*1 v. FLORIDA HOLLAND TO THE OF UNITED STATES COURT APPEALS FOR CERTIORARI
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT March Argued 09-5327. 2010—Decided June No. *3 Court, Roberts,
Breyer, J., C. J., opinion delivered the of the which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, Stevens, and and opinion concurring part concurring judgment, post, and in the J., filed J., Scaua, J., Thomas, joined in which p. dissenting opinion, a 654. filed I, post, p. all but Part as to Scher, by
Todd G. the Court, of 558 U. S. appointment cause and filed briefs for petitioner. argued D. Scott Makar, Florida, Solicitor General of argued Bill Mc him on With the brief were for respondent. cause Hubener, F. Collum, Louis General, Deputy Chief Attorney Timothy Craig Feiser, Osterhaus, D. D. General, Solicitor Courtney Brewer, Lathan, A. and Ronald Solicitors Deputy Carolyn Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy M. Attor General, Sabella, M. General, Candance Attorney Chief Assistant ney General, and Sandra S. As Jaggard Lerner, and Lisa-Marie sistant Attorneys General.* Breyer delivered the of the Court. opinion
Justice hereWe decide that the federal provision timeliness habeas statute corpus subject See equitable tolling. and Antiterrorism Effective Death Act of 1996 Penalty 2244(d). (AEDPA), § 28 U. S. C. We also consider its applica tion in case. In the Court of when view, Appeals’ seeks excuse a late on of petitioner the basis filing conduct, that if it is attorney’s unprofessional conduct, even or cannot “negligent” “grossly “rise to the level negligent,” of misconduct” that would warrant egregious attorney equi table unless the petitioner faith, offers bad “proof dishonesty, divided mental or loyalty, impairment so forth.” 1339 (CA11 2008) euriam). 539 F. 3d view, In our (per this standard is too See Irwin rigid. Vet- Department of
*Larry Yackle, Holdridge, Stull, Steven R. Shapiro, John Brian Ran- Marshall, Kayanan dall C. Maria filed brief the American Civil urging Liberties al. Union et as amici curiae reversal. urging curiae
Briefs amici affirmance were filed for the State of Ho, by Abbott, Texas, Greg Texas et al. James C. Solicitor General of At- torney General, Weber, Attorney General, C. Andrew First Assistant Eric Nichols, Deputy Attorney General, Marshall, J. R. L. Edward Assistant Attorney General, Sullivan, General, and James P. Assistant Solicitor Attorneys respective Troy General for their States as King follows: Alabama, Colorado, Joseph Delaware, John W. R. III Suthers of Biden Hawaii, Idaho, J. Madigan Mark Bennett of Lawrence G. oí Wasden Lisa *4 Illinois, Gregory Indiana, Iowa, of of F. Zoeller Tom Miller of Steve Six Kansas, Kentucky, Conway “Buddy” of of D. Jack James Caldwell of Loui- siana, Missouri, Nebraska, of Bruning Chris Koster of Jon Catherine Cor- Mexico, Nevada, Gary King Corbett, tez of K. of Masto New Thomas W. Jr., Dakota, Pennsylvania, Marty Jackley of J. of Cooper, South Robert E. Jr., Utah, Tennessee, Mark L. of Robert M. McKenna of Shurtleff Washington, Salzburg Wyoming; and Bruce A and for the Criminal Scheidegger. Legal Kent by Justice Foundation S. by Legal Eleven
Briefe were filed for Historians Wil- amici curiae Sheehan; al. Lawrence J. Legal F. and for Ethics Professors et liam Fox, pro se, Carr, Martyn, pro D. L. Susan Reece se. William and see also Lawrence v. erans 89, 498 U. Affairs, (1990); S. (2007). Florida, 549 U. S. therefore We reverse 327, 336 for further of the Court of remand Appeals judgment proceedings.
I states that 1-year AEDPA limitation shall period “[a] to an for writ of habeas by a application corpus per- apply of a custody pursuant son State court.” judgment 2244(d)(1). § It also time which “[t]he says during filed for post-conviction State re- application ... properly view” shall not be counted” “pending against 1-year 2244(d)(2). § period. se 19, Holland filed a pro January 2006,
On Albert habeas in the Federal District for the petition Court corpus South- (the ern District of Florida. Both Holland petitioner) (the the State of Florida agree that, unless respondent) equi- tolled, period limitations tably statutory applicable five Holland’s weeks before petition expired approximately was Brief 9, 7; filed. See for and n. petition Respondent for Petitioner and n. Brief 4. Holland asked District to toll the limitations for equitable Court reasons. set forth in detail shall some the record facts that under- We claim. lie Holland’s
A In Holland was convicted of murder and first-degree sentenced death. The Florida Court affirmed Supreme State, (2000). Holland v. 773 So. 2d judgment. 1, 2001, October denied Holland’s On petition on that date that certiorari. 534 U. 834. And date —the S. denial of the ended further direct review of Hol petition our conviction —the AEDPA limitations clock 1-year began land’s Quarter Jimenez 2244(d)(1)(A); § to run. See S. C. (2009). man, 555 U. S. 7, 2001, on November later, Florida
Thirty-seven days ap- Holland in all Bradley represent pointed attorney *5 636 and Fla. Stat.
state federal Cf. postconvietion proceedings. 27.711(2) (2007). 19, 2002—316 §§27.710, By September 1-year after his before the days appointment days limitations on Hol- expired Collins, acting AEDPA — in the behalf, filed a motion for relief land's postconviction trial court. Brief for n. That 9, state Cf. 7. Respondent limi- AEDPA automatically stopped filing running said, § 2244(d)(2), with, days as we have period, tations on the clock. left
For the next three Holland's remained petition years, Holland time, the state courts. During pending certain that all of wrote letters him to make Collins asking for federal would be preserved any subsequent claims “I would back, stating, review. Collins wrote corpus habeas time- are aware of state like reassure we you limitations and federal App. exhaustion requirements.” said that he would the .. . federal He also “presen[t]... courts courts” of Holland's claims the state denied. any Motion added, Ibid. In a letter Collins “should your second courts, for Post-Conviction Relief be denied” the state will then be for presen- state habeas claims “your corpus ripe tation in a of habeas in federal corpus writ petition Id., court.” at 61. re-
In trial court denied Holland 2003, state mid-May to the lief, and Collins that denial Florida Supreme appealed Flor- later, February 2005, Court. Almost two years See Court heard oral in the case. argument ida Supreme 3d, during 2-year period, 539 F. at 1337. But relations Indeed, down. between and Holland break began Collins communicated between January April time by times —each letter. See with Holland three only n. (SD 27, 2007), Fla., p. Apr. No. l:06-cv-20182-PAS (hereinafter 91, n. 6. District App. Court opinion), communication, twice
Holland, with this lack unhappy remove it to Court, asking wrote to Florida Supreme filed on June letter, In the second Collins from his case. *6 experienced complete he and Collins had “a he said that 2004, App. 160. Holland in- communication.” breakdown kept updated [him] had “not the court that Collins formed capital [his] case” and had status of that Holland “not on the spoken April Id., to” Collins “since 2003.” at 150. or seen [me]” “[I has wrote, said, “Mr. Collins abandoned He [my] going capital ap- have] on idea what is with ease on no peal.” Id., at 152. He added that “Collins has never made any relationship any to of reasonable effort establish trust [me],”id., at and stated that he with “does or confidence “any ability have confidence in Mr. Collin’s to trust” or by asking represent [him],” id., at 152. Holland concluded (removed) capital be off his “dismissed case” or that Collins given hearing in he a to order demonstrate Collins’ responded Id., at 161. The deficiencies. State any pro papers could not file se with the court while Holland seeking represented including papers counsel, he was new Supreme agreed Id., at 42-45. The Florida Court counsel. requests. Id., denied Holland’s 46. During period Holland this same wrote various letters to Supreme of the Florida In the last of the Clerk Court. these competent, postconvic- “[I]f a wrote, I had conflict-free, he attorney representing appellate I would not have tion, me, trying get you your this letter. I’m not on to write exactly just happening I like to what is nerves. would know my Supreme appeal on to the Court Florida.” case period, During that same time Holland also filed Id., complaint against Association, the Florida Bar Collins with complaint Id., at was denied. 65-67. but the argued appeal Holland’s the Florida Su- before February preme 3d, 2005. 539 F. at 1337. Court on emphasizing Shortly thereafter, Holland wrote Collins timely corpus filing petition importance for habeas Supreme the Florida issued its rul- court once federal Specifically, ing. 3, 2005, on March Holland wrote: A.: Collins, P. “Dear Mr. are you?
“How Fine I hope. “I write letter to ask that write me you please as soon as back, let possible me know what the status case on my appeal Supreme Court of Florida. “If the Florida Supreme Court denies my [postconvic- and State tion] Habeas Corpus my appeals, please file 28 U S. C. writ Habeas Corpus petition, before deadline to out my it runs (expires). file “Thank you very much. have
“Please a nice added). day.” App. (emphasis *7 Collins did not answer this letter. 15, 2005,
On June Holland wrote again: “Dear Mr. Collins:
“How are Fine I you? hope.
“On 3, March 2005 I wrote you letter, asking you let me know the status of my case on appeal of Court Florida. Supreme
“Also, have 28 U. S. you begun preparing my C. §2254 writ Habeas know, Please let me petition? Corpus as soon as possible. added). Id.,
“Thank at 212 you.” (emphasis But Collins did not again, reply.
Five
later,
months
November
Florida Supreme
affirmed
Court
the lower court decision
Holland re-
denying
curiam).
lief. Holland v. State,
“How are I Fine hope. “I write letter to ask that let me know you please status my before Court appeals Supreme Florida. Have been my decided appeals yet?
“Please send me the [necessary ... so information] that I can determine when the deadline will be to file my S. C. Rule 2254 U. Federal Habeas Petition, Corpus all accordance with United States Court and Supreme Eleventh Circuit case law and ‘Antiterrorism applicable and Effective Death if Penalty my before appeals Act/ Court of Florida are denied. Supreme I
“Please advised that want to my preserve privi- to federal lege my review of all of state convictions and sentences. Collins, me,
“Mr. would also inform as to you please which District C. Rule my United States U. S. *8 have Federal Habeas Petition will to be Corpus in and timely filed that address? court’s “Thank 214. you very App. much.” did not answer. Collins on later, 18, 2006, Holland,
Nine days January working for the first time that the Florida learned prison library, in his case Court had issued final determination Supreme and that its had issued —five weeks prior. mandate at his own 3d, immediately pro F. 1337. He wrote out se and mailed it to the Federal District petition federal habeas District of Florida the next day. for Southern begins Ibid. The by stating, petition now
“Comes Jr., Albert a Florida death Holland, R. row inmate and states that court counsel has appointed failed to undertake action to seek Federal Re- timely view in case my a 28 U. S. Rule 2254 Petition by filing C.
for Writ of Habeas on behalf.” Corpus my App. It then describes the various constitutional claims Hol- land assert court. federal hoped day
The same he mailed that re- Holland petition, a letter telling ceived from Collins him Collins intended file certiorari this Court from the State petition Court’s most recent Holland answered Supreme ruling. immediately:
“Dear Collins: Bradley Mr. M.
“Since of Florida recently, Supreme Court has denied and state writ my [postconviction] Habeas I am Petition. left to understand are Corpus you certiorari on these matters. seek planning “It’s that the AEDPA time understanding limita- my tions is not tolled re- discretionary appellate during views, such as certiorari from de- applications resulting nial state conviction post proceedings.
“Therefore, I file certiorari if you advise not to doing so affects or one as grace jeopardizes my year the AEDPA. prescribed (some Id.,
“Thank much.” at 216 you emphasis very deleted). Coates,
Holland about the law. See supra, was right (AEDPA not tolled of petition 1226-1227 during pendency from state for certiorari judgment denying postconviction Florida, Lawrence 421 F. 3d review); accord, (CA11 2005), aff’d, S., 331-336. call from Holland tried to January 26, 2006,
On office But collect and Collins’ would he called prison. later, Collins wrote days 218. Five accept call. App. *9 very time that, first as Collins told him for Holland and period applicable the limitations law, AEDPA understood expired application had fact habeas Holland’s federal Spe- begun represent had Holland. Collins 2000—before cifically, Collins wrote: Holland: “Dear Mr. your receipt January letter 20,2006
“I am in dated concerning operation AEDPA time limitations. One upcoming obtaining at in our efforts federal ha- hurdle one-year corpus statutory relief will be that the beas filing petition began time frame for such a to run after your] [when 5, affirmed the case was on October Judgment were affirmed Sentence... Florida Supreme it was not until However, Court. November appointing that I received the Order me 7, 2001, you appointed year As can I was about a see, case. your . case became .. final. after time-period my ap- “[T]he [thus] had run before AEDPA your [postconviction] pointment and therefore before added). (emphasis Id., motion was filed.” 78-79 wrong said, was about the law. As we have Hol- begin 1-year did not to run until this land’s limitations petition for certiorari from the denied Holland’s state review, occurred of relief on direct which on courts’ denial §2244(d)(1)(A); 1, Jimenez, 28 U. See S. C. October (CA11 Moore, 770, 309 F. 3d S., Bond v. 119; (on 2002). appointed was November And when Collins 2001) days go. left to therefore had 328 the AEDPA clock immediately pointing Collins,
Holland wrote back this out.
“Dear Mr. Collins: your January 31, 2006. You
“I received letter dated one-year statutory stating time ‘the are incorrect began my filing my petition to run after frame for by the Florida was affirmed on October case *10 on As stated three re- Court.’ Supreme page [the Petition for a writ of cently certiorari, 1, October filed] 2001 is when United denied States Supreme initial writ my of certiorari and that when petition my ease became final. That meant that the time would be once I filed my tolled motion [postconviction] trial court.
“Also, Mr. Collins never told me that time ran you my I out file my told 28 U. S. C. (expired). you timely deadline, 2254 Habeas Petition so Corpus before I would not be time-barred.
“You never informed me of oral or of the arguments 10, Court of Florida’s 2005 decision Supreme November You never me postconviction kept denying my appeals. about of my case, informed the status told although you me that inform me of the would court’s you immediately soon as decision as heard you anything. I on Collins, 19,
“Mr. filed a motion January [in federal because I did not rights, preserve my court] want to be time-barred. Have heard you anything about Do know what the sta- you the aforesaid motion? tus aforesaid motion is? Collins,
“Mr. file 2254 Habeas Petition im- my please not wait longer, Please do even mediately. any though will it it filed at least will be without filed untimely time, time). (valuable wasting anymore 2254 Petition at my file once. “Again, please “Your time that ever letter is the first have men- you my out, tioned to me time had run before about anything and that me, my were one- you appointed represent 5, 2000. year started to run on October motion that I “Please find out the status filed my me on 2006 and let know. 19, January much.” 222-223. App. “Thank you very federal did Nor did he file a Collins not answer this letter. habeas as Holland petition requested. 1,2006,
On March Holland filed another complaint against with the Florida Bar Record, Association. See Doc. Exh. 8. This time the p. bar asked Collins to respond, Id., did, he which his own on through March attorney, And the at 2. next months after very day, over three Hol- AEDPA land’s statute limitations had expired, Collins federal to Holland, mailed habeas proposed petition asking id., to review him it. See Doc. Exh. W. pro se motion
But point Holland had filed already *11 District Court in the dismissed as his asking 192. The to that attorney. App. responded State request pro se once that Holland could not file a again arguing to have motion Collins removed while he was seeking repre- e., id., i. sented Collins. See by counsel, represented by motion, 47-51. But this time the court considered Holland’s from Collins withdraw the case, permitted appointed 9-10, a new for Holland. See Docs. lawyer Record, 17-18, And it also received on whether the circum- briefing 22. of the case the of the justified stances equitable tolling for a of time AEDPA limitations sufficient period weeks) to make timely. five Holland’s petition (approximately
C Federal Court briefs, After the District considering and that the facts did not warrant equitable tolling held that court, The untimely. Holland’s was consequently petition on Hol- numerous filings that Collins had noting prepared that Holland courts, in the state and suggesting land’s behalf hold, but not that Col- a difficult did client, intimated, was at worst merely in the case was lins’ conduct professional 90-93. 7-8, App. See District Court opinion “negligent.” on an alternative rationale: the court rested its holding But charac- if could be even Collins’ “behavior that, It wrote Holland “did circumstance,’” ‘extraordinary as an terized find the date court out system from the seek any help not nor his state habeas petition, issued denying mandate [the] Id., he aid from did seek ‘outside at App. supporters.’” held, court Holland did “demonstrate” Hence, the “due to invoke diligence” necessary “equitable tolling.” Ibid. with District
On Eleventh Circuit appeal, agreed was The untimely. Holland’s habeas petition “ first Holland that Court Appeals agreed ‘[ejquitable ” can be to ... AEDPA’s deadline.’ statutory applied 3d, Secretary 539 F. at 1338 Helton v. Dept. (quoting (CA11 2001)). Corrections, 259 F. 3d it also But in ease, not be held could like equitable tolling applied Holland’s, that no more than “[pjure involves professional on of a petitioner’s attorney because negligence” part such behavior can never constitute an cir “extraordinary 3d, cumstance.” 539 F. at 1339. The court wrote: will “We assume conduct is alleged neg- Collins’s even in our view, But no ligent, negligent. grossly or to meet of failure allegation lawyer negligence standard care —in absence of lawyer’s allega- tion and of bad faith, dishonesty, divided proof loyalty, *12 on mental or so forth impairment lawyer’s part— of can rise to the level misconduct egregious attorney that would entitle Petitioner Ibid. to equitable tolling.” a “know- Holland made “no Collins had made allegation” or reckless factual or that he exhib- ing misrepresentation,” or ited “divided “mental “dishonesty,” loyalty,” impairment.” held, the court was se Hence, equitable tolling per Ibid. The court did not to Holland’s habeas inapplicable petition. to Hol- address the District Court’s ruling respect land’s diligence. of for certiorari. Because the Court
Holland petitioned in- doctrine to of equitable tolling Appeals’ application misconduct conflicts with the ap- stances professional we Circuits, granted taken petition. other proach (case below) with, e. g., Baldayaque 539 1334 Compare F. 3d
645 2003) States, v. United (CA2 338 3d 145, 152-153 F. (applying Moore, 345 796, a less v. F. 3d categorical approach); Spitsyn (CA9 2003) (same). 801-802
II have not AEDPA’s We decided whether limita statutory See Law be tolled for reasons. may tions equitable Pace rence, S., 336; 549 U. DiGuglielmo, 408, v. 544 U. S. (2005). 8 like all 11 418, Now, n. Courts that have Appeals 2244(d) § hold question, subject considered we cases. See Neverson v. Far appropriate (CA1 Smith v. McGinnis, 366 32, 2004); F. 3d 41 quharson, (CA2 2000) curiam); Miller v. New 17 13, 208 F. 3d (per Corrections, (CA3 Jersey Dept. 3d 617 616, 145 F. 1998); (CA4 v. Hutchinson, Harris 325, 209 F. 3d 329-330 2000); Johnson, (CA5 Davis v. McClendon 1998); 158 F. 3d 810 806, Sherman, (CA6 Chrans, v. 2003); Taliani 329 F. 3d v. 490, 492 (CA7 States, Moore v. United 597, 189 F. 3d 598 1999); 173 (CA8 v. United Dist. 1131, 1134 3dF. 1999); Calderon States Dist. (CA9 Cal., Central 1283, 1289 F. 3d 1997); 128 Ct. for (CA10 Marr, Miller v. 141 1998); Sandvik F. 3d (CA11 1999) States, v. United (per F. 3d curiam). base our on the considerations.
We conclusion following First, the AEDPA “statute of limitations defense ... is not Day McDonough, S. ‘jurisdictional.’” (2006). It does not “an inflexible rule set forth requiring Id., dismissal whenever” “clock has run.” at 208. See its (“We id., at 213 J., also have dissenting) repeatedly (Scalia, that the such as stated enactment of time-limitation periods §2244(d), elaboration, de- without further produces are waiver fenses that and thus subject nonjurisdictional (de- forfeiture” Brief for cases)); Respondent (citing *13 as “non-jurisdictional”). AEDPA limitations scribing that a nonjurisdictional have made clear We previously is to a “rebut- subject federal statute limitations normally 646 tolling.” presumption” equitable “of Irwin,
table favor Youngv. 95-96; States, see also United 535 S., U. S. (2002)(“It periods is hornbook law that limitations are 43, 49 ’” subject 'customarily “equitable tolling” (quoting Irwin, 95)). swpra, at presumption’s strength AEDPA, case of is rein-
In the '"equitable by principles’” fact forced have tradi- “ ” 'governed’ tionally corpus, the substantive law of habeas (2008), Geren, 674, 693 for we v. 553 U. S. will “not Munaf displace construe statute courts’ traditional ” authority command,’ absent the 'clearest v. French, Miller (2000) (quoting v. Yamasaki, 530 S. U. Califano (1979)). presumption’s yet strength The 682, 705 U. S. Congress the fact that further reinforced enacted AEDPA likely after Court decided Irwin and therefore was interpreting timing provi- courts, when AEDPA’s aware apply presumption. g., sions, See, would e. Merck & Co. (2010). Reynolds,
v. 559 U. S. significantly the statute here Second, differs from the stat- Brockamp, v. utes at issue in States United U. S. 347 (1997), Beggerly, (1998), States United U. S. 38 two presumption cases which we held that Irwin’s had been Brockamp, interpreted overcome. In we a statute of limita- question equitable tolling tions was silent on the as foreclosing application doing of that But in doctrine. so we (1) emphasized “se[t] that the statute at forth issue its time (2) unusually emphatic “highly limitations in used form”; de- linguistically language speak- and “technical” “that, tailed” ing, easily implicit exceptions”; containing cannot be read as (3)“reiterate[d] its limitations several several times differ- (4) ways”; subject “underlying matter,” related to ent na- respect practical collection, tionwide tax which the consequences tolling permitting would have substan- been (5) only proce- “require tolling, would, tolled, if tial; on limitations limitations, dural but also substantive recovery found kind of for which we ... amount —a
647 precedent.” Beg- S., 519 at 350-352. And in no direct U. presumption gerly we held that Irwin’s was overcome where (1) 12-year “unusually of limitations at was statute issue (2) underlying generous” “deal[t] and claim with owner- thereby implicated ship of land” and landowners’ need to certainty rights period what their are, “know during rights may subject challenge.” those be which 524 at 48-49. S.,U.
By way of AEDPA’s contrast, statute of limitations, unlike Brockamp, language at issue in the statute does not contain “unusually emphatic,” “reiterat[e]” nor does it its application equitable limitation. Neither would time toll- ing petitioner’s here affect the “substance” of a claim. 12-year period Moreover, in contrast to the limitations Beggerly, particu- AEDPA’s issue limitations is not larly long. subject And unlike the matters at issue in both Brockamp Beggerly collection and land claims— —tax subject corpus, pertains matter, AEDPA’s habeas to an area equity the law where finds a comfortable home. See supra, 1-year short, 693. In AEDPA’s Munaf, limit reads ordinary, like an run-of-the-mill statute of limitations. See supra, Calderon, at 1288. citing
Respondent, Brockamp, argues that AEDPA should equitable interpreted tolling to foreclose because stat “explicit exceptions forth ute sets to its basic time limits” ” 'equitable tolling.’ that do “not include at S., 351; Respondent 27. see Brief for The statute does contain mul tiple provisions relating trigger to the events that its run § ning. 2244(d)(1);Clay States, See v. United 537 U. S. (2003); Corp., see also v. Baxter Healthcare Cada (CA7 (“We 1990) distinguish 446, 450 F. 2d must... between tolling plaintiff’s accrual of the claim and the of the stat ”); States, of limitations . . . F. ute v. United 3d Wims 2000) (CA2 (same); Barney Inc., 186, 190 Wolin v. Smith (CA7 1996)(same). And we concede that it is 847, 852 F. 3d tolling containing provision as to while one silent tolling. expressly kind of See refers a different 2244(d)(2) peti- (stating during § “[t]he which” time postconviction pending request relief state tioner has “period toward” his of limitation” not be counted “shall AEDPA). Congress expressly But the fact that re- under during proceedings review *15 state collateral ferred rebutting presumption easily explained without is equitable tolling. petitioner bring A cannot a fed- favor of exhausting claim first remedies— without state eral habeas year. longer frequently process than one See takes a 2254(b)(1)(A). § (1982); Lundy, Hence, 455 S. 509 Rose v. U. explain Congress statute had how the limitations accounts proceedings pend- during which are time such state for the special express provision ing. for an undermines This need interpretive any temptation maxim to invoke the inclusio (to (i. suspen- e., exclusio alterius include one item unius est review) during collateral is to state-court exclude other sion (i. tolling)). Young,supra, e., items similar See tolling provision, (rejecting “express ap- claim that an period, [limitations] pearing as the in the same subsection statutory [limitations] not to toll demonstrates a intent period”). finally, disagree respondent equi we with
Third, purposes. tolling undermines AEDPA’s basic We rec table delays ognize to eliminate in the that AEDPA seeks federal Day, process. S., at 205-206; habeas review See (2003). Cockrell, 322, 337 U. But AEDPA Miller-El v. 537 S. undermining corpus do- basic seeks to so without habeas seeking principles harmonize the and while new statute petition’s prior which a timeliness was al law, with under equitable principles. ways determined under See Slack v. (2000)(“AEDPA’s present pro McDaniel, 529 U. S. corpus principles”); incorporate earlier habeas see visions ... Day, id., J., at 214 dis S., 1; n. also U. (Scalia, Corpus senting); Federal Liebman, Habeas Hertz & R. J. 2005). (5th pp. 1123-1136 §24.2, ed. Practice Procedure codified new rules governing When Congress previously so area of it did without law, sight judicially managed losing fact that “writ of vital plays of the habeas role corpus Slack, 529 U. atS., constitutional rights.” protecting at all delay It did seek end costs. every possible id., Writ, at 483-488. The the Great importance Cf. Constitution, § Art. I, 9, writ explicitly protected by only with to harmonize the congressional efforts new along cl. law, before prior counsels hesitancy interpret- statute statutory AEDPA’s silence as ing indicating congressional intent to close courthouse doors that a claim strong equitable ordinarily keep would open. we conclude neither AEDPA’s tex-
For these reasons tual characteristics nor statute’s basic “rebut” purposes set forth in Irwin. And we the basic therefore presumption 2244(d) § holding the Courts join Appeals subject to equitable tolling.
Ill *16 have made clear a is “enti- “petitioner” that previously We “(1) if that he he shows has only tled equitable tolling” (2) ex- and that some rights been pursuing diligently, circumstance in his and way” stood traordinary prevented deleted). 418 In Pace, S., at timely filing. (emphasis at circumstances” issue involve case, “extraordinary standards of failure to care. attorney’s satisfy an professional that, so, held that is even attor- The where Court Appeals can never warrant that conduct “grossly negligent” ney mental divided faith, dishonesty, loyalty, absent “bad 3d, 539 F. or so forth on the lawyer’s part.” impairment standard is view, in our the Court Appeals’ But rigid. too courts of “must equity governed have that
We said than the courts of law.” no less precedents rules (internal (1996) 314, 323 quota S. Thomas, v. U. Lonchar omitted). made clear But we have also marks tion . must be .. of a powers “exercise court’s equity often the case-by-case Baggett made on a Bullitt, basis.” v. 377 U. S. (1964). emphasizing “flexibility,” In 360, 375 for need avoiding Holmberg “mechanicalrules,” Armbrecht, v. (1946), 392, U. S. we have a followed tradition in which equity sought hardships courts of have which, “relieve from time to arise time, from a hard and fast adherence” legal strictly applied, more rules, which, absolute if threaten rigidity,” the “evils of archaic Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Glass (1944). Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. The “flexi- bility” “equitable procedure” inherent in enables courts “to [that] meet new situations demand intervention, necessary particular all to accord the relief to correct... Ibid, injustices.” postdeadline (permitting filing of bill of review). together, recognize Taken these cases that courts equity upon can and do draw decisions made in other simi- guidance. judgment lar cases for Such courts exercise light prior precedent, but with of the fact awareness specific predict often circumstances, advance, hard to special appropriate could warrant treatment in an case. recognize procedural that, We in the context of default, we previously qualification, peti have stated, without that a ” attorney tioner “must ‘bear the risk of error.’ Coleman (1991). Thompson, 501 U. S. 752-753 But Coleman was “a id., case about federalism,” it asked may petitioner’s whether courts excuse failure to federal comply procedural rules, with state court’s notwithstand ing the state court’s determination that own its rules had tolling, by Equitable contrast, been violated. whether asks may comply petitioner’s federal courts excuse a failure to timing inquiry implicate rules, does federal *17 interpretation state Lawrence, a Cf. court’s of state law. dissenting). U. S., 549 at 341 Holland does (Ginsburg, J., argue attorney’s provides not that his misconduct a substan §2254(i), ground tive a case that asks relief, cf. nor is this recog should whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations be Day, supra, Rather, at case asks all, nized cf. at 209.
651 how should be once the statute is equity recognized. applied cannot rules, And resistance to we read equity’s rigid given per Coleman se as in a this context. requiring approach short, In no rule of or demands pre-existing law precedent like the a rule one set forth the Eleventh Circuit in this by That rule case. is difficult to reconcile with more general in that it fails to at least equitable principles that, recognize sometimes, to professional misconduct fails meet Eleventh Circuit’s standard could nonetheless amount to behavior and create an circum- egregious extraordinary And, stance that warrants equitable tolling. given long history judicial courts can application equitable tolling, find that can their easily precedents Sev- guide judgments. lower courts held eral have specifically unprofessional conduct attorney circumstances, certain may, prove “egre- and can be even the conduct gious” “extraordinary” though not See, Circuit’s rule. may Eleventh question satisfy g., Frank, e. Nara (CA3 2001) 264 v. F. 3d 320 (ordering as to whether client who was aban- hearing “effectively Calderon, lawyer 3d, doned” merited 128 F. tolling); at was a where client last (allowing tolling prejudiced by beyond minute that was his con- change representation Baldayaque, F. 3d, at 152-153 where trol); (finding an to commu- service, failed essential attorney perform research, with the client, and do basic legal tolling nicate Spitsyn, warranted); could, circumstances, under circumstances” 3d, “extraordinary F. 800-802 (finding denied client access lawyer warrant where may tolling a to his respond failed did files, prepare petition, Martin, United States 408 F. 3d communications); client’s (CA8 (client 2005) to equitable entitled files, misleading retained made state- attorney where his conduct). in similar ments, engaged claim of variety have held that “a garden We previously Irwin, as S., simple such U. neglect,” excusable deadline, that leads a to miss lawyer filing “miscalculation” *18 Lawrence, supra, 336, does not warrant equitable tolling. But the ease before us does not and we are con involve, sidering, claim” “garden variety of attorney negligence. the facts of Rather, this case in far more present serious stances of attorney misconduct. as we al And, said, have the circumstances of though a ease must be “extraordinary” before can be we that hold such applied, are circumstances not limited to those that the test satisfy that the Court of used this case. Appeals
IV The record facts that we I have set forth in Part of this opinion this case well be an suggest “extraordi- may instance in which con- nary” petitioner’s conduct attorney’s far stituted more than “garden or “excusable ne- variety” To sure, Collins failed file glect.” to Holland’s on petition time and to have been unaware of the appears date on which the limitations period that, alone, facts expired might —two suggest simple But, circumstances, these negligence. facts record we have elucidated the failure suggest amounted to more: Here, Collins failed to file fed- Holland’s eral on time petition Holland’s letters re- despite many peatedly emphasized of his so. Collins importance doing did not do the out the apparently research to find necessary proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far identify as to rules. failed to applicable legal Collins inform Holland ain manner the crucial timely about fact that the Florida Supreme case, Court had decided his de- again Holland’s information. spite many pleas And Col- lins failed to client over communicate a period Holland that years, various from despite pleas to his respond letters.
A tells us that vari- of teachers ethics these group legal re- ous failures violated fundamental canons of professional reasonably which to sponsibility, attorneys perform require clients, with their legal work, communicate competent requests, reasonable their clients keep clients’ implement cases, in their informed of never key developments Brief for Ethics Legal client. See Professors abandon *19 as Amici ethical rules set forth (describing et al. Curiae law, the of the Restatement Restatements Agency, case (Third) of (1998), the Law and Governing Lawyers (2009)). And Model Rules of Professional Conduct ABA case, the failures client who seriously prejudiced this his for lost what was fed- thereby likely single opportunity review eral habeas of the lawfulness of imprisonment his death sentence. of form, however, do not our conclusion in absolute
We state The District may necessary. more proceedings because on a lack circum- rested its not ruling extraordinary Court that re- stances, rather on lack of diligence ruling but —a for 38, does not defend. See Brief Respondent spondent the District 19; 43, n. of Oral 52. We think Arg. Tr. The required conclusion was incorrect. diligence Court’s see, is “‘reasonable equitable diligence,’” tolling purposes “ ‘ dili- Lonchar, 517 “maximum feasible S., e. U. g., ’” 2008) (CA5 612, 618 Andrews, F. 3d Starns 524 gence,” (CA7 2004)). F. Moore v. 3d Knight, (quoting numerous letters Here, attorney Holland not wrote his only he direction; also crucial information and seeking providing and the their courts, clerks, the state contacted repeatedly in an effort have Collins— State Bar Florida Association of his remedy— central to the pursuit legal impediment that Holland dis- And, the very day from his case. removed due to Collins’ AEDPA clock had expired covered that his se and pro his own habeas petition Holland failings, prepared Court. filed it with District promptly a lack of relied on erroneously the District Court Because re- erroneously the Court of because Appeals diligence, has no court se lower an overly approach, on rigid per lied to determine case in detail facts this considered yet circumstances extraordinary constitute indeed they whether “[mjindful warrant relief. are sufficient to We of final is a court and not first view.” Adarand review (2001) Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, (per 534 U. S. curiam) (internal omitted). we also marks And quotation when with an often faced recognize prudence, “equitable, “to un- inquiry, fact-intensive” the lower courts allowing in the it first Crosby, dertake instance.” Gonzalez v. (2005) 524, 540 be- (Stevens, J., Thus, U. S. dissenting). cause we conclude the District Court’s determination aside, must be set we leave to the it Appeals whether the facts in this record entitle determine Holland or whether further includ- equitable tolling, proceedings, indicate that evidentiary might respondent ing hearing, prevail. should reversed,
The below is and the case is judgment remanded *20 for further with this proceedings consistent opinion.
It is so ordered. in Alito, and concurring Justice the part concurring judgment. case two first,
This raises broad whether questions: of limitations set out in the the statute Antiterrorism and Act of Penalty Effective Death (AEDPA), S. C. § to 2244(d), is and subject equitable tolling; second, assuming to the first an affirmative answer whether question, peti- tioner in this case has facts that alleged are suffi- particular cient to the circumstances” of satisfy “extraordinary prong I with the test. the Court’s con- equitable tolling agree clusion that is available under tolling AEDPA. I equitable also much the agree with Court’s discussion concerning on whether is available the facts this equitable par- I agree ticular case. In that the Court of particular, Ap- erred the relevant by essentially limiting to the peals inquiry whether of counsel be an negligence” may “gross question warranting circumstance extraordinary tolling. in this has clear, alleged As the makes case petitioner any attorney beyond negli- go facts well form of certain Appeals gence, ante, 686-637, 652', and the Court of see appear particular to have asked whether those not facts does tolling. independent Accordingly, provide an basis judgment in the decision to reverse the I Court’s concur may properly remand that the lower courts and so below legal apply the correct standard.
Although agree Appeals applied I that the Court of the wrong majority I think that the does standard, not do explain right enough the standard. It is of course true equitable tolling requires “extraordinary circum- conelusory provide stances,” but that formulation does not guidance charged reviewing to lower courts much with many every year. petitions habeas filed I therefore write my understanding separately principles set forth governing availability equitable tolling in cases involv- attorney ing misconduct.
I “Generally, litigant seeking equitable tolling bears (1) establishing burden of two elements: that he has been (2) rights diligently, pursuing some his extraordi- way.” nary DiGuglielmo, circumstance stood Pace v. (2005). dispute 408, The 544 U. S. case concerns attorney and when amounts an “ex- misconduct whether traordinary petitioner’s way in a circumstance” that stands petitioner filing petition. prevents timely from majority practical agree attempt it I *21 compilation provide an of the to exhaustive kinds of situa- attorney may provide in which misconduct a basis tions equitable my tolling. In it is useful note view, however, to may principles from this several broad distilled precedents. Court’s prior abundantly make it clear that attor-
First, our cases negligence extraordinary ney circumstance is not war- tolling. ranting equitable Florida, In Lawrence v. 549 U. S. (2007), expressly rejected petitioner’s the the Court 327, 336 656 miscalculating that “his mistake in the
contention counsel’s entitlefd] tolling.” limitations him to “At- torney simply miscalculation,” the held, Court “is suffi- equitable tolling, particularly post- in the cient to warrant prisoners context where have no conviction constitutional right (citing Id., at 336-337 to counsel.” Coleman v. added). (1991); Thompson, emphasis 501 U. S. 756-757 holding rationale for The basic Lawrence’s is that the constructively are of counsel attributable to the mistakes postconviction at in the client, least context. The Lawrence Coleman, reliance on Coleman is instructive. In Court’s attorney provided whether the addressed error cause Court filing. procedural default a S., for a based on late See 501U. “[t]here right at 752. Because is no constitutional to an at torney postconviction proceedings,” in state the Court ex plained, petitioner constitutionally “a claim cannot ineffec proceedings.” tive assistance of counsel in such Ibid. In “ ineq circumstances, reasoned, such the there was ‘no uity requiring petitioner] attorney [the to bear the risk Ibid, procedural (quoting error results default.’” Murray (1986)); Carrier, accord, U. S. Cole (“ prej ‘[C]ause’ man, S., U. under the cause and something petitioner, to udice test must be external the him”); something fairly be attributed ibid. that cannot (“Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’because attorney agent acting, petitioner’s failing the or is the when petitioner litigation, in furtherance of act, and the (what error’”); attorney id., must ‘bear risk of [of counsel] matters is whether “the error be seen must as (“In ”); ‘imputed i. factor, e., an external to the ibid. State’ petitioner violation, the absence of constitutional bears attorney risk in federal habeas for all errors made in (“Because representation”); id., course of the at 757 Coleman pursue appeal right habeas, no in state had counsel to any attorney claims error that led the default of Coleman’s default in state court cannot constitute cause to excuse *22 657 habeas”). clear, makes As Lawrence the same federal equitable analysis applies petitioner tolling seeks when attorney postconviction on error in the context. based See Coleman). (citing S.,U. at 336-337 549 allegation attorney an Lawrence addressed mis- While fully applies to calculation, its rationale other forms of attor- miscalculating ney negligence. filing Instead dead- attorney example, compute could the deadline line, correctly petition forget to file on time, but the habeas mail wrong requisite petition to address, or fail to do the applicable any to determine the deadline. In case, research constructively however, error counsel’s would attribut- to the client. able
Second, the mere fact that a missed deadline involves “gross negligence” part on the does not counsel it- extraordinary explained self establish an circumstance. As principal disallowing above, the rationale for ordinary attorney based on miscalculation is attorney constructively error of an is attributable to the cli- beyond litigant’s is not a ent thus circumstance supra, supra, Lawrence, Coleman, at 336-337; control. See (CA7 752-754; Davis, see also Powell v. 415 3d F. (CA7 2005); McBride, Johnson v. 381 F. 3d 589-590 (CA4 2000). 2004); Hutchinson, Harris v. F. 3d plainly applies regardless of whether the That rationale ordinary gross attorney question or error in involves (“[I]t negligence. Coleman, S., not See gravity attorney’s matters, but that of the error right petitioner’s to counsel, it a violation of so constitutes factor, e., i. ‘im- the error must be seen as an external State’”); (rejecting puted the contention id., to the at 752 attorney filing “[t]he error late was . . . the result magnitude the default federal excuse of sufficient habeas”). gross involving
Allowing equitable tolling rather in cases only attorney ordinary negligence fail to would than *23 light prior in of our make sense it would also be im eases; practical Missing extreme. statute of limitations always, generally, negligence, if not Law will amount see to aptly gross rence, S., at it said and has been that ordinary vituperative negligence negligence epithet is awith gross negligence may enough if Therefore, added. for tolling, equitable arguing tolling there will be a basis for every appropriate involving in almost is counseled case ibid, (argument attorney a missed deadline. See mis extraordinary circumstance, credited, is if calculation essentially equitably periods toll “would limitations for deadline”). every person attorney whose a missed This impose just not burden on the courts; would severe district availability it would also make the turn on the ordinary highly gross neg artificial distinction between and ligence. to administer, That line would be hard would need judicial lessly resources, consume scarce and would almost certainly yield unsatisfying inconsistent and often results. (CA2 Baldayaque States, v. United 338 F. See 3d 2003)(Jacobs, concurring) (noting J., that the “distinction be ordinary extraordinary attorney malpractice and . tween . . counterintuitive”). apply, elusive, is hard Finally, noting distinguishes it is worth that a rule that gross ordinary attorney negligence pur- between equitable tolling analysis poses would have demonstra- bly “inequitable” consequences. example, For it is hard to why petitioner effectively penalized see a habeas should be negligent just grossly because his counsel was rather than why penalized just negligent, or the State should be because negligent petitioner’s grossly counsel was rather than mod- erately negligent. Regardless of how one characterizes performance petitioner cases, counsel’s deficient such personally untimely filing, attorney at fault for the is not filing, governmen- error cause and the is but-for of the late statutory enforcing interest tal limitations the same.
II styled, negligence, attorney does Although however not tolling, the AEDPA statute of provide a basis for may if results from be tolled the missed deadline limitations constructively attorney attributable that is miseonduct alleges petitioner petitioner. case, In facts this (acknowledg- ante, such misconduct. See amount attorney equi- ordinary negligence ing does not warrant observing pre- tolling, that “the facts of case but table misconduct”). attorney serious instances of far more sent “ attorney essentially alleges particular, he that his ‘aban- In ” counsel’s near-total failure him, as evidenced doned’ *24 respond petitioner’s petitioner to to or with communicate many years. period requests inquiries over a of several appears allege to that Petitioner also ante, at 636-637. See efforts to terminate counsel due to his reasonable made he inadequate proceed pro representation se, and to and that successfully by opposed the State on the were efforts such through ap- ground petitioner perverse to failed act pointed ante, 637; Brief for Petitioner 50-51 counsel. See (stating petitioner pro in the Flor- filed “two se motions (one Supreme as counsel to remove Collins ida [petitioner] proceed granted, if would have allowed to which, se)” deleted)). (emphasis pro allegations petitioner’s to true, would suffice establish
If beyond extraordinary control. Common circumstances constructively litigant held that a cannot be dictates sense attorney operat is not responsible who for the conduct of an meaningful agent any ing word. See sense as his principles supra, (relying Coleman, on “well-settled attorney at agency error was whether law” to determine (Jacobs, client); Baldayaque, supra, J., at 154 to tributable (“[W]hen completely ‘agent concurring) in a manner acts ‘principal is not principal’s interest,’ to the adverse ”). particularly agent’s charged [the] That is misdeeds’ litigant’s attor- to terminate reasonable efforts if so ney’s representation wholly have been thwarted forces petitioner’s beyond Appeals ap- control. The Court of parently petitioner’s argu- did not consider abandonment improperly prevented peti- assess whether the ment or State obtaining representation either assuming tioner from new or responsibility representing Accordingly, himself. agree majority appropriate disposition I with the that the may apply and remand so that reverse the lower courts alleged the correct to the facts standard here. joins Scalia, with whom as to
Justice Justice Thomas dissenting. Part I, all but Penalty
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Act of (AEDPA) 1-year establishes limitations prisoners subject state to seek federal habeas relief, to sev- 2244(d). § specific exceptions. eral 28 U. S. C. The Court subject time limit concludes is also toll- ing, attorney ordinarily even for errors that are attributable rejects Appeals’ the client. And it Court of conclu- tolling, sion that Albert Holland is not entitled without explaining why applied wrong the test that court was or applied my what rule it should have instead. In view 2244(d) § equitable exceptions, no leaves room for and Hol- qualify land if could even it did.
I ordinarily ante, The Court is correct, 645-646, we presume periods subject limitations federal are to tolling unless would be inconsistent with the statute. (2002). Young espe States, v. United 43, 49 U. S. That is cially provisions applicable true of limitations to actions that traditionally by governed equitable principles are cate —a gory proceedings. that includes habeas If id., See at 50. 2244(d) § merely period created a limitations for ha federal applicants, agree applying equitable tolling beas I would appropriate. than 2244(d) that, more § does much a de- establishing But the deadline that filing scheme addresses an tailed regarding case, In an the of clock starts ordinary array contingencies. becomes final on direct the state-court re judgment when 2244(d)(1)(A).1 § But the statute the start delays view. the limitations effectively tolling period date —thus —in (1) where action the unlawfully prisoner state impeded cases (2) the his habeas asserts a filing application, prisoner from this Court right newly recognized by constitutional (B) cases, retroactive collateral or the factual made predi- the claim could not for have prisoner’s previously cate been §2244(d)(l)(B)-(D). due It through diligence. discovered tolls the limitations the expressly period pend- also during aof filed for state collateral ency properly application relief. 2244(d)(2). short, § has considered and ac- Congress, in its view counted circumstances that excuse an specific delay. applicant’s 2244(d)’s therefore, §
The is not whether time bar question, it but whether is consistent with subject tolling, is 2244(d) § provides: 28 U. S. C. Title “(1) 1-year period apply application A of limitation shall to an for a writ by person custody pursuant corpus judgment a of habeas of run court. The limitation shall from the latest of— State “(A) judgment by the date on which the became final conclusion review; expiration seeking or the of the time for such review direct “(B) impediment filing application on which the created the date or by State action violation of the Constitution laws the United States action; removed, applicant prevented filing by if from such was State “(C) initially right the date on which the asserted was constitutional recognized Supreme Court, newly if the has been recognized right Supreme retroactively applicable Court and to cases on collat- by the made review; or eral “(D) predicate pre- date on of the claim or claims which factual through diligence. have been the exercise due could discovered sented “(2) during properly application post- which filed for State The time respect pertinent judg- or review to the other collateral conviction any period limita- pending shall not be counted toward or claim is ment this subsection.” under tion
662 2244(d)
§ to toll for federal courts the time bar for additional beyond Congress those included. reasons enough my It it is not. is fair when a infer, In view says tolling, nothing equitable of limitations about statute Congress displace when did default rule. But Congress specified has that default rule and the in- codified applies, where it we have no warrant it to to extend stances Beggerly, v. 38, cases. See United States 524 U. S. other 2244(d) (1998). § Unless the Court believes contains 48-49 (and exception implicit, that subsumes an across-the-board 2244(d)(l)(B)-(D) (d)(2), § unnecessary) it thus renders rely assumption Congress on the untenable that when must period the events that toll the limitations enumerated —with merely implicitly the list no indication illustrative —it au- they to add others as see fit. We thorized courts should opposite: specifying situations in assume which principle applies specific requirement, to a Con- gress displaced develop has courts’ discretion to ad ex- hoc ceptions. Thomas, Lonchar v. 517 314, Cf. U. S. 326-328 (1996). responses unpersuasive.
The are It Court’s brushes aside §2244(d)(l)(B)-(D), apparently because those subdivisions merely delay period the start of the limitations but do not suspend period already underway. Ante, limitations explain why But the 647-648. Court does not that dis- any tinction difference,2 makes and we have described a rule 2 Appeals The Court support cites several Court of cases that its distinction, ante, triggering-tolling but no case of ours does so. States, Clay 2244(d)(1)(A) v. United 522, 529 (2003), § 537 U. S. described as containing “triggers” period, distinguish the limitations but it did not delaying tolling. of the from start limitations The Court cites, Corp., Cada Baxter Healthcare Appeals v. 2d cases 920 F. Inc., (CA7 (CA7 Barney v. Smith 1990), F. Wolin 3d 852 (CA2 States, 1996), 2000), rely and Wims v. United 186, 190 on a F. 3d tolling that we since disre distinction between accrual rules and have Andrews, (2001). see TRW 19, 27, Inc. garded, 534 U. S. *27 “effectively of a that forestalls the start limitations as allowing] equitable tolling.” Beggerly, supra, for at 48. § 2244(d)(2), undeniably pro-
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II A 2244(d) § equitable tolling Even if left room for in some tolling surely delay not situations, should excuse the here. equitable tolling available, is we have Where held a liti- only diligently pursued gant to it if he has is entitled his requirement rights here —if and—the relevant “‘some ex- traordinary way.’” circumstance stood Lawrence v. Young support specific disregarding tolling The reads as the 2244(d). Ante, §in provisions Congress perti included at 648. But in the passage, Young explained only express tolling nent that the inclusion an provision period, regarding rule in a limitations different different §507(a)(8)(A)(ii) (2000 ed.) provision S. C. within' the U. same —albeit 507(a)(8)(A)® provision subparagraph issue, § as not rebut the —did Moreover, Young S., U. presumption tolling. See 535 §507(a)(8)(A)(ii) equity where authorized instances stressed it, not have allowed presumption in favor of which reinforced the would §2244(d)’s Here, any of Ibid. suggest does not tolling. the Court beyond what exceptions go equity would have allowed. (2007) DiGug- (quoting
Florida, 327, 549 U. S. Pace (2005)). attorney 544 U. S. Because lielmo, (or act) agent, attorney’s litigant’s acts failures to scope representation of the are treated as those within Co., 633- client, see Link v. R. S. of his Wabash (or act) (1962), n. 10 thus such failures to and acts necessarily extraordinary circumstances. are attorney’s oversights acts sure, To be rule that to the client is relaxed where the client has are attributable *28 right to effective assistance constitutional counsel. a constitutionally obliged provide to an attor- State is Where provide attorney’s ney one, to an effective the fail- but fails that fall below the set forth in ures standard Strickland v. (1984), Washington, chargeable S. 668 are 466 U. prisoner. Murray Carrier, not to the v. State, See U. S. (1986). right no 478, 488 But where the client has to coun- proceedings he in habeas does not—the rule hold- sel—which attorney’s ing responsible applies him for his acts with full Thompson, Coleman 501 U. force. See v. S. 752-754 (1991).4 petitioner’s appeal Thus, when a state habeas is attorney petitioner error, too late because of filed out proceeded pro less if had of luck—no than he se and ne- appeal glected to file the himself.5 dismisses Coleman as “a case about 4The federalism” and there (internal Ante, omitted). quotation inapposite at 650 fore here. marks implicated by see are not ad excep I fail to how federalism concerns hoc for attempts tions to the statute of limitations overturn state-court event, invent, Coleman did any merely applied, In not but convictions. attorney’s already principle established acts are his client’s. S., at 754. 501 U. See in Cole than, appointed, That rather like Holland’s counsel was counsel man, retained, Thompson, in Coleman v. Respondent Brief for O. T. see 33-34, 89-7662, pp. 40, is irrelevant. The Sixth Amendment 1990, No. counsel, held, applies have to an right to we even effective assistance Sullivan, Cuyler 446 U. S. attorney defendant hires. See himself (1980). Coleman was not that Coleman had 342-345 The basis obligation pro- him counsel, own but that the State owed no hired his Congress could, course, have included errors state- appointed delaying as a habeas counsel basis for the limita- period, oversight: it tions but did not. Nor was that an Sec- 2244(d)(1)(B)expressly tion allows for state-created impediments prevent prisoner filing applica- from only impediment tion, but violates the Constitution if law. or federal any equitable tolling there
If were doubt that is unavail 2244(d) § attorney able under to excuse error, we eliminated petitioner it Lawrence. The there asserted that his at torney’s period miscalculation of the limitations for federal applications filing habeas caused him to miss the deadline. attorney’s The error stemmed from his mistaken belief (which contrary precedent approved to Circuit we that — Lawrence) during pend- limitations is tolled —the ency petition postconviction of a for certiorari from a state proceeding. S., at 336; see Brief also for Petitioner pp. Florida, Lawrence v. O. T. 2006, 05-8820, No. Assuming, arguendo, equitable tolling apply could ever §2244(d), attorney we held that such error did not warrant especially petitioner constitutionally it, since the was supra, entitled to counsel. Lawrence, at 336-337. *29 application
Faithful of Lawrence should make short work Although alleges array of Holland’s claim. Holland a wide by Bradley only perti counsel, of misconduct his Collins, part appears extremely nent if similar, identical, not to attorney’s period error in Lawrence. The relevant time ex tends most from November 10, 2005—when the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Holland’sstate habeas petition* **6—to 15, 2005, December date latest on which S., course, vide one. See 501 U. at 754. It be utterly perverse, would providing penalize the State for petitioners representation, habeas equitable tolling by the State could avoid providing when none at all. Supreme mandate, The Florida Court did not its issue and limita Lawrence, resume, 331, period S., tions did not see U. until Decem (with Supreme once the ber 2005. But Florida Court its decision issued *7 §2244(d)’s Within limitations have expired.* could Holland to the Florida Collins could have alerted period, him Collins or Holland decision, Court’s and either Supreme have filed a federal habeas application. self could timely a for certiorari so, did do but instead filed petition Collins months later. several file a did not Holland or federal
Why notify Collins timely him unclear, plausible for but none of expla- application far the most tolling. By would support equitable nations exactly is that made same mis- Collins likely explanation e., he incor- take as the Lawrence —i. assumed attorney for certiorari that the of a pendency petition rectly state review of Holland’s habeas the denial seeking 2244(d)(2). § In toll time bar under would AEDPA’s petition to Holland letter December had explained Collins if and his state habeas was denied this Court petition “will certiorari in that Holland’s claims denied proceeding, a for then he for writ of habeas ripe petition presentation added). Hol- in federal court.” corpus (emphasis App. that, at that land statement as interprets proof himself time to “Collins was under the belief that time, [Holland’s] continue file his federal habeas would to be tolled petition until this certiorari” in state postconviction Court denied Pet. for Cert. n. 10. That misunderstand- proceeding. cer- account for filing would Collins’s ing entirely conduct — tiorari instead of habeas petition application, waiting so. But it would also be insuffi- nearly three months do was, held it tolling. as Lawrence warrant cient, failure The other Collins’s explanations conceivable ex- believed —as he fare no better. It may Holland, in turn come), notified who the mandate still to Collins could have pro se federal application. could have filed a filed, petition habeas parties dispute The when Holland’s state was *30 4-5, and period expired. Brief for Petitioner thus when the limitations immaterial, 8, 9, discrepancy is but 4; Respondent n. 7. The n. Brief doubt. give Holland the benefit I January plained letter, Holland in a after to Holland petition post- certiorari in a informed him state had stop proceeding would not the clock—that the cer- conviction appeal petition in Holland’s direct also did toll tiorari Consequently, wrote, bar. Holland’s the time time to application expired had even a federal before file Collins was App. explains, appointed. 78-79. As the Court ante, at wrong, was this view too but it is no amore basis for attorney’s misunderstanding than the Lawrence. may (despite it be that Collins what he wrote
Or to Hol- land) correctly simply neglected understood the rule but notify perhaps ruling he Holland; missed the state court’s perhaps simply slipped mail, or it his mind. Such oversight “garden variety” unfortunate, but it amounts negligence, equitable tolling. not a basis for Irwin v. De- (1990). partment Veterans Affairs, S. Surely extraordinary attorney’s it is no more than the error rudimentary Lawrence, which research and arithmetic would have avoided. goes beyond
The Court insists that Collins’s misconduct neglect garden-variety Ante, and mine-run miscalculation. only But the it at 651-652. differences identifies had no ef- ability application to file on Holland’s his federal on time. fect nonresponsiveness highlights Collins’s while Hol- The Court postconviction pending. state motions were land’s still But taken at face Ante, value, even Collins’s silence prevent prior to 10, 2005, November did not Holland from filing timely application federal once the Florida courts appears finished with his The Court also were case. significant correspondence with Holland in think Collins’s period January elapsed. the limitations had after Holland can Ante, 639-643, 652. But unless establish should tolled due events Decem- time bar before any by Collins after the misconduct limitations 15, 2005, ber elapsed if is irrelevant. Even Collins’s conduct be- *31 668 after 10 and December
fore November nary,” 15 was “extraordi- way has not shown that Holland it in his “stood and (inter- timely filing.” prevented Lawrence, 549 U. S., at 336 omitted). quotation nal marks part, his Holland now
For asserts that Collins did not merely forget keep deliberately to his client informed, but Appeals As him. the Court of deceived concluded, however, allege deception seeking equitable tolling did not Holland (CA112008) curiam).8 (per See 539 3d 1334, below. F. 1339 deception any complains event, the In of which he consists early only representation of Collins’s assurance in the protect ability he would Holland’s to assert his claims in fed- App. coupled court, eral see 55,62, later Collins’s failure by decep- course, to do not That, so. does itself amount to tion, Holland no offers evidence that meant hardly Moreover, mislead him. Holland can claim to have caught guard. respond off been Collins’sfailures to to Hol- repeated requests land’s for information the State Su- before preme gave greater ruled Holland even reason to sus- pect asleep that Collins had fallen at the switch. Holland contrary, repeated indeed was no under illusion to the as his replace efforts to Collins reflect.9 allege deception below, Holland insists that he did see Brief for Peti n. only conclusory tioner but allegation cites in an unrelated mo (a counsel). appointment tion motion for App. new reply See 194. His response cause, State’s by counsel, to the order to show drafted new allege Record, deception. did not Doc. 9The argues allegations concurrence they Holland’s suffice because ” show, true, if “essentially that Collins failing ‘abandoned’ Holland respond inquiries, to Holland’s and therefore to act as ceased Holland’s Ante, (Alito, agent. J., concurring part concurring in judg ment). But Collins’s failure to bearing communicate has no unless it agency relationship ended before the relevant window. The concur does explain why contend, rence not it example, would —does not role, disloyalty Collins’s conduct amounted to or renunciation which (Second) would authority, Agency terminate Collins’s see Restatement (1957). §§ alleged nonresponsiveness help Hoi- Collins’s not did B Despite its that Lawrence not insistence does control this actually case, hold the Court does that Holland is entitled only equitable tolling. It concludes the Eleventh applied wrong rule and remands the case for a Circuit appropriate re-do. That would be if the Court identified a *32 analysis legal error in the Eleventh Circuit’s and set forth applied. proper it standard should have rejects rigid,” It ante, The Court does neither. as “too requires, beyond 649, the Eleventh at Circuit’s test—which ordinary attorney negligence, allegation proof “an of bad dishonesty, loyalty, impairment faith, divided mental or so lawyer’s part,” on the forth 539 F. at 3d, 1339. But the explains why never Court that “or so forth” which ex- test, plicitly egregious attorney leaves room for other kinds insufficiently error, is elastic. adopted even the
Moreover, if Eleventh Circuit had an en- tirely simply rule, inflexible it is untrue that, as the Court appears general ante, to believe, at all 649-650, rules are incompatible ipso equity. rejected with We have that facto e.g., Grupo before, canard see, Mexicano Desarrollo, de Fund, A. v. Alliance Bond Inc., S. S. 321-322 (1999), general and we have relied on the existence of rules equitable regarding particular, g., Young, see, e. rejecting equitable S., at 53. we U. As observed ad hoc cause, but it land’s was no more “adverse to [Holland’s] interest” or “be ante, (internal control,” yond quotation [Holland’s] 659-660 marks omit ted), and no more holding thus a basis for Holland harmless from con sequences conduct, attorney mistakes, of his counsel's than mine-run cf. (1990). Department Affairs, Irwin Veterans U. S. The upon requests replace also concurrence relies Holland’s new requests prevent imputing counsel. But if those could appointed Collins’s Holland, every unsuccessfully applicant habeas who asks for a new acts (but proceed pro se when state-provided lawyer who does not seek to denied) attorney’s subsequent would not be request by is bound acts. use each relief, on habeas “the alternative restrictions equity, which equity conscience as measure chancellor’s arbitrary as meas- be as and uncertain would alternative length uring foot.” of each chancellor’s distance S., at 323. Lonchar, 517 U. explain Elev- with its the error in the failure to
Consistent no test, the almost clue about Court offers enth Circuit’s applied. The un- court have should what test Appeals helpfully its test is the Court of too advises explanation the assertion that its with no besides narrow, tolling might warranted, and no where left out cases test might precise Ante, of what cases be. those indication (“[A]t professional sometimes, that fails misconduct least could nonetheless to meet the Eleventh Circuit’s standard extraordinary egregious behavior create amount tolling”). warrants The Court circumstance that says easily precedents guide that “courts can find that can citing Appeals opin- judgments,” ibid., their several Court (in contexts) permit tolling attorney various ions *33 notably omitting opinions that disallow such it, error —but opinion Davis, as the Seventh Circuit’s Powell F. 3d (2005), “guide[d]. judgmen[t]” would have . . which “[Ajttorney precisely misconduct, court arrived: where this negligent, grossly negligent, or willful, labeled whether is not a be- to the client thus circumstance attributable might untimely yond petitioner’s an that excuse control ibid, omitted). (internal quotation petition,” marks approaches only thing offers that substan- The the Court approval implicit of “fundamental can- is its tive instruction by responsibility,” professional articulated an ad hoc ons consisting mainly professors group legal-ethicist amici subjective rigorous analytically most and hence that least subjects, legal Ante, at ethics. 652. The of law-school try equity justify importing into the not even to does Court implicit in the professional we held “prevailing norms” have In his habeas right Strickland, S., counsel, U. to right object no counsel. I action Holland has this smuggle transparent attempt to Strickland into realm the not reach. Amendment does Sixth
C intelligible an The refusal articulate rule re- Court’s actually only sharp garding the issue before us stands con- deciding insistence on an trast to its issue that is not before prerequisite eq- Holland the second us: whether satisfied for tolling demonstrating pursued rights that uitable he diligently, S., Pace, at 418-419. As the see U. Court ad- only question addressed the District Court mits, below; impor- the Circuit had no need to reach it. More Eleventh tantly, arguably question it is not even included within the only attorney’s presented, gross an which concerns whether “extraordinary negligence can constitute an circumstance” of equitable tolling. the kind we have held essential for Pet. tolling fairly for is ever Cert. i. Whether available is in- question, in that but cluded whether Holland has overcome independent hurdle to is not. additional, justification deciding The offers no Court distinct it comes is issue. The closest its observation that the State ruling regarding the District Court’s “does defend” dili- gence. had Ante, at 658. But the no reason to do State any more than it had reason to address the merits of so— Holland’shabeas claims. contrary impli- Nor, Court’s The cation, the State conceded the issue. footnote of has just opposite: brief which the Court cites did State’s only extraordinary-circumstance .observing After (per- prong equitable-tolling issue, of the test is State astutely might ignore haps apprehensive *34 fact) the considers the mat- added that “to the extent diligence, “[Respondent on the find- ter” of Holland’s relies Respondent ings 38, of district court below.” Brief for the by a the State’s coun- Court also cites statement n. 19. The Arg. argument, coun- 43, and Holland’s oral Tr. Oral sel at 52. But id., at concession, sel’s characterization it as only in not remark, context, does shows that the State dispute diligence only in ex- Court, where the issue is traordinary circumstances: goes diligence,
“Well, course, to the issue ... of looking looking not the which is issue at. We’re we’re extraordinary diligence____ not the circumstances, at diligence “[WJe’ll Id., concede . . for moment . .” at 43.
Notwithstanding the that the District Court’s confidence wrong, it not clear Court was even that Holland acted requisite diligence. Although repeatedly con- Holland courts, the state there were other tacted Collins and reason- pursued. example, Holland For able measures could have as suggested supra, Pace, at 416—decided while we Holland’s petition pending might state habeas was still have —Holland “‘protective’” application filed a federal habeas and asked stay the District Court the federal until his action state proceedings presumably He also had concluded. could have prison’s the court records in the checked writ room—from eventually he decision, which learned the state court’s regular 3d, F. 1337—on more basis. he could have And sought permission proceed pro from state courts se equation.10 remove from the thus This is not to (which pro many se filings state court
10Holland made were stricken represented), sought and he because was still to have Holland new counsel proceed pro se. The Court not appointed place, in Collins’s but did seek this, dispute not nor Holland. The most he does does asserts is that one filed, pro se motions would have entitled him pro granted, of the if he se, pro 50-51—an appears ceed see Brief for Petitioner assertion he Court, Record, District see Doc. The to have made allegation actually with an that he equates concurrence that assertion Ante, sought to ease on his own behalf. at 659. It is not the litigate his to, and n. filing see Brief Petitioner same. The Holland refers replaced filings, requested like his earlier that Collins new counsel. to Nelson hearing pursuant for a App. The motion asked 149-163. also *35 to conclude correct Holland was District was Court say answer is not as obvious as the but the diligent; make it seem. would
[*] [*] lawyer to intervene when a impulse litigant’s The Court’s to tin- understandable; mistakes is temptation has made a just rules to achieve what appears with technical result ker a when the client faces sen- strong, especially capital is often the Constitution does not empower But federal tence. rewrite, to name of rules equity, Congress courts unelected with that made. is Endowing judges power has for it system, irreconcilable with our “would literally place whole and of the community under the rights property will of the him with “a arbitrary judge,” arming despotic 1 J. Commentaries on sovereign authority,” Story, Equity (14th 1918). §19, ed. The p. Jurisprudence danger when we our own disregard doubled precedent, leaving only to our own consciences constrain our discretion. Because the statute and stare decisis foreclose Holland’s claim, both I dissent. respectfully (Fla.
State, 1973), App. poor to show perform- 274 So. 2d Collins’s pro 149-150, request proceed ance, not amount to a to App. but did facing trial who seeks discharge to se. Nelson held that a defendant hearing a court-appointed for ineffectiveness is entitled to to counsel 2d, required. If the if new counsel is So. at 259. defend- determine showing, but “continues to fails to make that demand dismissal ant Nelson counsel,” judge may appointed explained “trial his court require proceed discharge the defendant his discretion counsel Ibid.; representation by appointed counsel.” trial without court see also State, (Fla. 1988). no Hardwick So. 2d 1074-1075 There is why requesting procedure proceedings in state habeas should reason proceed pro Holland, se. unlike a request as a defendant be construed Collins, trial, permission to fire since there was facing did not need still request attorney for a new to waive. Once his right representation no denied, Holland himself could have informed that his services was required. longer no were