the statute when one doesn’t appear there. See United States v. Sturm,
But if we had to resolve that manufactured ambiguity, we would next examine the legislative history. See United States v. Quarrell,
So whether we confine our analysis to, or extend our analysis beyond, the plain language of § 12181(7)(F), the result is the same: service establishments are establishments that provide a service, regardless of
The only remaining question before us is whether PDCs like Octapharma satisfy that definition. We conclude that they do. PDCs like Octapharma are “place[s] of business.” Webster’s, supra, at 778. And they “assist[ ] or benefit[ ]” those who wish to provide plasma for medical use — whether for altruistic reasons or for pecuniary gain — by supplying the trained personnel and medical equipment necessary to accomplish that goal. Id. at 2075. Finally, while PDCs may ultimately “produce a tangible good”
Conclusion
Because Octapharma is an establishment that provides a service, it is a service establishment under the plain language of § 12181(7)(F). And even if that weren’t unambiguously the case, the relevant legislative history and our duty to liberally construe the statute would lead us to the same conclusion.
Notes
. A magistrate judge heard the case upon the parties' consent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
. We take the bulk of these facts from Levor-sen’s complaint. See Cressman v. Thompson,
. The district court also rejected Levorsen's argument that Octapharma constitutes a “professional office of a health care provider” under § 12181(7)(F). Because Levorsen has abandoned this argument on appeal, we need not address it. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
. The dissent cites Bruñe as an example of a case in which we looked beyond the dictionary definition of the term at issue to canons of statutory construction. See Dissent 1237. But we did so only because that term’s multiple dictionary definitions "preclude[d] an obvious, unitary usage.” Brune,
. The dissent quotes the Eleventh Circuit's decision in CBS Inc. to bolster its assertion that "canons of statutory construction are aids in construing the language itself — not tools to be relied on only in the face of ambiguity.” Dissent 1237-38. But as the Eleventh Circuit made clear in a footnote, a statute’s plain language "often vitiates” any need to resort to the canons in the first place. CBS Inc.,
. The dissent cites Chickasaw Nation for the proposition that we should employ the canons to discern § 12181(7)(F)’s plain meaning. Dissent 1236. But notably, Chickasaw Nation ultimately declined to apply the canons upon which the petitioner relied, in part because the application of those canons "would produce an interpretation [of the statute at issue] that ... would conflict with the intent embodied in the statute Congress wrote.”
. The dissent purports to explain why it can ignore this legislative history, noting that “we only turn to extrinsic sources such as legislative history for illumination after we have been unsuccessful in discerning Congress’s intent from the words of the statute itself— including through the use of canons of statutory interpretation.” Dissent 1238 n.l. We wholeheartedly agree with the dissent that examining thе legislative history is unnecessary in this case, albeit for the same reasons that we also find it unnecessary to apply the canons. But even if we assume that we must apply the canons, the result of that application is so ambiguous as to require us to examine the legislative history as well. And that history makes it abundantly clear that the dissent’s approach does precisely what Congress warned against doing: it reads a similarity requirement into § 1218 l(7)(F)’s "other service establishment” clause. See Dissent 1239-43.
. Both the dissent and Octapharma characterize PDCs as manufacturers. See Dissent 1243-44; Aplee. Br., 13-19. But neither provides any authority establishing that an entity can't simultaneously be both a manufacturer and a service establishment for purposes of § 12181(7)(F), especially if — as is the case here — that entity provides a service to some customers while producing a tangible good for others. In fact, Octapharma implicitly acknowledges that entities can simultaneously perform different functions for different customers or clients. See Aplee. Br. 15 n. 6 (characterizing pawn shops and used record stores as "sales establishments" for purposes of § 12181(7)(E) because, while these entities buy goods from some members of the public, they sell goods to others). Moreover, we question the dissent’s likening of PDCs to paper mills. See Dissent 1244. Unlike PDCs, paper mills don’t typically hold themselves open as accepting source product from individual members of the public. PDCs, on the other hand, are public-facing businesses. Given the ADA’s goal of affording individuals with disabilities access to the same establishments available to those without disabilities, see PGA Tour,
. Octapharma insists this conclusion will put PDCs in an untenable position by creating a conflict between the ADA and certain regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 606.100(b)(1) (requiring PDCs to establish "[c]riteria used to determine donor eligibility, including acceptable medical history criteria”); 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(a) (noting that PDCs must determine donor eligibility, and that donors aren’t eligible if "not in good health” or if PDC identifies "factor(s) that may cause the donation to adversely affect” a donor’s health or the "safety, purity, or potency of the blood or blood component”). We find this argument unavailing. As the United States as amicus curiae points out, the Department of Justice’s Title III regulatiоns explicitly allow public accommodations to “impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation,” as long as those requirements are "based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.” U.S. Reply Br. 3 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b)). In any event, we do not hold today that Octapharma must allow Levorsen to donate plasma. Nor do we take a position on whether Octapharma unlawfully discriminated against Levorsen under § 12182(a). We hold only that Levorsen has access to Octap-harma as a public accommodation. Thus, we reject Octapharma’s suggestion that our holding is fundamentally irreconcilable with the FDA regulations governing PDCs.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The sole question on appeal is whether a plasma-donation center constitutes a “service establishment” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). In contrast to the majority, I do not believe that such centers fall within the ambit of the term “service establishment.” Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s judgment.
I
A '
In 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), Congress identified a category of “private entities [that] are considered publiс accommodations” — i.e., service establishments — under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Congress enumerated the category as follows: “a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added).
We construe Title III with its broad remedial purpose in mind. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
More specifically, I would conclude that the district court correctly ruled — by reference to the examples of service establishments listed in § 12181(7)(F) — that service establishments offer certain services in exchange for monetary compensation (i.e., a fee). Going further, in my view, every service establishment listed in § 12181(7)(F) shares some key unifying traits: they offer the public a “service” (1) in the form of (a) expertise (e.g., barbers, beauticians, shoe-repair craftsman, dry cleaners, funeral parlors, lawyers, accountants, insurance offices, pharmacists, health care providers, and hospitals) or (b) specialized equipment (e.g., laundromats and gas stations), (2) for use in achieving some desired end, (3) in exchange for monetary compensation.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, it becomes clear that plasma-donation centers are not service establishments within the meaning of subsection (7)(F). First, plasma-donation centers do not receive a fee from members of the public in exсhange for any services that they provide. Second, to the extent that plasma-donation centers provide services to the public, they do not do so for the public’s
1
“[0]ur primary task in interpreting statutes [is] to determine congressional intent,” and the starting point for discerning congressional intent is the plain language of the statute. Coffey v. Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold, 581 F.8d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Russell v. United States,
We do not, however, construe statutory terms in isolation. See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, — U.S. -, -,
Furthermore, in interpreting the plain meaning of statutory terms, courts frequently use various canons of interpretation “designed to help judges determine
2
At issue in this case is subsection (7)(F); it includes in the definition of “public accommodations”: “a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel servicе, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added). The district court sought to derive a “common theme” from the enumerated examples, and concluded that they all involve “the provision of goods or services to the public, in exchange for money.” Aplt.’s App. at 37. In effect, the court applied the ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis canons.
The majority concludes that the district court erred in applying these canons because the ordinary meaning of the statutory language is clear. This conclusion, however, overlooks the key principle that such canons of statutory construction are aids in construing the language itself — not tools to be relied on only in the face of ambiguity. See McDonnell, — U.S. at-,
Indeed, the single case the majority cites in support of its assertion that resort to canons of construction is appropriate only in the face of an ambiguity or an irrational result does little to advance that position. In Edwards v. Valdez, our court made the unremarkable point that courts should look to legislative history only when faced with a statutory ambiguity. See
Furthermore, the majority’s suggestion that applying these canons here amounts to “interpretative gymnastics ... [that are] inappropriate given our duty to liberally construe § 12181(7)(F)” is misguided. Maj. Op. at 1231. Though we construe statutes like Title III of the ADA liberally to effectuate their remedial purposes, see, e.g., PGA Tour,
In short, I would conclude that the district court’s decision to apply, at least tacitly, the canons of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis was not erroneous.
3
Having reviewed the examples listed in § 12181(7)(F) with the benefit of the foregoing interpretive canons, I agree with the district court that service establishments offer services to the public in exchange for compensation.
The district court did not expressly opine on the kinds of “services” that the statute contemplates. Undertaking a de novo study of the examples listed in subsection (7)(F), however, offers some dis-cernable clues. Specifically, every service establishment listed in subsection (7)(F) prоvides the public a “service” in the form of (1) expertise (e.g., barbers, beauticians, shoe-repair businesses, dry cleaners, funeral parlors, lawyers, accountants, insurance offices, health care providers, and hospitals), or (2) specialized equipment (e.g., laundromats and gas stations).
In contrast to this method of arriving at a definition of “service establishment,” the majority contends that we may glean the meaning of the phrase by simply combining the dictionary definitions of the terms “service” and “establishment.” This analysis is misguided, however, because the operative term under subsection (7)(F) is “service establishment” — a statutory term that my analysis shows has a meaning quite distinct from the dictionary definitions of its component words. Although the ordinary meaning of the terms “service” and “establishment” may be helpful in discerning the meaning of the statutory term “service establishment,” it is critical that courts eschew the analytical misstep of concluding that the unambiguous meaning of a statutory term may be divined perforce from the ordinary meaning of its component terms. See Yates v. United States, — U.S.-,
4
In arguing that plasma-donation centers are “service establishments” under subsection (7)(F), Mr. Levorsen and the United States assert that “a plasma donation center provides at least two discrete services: (1) screening the individual’s blood to ensure the donor’s eligibility for a donation and (2) using its technology and trained personnel to extract and properly process the individual’s plasma.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 20; see also Br. for U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 22 (“Plasma donation centers have these same characteristics [as the examples listed in § 12181(7)(F)]. They provide the specialized equipment needed to procure plasma and trained personnel to assess donor eligibility, operаte the equipment, etc.”). For purposes of my analysis, I assume that they are correct. Indeed, in some material respects, these two alleged services seem to fit comfortably within the category of “services” that, in my view, subsection (7)(F) contemplates, in that they would involve providing the public with expertise (e.g., blood screening for donor eligibility) and specialized equipment (e.g., equipment capable of performing plasmapheresis).
However, I would nonetheless conclude that under the definition of “service establishment” discussed above, for two principal reasons, plasma-donation centers like Octapharma fail to qualify as service establishments within the meaning of § 12181(7)(F). First, plasma-donation centers do not receive a fee from members of the public in exchange for any services that they furnish. Quite the obverse is true: the centers give members of the public a fee for tendering to them a commodity in the form of plasma or, alternatively, for performing — at least in a colloquial sense — the “service”
Second, to the extent that plasma-donation centers provide services to the public — such as those services identified by Mr. Levorsen and the United States — they do not do so for the public’s use in achieving a desired end; instead, they provide them for the centers’ use in achieving a desired end. More specifically, plasma-donation centers provide the public with the expertise associated with blood screening and the specialized equipment necessary to collect plasma so that the centers can sell the plasma to their customers in the pharmaceutical industry (i.e., the desired end) — not so that they can assist the public to achieve some desired end. Or, viewed through the lens of these facts, Octaphar-ma provided Mr. Levorsen its expertise and specialized equipment so that it could оbtain his plasma for sale (i.e., the desired end), not to allow Mr. Levorsen to achieve some desired end.
This Octapharma-Levorsen scenario is patently at odds with the service-establishment paradigm that subsection (7)(F) envisions: specifically, every service establishment listed in that subsection offers members of the public a service — i.e., expertise or specialized equipment — for use in achieving an end desired by them (e.g., clean clothes, a haircut, repaired shoes)— not an end desired by the service establishment. Thus, the majority’s conclusion that plasma-donation centers are service establishments under subsection (7)(F) effectively turns the statute’s service model on its head — the recipient of the desired end (as well as the payor) is the plasma-donation center and not the public.
Indeed, once one recognizes that it is the plasma-donation center, and not the public, that is the recipient of the desired end, the first point of distinction discussed supra between plasma-donation centers and subsection (7)(F)’s service establishments — i.e., the fact that plasma-donation centers рay a fee rather than receive one — makes perfect sense. Specifically, because the centers are the ultimate recipients of the desired end, it should not be surprising that the centers are the ones providing the compensation, rather than the public.
In sum, guided by well-settled canons of statutory construction, I would conclude that plasma-donation centers are fundamentally unlike the service establishments listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). And, consequently, they do not fall within the ambit of that provision. It ineluctably follows that plasma-donation centers are not public accommodations under Title III of the ADA. Accordingly, I would hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Levor-sen’s complaint.
B
The foregoing conclusion — that plasma-donation centers are not service establish
In accord with this observation, at least for some purposes, Congress clearly regards plasma-donation centers as manufacturers. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(l)(B)(ii) (requiring that each package of a biological product be marked with the identity “of the manufacturer of the biological product”); id. § 262(i)(l) (“The term ‘biological product’ means a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, [or] blood component ... applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, a regulatory agency, the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”), too, regards plasma-donation centers as “manufacturers,” and all their activities— including the services that Mr. Levorsen and the United States identified — as “steps' in the manufacturing of Source Plasma.” 21 C.F.R. § 640.71(a) (“All steps in the manufacturing of Source Plasma, including donor examination, blood collection, plasmapheresis, laboratory testing, labeling, storage, and issuing shall be performed by personnel of the establishment licensed to manufacture Source Plasma ....”); id. § 600.3(t) (“Manufacturer means any legal person or entity engaged in the manufacture of a product subject to license under the act ....”); id. § 606.171(a) (“Who must report under this section? You, a licensed manufacturer of blood and blood components, including Source Plasma .... ”).
Thus, the observation that plasma-donation centers resemble manufacturers much more than they do the typical business that provides services to the public under subsection (7)(F) is validated by the regulatory judgment of Congress and the FDA. And this observation bolsters the conclusion that I would reach based on an analysis of the plain terms of § 12181(7)(F)— viz., plasma-donation centers are not service establishments within the meaning of subsection (7)(F).
II
For the foregoing reasons, I am constrained to dissent. Contrary to the major
. Furthermore, the two reasons that Mr. Le-vorsen and the United States offer for why these canons should not be applied here are no more persuasive than the majority's position. First, Mr. Levorsen and the United States point out that the administrative guidance provided by the Department of Justice ("DOJ”) states that the examples provided in § 12181(7) are not "exhaustive” but merely "representative.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, at 893 (2013). The guidance notes that "[t]he category of social service center establishments would include not оnly the types of establishments listed, day care centers, senior citizen centers, homeless shelters, food banks, adoption agencies, but also establishments such as substance abuse treatment centers, rape crisis centers, and halfway houses.” Id.
Second, Mr. Levorsen and the United States cite legislative history to suggest that ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis should not be applied to subsection (7)(F). But, in relying on legislative history, they put the proverbial cart before the horse. As several courts have observed, we only turn to extrinsic sources such as legislative history for illumination after we have been unsuccessful in discerning Congress’s intent from the words of the statute itself — including through the use of canons of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Carrieri v. Jobs.com Inc.,
. To be more precise, the district court indicated that "in all establishments listed under subsection (F), a common theme is the provision of goods or services to the public, in exchange for money.” Aplt.'s App. at 37 (emphasis added). However, it seems more appropriate and natural to think of “service establishments” as providing some form of “service,” rather than a good, though the delivery of a good may be incidental to the furnishing of a service (e.g., a full-service gas station or a pharmacy). Indeed, there are other provisions of the statute’s “public accommodations” definition that appear to more clearly contemplate the provision of goods, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) (defining "public accommodations” to include "a bakery, grocery store, [or] clothing store”), and we do not "lightly” presume that Congress intended any redundancy in enacting subsection (7)(F), United States v. Smith,
. The same can be said of every other listed example: that is, gas stations, funeral parlors, banks, travel-service businesses, offices of accountants or lawyers, pharmacies, insurance offices, professional offices of healthcare providers, and hospitals.
. Of course some of the entities listed in subseсtion (7)(F) could conceivably provide the public a "service” in both forms — that is, they could provide the public both expertise and specialized equipment. For example, a gas station might provide the public specialized equipment for obtaining gasoline but also expertise in repairing malfunctioning automobiles. It is reasonable to conclude that, in some circumstances, unenumerated entities that qualify as service establishments under subsection (7)(F) may provide a "service” to the public in both forms as well.
.This understanding of "services” in the context of the examples in subsection (7)(F) is consistent with the common view of the term "service.” As the majority notes, in discerning the ordinary meaning of a term, we generally look to standard dictionaries. See, e.g., In re Hamilton Creek Metro. Dist.,
. Additionally, the majority asserts that applying the well-established canons of construction discussed herein runs afoul of the principle of statutory construction that "counsels against reading ... a direction-of-compensation requirement into the statute when one doesn’t appеar there.” Maj. Op. at 1232. In this regard, the majority cites United States v. Sturm, where we cautioned that "[c]ourts must 'ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.’ ”
. The district court suggested that plasma donors like Mr. Levorsen may be viewed as providing a service to plasma-donation centers like Octapharma. In this regard, it observed that "it is the plasma donation center that offers money to a member of the public in exchange for a service to the center — the donation of plasma.” Aplt.'s App. at 37. However, as noted infra in Part I.B, plasma-donation centers actually resemble manufacturers much more than they do the typical business under subsection (7)(F) that provides services to the public, and thus it is probably closer to the truth to say that Mr. Levorsen is providing a commodity for Octapharma’s manufacturing process. Indeed, in his complaint, Mr. Levorsen avers that the plasma that he donates is "used as source material for further manufacturing use.” Aplt.’s App. at 8. However, for purposes of analyzing the plain terms of the statute, the proper characterization of the donor’s action as providing a commodity or service is immaterial. Rather, the important point is that — irrespective of whether Mr. Levorsen (and other donors) provided Octap-harma a commodity or a service — in exchange, he received a fee from Octapharma, whereas, in contrast, all of the service establishments listed in subsection (7)(F) received a fee from the public for their service, rather than paying one. Therefore, in my view, Oc-tapharma's business practice of paying plasma donors does not fit the paradigm of service establishments described in subsection am.
. To be sure, Mr. Levorsen receives a fee for his plasma donation, and the complaint’s averments indicate that he clearly desires such payments. But such fees cannot be the desired end of the service under subsection (7)(F) because the statute contemplates that the service establishment will provide the service to the public in exchange for a fee that it receives; the statute does not envision that a member of the public will receive from the service establishment both the service and the fee. In other words, viewed through the prism of subsection (7)(F), the fee cannot be the desired end that the public seeks to achieve from the plasma-donation centers because the statute contemplates that it is the service establishment that will receive the fee in exchange for providing the desired end.
. See generally Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,