Raul MORALES-IZQUIERDO, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 03-70674
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
February 6, 2007
Amended May 8, 2007
486 F.3d 484
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge
Argued and Submitted Dec. 13, 2005. Proceedings Stayed Jan. 5, 2006. Resubmitted June 22, 2006.
Thus, the ADA does not require Wal-Mart to turn away a superior applicant for the router position in order to give the position to Huber. To conclude otherwise is “affirmative action with a vengeance. That is giving a job to someone solely on the basis of his status as a member of a statutorily protected group.” Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029.
Here, Wal-Mart did not violate its duty, under the ADA, to provide a reasonable accommodation to Huber. Wal-Mart reasonably accommodated Huber‘s disability by placing Huber in a maintenance associate position. The maintenance position may not have been a perfect substitute job, or the employee‘s most preferred alternative job, but an employer is not required to provide a disabled employee with an accommodation that is ideal from the employee‘s perspective, only an accommodation that is reasonable. See Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000). In assigning the vacant router position to the most qualified applicant, Wal-Mart did not discriminate against Huber. On the contrary, Huber was treated exactly as all other candidates were treated for the Wal-Mart job opening, no worse and no better.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the district court, and we remand for entry of judgment in favor of Wal-Mart consistent with this opinion.
Opinion by Judge KOZINSKI; Dissent by Judge THOMAS.
ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
The petition for panel rehearing is denied. See
Delete <Finally, Morales was not entitled to adjustment of status.> and footnote 15, id. at 1408-09 [477 F.3d at 702].
Delete <In short, reinstatement of the removal order leaves Morales in the same position as on the date of the original removal.>, id. at 1412 [477 F.3d at 704].
Robert Pauw, Gibbs Houston Pauw, Seattle, WA, for the petitioner.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Jonathan F. Cohn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Donald E. Keener, Deputy Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; John Andre, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for the respondent.
Trina A. Realmuto and Nadine K. Wettstein, American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington, DC, as amici curiae in support of the petitioner.
OPINION
When an alien subject to removal leaves the country, the removal order is deemed to be executed. If the alien reenters the country illegally, the order may not be executed against him again unless it has been “reinstated” by an authorized official.1 Until 1997, removal orders could
I
Morales-Izquierdo, a native and citizen of Mexico, was arrested in 1994 for entering the United States without inspection. He was released and served with a mail-out order to show cause.2 Eventually, a removal hearing was scheduled, and Morales was notified via certified mail of the time and place of the hearing. When Morales failed to attend the hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia.3 Morales claims he never received notice of the hearing date, but the record shows that the notice was mailed to his address of record, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) received a return receipt bearing the signature “Raul Morales.”
A warrant of removal was issued, and the INS apprehended and removed Morales from the United States in 1998.4 He attempted to reenter illegally in January 2001—this time using a false border-crossing card. He was apprehended at the port of entry, and was expeditiously removed for misrepresenting a material fact in violation of the
Sometime between his 1998 and 2001 removals, Morales married a United States citizen. In March 2001, Morales’ wife filed
The case came before a three-judge panel, which held that the regulation authorizing immigration officers to issue reinstatement orders is invalid and Morales’ removal order could only be reinstated by an immigration judge. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir.2004). We took the case en banc. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.2005).
II
As noted, Morales cannot be removed again under the 1994 removal order unless and until it was reinstated. The order was reinstated by an immigration officer, who acted pursuant to
However, the First, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld the regulation against similar challenges. See De Sandoval v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir.2006); Ochoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir.2006); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir.2004). The Sixth Circuit saw the matter as so clear-cut that it did not deem it necessary to publish its disposition upholding the regulation. Tilley v. Chertoff, 144 Fed.Appx. 536, 539-40 (6th Cir.2005) (mem.), cert. denied, Id., — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 62, 166 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). No other court has reached a contrary conclusion.
A. In determining whether
Here, two sections of the INA are potentially implicated. The first,
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.
Morales argues that Congress spoke clearly as to whether a hearing before an immigration judge is required for reinstating a prior removal order, and did so in INA § 240. While recognizing that reinstatement is mentioned nowhere in this section, Morales claims a reinstatement order is functionally a removal order because it has the effect of authorizing an alien‘s removal. In other words, reinstatement is simply a species of removal, and is thus governed by INA § 240, which calls for a hearing before an immigration judge. In support of his argument, Morales points out that when Congress has intended to exempt certain removal proceedings from the INA § 240 hearing requirement, it has done so explicitly.9 Reinstatement is not among those proceedings explicitly exempted.
Morales’ argument that the failure to exempt reinstatement from the requirement that a hearing be held before an immigration judge, particularly when similar provisions of the same statute contain explicit exemptions, carries some force. But such failure hardly amounts to the kind of unambiguous expression of congressional intent that would remove the agency‘s discretion at Chevron step one. Far more telling is the fact that reinstatement and removal are placed in different sections, which “logically can be understood as indicating a congressional intention to treat reinstatement determinations differently from first-instance determinations of removability.” Lattab, 384 F.3d at 18 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-91, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)); see also De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1281. After all, “the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989)). Here, the fact that Congress placed reinstatement in a separate section from removal suggests that reinstatement is a separate procedure, not a species of removal.
The scope of a reinstatement inquiry under INA § 241 is much narrower, and can be performed like any other ministerial enforcement action. The only question is whether the alien has illegally reentered after having left the country while subject to a removal order. As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, INA § 241 reinstatement—unlike INA § 240 first-instance removal—“deprives aliens of any relief, reopening, or review at the reinstatement stage.” De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1281. By barring all relief, Congress eliminated the second and much more difficult removal inquiry. The First and Eighth Circuits similarly found that “the elimination of any exogenous defense to reinstatement significantly narrows the range of issues to be adjudicated, thereby limiting the value of additional procedures.” Lattab, 384 F.3d at 20; see also Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir.2002) (same).
Moreover, the texts of the two sections differ in their delegation of discretion: INA § 240 expressly requires that an immigration judge conduct removal proceedings, whereas INA § 241 authorizes the Attorney General to reinstate removal orders. “This distinction suggests Congress knew how to mandate a hearing before an immigration judge, but chose not to do so in the context of reinstatement orders.” De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1281.
Given the different layout of the two sections and their very different scope, we conclude that Congress did not consider removal and reinstatement to be equivalent. Certainly, nothing in the text of the INA, or the statutory scheme, supports Morales’ argument that reinstatement is merely a species of removal. Nor does anything in the INA express an unequivocal congressional intent that reinstatement proceedings be conducted before an immigration judge. If anything, the statutory scheme supports the opposite conclusion. See Tilley, 144 Fed.Appx. at 540 (“[T]he regulations promulgated in
Deference to an agency‘s interpretation “is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.‘” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988)). For these reasons, the First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits had “little difficulty in concluding that the government‘s interpretation satisfies” the second step of Chevron. Lattab, 384 F.3d at 19-20; see also De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1283; Ochoa-Carrillo, 437 F.3d at 846. We find no fault with this conclusion.
Morales raises two issues, however, that our sister circuits did not consider. First, he invokes the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, asking us to construe the statute so as to avoid serious constitutional issues. Morales relies on Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005):
[W]hen deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the Court.
Id. at 380-81, 125 S.Ct. 716; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (same). According to Morales, construing the statute so as to require that reinstatement hearings be held before an immigration judge would avoid constitutional problems that arise by assigning the reinstatement function to an immigration officer. See Part III infra (discussing various constitutional challenges Morales raises to the reinstatement process).
The problem with Morales’ argument is that we are not deciding between two plausible statutory constructions; we are evaluating an agency‘s interpretation of a statute under Chevron. At step two of this inquiry, our function is “not simply [to] impose [our] own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the ab-
Second, Morales argues that the Attorney General impermissibly eliminated the hearing requirement in 1997, when it had been a mainstay of the reinstatement process during the previous four decades. Compare
Here, we concluded at Chevron step one that Congress has not expressed a clear preference that reinstatement hearings be held before immigration judges; if anything, the INA‘s statutory scheme supports the opposite conclusion. Nor has Morales pointed to anything in the legislative history that discloses congressional acquiescence in the agency‘s past practice—and certainly not the requisite “overwhelming evidence.” A finding of congressional acquiescence must be reserved for those rare instances where it is very clear that Congress has considered and approved of an agency‘s practice, lest the agency be improperly deprived of the very flexibility Congress intended to delegate. Such is not the case here.
We also understand Morales to be arguing that the agency‘s change in policy was impermissibly inconsistent with its past practice. An “[u]nexplained inconsistency is ... a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2699 (emphasis added). This rule, too, is reserved for rare instances, such as when an agency provides no explanation at all for a change in policy, or when its explanation is so unclear or contradictory that we are left in doubt as to the reason for the change in direction. A broader rule would deny agencies the necessary flexibility to change policies in light of “changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations.” Id. at 2700. Indeed, Chevron itself involved a 180-degree reversal in an agency‘s position that survived judicial scrutiny. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58, 104 S.Ct. 2778; see also id. at 863, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.“).
The net effect of these statutory changes is two-fold. First, IIRIRA brings vastly more aliens within the sweep of the reinstatement provision, essentially making every removed alien subject to reinstatement if he returns to the United States without the Attorney General‘s permission. Second, the decision to reinstate is now far more mechanical: There need be no determination whether the alien falls into one of the narrow categories specified in the earlier statute as eligible for reinstatement, see n. 11 supra, and aliens can no longer seek certain kinds of relief, such as adjustment of status. These major legislative changes provide an adequate justification for the Attorney General‘s decision to make parallel changes to the implementing regulations. “Providing a mechanical procedure for the reinstatement of prior orders is entirely consistent with [IIRIRA‘s] purpose” “to make the removal of illegal reentrants more expeditious.” Lattab, 384 F.3d at 20.
III
We now turn to Morales’ argument that the regulation, if authorized under Chevron, is nevertheless invalid because it violates various constitutional guarantees.
A. Morales first argues that the regulation violates due process because it assigns the reinstatement determination to an immigration officer—an official not qualified to resolve disputed questions as to the factual predicates for reinstatement. But reinstatement only requires proof that (1) petitioner is an alien, (2) who was subject to a prior removal order, and (3) who illegally reentered the United States.
We note at the outset that the regulation provides significant procedural safeguards against erroneous reinstatements. First, the immigration officer must verify the identity of the alien. “In disputed cases, verification of identity shall be accomplished by a comparison of fingerprints.”
We need not determine whether these procedures are adequate as to all aliens in all cases because Morales does not dispute that he satisfies the statutory predicates for reinstatement. Rather, he argues that
We are satisfied, moreover, that the regulation provides sufficient procedural safeguards to withstand a facial challenge for patent procedural insufficiency. Given the narrow and mechanical determinations immigration officers must make and the procedural safeguards provided by
While the regulation does not offend due process, we leave open the possibility that individual petitioners may raise procedural defects in their particular cases. Morales himself raises several such challenges, and to these we now turn.
B. Morales first claims he had no meaningful opportunity to review his file and respond to adverse evidence. But Morales points to no material errors in his file; nor does he explain what evidence he would have presented, had he been given an opportunity to do so.
Morales’ third argument, that the immigration officer who reinstated his removal order suffered from institutional bias, is foreclosed by Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955): “Th[is] contention [of bias] is without substance when considered against the longstanding practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.” Id. at 311, 75 S.Ct. 757; see also United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 228 F.3d 956, 960-63 (9th Cir.2000).
Finally, Morales argues that he was denied due process because he was not notified of the availability of judicial review. We have never required such notice in the civil immigration context, and we find no reason to require it in the reinstatement context—where an alien‘s rights and remedies are severely limited. See Part III.C infra. In any event, petitioner obviously got notice because he “filed a timely petition for judicial review to this court. Again, no prejudice has been shown.” Ochoa-Carrillo, 437 F.3d at 848.
C. Morales also claims that a removal order may not constitutionally be reinstated if the underlying removal proceeding itself violated due process. We have, on several occasions, expressed “ser-ious[] doubt that the government‘s new reinstatement procedure comports with the Due Process Clause.” Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.2001), abrogated by Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. at 2427 & n. 5.16 And, one of our cases lends direct support to Morales’ contention: “[T]he INS cannot reinstate a prior order of removal that did not comport with due process.” Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir.2004).
To the extent we so held in Arreola-Arreola, we revisit that decision here and reverse field: Reinstatement of a prior removal order—regardless of the process afforded in the underlying order—does not offend due process because reinstatement of a prior order does not change the alien‘s rights or remedies. The only
The Supreme Court noted this very point in Fernandez-Vargas:
While the [reinstatement] law looks back to a past act in its application to “an alien [who] has reentered ... illegally,”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) , the provision does not penalize an alien for reentry (criminal and civil penalties do that); it establishes a process to remove him “under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” Ibid. ... [T]he statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation that the alien himself could end at any time by voluntarily leaving the country.
126 S.Ct. at 2432 (second alteration in original). While aliens have a right to fair procedures, they have no constitutional right to force the government to re-adjudicate a final removal order by unlawfully reentering the country. Nor is the government required to expend vast resources on extraneous procedures before reinstating a removal order that has already been finalized and executed.
Or, to put it differently, an alien who respects our laws and remains abroad after he has been removed should have no fewer opportunities to challenge his removal order than one who unlawfully reenters the country despite our government‘s concerted efforts to keep him out. If Morales has a legitimate basis for challenging his prior removal order, he will be able to pursue it after he leaves the country, just like every other alien in his position. If he has no such basis, nothing in the Due Process Clause gives him the right to manufacture for himself a new opportunity to raise such a challenge. The contrary conclusion would create a new and wholly unwarranted incentive for aliens who have previously been removed to reenter the country illegally in order to take advantage of this self-help remedy. It would also make a mockery of aliens who do respect our laws and wait patiently outside our borders seeking lawful admission. Nothing in the Constitution requires such a perverse result.
IV
We conclude that a previously removed alien who reenters the country illegally is not entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether to reinstate a prior removal order. The reinstatement statute and its implementing regulation comport with due process, and
Morales has shown no violation of due process in the conduct of his reinstatement proceeding. To the extent genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to his underlying removal order, this “prior order ... is not subject to being reopened or reviewed” during the course of the reinstatement process.
PETITION DENIED.
On January 15, 2003, Raul Morales-Izquierdo and his United States citizen wife, Patricia Morales, attended a meeting at the INS‘s Tacoma, Washington office. The Moraleses expected to discuss the I-130 alien relative petition that Patricia had filed on March 1, 2001, to adjust her husband‘s status to that of a legal permanent resident. Instead, the INS served on the couple both a denial of the petition for adjustment of status and a notice of intent to reinstate a 1994 deportation order against Raul Morales under
Morales has consistently and emphatically maintained that the 1994 deportation order is invalid because he was never given notice of the 1994 hearing at which he was ordered deported in absentia. In a sworn statement, Morales claimed never to have received the notice that was sent to his ex-girlfriend‘s house, explaining that someone else had signed to indicate receipt of the notice. He has never been granted a hearing at which he could present his case; the majority opinion assures that he never will be.
This result would have been impossible under the regulations that governed reinstatement proceedings for nearly forty-five years. Under the former
All of that changed in 1997, when the Attorney General made a complete course reversal. Under the new regulation, aliens were to be removed from the country without a hearing or an opportunity to contest the charges, via reinstatement by a low-level Department of Homeland Security employee who served as both prosecutor and judge.
The central question in this case is whether the
I
As the majority and I agree, the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of
In determining congressional intent, we not only examine the precise statutory section in question but also analyze the provision in the context of the governing statute as a whole, presuming a congressional intent to create a “symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995)). We must also “be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of [significant] economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.” Id. If, after conducting such an analysis, we conclude that Congress has not addressed the issue, we “must respect the agency‘s construction of the statute so long as it is permissible.” Id. (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999)).
Ultimately, “the judiciary is the final authority” in interpreting statutes, and courts must employ all “traditional tools of statutory construction” under Chevron step one to ascertain whether Congress‘s intent is “clear.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In this case, the text and structure of the INA are clear; the statute unambiguously prohibits the Attorney General‘s interpretation. But even if the statute were ambiguous, the Attorney General‘s interpretation would be precluded by the canon of constitutional avoidance—unquestionably a “traditional tool of statutory construction” to be used at Chevron step one—pursuant to which we must presume that Congress did not intend to permit any interpretation that, like the Attorney General‘s, raises serious constitutional questions.
II
The intent of Congress could hardly be clearer. The text and structure of the INA unambiguously require that inadmissibility and deportability determinations be made by an immigration judge pursuant to the procedural protections outlined in INA § 240. Section 240 declares that the procedural mechanism it creates “shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining” an alien‘s removability, unless Congress has “specified” an alternative procedure.
Although the statute‘s plain language should settle the question, it is worth noting that this construction is buttressed by the INA‘s inclusion of several provisions that do explicitly create or authorize alternative procedural mechanisms, demonstrating that Congress knew how to express an intention to deviate from § 240 and failed to do so in § 241(a)(5). See, e.g.,
In short, § 240 requires an explicit exemption before expedited procedures may be used, and § 241(a)(5) contains no such exemption. Thus, because
Despite these unambiguous statutory requirements, the majority concludes that reinstatement proceedings need not follow § 240 strictures. The majority holds that the reinstatement provision authorizes the Attorney General‘s less-protective procedural mechanism just by implying a preference for shorter proceedings. But this analysis violates the very statute it purports to interpret. The INA does not tolerate implied authorizations; it requires Congress to “specify” an intention to deviate from § 240 guarantees.
The majority, of course, does not rest entirely on its assertion of implied repeal; it also argues that reinstatement proceedings are not “removal proceedings” and that they therefore do not fall within the ambit of § 240. However, reading the reinstatement provision both on its face and in its context, “with a view to [its] place in the overall statutory scheme,” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989), it is evident that § 241(a)(5) is not an alternative to § 240; rather, a § 241(a)(5) reinstatement order may issue only after a § 240 determination has been made that the alien is removable. The reinstatement provision does nothing to change the fact that illegally reentering aliens fall squarely within the category of “removable” aliens entitled to § 240 procedural guarantees.
Importantly,
This dual coverage need not render either provision surplusage nor need it imply that an alien subject to reinstatement is entitled to precisely the same rights as an alien facing removal for the first time. As many courts have made clear, the reinstatement provision strips illegally reentering aliens of discrete rights that are granted to first time removable aliens, including the rights to “relief, reopening, [and] review.” De Sandoval v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir.2006). The majority is also correct to note that
In short, the only way to give effect to both §§ 240 and 241(a)(5), especially taking into consideration the express inclusion of reentering aliens in the category of “removable” aliens, is to require that a reinstatement order issue only after a full § 240 hearing before an immigration judge. See Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. 824, 833, 103 S.Ct. 1587, 75 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (restating and reaffirming “the settled principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute“); FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959) (holding that statutes should be interpreted so as to “fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole“).
The majority finds additional justification for reading
The majority additionally claims that the mention of immigration judges in § 240 “suggests Congress knew how to mandate a hearing before an immigration judge, but chose not to do so in the context of reinstatement orders.” Maj. Op. at 491 (quoting De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1281). This argument begs the question. The point is that Congress did not believe itself to be mandating or authorizing any kind of hearing whatsoever; section 241(a)(5) is a substantive provision that leaves § 240 hearing requirements entirely intact.
Although the majority is right to assert that
In sum, Congress has expressed its unambiguous intent that the procedural mechanisms it created in § 240 “shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining” an alien‘s removability. Because the Attorney General‘s regulation establishes procedures that conflict with the express provisions of the INA, it cannot stand. See Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 670-71 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that a regulation that is contrary to statute is invalid).
III
Even if the text and structure of the INA were sufficiently ambiguous to leave some discretion to the Attorney General, the canon of constitutional avoidance would preclude the interpretation that the Attorney General chose.
A
The avoidance canon instructs courts to reject those “plausible statutory constructions” that “would raise a multitude of constitutional problems,” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005), as long as an alternative construction exists that is “fairly possible” and less troubling, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). The canon rests not only on courts’ desire “to avoid the decision of constitutional questions” but also on a “reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises constitutional doubts.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 381, 125 S.Ct. 716. Avoidance, then, is a “means of giving effect to congressional intent,” id. at 381-82, 125 S.Ct. 716, resting on an assumption that, between two plausible statutory constructions, Congress meant the one that does
For purposes of this case, two important conclusions flow from the avoidance canon‘s rationales: first, the canon is highly relevant at Chevron step one, and second, the canon does not ultimately depend on the merits of implicated constitutional claims.
Because the avoidance canon centers on a presumption about congressional intent, it certainly pertains to the step one determination of whether Congress intended to preclude the agency‘s interpretation. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (denying deference at step one, not because the statute was entirely clear, but because “Congress ha[d] clearly precluded” the agency‘s construction); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994) (holding that an agency‘s interpretation should be denied deference at step one, even in the face of some ambiguity, if the proffered interpretation “goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear“); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988) (holding that an interpretation should be denied deference at step one if it is “clearly contrary to the intent of Congress“); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 n. 31, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (denying deference at step one even while noting that the provision contained significant ambiguities, on the ground that the statute clearly precluded the agency‘s interpretation).
The avoidance canon, thus, is properly applied at step one of the Chevron analysis. While the majority may be correct that the avoidance canon cannot be used to render an agency‘s interpretation “unreasonable” at Chevron step two, the canon is unquestionably a “traditional tool of statutory interpretation” that may and should be used to determine whether Congress intended to preclude the agency‘s chosen interpretation. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (denying deference because the agency‘s interpretation “needlessly” raised serious “constitutional issues” and because the Court assumed “that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority“); DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392 (rejecting an agency‘s interpretation at step one because it raised “serious constitutional problems“). See also Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 n. 5 (1st Cir.2004) (specifically reserving the question of whether “the rule of avoidance” would “lead to a different statutory construction” if it were applied “under the first step of Chevron“).
The second conclusion to flow from the avoidance canon‘s rationales is that its application does not depend on this or any court‘s conclusions as to the merits of implicated constitutional claims. Clark, 543 U.S. at 381, 125 S.Ct. 716 (“The canon is not a method of adjudicating constitutional questions by other means.“) (citing Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1960-61 (1997) (listing cases in which the Supreme Court used the canon to avoid a constitutional question only later to decide that the avoided application was not unconstitutional)). Even if every constitutional challenge to arise under the Attorney General‘s regulation were ultimately decided against the alien, the regulation should be rejected under the avoidance
B
That the reinstatement regulation does, in fact, approach the “constitutional danger zone” is beyond cavil. We have noted specifically on more than one occasion that
And several of our sister circuits have expressed similar doubts as to the sufficiency of process afforded. See Lattab, 384 F.3d at 21 n. 6 (noting the seriousness of the constitutional claim given that the regulation “offers virtually no procedural protections“); United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 356 n. 10 (3d Cir.2006) (noting that constitutional doubts relating to the regulation “continue to cause a significant amount of consternation“); Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 687 (6th Cir.2002) (construing the regulation as having no retroactive effect in part “to avoid a constitutional question“), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. at 2427 & n. 5; Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.2002) (reserving the question of “what kind of procedures” would be “necessary” for an alien who challenges the factual basis for reinstatement); Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir.2002) (noting that additional procedures might be due for an alien who challenges the applicability of reinstatement), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. at 2427 & n. 5.
When we examine the reinstatement procedures more closely, the constitutional concerns expressed by our court and others become apparent. It is well-settled that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to aliens in removal proceedings. Arreola, 383 F.3d at 962; United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.1985). Due process requires “a full and fair hearing of [the alien‘s] claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf,” Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, both on a facial and as-applied examination, the reinstatement process is well within the constitutional danger zone.
1
First, purely on a facial analysis, the reinstatement process itself approaches the “constitutional danger zone” because it does not provide any opportunity for the alien to challenge the legality of a prior removal order. The inquiry is confined to three determinations: (1) the identity of the alien, (2) that the alien has previously been deported, and (3) that the alien illegally reentered the United States.
Even as to the three factual determinations to be made, the Attorney General‘s reinstatement procedure affords insufficient procedural protections, clearly approaching—if not breaching—the constitutional danger zone. The reinstatement procedure does not provide adequate means to contest the predicates to reinstatement. As we observed in Castro-Cortez, “an alien cannot receive a full and fair hearing unless he has the right to
The lack of due process in practice is illustrated by the reinstatement cases that have found their way to the courts of appeal. In the typical reinstatement case considered by our circuit and our sister circuits, the alien has married a United States citizen and makes an appointment with the agency to discuss adjustment of status or an extension of a previously granted work authorization. During the discussion, the officer serves a Notice to Reinstate Prior Order and asks the alien to fill out the form, which includes a checkbox to indicate whether the alien wishes to make a statement. If the box is checked “no,” that is the end of the matter, and the reinstatement is effected without further ado. If the box is checked “yes,” either the alien writes out a statement, or the officer asks questions and writes down the answers. Then the reinstatement is effected, and the alien usually is immediately taken into custody.3 This procedure cannot be said to comport with the require-
In short, the regulatory procedure is so streamlined that it deprives reentering aliens of any meaningful opportunity to raise potentially viable legal, constitutional, or factual challenges to their removability. Based on these observations, it is clear that the reinstatement process implemented by
2
When one specifically examines whether due process has been afforded to Morales in this case, one can only conclude that the procedures as applied to him place him within the constitutional danger zone.
First, the due process problems inherent in the reinstatement process affected Morales. He appeared at his interview for adjustment of status. Without prior notice, he was presented with a Notice of Intent to Reinstate Prior Order. He was not afforded a lawyer. Although he stated that he did not read or write English and needed to have things explained in Spanish in words he could understand, he was not afforded an interpreter. According to the agent‘s notes, Morales stated that he had never been before an immigration judge, that he was never informed that he was deported in absentia, and that the signature on the notice card was not his. He was not afforded the opportunity to examine the immigration file that served as the basis for the reinstatement. Rather, despite the fact that he contested the factual predicate for a reinstatement order to issue, he was immediately arrested and taken into custody after he finished answering the officer‘s questions. Thus, in his case, the facial due process concerns with the reinstatement process were not merely theoretical; he experienced them. He was not given the opportunity to contest the factual basis for the reinstatement, even though he vigorously disputed it. The procedures utilized in Morales’ reinstatement hearing place him within the constitutional danger zone.
Second, because he was deported in absentia, Morales has never seen an immigration judge at all. He never had a full hearing on his prior deportation charges. Therefore, his situation is different from that involved in Arreola-Arreola, in which we concluded that the alien had received due process in his prior deportation hearing.
If Morales’ allegations are true—that he never received notice of the deportation hearing at which he was deported in absentia—then there can be no question that he has been denied a full and fair hearing of his claims; he was, in fact, denied any hearing at all. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that an asylum petitioner was denied a full and fair hearing and a reason-
3
Because the reinstatement procedures fall within the constitutional danger zone, both facially and as applied to Morales, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires a presumption that Congress intended to afford Morales a full § 240 hearing before an immigration judge. This statutory construction, which is consistent with the plain words of § 240 and with the overall structure of the INA, necessarily means that the reinstatement regulation is ultra vires to the statute and must be invalidated.
C
Rather than reaching the question of whether there has been a deprivation of due process, the majority opinion contends that any such violation can be addressed and remedied by the court on a petition for habeas corpus, filed by the alien following removal. This contention, however, cannot be squared with the
Section 106(a) of the
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, ... or any other habeas corpus provision, ... a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of [the INA].
“The [Real ID Act] eliminated habeas jurisdiction ... over final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal.” Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir.2005). Without § 240 procedural protections during the reinstatement proceeding, this lack of post-removal habeas review raises serious Suspension Clause concerns. The Attorney General‘s regulation, thus, approaches a second and independent “constitutional danger zone” by denying reinstateable aliens any constitu-
When there are essential disputed factual issues, the only constitutionally adequate remedy is a “full and fair hearing,” which includes “a reasonable opportunity [for the alien] to present evidence on his behalf.” Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
In addition, even if a full post-removal evidentiary hearing were permitted, Morales would be unable to attend and present live testimony without committing the criminal act of reentering the United States after removal, in violation of
In short, the theoretical existence of a post-removal habeas corpus remedy does not provide an opportunity for a full and fair hearing of Morales‘s claims before a neutral fact-finder. Morales will never have a hearing on his claims. The only method of avoiding this constitutionally problematic result is to enforce the proper construction of the statute, requiring that reinstatement proceedings be governed by § 240 procedures.
D
Given all of these considerations, even if the statutory language were susceptible to another interpretation, the canon of constitutional avoidance would require us to construe the statute to avoid these many constitutional concerns, interpreting it instead as requiring that § 240 procedures be applicable to reinstatement proceedings. That construction is at least “fairly possible,” Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, even if not textually and structurally required, and that construction would avoid the plethora of due process and Suspension Clause problems that are inherent in the Attorney General‘s regulation.
IV
Congress could hardly have been more clear. The INA unambiguously requires that inadmissibility and deportability determinations be made by an immigration judge pursuant to the procedural protections outlined in INA § 240. Lest there be any doubt, application of the traditional rules of statutory construction, including the canon of constitutional avoidance, dictate the same conclusion; we should not lightly assume that Congress intended to authorize the Attorney General‘s abrogation of so many aliens’ procedural rights. The Attorney General‘s action in stripping away the procedural protections that had been in place for nearly forty-five years is
For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
SIDNEY R. THOMAS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
