M. C. C.-G. v Todd W. BlancheM. C. C.-G. v Todd W. Blanche
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Federal law prohibits removal of a noncitizen from the United States to a country where he or she will be persecuted because of a protected ground or subjected to torture. In most circumstances, agency denials of such relief are subject to judicial review.
The government has moved to dismiss these petitions as untimely. It has also raised new jurisdictional arguments that seek more broadly to block judicial review of many noncitizens’ requests for withholding of removal or CAT relief. We reject the government‘s attempts to limit such judicial review, both as applied to these petitioners and more broadly. We instead follow the path mapped out in Riley itself and find these petitioners are entitled to equitable tolling of the thirty-day deadline. We deny these motions to dismiss.
A. Withholding-Only Relief
The government may not remove involuntarily a noncitizen from the United States to a country: (1) where her “life or freedom” would be threatened due to her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; or (2) where it is more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture. The first is a statutory prohibition known as “withholding of removal” or sometimes “statutory withholding of removal.”
A noncitizen may seek withholding-only relief during removal proceedings before an immigration judge and the
Nonetheless, noncitizens subject to these orders are still entitled to seek withholding-only relief. A noncitizen subject to a final administrative removal order or reinstatement order who expresses fear of returning to the country of removal will
If the asylum officer makes a positive determination, the noncitizen is referred to an immigration judge for withholding-only proceedings.
For an expedited removal order, the process is slightly different. A noncitizen who asserts a fear of persecution or torture in the country of removal will be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine if the noncitizen has a “credible fear” of persecution or torture, meaning there is a “significant possibility” the noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal or CAT protection.
A negative determination must be reviewed by a supervisory asylum officer, and if the supervisor concurs with the officer, the noncitizen may have the determination reviewed by an immigration judge, who must provide the noncitizen with an opportunity to be heard and questioned.
Critical to this case, any “final order of removal” other than an expedited removal order is subject to judicial review in the court of appeals through a petition for review.
The motions to dismiss we consider here are based on the statutory deadline for filing a petition for review: “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”
The Supreme Court held last year in Riley v. Bondi, however, that because a final administrative removal order may not be appealed within the agency—which is also true of a reinstatement order—it becomes final and starts the clock for the thirty-day deadline upon issuance even if withholding proceedings remain pending. 606 U.S. 259, 266–67, 272 (2025) (“withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality of an otherwise final order of removal“). The Court recognized the “legitimate practical concerns” posed by needing to file a petition for review before withholding-only proceedings conclude. Id. at 272. The solution to that problem, the Court wrote, is for the government to “alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a withholding-only proceeding so that review there can wait until that issue is decided.” Id.
B. These Petitions for Review
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Riley on June 26, 2025, this court received over a dozen petitions for review from noncitizens whose orders of removal had been final for more than thirty days when Riley was decided, but whose withholding-only proceedings were still pending or whose negative credible-fear determinations were pending before immigration judges. Unlike in Riley itself, however, the government has moved to dismiss or deny each of these petitions as untimely. Because the government and each petitioner raised substantially similar arguments in each motion, we directed the parties to identify suitable lead cases for briefing and argument on the common issues presented in these motions. After receiving their selections, we consolidated these
E.E.V. is a citizen of El Salvador. She entered the United States unlawfully and was removed to El Salvador under an expedited removal order issued in March 2007 and executed two months later. Years later, in August 2015, Border Patrol agents apprehended her after she reentered the United States near Rio Grande City, Texas. The agency issued a reinstatement order the next day in McAllen, Texas. At some later time, E.E.V. expressed fear of returning to El Salvador. An asylum officer conducted a reasonable-fear interview in February 2017. The officer determined that E.E.V. showed a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in El Salvador and referred her to an immigration judge for withholding-only proceedings. Her proceedings began in Chicago and were later reassigned to another immigration judge in Indianapolis, where they remain pending as of this decision. E.E.V. filed her petition for review on July 24, 2025, less than thirty days after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Riley.
M.C.C.-G. is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States on an unknown date. In November 2018, she was convicted of theft in a municipal court in Goshen, Indiana, and given a suspended sentence of 365 days in custody. She was later detained by immigration officials after a traffic stop. The agency notified her of its intent to issue a final administrative
II. Jurisdictional Challenges
Before we turn to the equitable tolling issues at the center of these cases, we must address two new arguments challenging this court‘s jurisdiction. The first challenge—raised for the first time in the government‘s reply brief—is that a reinstatement order is not subject to judicial review because it is not a final order of removal. That argument asks us to overrule binding precedents in this circuit and is contrary to precedents in all other circuits as well. If we were to adopt the government‘s position, we would foreclose judicial review of questions of law and fact arising from reinstatement orders, including entitlement to CAT protection and even claims of mistaken identity and United States citizenship. The second challenge, that these petitions were filed too early, is irreconcilable with the government‘s primary position—that they were filed too late—and runs counter to the course charted in Riley itself for placeholder petitions for review like these. We reject both jurisdictional challenges.
This court has consistently concluded that a reinstatement order is a final order of removal subject to judicial review under
Judicial review of a reinstatement order is limited to the reinstatement order itself. Villa, 924 F.3d at 372–73. To issue a reinstatement order, an immigration official must make three determinations: (1) the identity of the noncitizen; (2) that the noncitizen was removed or departed voluntarily under a prior order of removal; and (3) that the noncitizen unlawfully reentered the United States. Id. at 373, citing
Although judicial review of a reinstatement order is narrow, the zipper clause both allows and requires a petition for judicial review of a final order of removal to raise a petitioner‘s challenges to the denial of withholding-only relief. See F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 635 (“Section 1252(b)(9)‘s zipper clause consolidates our review of withholding proceedings with our
The government argues now that a reinstatement order is not a final order of removal. If that position were accepted, courts of appeals would lack jurisdiction to consider through a petition for review any questions of law and fact arising from a reinstatement order. There would be no judicial review of whether the government has the right person, whether the person is likely to be subjected to torture, whether the person reentered the country illegally, and even whether the person subject to the order is or is not actually a United States citizen with a constitutional right to remain in the United States.
We do not overrule circuit precedent without a “compelling reason,” such as statutory changes or intervening Supreme Court decisions that have undermined our prior case law. United States v. Betts, 99 F.4th 1048, 1055–56 (7th Cir. 2024), quoting Wilson v. Cook County, 937 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Three cases warrant discussion here: Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020), Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), and Riley. None provides a sound reason, let alone a compelling one, to overrule circuit precedent and restrict judicial review in such cases.
Nasrallah did not undermine this court‘s precedents. The “narrow” question presented in Nasrallah was whether the so-called “criminal alien bar” stripping the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to review factual challenges, but not legal or constitutional challenges, to a final order of removal for a noncitizen convicted of certain criminal offenses extends to the denial of CAT relief. The Court‘s answer hinged on analysis that is not relevant here. 590 U.S. at 576; see
Further, in F.J.A.P., which was decided in 2024, after Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, we reaffirmed that a reinstatement order is a final order of removal subject to (limited) judicial review. 94 F.4th at 633. A separate opinion questioned that holding and drew particular attention to Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, so we are confident the majority did not simply overlook this issue. See id. at 643–44 (Brennan, J.). The separate opinion noted that “caution counsels against” overruling precedent and wrote: “So, as does the majority opinion, I conclude that a reinstatement decision is a final order of removal subject to judicial review under
That leaves only Riley as a possible candidate for overruling circuit precedent. But Riley clearly supports our precedents on the reviewability of reinstatement orders. In concluding that a denial of withholding-only relief is not a final order of removal, the Court wrote as follows on the definition of the term “order of removal“:
While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the term “order of removal,” any statutory reference to “an order of removal”
is “deemed to include a reference to ... an order of deportation.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–627. An “order of deportation,” in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) . So an “order of removal” must have those same characteristics.We must therefore identify which order concluded that Riley is “deportable” and commanded his deportation, and it is clear that the qualifying order is the FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021. That order held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States.
Id. at 267. The Court had already used
Notably, Riley used the terms “removable” and “removed” interchangeably with “deportable” and “deported.” Compare id. at 264 (“If the immigration officer finds that the alien is removable ... the officer issues a FARO specifying the country to which the alien must be deported.“) (emphasis
On its face, E.E.V.‘s reinstatement order fits that definition. It is an “order” that declares: “In accordance with [
There is nothing unusual about our exercising jurisdiction over reinstatement orders. Even the government acknowledges that “the courts of appeals have unanimously exercised jurisdiction over petitions for review of reinstatement orders.” Respondent‘s Reply Br. at 3. Indeed. See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003); Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Laureano, 177 F.4th at 457; Tomas-Ramos v. Garland, 24 F.4th 973, 980 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2022) (treating negative reasonable-fear determination as relevant removal order); Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 2014); Moreno-Martinez v. Barr, 932 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2019); Lara-Nieto v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2019); Ruiz v. Bondi, 172 F.4th 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2026); Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2023); Avila v. U.S. Attorney General, 560 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009).9
Under the government‘s and the dissenting opinion‘s theory, a reinstatement order is not subject to any judicial review through a petition for review, including even a challenge based on citizenship. That jurisdictional prohibition would apply equally to a petition for review that is indisputably timely. If the government were correct on this point, then a
After all, immigration statutes limit the availability of the writ of habeas corpus, the historical mechanism for United States citizens to assert so-called “nationality claims,” in favor of consolidating such questions into a single petition for review in the court of appeals.
Wrongful deportation of United States citizens is not merely a “hypothetical” concern with “vanishingly small” odds, as the dissenting opinion asserts. See post at 56. Case reports show that the government has on several occasions sought to deport citizens through reinstatement and rejected
In other words, the government‘s new jurisdictional argument asserts a power for the executive branch to banish, without any access to judicial review, wrongfully deported United States citizens who return to this country. See Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The most precious right of citizenship is at stake. The stakes are indeed high and momentous, for deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.“) (cleaned up), quoting first Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963), then Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947), and then Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). In fact, if not even a person‘s identity or the existence of the prior order of removal were subject to judicial review, then the government‘s jurisdictional theory would allow the executive to banish anyone. We are concerned not merely with clerical errors that the “safeguards” identified by the dissent might sometimes—
We would not easily be persuaded that Congress has implicitly granted the government that power, if it even could grant such a power. Nothing in Riley or any other Supreme Court decision convinces us to overrule circuit precedent to do so. We conclude once again that a reinstatement order is a final order of removal.
B. Ripeness
The government’s next jurisdictional argument makes a U-turn, saying these petitions for review should be dismissed as not yet ripe. That argument asks us to reject the path charted in Riley itself for dealing with the new practical reality, after Riley, that a petition for review will almost always
The Government’s final submission concerns the practical problems that it fears will arise if a removal order becomes final before the issue of withholding-only relief is decided. The Government worries that aliens like Riley who wish only to contest removal to their native country will not file a petition for review until their request for withholding of removal to that destination is denied. And if an alien files a petition for review before the question of withholding-only relief is settled, the Government fears that the proceeding in the court of appeals may be wrapped up before the BIA denies withholding-only relief, and the alien may thus be deprived of any judicial review of that denial.
606 U.S. at 271–72. The Court then offered a solution to this procedural dilemma posed by its holding:
In a case like this, the Government can inform aliens of the need to file a petition within 30 days after the issuance of a FARO, and it can alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a withholding-only proceeding so that review there can wait until that issue is decided.
606 U.S. at 272 (emphasis added). That is, Riley itself recognized and provided a solution for the problem that the government now claims defeats this court’s jurisdiction: hold the petitions pending until withholding-only proceedings con-
The government’s fallback position, as we understand it, is that these petitions are unripe because withholding-only proceedings have not concluded and these petitioners have not (yet) raised substantive challenges to their final orders of removal, meaning at present there is nothing for this court to decide. This argument fails for three independent reasons.
First, even if the government were correct that a challenge to the final order of removal is required, these petitioners may well have one. These petitions are not yet at the merits stage. Petitioners have not yet been required to lay out the arguments they intend to pursue. Counsel indicated in the briefing and again at oral argument that either or both petitioners may challenge their final orders of removal. The government offers no reason not to credit those assertions.
Second, and more fundamental, we are considering here the government’s motions to dismiss these petitions because they were supposedly filed too late—the opposite of unripe. The government’s self-contradictory arguments signal that something is seriously amiss with the government’s theories. Its position amounts to “a heads I win, tails you lose, proposition, which the law would be unlikely to countenance.” McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 2011) (also concerning timing for bringing court action).
Third, nothing in Riley suggested that its approval of placeholder petitions for review depended on the petitioner challenging the final order of removal itself. Riley himself “did not contest his removal from the United States”—that is, “it was undisputed that Riley had been convicted of an aggra-
The government relies on two cases in support of its position. Neither provides persuasive support. In Navarrete v.
Insofar as certain statements in Navarrete could be read to require a challenge to a final order of removal in order to secure judicial review of withholding-only relief in all circumstances—a position adopted by the other case the government cites, Hayles v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 1782580 (11th Cir. 2026)—that analysis rests on shaky ground. To start, the petitioner in Riley itself raised no such challenge, and at least this court and the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have exercised jurisdiction over petitions challenging only the denial of withholding-only relief. See F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 624–25; De Leon v. Garland, 51 F.4th 992, 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2022); Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General, 735 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013).13
Some language in Navarrete seems, with respect, to go astray insofar as it overreads the conclusion in Nasrallah that a denial of CAT relief “does not affect the validity of the final
The missing analytical step is that both Navarrete and Hayles assumed that judicial review of a final order of removal requires a substantive challenge to a removal order even if the real focus of the petitioner’s case is withholding-only relief. Navarrete, 170 F.4th at 1221–22 (“[W]e have not been granted any jurisdiction to hear CAT claims independent of challenges to final orders of removal.”); Hayles, ___ F.4th at ___, 2026 WL 1782580, at *3–4 (“[O]ur review of CAT claims may come only through a review of [a] final order.”). That proposition is not supported by Nasrallah or Riley. And neither Navarrete nor Hayles explains the assumption. Navarrete seemed to be searching for a justification when it cited a leading treatise on federal procedure for the proposition that “the only jurisdiction to review CAT orders is a ‘pendent jurisdiction’ requiring ‘an independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction’ under
Congress has confirmed more than once that CAT orders are subject to judicial review. See Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 585. It has done so through legislation drafted against the backdrop that, until only a few years ago, courts uniformly treated the denial of withholding-only relief as the triggering event for the deadline to file a petition for review. See F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 628–29. That means ripeness was not relevant then in the way it now could be after Riley. Petitioners here represent that “[p]ractically speaking, th[e] deadline will pass long before applications for protection will have been adjudicated, and often before withholding-only proceedings have even begun.” Petitioners’ Br. at 2. That looks to be true. The fastest resolution to a claim for CAT relief is when the immigration judge affirms a negative reasonable-fear determination. In M.C.C.-G.’s case, however, the judge took over two months to decide. And if the noncitizen receives a positive determination, withholding-only proceedings will not conclude even close to the deadline. E.E.V.’s withholding-only proceedings began in February 2017 and remain pending today.
Congress knows how to exclude certain noncitizens from eligibility for seeking CAT relief. It has done so only for a few narrow categories. FARRA, § 2242(c), 112 Stat. 2681–822. Those categories are, essentially, “serious” criminals, spies, persecutors, and Nazi concentration camp guards. See
Accordingly, we decline the government’s invitation, contrary to Riley and inconsistent with the practice of this and every other circuit, to conclude that Congress has silently foreclosed judicial review of the denial of withholding-only relief to a noncitizen who does not also challenge substantively a final order of removal.
III. Timeliness
So we have jurisdiction over these petitions for judicial review. We now arrive at the original heart of the matter. The government argues that these petitions for review should be dismissed as untimely. To recall,
A. Availability of Equitable Tolling
Riley did not address the availability of equitable tolling because it did not need to. Instead, the Court noted that “because the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal, it does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand.” 606 U.S. at 277. In other words, the government waived the deadline, so the Riley case itself could proceed. And the Riley majority did not respond to the partial dissent’s prediction that “standard principles of equitable tolling … are likely available.” 606 U.S. at 302–03 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part).14
Simply put, Riley left open the availability of equitable tolling. The dissenting opinion relies on language in Riley describing the question presented as whether
The government’s reasoning is not persuasive. The Court used the phrase “claim[s]-processing rule” two other times in Riley, in neither instance attached to the word “mandatory.” See 606 U.S. at 273–74 (Riley and government have “better argument” that
The Sixth Circuit has since addressed the issue in Oxlaj-Perez v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2026), and found equitable tolling available. The Fifth Circuit in Liao v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2025), characterized
The Supreme Court has taught consistently for decades that non-jurisdictional statutes of limitations are subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of allowing equitable tolling in appropriate cases. E.g., Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan, 608 U.S. ___, ___, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2026); Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 489 (2024); Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2023); Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 208–09 (2022); United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 407–08 (2015); Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2014); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 (2010); Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). The thirty-day deadline for filing a petition for review of a final order of removal is a statute of limitations because it “prescribes a period within which certain rights … may be enforced.” Young, 535 U.S. at 47.
The presumption is not overcome in this case. We start with petitioners’ observations that the deadline is quite short and directed at them, not at the court, both of which do “nothing to rebut the presumption” in favor of equitable tolling. Boechler, 596 U.S. at 209. In line with the Court’s recent decision in Enbridge, we also acknowledge but give less weight to the government’s observation that the statute speaks in man-
We look next to the expansive and grave “nature of the subject matter,” which makes it unlikely that Congress meant to forbid equitable tolling. See Enbridge, 608 U.S. at ___, 146 S. Ct. at 1084, quoting Arellano, 598 U.S. at 14. Although Enbridge and Arellano used the subject matter of the statutes in those cases merely as “garnish,” that factor is far stronger here. In Holland, the Court noted that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling applied with special force in the context of habeas corpus, which has traditionally been governed by equitable principles. 560 U.S. at 646. Section 1252 implicates habeas corpus because it channels judicial review of CAT denials and nationality claims away from habeas and into a petition for review of a final order of removal.
The stakes in these cases are whether a person will be removed to a country where she faces persecution, torture, or worse. In some cases the issue will be United States citizenship. In many of these circumstances, a petition for review is the only mechanism Congress has provided for a person to argue her claims before Article III judges. The government contends that executive branch “employees” who handle many immigration cases are bound to obey the personal legal opinions of the President and the Attorney General, and it
The government asserts that practical interests specific to immigration law cut against recognizing “case-specific exceptions and individualized equities.” It also warns that recognizing equitable tolling will invite spurious untimely petitions filed merely to delay removal. Respondent’s Br. at 43. We are not persuaded.
As for practical concerns specific to withholding-only proceedings, the new reality after Riley is that a petition for review will almost always come due long before withholding-only proceedings end. Under those circumstances, tolling the deadline to a date when the agency still has not decided the claim leads to no additional delay. For untimely petitions that may actually cause delay, the appropriateness of equitable
Moreover, and in stark contrast to the “decisive” feature of the statute in Enbridge, where the presumption of equitable tolling was rebutted, the thirty-day deadline at issue here lacks not only exceptions sounding in equity, but any exceptions at all. See 608 U.S. at ___, 146 S. Ct. at 1082; see also Arellano, 598 U.S. at 7 (“[
Congress did not specifically provide relief from the deadline if, for example, immigration authorities unlawfully delay, frustrate, or prevent a noncitizen from filing a timely petition for review. Federal courts have recently found that immigration officials engaged in the following examples of conduct that might warrant equitable tolling of missed deadlines:
- Denying access to an attorney during detention, including by denying visits, phone calls, mail, or email, shuffling detainees between various facilities across the country without notice, and coercing detainees into signing voluntary removal forms before consulting an attorney. See Perdomo v. Noem, 815 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1067–71 (C.D. Cal. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-209 (9th Cir.); Advocates for Human Rights v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 825 F. Supp. 3d 858, 868–74 (D. Minn. 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-2064 (8th Cir.).
Dumping the noncitizen onto the street hundreds of miles from home without her personal property or identification documents. See S.J. v. Bondi, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 490104, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2026), appeal docketed sub nom., Jimenez v. Isihara, No. 26-1327 (8th Cir.). - Designating removal to a third country over thirty days after a final order of removal because the noncitizen obtained withholding-only relief as to his home country, but doing so without notice and without informing him of the right to undergo another reasonable-fear interview. See, e.g., Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 811 F. Supp. 3d 741, 746–54 (D. Md. 2025) (recounting government’s “extraordinary” attempts to remove El Salvadoran national to Uganda, Eswatini, Ghana, and Liberia), appeal docketed, No. 26-6466 (4th Cir.); Kumar v. Wamsley, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065–67 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (granting habeas relief; government attempted to remove Indian national, an HIV-positive gay man, to Uganda); Mbaba v. Perez, No. 26-cv-00070, 2026 WL 917484, at *1–3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2026) (enjoining removal to Equatorial Guinea of Mauritanian national who escaped chattel slavery).17
The last group of cases cannot be attributed to mistakes. “The Department of Homeland Security has adopted a policy whereby it may take people and drop them off in parts unknown—in so-called ‘third countries’—and, ‘as long as the Department doesn’t already know that there’s someone standing there waiting to shoot … that’s fine.” D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 821 F. Supp. 3d 102, 117 (D. Mass. 2026) (alteration in original), appeal docketed, No. 26-1212 (1st Cir.), prior order stayed, 145 S. Ct. 2153, and clarification granted, 145 S. Ct. 2627.
Nor is the deadline incorporated into other statutes with specific allowances for exceptions, as the United States Code does three times with the thirty-day deadline for removal of civil actions to federal court at issue in Enbridge. 608 U.S. at ___, 146 S. Ct. at 1083. The only equitable-seeming exception to any related statutory deadline cited by the government here applies to statutory briefing deadlines. The court “may not extend these deadlines except upon motion for good cause shown” and, if they are not met, the petition must be dismissed “unless a manifest injustice would result.”
This solitary provision concerning briefing schedules does not persuade us that Congress meant to prohibit equitable tolling of the time to file a petition for review, regardless of the equities in a particular case. Section 1252 sets bespoke statutory briefing deadlines and makes them subject to extension by the court based on “good cause.” That is the same standard
Careful attention to the differences between rules and statutes, and between the interaction of different rules with statutes, is also why we find unconvincing the government’s reliance on Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188 (2019). In Nutraceutical, the Court held that the fourteen-day deadline to seek a discretionary interlocutory appeal of a grant or denial of class certification under Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 189–90. The Court began by noting where the deadline comes from: “Because Rule 23(f)’s time limitation is found in a procedural rule, not a statute, it is properly classified as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.” Id. at 192. Then, the Court noted that “some claim-processing rules are ‘mandatory’—that is, they are ‘“unalterable”’ if properly raised by an opposing party.” Id., quoting Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 121 (2017), quoting in turn Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005). Critical to the Court’s conclusion that Rule 23(f) is such a mandatory rule not subject to equitable tolling is that “the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure single out Civil Rule 23(f) for inflexible treatment.” Id. at 193. That is:
While Appellate Rule 2 authorizes a court of appeals for good cause to “suspend any provision of these rules in a particular case,” it does so with a conspicuous caveat: “except as otherwise
provided in Rule 26(b).” Appellate Rule 26(b), which generally authorizes extensions of time, in turn includes this express carveout: A court of appeals “may not extend the time to file … a petition for permission to appeal.” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 26(b)(1). In other words, Appellate Rule 26(b) says that the deadline for the precise type of filing at issue here may not be extended. The Rules thus express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule 23(f)’s deadline, even where good cause for equitable tolling might otherwise exist.
Id. (alteration in original).
Appellate Rule 26(b) reads in full:
Extending Time. For good cause, the court may extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after that time expires. But the court may not extend the time to file:
(1) a notice of appeal (except as authorized in Rule 4) or a petition for permission to appeal; or
(2) a notice of appeal from or a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify, enforce, or otherwise review an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer of the United States, unless specifically authorized by law.
To begin, if any part of Rule 26(b) is relevant to this case, it is not Rule 26(b)(1)’s absolute prohibition on extensions of time to file discretionary interlocutory appeals that was ad-
The presumption in favor of equitable tolling of statutes of limitation drafted by Congress is law. It applies to petitions for review of agency action. See Boechler, 596 U.S. at 202–03, 209; Harrow, 601 U.S. at 482; Nelson v. SEC, 138 F.4th 514, 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“As we have previously stressed, however, the presumption of equitable tolling applies to deadlines pertaining to petitions for review.”). We agree with both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits that Rule 26(b)(2)’s “specifically authorized” language does not override the presumption in favor of equitable tolling for statutory deadlines. Oxlaj-Perez, 174 F.4th at 527; Nelson, 138 F.4th at 523.
Moreover, we need not read either part of Rule 26(b) to apply to statutory deadlines for petitions for review in the first place. See Oxlaj-Perez, 174 F.4th at 527 (“But Nutraceutical’s analysis of Rule 23(f) is inapposite here. There was no presumption of tolling in Nutraceutical because the case involved only a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.”). Rule 26(b) is an exception to Rule 2(a), which authorizes the court of appeals, in order “to expedite its decision or for other good cause—[to] suspend any provision of these rules in a particular case and order proceedings as it directs, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” (Emphasis added.) Rule 26(b) clarifies that the power to suspend the rules includes the power to “extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act” or to “permit an act to be done after that time expires,” with the two exceptions given above. Once
The thirty-day deadline to file a petition for review under
A party seeking equitable tolling must meet the high bar of showing that it is appropriate in her particular case. “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). These petitions for review are among the rare cases where those conditions are met.19
Both petitioners have diligently pursued their rights, including their rights to judicial review. The government has not suggested that either petitioner has failed to participate diligently in withholding-only proceedings. Petitioners have also acted diligently in this court since filing their petitions for review, including responding to the government‘s motions and meeting all briefing deadlines in these consolidated proceedings. The only question is whether they acted diligently between receiving their final orders of removal and filing the petitions.
If petitioners had filed these petitions for judicial review within thirty days of their final orders of removal in August 2015 and May 2025, circuit precedent would have required this court to dismiss them as unripe. F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 636, citing Order, Delgado-Arteaga v. Lynch, No. 15-1810 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015), Dkt. No. 11 (granting motion to dismiss); see also Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We are satisfied that the Attorney General is correct that the immigration authorities were not finished with Eke‘s case until the BIA‘s final decision [on withholding-only relief] ....“). Then, when Riley abrogated F.J.A.P. and immediately put E.E.V. and M.C.C.-G. outside the thirty-day window, both filed their petitions for review within thirty days. Both petitioners acted with the necessary diligence.20
The Supreme Court appears to have left open whether reliance on binding precedent that is later overruled can qualify as an extraordinary circumstance to justify equitable tolling. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 253, 257–58, 258 n.4 (2016) (noting litigant‘s mistake in relying on district court decision that was not appealed is “quite different from relying on actually binding precedent that is subsequently reversed,” but not deciding if the latter may justify equitable tolling), aff‘g 764 F.3d 51, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (suggesting availability of equitable tolling for reliance on binding precedent for “deciding when and how to file” claims). This court‘s discussion of Menominee Indian Tribe in Evans v. United States also seems to leave this question open:
What is more, as the Supreme Court stated in Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, misreading case precedent is “fundamentally no different from a garden variety claim of excusable neglect[.]” 58” court=“U.S.” type=“short“>577 U.S. 250, 257–58 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (distinguishing cases in which a party relies on binding precedent that is subsequently reversed).
132 F.4th 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2025) (alteration in original).
Other circuits have addressed similar issues about when to file claims in habeas corpus cases, and we find their thinking instructive. In Harris v. Carter, when the petitioner was convicted, then-binding circuit precedent held that an untimely state court post-conviction petition was “properly filed” and therefore tolled the one-year statute of limitations under the
The Supreme Court‘s overruling of the Dictado rule made it impossible for Harris to file a timely petition. Harris’ petition became time-barred the moment that Pace was decided. Finally, Harris had no control over the operative fact that caused his petition to become untimely—the Supreme Court‘s decision in Pace. These are precisely the circumstances in
which equitable principles justify tolling of the statute of limitations.
Id. at 1056 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Sherwood v. Prelesnik, the Sixth Circuit addressed another change in the law concerning the same statute at issue in Harris that also led to an untimely habeas corpus petition. 579 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2009). In Sherwood, a new Supreme Court decision abrogated a Sixth Circuit precedent and held that filing a petition for certiorari after the state court of last resort denied relief did not toll the federal statute of limitations. Id. at 583–84, 588, citing Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 337 (2007), abrogating Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164, 172–73 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Sherwood had relied on Abela in waiting 363 days after his conviction became final to file his application for state post-conviction relief, meaning he went from having ninety days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied reconsideration to having just two days. See Id. at 584, 588. The Sixth Circuit concluded that equitable tolling was appropriate because Abela had “assured” Sherwood of an additional ninety days when he made the “crucial decision” to seek state post-conviction relief rather than file a habeas petition in federal court. Id. at 588–89. The court quoted Sherwood‘s brief: “By the time the rules changed, counsel had effectively no opportunity to alter the course of Mr. Sherwood‘s ‘ship.‘” Id. at 588.
We agree with the reasoning of Harris and Sherwood and find it applies here. A change in binding case law that makes it impracticable, as in Sherwood, or impossible, as in Harris, for a party ever to have timely sought relief can constitute an extraordinary circumstance for the purpose of equitable tolling. A person who relies in good faith on binding precedent in de-
In the government‘s view, however, E.E.V. should have realized that her reinstatement order became final upon issuance back in 2015. That would have been contrary to then-settled case law in this circuit and in every other circuit. See F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 628–29. Then she should have filed a petition for review and tried to convince this court we were wrong about the deadline. In fact, at that time, the government itself would have moved to dismiss her premature petition, and we would have granted the motion. See, e.g., Order, Baatarjav v. Garland, No. 21-1191 (7th Cir. Apr. 9, 2021), ECF 14; Order, Lorenzo-Avila v. Whitaker, No. 18-3589 (7th Cir. Dec. 14, 2018), ECF 5; Order, Atisele v. Lynch, No. 15-1183 (7th Cir. July 22, 2015), ECF 29. And even if E.E.V. had won that then-improbable argument, in the best-case scenario she would have ended up with a placeholder petition for review pending the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings. That‘s the same situation she is in now. For someone in her position, that was not a fight worth picking.
Moreover, by the logic of the government‘s argument, every other noncitizen in the same situation in the years before Riley was decided should have done the same thing: file a petition for review that would have been premature under binding precedent, asking us to reconsider that precedent. And to what end? Parties are of course free to urge us to reconsider circuit precedent, but we do not respond with limitless pa-
The equities here are clear-cut. E.E.V. and M.C.C.-G. relied on this court‘s binding precedent in deciding when to seek judicial review. Then, the Supreme Court decided Riley, and, according to the government, they suddenly found the courthouse doors barred. Cf. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. Not so. These petitioners are entitled to equitable tolling, so these petitions for review are timely.
IV. Venue
In the alternative to dismissal as untimely, the government moved to transfer E.E.V.‘s petition to the Fifth Circuit because her reinstatement order was issued in Texas. See
Even if venue would also be proper in the Fifth Circuit or eventually becomes proper elsewhere, we would not transfer her petition unless doing so would be in the interests of justice. Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 2013);
Accordingly, the government‘s motions to dismiss or summarily deny these petitions are DENIED. The government‘s motion to transfer E.E.V.‘s petition is DENIED. The court will hold these petitions for review in abeyance pending the agency‘s final decisions in petitioners’ withholding-only proceedings.
Section 1252(b)(1) also requires a petition to be filed not later than 30 days after a final order of removal. M.C.C.-G., a Mexican citizen who entered this country illegally, filed a petition after the 30-day deadline. Although the deadline is not jurisdictional, the Supreme Court recently indicated in Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), that it is a mandatory claims-processing rule, precluding equitable tolling. Her petition therefore should be denied.
On both questions, the majority opinion holds to the contrary. Because I believe that conflicts with Riley and the statutory text, I respectfully dissent.
I
E.E.V. is a citizen of El Salvador. Around March 2007, she illegally entered this country. DHS detained her and issued a removal order under
“Congress has created an expedited process for aliens who reenter the United States without authorization after having
Following this streamlined process, DHS reinstated E.E.V.‘s order of removal in August 2015. Sometime later, she expressed a fear of returning to El Salvador. See
After the Court decided Riley, E.E.V. petitioned for review of the reinstatement order.
A
Federal courts must always evaluate their jurisdiction before the case‘s merits. Chi. Tchrs. Union, Loc. 1 v. Educators for Excellence, Inc., 159 F.4th 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2025). This court‘s jurisdiction is based on
The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define “order of removal.” But Riley did. A “final order of removal” is
E.E.V.‘s reinstatement order does not “affect the validity” of her original deportation order. The reinstatement decision does what it says: it reinstates a “prior order of removal.”
Consider, too, that an “alien subject to a reinstated order of removal will not have any removal proceedings.” Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 531. How, then, can a reinstatement decision from a non-removal proceeding be a reviewable “final order of removal?” Put another way, “as a matter of ordinary meaning, it would be odd for a reviewable removal order to come from a non-removal proceeding.” Ruiz-Perez, 49 F.4th at 982 (Oldham, J., dissenting); see also Laureano, 177 F.4th at 473 (Matey, J., dissenting).
Because an alien‘s original removal order is a “final order of removal,” some have argued that a reinstatement order is as well, because they are functionally the same. See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003). But applicable statutes expressly distinguish between original orders of removal and reinstatement orders. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, “that Congress placed reinstatement in a separate section from removal suggests that reinstatement is a separate procedure, not a species of removal.” Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 490 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Reinstatement is a “far more summary procedure than removal,” and is akin to a “ministerial” act. Id. at 491. Such an order carries no “independent validity.” United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.4th 288, 294 (2d Cir. 2025). And regulations implementing the INA “repeat this distinction.” F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
I read our caselaw differently. Torres-Tristan v. Holder, 656 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2011), and Villa v. Barr, 924 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 2019), suggest there is jurisdiction, yet do not analyze it. Dictum in Velazquez-Olais, 172 F.4th at 538, could be read to support the majority. Id. (noting “the act of reinstatement is reviewable under some circumstances“). The closest to a holding this court has reached is one sentence in Lemos v. Holder, 636 F.3d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Reinstatement of an old removal order is reviewable in a court of appeals under
These “drive-by” jurisdictional statements carry little weight, like in Riley, in which the Court disregarded such previous “loose” proclamations of jurisdiction. 606 U.S. at 275. Our court has yet to independently examine this question, and notably, the cases the majority opinion cites largely predate Riley. To the extent this court has concluded that jurisdiction exists over final orders of removal, in light of Riley I would overrule that conclusion.
This issue is far from settled. Until Riley, courts—including ours—debated and questioned their own precedent. See, e.g., F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 643–44 (Brennan, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part.); Ruiz-Perez, 49 F.4th at 982–83 (Oldham, J., dissenting); Bhaktibhai-Patel, 32 F.4th at 195 (prior
B
As I understand my colleagues’ reading of Riley, they believe it used “final order of removal” and “an order of deportation” interchangeably, so the terms are synonymous. Because E.E.V.‘s reinstatement order states she is “removable,” she is therefore subject to an “order of deportation.” I read Riley differently. That case explained that “final orders of removal” are those orders that “affect the validity of a previously issued order of removal or render that order non-final.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 269. A reinstatement decision does not invalidate her removal order; it gives effect to that order. Left unexplained in the majority opinion is why E.E.V.‘s reinstatement order affects the validity of her 2007 order.
Nor does the majority opinion engage with the final part of E.E.V.‘s reinstatement order “that the above-named alien is
E.E.V. makes a slightly different argument, apparently accepted in the majority opinion. Once the alien is physically deported, her original removal order is “defunct,” and by issuing the reinstatement order, the latter “revive[s]” the former. Thus, a reinstatement decision “affect[s] the validity of a previously issued order of removal.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 269.
Reinstatement orders are not defibrillators. I am aware of no statute or case stating that original removal orders are defunct until given life by reinstatement orders. Nor does E.E.V. cite any. Instead, her original removal order remains valid; a reinstatement order restores that removal order. F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 641, 644 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (citing
To be sure, as E.E.V. points out, the alien cannot “travel back in time and challenge the prior removal order” to contest his current withholding-only proceedings. Yet a reinstate-
The majority opinion includes a cautionary hypothetical for why judicial review is appropriate. The opinion imagines a U.S. citizen who was deemed illegal, deported, and then reenters the country. After DHS again apprehends the citizen and finds that he has already been deported, the agency reinstates the citizen‘s prior order of removal. No judicial review of that last determination will again result in removal. An Article III federal court therefore must have jurisdiction to prevent such a wrong.
The probability of this hypothetical occurring is vanishingly small. A citizen who was wrongly ordered removed under a FARO would have a chance to assert citizenship defensively, and if denied, seek review in a court of appeals by petitioning for review under
The hypothetical also stresses a need for federal court review when an alien reenters the country and the removal order is reinstated. But the events here show that an alien‘s rights are protected at that juncture. Without this court‘s review, an asylum officer still found that E.E.V. had credible concerns about returning to El Salvador. And for approximately the last eight years, she has been in withholding-only proceedings.
In any event, we must follow Riley‘s instructions. In the face of “legitimate practical concerns,” our court “must nevertheless follow the statutory text and our prior precedents.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 272. At any time, Congress can revise the text of
II
The majority opinion holds next that equitable tolling is available for these untimely petitions. I respectfully disagree.
M.C.C.-G. is a citizen of Mexico who entered the country illegally at some unknown date.2 In November 2018, she was convicted of theft in Indiana and given a suspended sentence of one year. In May 2025, DHS issued a FARO and ordered her removed to Mexico. She expressed fear of persecution and torture if she returned, but an asylum officer found her fears not reasonable. An Immigration Judge reviewed her case and agreed with her, overruling the asylum officer, and placed her in withholding-only proceedings. In December 2025, she was denied relief and she appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Her case remains pending.
Her FARO is a “final order of removal.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 267. So, under
Statutory filing deadlines fall into different categories. Some are “jurisdictional,” meaning if the filer misses the deadline, the court lacks the power to hear the case. Harrow v. Dept. of Def., 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024). But by and large, filing deadlines are “claims-processing rules.” United States v. Johnston, 158 F.4th 870, 875 (7th Cir. 2025). These requirements
Some claims-processing rules are “mandatory.” Such deadlines are “unalterable” and must be followed if a party raises them as a defense. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188, 192 (2019). Accordingly, equitable tolling of mandatory claims-processing rules is almost always unavailable. See Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2026) (“Enbridge argues that it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. … Some nonjurisdictional rules remain ‘mandatory’ and ‘are not susceptible of the equitable approach’ that Enbridge urges.“). To be sure, the Court has “reserved whether mandatory claim-processing rules may [ever] be subject to equitable exceptions.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 549 n.5 (2019). But “the Court‘s recent decisions in this area have consistently compelled enforcement of mandatory claim-processing rules.” In re Wade, 926 F.3d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 2019).
Section 1252(b)(1)‘s 30-day deadline is a mandatory claims-processing rule. Riley confirmed this. There, the Court characterized the issue on appeal as “whether the 30-day filing deadline … is a jurisdictional requirement or simply a mandatory claim-processing rule.” 606 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added). The Court chose the latter. Id. Further, the majority opinion in Riley analogized to a case involving a “mandatory time bar.” Id. at 277 (citing Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 152, 159 (2023)). From these points, we can conclude the Court
After Riley, another court has concluded that
There are more reasons to believe that the 30-day deadline cannot be equitably tolled. The presumption in favor of equitable tolling is rebutted if “there is good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” Enbridge, 146 S. Ct. at 1082 (citation modified). Congress in
B
My colleagues interpret
But Riley stated the 30-day deadline is a “mandatory claims-processing rule.” Id. at 263. If not dispositive, it follows from that statement that equitable tolling should not be permitted, as the rule is “unalterable” and equitable tolling in that circumstance is almost always unavailable. Nutraceutical, 586 U.S. at 192; see also Enbridge, 146 S. Ct. at 1081–82. And the fact that the majority opinion relies on a Supreme Court dissent should suggest its position is unlikely to prevail. Cf. DHS v. D.V.D., 145 S. Ct. 2627, 2629–30 (2025) (district court wrongly ordered compliance with a stayed order because the “only authority it cited was the dissent from the [Court‘s] stay order.“).
Granted, after Riley, circuits have disagreed on whether
The first problem with Oxlaj-Perez and the majority opinion here concerns statutory exceptions. The Supreme Court recently explained that “‘an explicit listing of exceptions,’ set
Second, the majority opinion and Oxlaj-Perez give the text of
Third, another factor when evaluating if equitable tolling applies is whether “the nature of the [statute‘s] subject matter” is consistent with tolling. Id. at 1084. The Court termed this a “garnish” in the overall analysis. Id. (quoting McDonough” cite=“598 U.S. 1” pinpoint=“14” court=“U.S.” date=“2023“>Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 14 (2023)). Yet, the majority opinion submits that the “expansive and grave” subject matter of immigration means that Congress did not intend to foreclose equitable tolling. See also Oxlaj-Perez, 174 F.4th at 528 (“[T]he humanitarian nature of petitions for review instead militates in favor of tolling.“). The majority opinion then lists several recent immigration incidents, that “cannot be attributed” to mistakes, as “examples of potential grounds for equitable tolling and to illustrate the stakes if judicial review were cut off.”
This flips the test around. The question is whether Congress wanted equitable tolling, not whether equitable tolling vindicates the rights of alien petitioners. And from Congress‘s viewpoint, “the nature of the subject matter” cuts against equitable tolling. The Act, including
The majority opinion looks for support in Holland, 560 U.S. at 646. There, the Court reasoned that habeas corpus has “traditionally” been governed by equitable principles, so
My colleagues note that a petition for review may be the only mechanism Congress has provided to argue before an Article III court. But most appellate deadlines limit federal court review. Take two examples. We have upheld filing deadlines in the habeas context, depriving state prisoners of review by a federal court. Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2013) (Despite alleging a constitutional violation, “we dismiss this case for the simple reason that Taylor did not file his petition within the statutorily prescribed time limit.“). And in Enbridge, the Court held that
Some aliens may raise constitutional claims, my colleagues warn, and the “importance of such claims” cuts in favor of interpreting the 30-day deadline to permit equitable tolling. But that a claim is constitutional does not mean a federal court must hear it. “The Constitution does not require that courts hear all constitutional claims.” Mullin v. Doe, Nos. 25–1083 and 25–1084, 2026 WL 1825840, at *14 (2026) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation modified). Indeed, “the very text of the Constitution refutes the principle that all constitutional violations must be remediable in the courts.” Id. (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation modified)). For example, under the political-question doctrine, federal courts cannot entertain those
III
This case should be decided under Riley, the text of
E.E.V. repeatedly violated our country‘s immigration laws, yet she has remained in this country for nearly a decade after DHS placed her in “expedited” removal proceedings. M.C.C.-G. was convicted of an aggravated felony, placing her among the “dangerous aliens” Congress sought to “expeditiously” remove. Riley, 606 U.S. at 272. The majority opinion finds jurisdiction where there is none. The result is even more delay for E.E.V., M.C.C.-G., and future petitioners. Because those holdings are contrary to the statutes and fail to adhere to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Riley, I respectfully dissent.