ANDREW LEBEAU, Petitioner, v. STATE OF UTAH Respondent.
No. 20120829
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
September 19, 2014
2014 UT 39 | 337 P.3d 254
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
Third District, West Jordan
The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen
No. 091400631
Joan C. Watt, Brittany D. Enniss, Salt Lake City, for petitioner
Sean D. Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye, Asst. Att‘y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent
JUSTICE PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, and JUSTICE DURHAM joined.
JUSTICE LEE filed a dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 On certiorari, petitioner Andrew LeBeau asks us to consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court‘s imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole following Mr. LeBeau‘s conviction for aggravated kidnapping pursuant to
¶2 Mr. LeBeau unsuccessfully challenged his sentence of LWOP before the court of appeals. He now argues that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the district court‘s imposition of LWOP because the district court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah‘s aggravated kidnapping statute. Because we conclude that the district court improperly applied the sentencing provisions of
BACKGROUND
¶3 In early 2009, Mr. LeBeau and Stephanie were living together, but they were experiencing trouble in their relationship. Stephanie had moved out of their shared home for a period of time before returning and, according to Mr. LeBeau, had been unfaithful during the relationship. Both Stephanie and Mr. LeBeau struggled with drug addiction. In early February, Stephanie moved out of the couple‘s shared bedroom but continued to live in the house.
¶4 The couple was acquainted with a man named Mark, from whom they occasionally purchased drugs. In February 2009, Mr. LeBeau began to suspect that Stephanie was having an affair with Mark. On February 23, 2009, Stephanie spent the afternoon and evening with Mark. Mr. LeBeau repeatedly called Stephanie and sent her text messages, but she ignored him. When Stephanie returned home sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 that night, Mr. LeBeau angrily confronted her about where she had been. Stephanie testified that Mr. LeBeau became violent when she refused to explain where she had been and began hitting and choking her.
¶5 As the argument escalated, Mr. LeBeau forced Stephanie to accompany him to the garage, where he threatened to bind her with duct tape and continued to behave violently. Mr. LeBeau placed his dog in the back seat of Stephanie‘s car before forcing Stephanie to get into the front seat, telling her they were going for a
¶6 As Mr. LeBeau drove, he attracted the attention of Sergeant Marcelas Rapela of the Midvale Police Department. Sergeant Rapela began to follow the couple‘s car, ultimately signaling Mr. LeBeau to stop with lights and siren. Stephanie testified that she repeatedly asked Mr. LeBeau to pull over. Rather than stopping, Mr. LeBeau continued toward Mark‘s house. Mr. LeBeau initially turned onto Mark‘s street heading in the wrong direction. While turning the car around, Mr. LeBeau nearly crashed into Sergeant Rapela‘s patrol car and accelerated rapidly toward Mark‘s house.
¶7 As the car accelerated, Stephanie opened the passenger door in an attempt to jump from the car. Officer David Wilson, who had arrived to assist Sergeant Rapela, observed Stephanie‘s foot dragging along the road as the car accelerated. As the car raced down Mark‘s street at approximately sixty miles per hour, it collided with Mark‘s box-style truck, which was parked at the end of the street.
¶8 Stephanie was thrown from the car on impact. Officer Wilson testified that he observed Stephanie‘s body ricochet off the passenger-side door as the collision occurred. Stephanie suffered extensive injuries, including a broken eye socket, fractured femur, fractured pelvis, broken arm, and shattered ankle. Mr. LeBeau‘s dog was also injured in the crash and required surgery. Mr. LeBeau did not suffer any significant injuries.
¶9 The State charged Mr. LeBeau with aggravated kidnapping based on the serious bodily injury Stephanie suffered, attempted murder, aggravated assault, failure to respond to an officer‘s signal to stop, and cruelty to an animal. Mr. LeBeau pled guilty to failure to respond to an officer‘s signal and was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal. Though the State argued at trial that Mr. LeBeau intentionally crashed into Mark‘s truck in an attempt to kill Stephanie, Mr. LeBeau claimed the collision occurred while he was distracted trying to keep Stephanie from jumping out of the car. The jury acquitted Mr. LeBeau of attempted murder.
¶10 At Mr. LeBeau‘s sentencing hearing, the court determined that the sentencing matrices created by the Utah Sentencing Commission were not applicable to Mr. LeBeau‘s case because Utah‘s aggravated kidnapping statute created “a minimum mandatory type sentence.” As a result of this determination, the
¶11 The court then considered, and rejected, several mitigating factors raised by Mr. LeBeau. First, Mr. LeBeau claimed to have acted under a strong provocation because he believed Stephanie was having an affair with Mark. The court rejected this mitigating factor, stating, “There was no evidence presented that [Stephanie] was having an affair. There was no evidence that she was involved in a sexual relationship.” Second, Mr. LeBeau claimed to have a good employment history and strong family ties, both of which indicate rehabilitative potential. The court rejected Mr. LeBeau‘s claim relating to his employment history, stating, “You were unemployed at the time of this incident. I don‘t know how you can say that was exceptionally good employment.” Similarly, the court refused to consider Mr. LeBeau‘s family ties as a mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau had not “seen [his] mother or . . . sister for years at the time they came to testify at trial.” Finally, Mr. LeBeau claimed that he had an extended period of arrest-free time prior to this incident. The court rejected this mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau had an outstanding arrest warrant in Alabama and had admitted to using illegal drugs during that time period. The court found that the fact that Mr. LeBeau had not been arrested for, nor convicted of, an offense for several years prior to this incident did not necessarily mean that Mr. LeBeau had been law abiding. The court thus refused to consider Mr. LeBeau‘s relatively minor criminal history a mitigating factor.2
¶13 Mr. LeBeau timely appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction. State v. Lebeau, 2012 UT App 235, ¶ 16, 286 P.3d 1. Specifically, Mr. LeBeau argued that the district court failed to adequately consider the interests of justice, as required by
¶14 The court of appeals rejected Mr. LeBeau‘s arguments and upheld his LWOP sentence. Id. ¶ 37. The appeals court found that the district court “expressly considered all of [Mr. LeBeau‘s] mitigating evidence” and that Mr. LeBeau had “demonstrated no more than his disagreement with how the court weighed the mitigating factors.” Id. ¶ 29. Additionally, the appeals court reasoned that Mr. LeBeau‘s LWOP sentence was the presumptive sentence prescribed by the Legislature and was, therefore, appropriate. Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
¶15 We granted certiorari on the question of “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court‘s imposition of a sentence of life without parole pursuant to
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. We review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, granting “no deference to its conclusions of law.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 7, 229 P.3d 650 (citing another case). To determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming Mr. LeBeau‘s sentence requires that we consider the standard of review applicable to the court of appeals’ review of the sentence. When reviewing a district court‘s sentencing decision, appellate courts “traditionally afford[] the [district] court wide latitude and discretion.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 34, 282 P.3d 985 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court will, therefore, only set aside a sentence if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the district court “fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive.” State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a district court‘s sentencing determination constitutes an abuse of discretion if such determination is based on an erroneous interpretation of law. See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶¶ 14–17, 127 P.3d 682.
ANALYSIS
I. UTAH‘S AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING STATUTE
¶17 Mr. LeBeau was convicted of aggravated kidnapping pursuant to
¶19 Our task of reviewing Mr. LeBeau‘s sentence requires that we interpret
II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN INTERESTS-OF-JUSTICE ANALYSIS PRIOR TO SENTENCING MR. LEBEAU TO LWOP
¶20 As with any question of statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 18, 309 P.3d 209. The best evidence of the Legislature‘s intent is the statute‘s plain language. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P‘ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863. “We presume that the [L]egislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “we interpret[] statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid[] rendering portions of the statute superfluous.” Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 23 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To do so, “we read the plain
¶21 Subsection (3)(b) of Utah‘s aggravated kidnapping statute directs sentencing courts to impose a sentence of LWOP, “except as provided in Subsection . . . (4).”
¶22 Reading Utah‘s aggravated kidnapping statute as a whole further supports this conclusion. The statute distinguishes three types of aggravated kidnapping: (1) aggravated kidnapping, (2) aggravated kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury, and (3) aggravated kidnapping committed by a defendant who has previously been convicted of a “grievous sexual offense.”
¶23 Further bolstering our conclusion that the Legislature intended to differentiate between different types of aggravated
¶24 Were we to conclude that sentencing courts could impose the statutory presumptive sentence under subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) without first considering the interests of justice, it would undermine the distinctions between the different types of aggravated kidnapping drawn by the Legislature. Though the language of subsection (4) is permissive, the statutory scheme makes clear that the Legislature did not intend to give sentencing courts a license to ignore this subsection altogether. Rather, reading subsections (3) and (4) together, we conclude that the Legislature intended sentencing courts to consider the interests of justice when sentencing defendants under subsections (3)(a) or (3)(b), but not under subsection (3)(c).
III. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-302(4)
¶25 Having determined that the district court was required to engage in an interests-of-justice analysis when sentencing Mr. LeBeau, we turn our attention to what is required for such an analysis. At sentencing, the court did consider whether a lesser indeterminate sentence was appropriate for Mr. LeBeau. In doing so, the court considered Mr. LeBeau‘s crime in light of the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances compiled by the Utah Sentencing Commission in its sentencing guidelines. Though the district court did not articulate its reasoning on the record, it appears
¶26 We begin, as always, with the statutory text. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P‘ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863. We presume that the Legislature chose its words carefully, using each term advisedly. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682. Absent some indication of contrary legislative intent, we give effect to each term according to its ordinary meaning. Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479. If the statutory language remains ambiguous—meaning the statute is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations—we may resort to other indications of legislative intent, including legislative history and policy considerations. State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 24, 309 P.3d 209.
¶27 The Legislature did not provide a statutory definition of “in the interests of justice.” Accordingly, we look to other sources to derive the meaning of the phrase. See State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ¶ 14, 322 P.3d 719 (approving the use of dictionaries to ascertain the “range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear” (internal quotation mark omitted)). Generally, the phrase “in the interests of” connotes being “to the advantage or advancement of” something. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 993 (2d ed. 1987); see also WEBSTER‘S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 744 (2007) (defining “in the interests of” as “for the sake of“). So, something “in the interests of justice” will act to advance or promote justice. But “justice” is an abstract notion that incorporates a variety
¶28 The phrase “in the interests of justice” appears in many other parts of the Utah Code, but is never specifically defined. See, e.g.,
¶29 The Legislature added the interests-of-justice language to Utah‘s aggravated kidnapping statute in 2007 as part of a sweeping revision of the penalties associated with sexual offenses and kidnapping. See 2007 Utah Laws 2060–73. The Legislature crafted a sentencing scheme substantially similar to that found in the aggravated kidnapping statute in at least eight other criminal statutes. See
A. Section 76-5-302(4)‘s Interests-of-Justice Analysis Is not Equivalent to Weighing the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
¶30 As an initial matter, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend the phrase “interests of justice” as a mere substitute for the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission. First, the plain language5 of the statute does not support such an interpretation. The Legislature instructed courts to consider the “interests of justice,” not just to weigh the “aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Though the two concepts are related, they are not equivalent.
¶31 The Utah Sentencing Commission is empowered to create sentencing guidelines designed to “increase equity in criminal sentencing.”
¶32 More tellingly, prior to 2007,
¶33 In Mr. LeBeau‘s case, the district court looked to the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances contained in the sentencing guidelines and no further. Because the Legislature replaced its previous aggravating-and-mitigating-circumstances instruction with the new mandate to consider the interests of justice, we conclude that the district court‘s analysis was in error. We now turn our attention to what a proper interests-of-justice analysis requires.
B. An Interests-of-Justice Analysis Requires Consideration of Proportionality and the Defendant‘s Rehabilitative Potential
¶34 Though the Legislature did not specifically define “interests of justice” in the aggravated kidnapping statute, it has provided guidance elsewhere in the Utah Code.
- (1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.
- (2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitutes each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition [of] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders. - (4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.
(Emphasis added.)
¶35 The goals enumerated in
¶36 But it is subsection (3) that relates most closely to sentencing. Subsection (3) articulates the legislative goal that sentencing be proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant‘s conduct and recognizes that individual offenders have different potential for rehabilitation. Thus, reading
¶37 Keeping these basic principles in mind, we conclude that the Legislature‘s use of the phrase “interests of justice” necessarily requires the court to consider the proportionality of the defendant‘s sentence in relation to the severity of his offense. Additionally, it requires that sentencing judges appropriately weigh a defendant‘s potential for rehabilitation.
1. A Proportionality Analysis Requires the Court to Consider the Seriousness of the Defendant‘s Conduct When Compared to the Severity of His Sentence and the Sentences Imposed for Different Offenses
¶38 “The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). For example, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized the existence of a proportionality principle in its jurisprudence related to the Eighth Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
¶39 It is important to note, first, that the Supreme Court‘s proportionality jurisprudence arose in a very different context than that with which we are now confronted. Typically, the Court was confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of a legislatively enacted sentencing statute. See, e.g., Weems, 217 U.S. at 359; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole under a recidivist statute for a defendant‘s third nonviolent felony); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (rejecting a sentence of LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes). As it has addressed these constitutional challenges, the Court has struggled to balance deference to legislative judgment as to the appropriate sentence for a particular crime with the long-standing precept that sentences “should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems, 217 U.S. at 367; see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–1001 (attempting to reconcile the need for judicial deference to legislatively enacted sentences and the need for proportionality). But the case before us presents a very different question. We are not being asked to overturn a sentence imposed by the Legislature on the grounds that it is constitutionally disproportionate. Instead, our task is to ensure that courts properly comply with the Legislature‘s instruction to undertake a proportionality analysis when sentencing defendants pursuant to
¶40 In Solem, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a South Dakota recidivism statute that imposed a sentence of LWOP on a defendant who had written a “no account” check for $100, a class 5 felony under South Dakota law. 463 U.S. at 280–81 & n.5. Because the defendant had previously been convicted of six other nonviolent felonies, his sentence was enhanced to that of a class 1 felony, LWOP. Id. at 281. The defendant brought a proportionality challenge under the Eighth Amendment, arguing
¶41 The Court enumerated three objective factors designed to guide its proportionality analysis: (1) the seriousness of the defendant‘s conduct in relation to the severity of the sentence imposed, (2) the severity of the sentence imposed in light of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the severity of the sentence imposed in relation to sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 290–92. In State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997). In a thorough discussion of Utah‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, Justice Durham articulated a test for proportionality that is substantially similar to that which was established in Solem. Id. at 639–40 (Durham, J., plurality opinion). We find this reasoning persuasive and adopt the first two of these factors for the purpose of
a. The seriousness of the defendant‘s conduct in relation to the severity of his sentence
¶42 First, sentencing courts should consider “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 290–91. This factor necessarily includes an examination of the nature and circumstances of the defendant‘s crime. Though we decline to articulate an exhaustive list of circumstances a court should consider, we note that the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances created by the Utah Sentencing Commission provides a good starting point. Many of the Sentencing Commission‘s guidelines already take into account factors relevant to the gravity of the defendant‘s conduct. However, we emphasize that courts should not limit their inquiry merely to those factors recognized by the Sentencing Commission. Rather, courts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendant‘s crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty.
¶43 In general, nonviolent crimes should be viewed as less serious than violent crimes. Id. at 292-93. The Legislature made a
¶44 The court may also consider the “absolute magnitude of the crime.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 293. A crime that results in the loss of more valuable property may be more serious than stealing a few hundred dollars worth of retail goods. For example, in Utah, theft is usually a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $500.
¶45 Another important consideration is the culpability of the offender. We generally agree with the notion that negligent conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. Solem, 463 U.S. at 293; see also
¶46 We emphasize that a court‘s consideration of this first factor should be guided by its objective assessment of the nature and circumstances of the defendant‘s crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty. The above discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of factors because sentencing remains a highly fact-dependent endeavor. And the Sentencing Commission‘s list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances remain relevant for this factor. On remand, the sentencing court should consider the seriousness of Mr. LeBeau‘s conduct in light of the severe nature of a sentence of LWOP when determining whether the interests of justice warrant the imposition of one of subsection (4)‘s lesser sentences.
¶47 Second, sentencing courts should compare the sentence being imposed to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Utah. A key proposition underlying the proportionality principle is fairness. Defendants who commit more serious offenses should be punished more severely than those who commit less serious crimes. As part of a proportionality analysis, courts should consider the sentences imposed for more and less serious crimes in order to ensure that a particular defendant‘s sentence is not arbitrary.
¶48 For example, in Utah, a person who commits intentional murder is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by an indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life in prison.
¶49 Other crimes for which the Legislature has established LWOP as a possible sentence include a variety of sexual offenses, but only if the defendant is a repeat offender. For example, aggravated sexual assault, rape, and sodomy each carry a penalty of LWOP if the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
¶50 In contrast, Mr. LeBeau was sentenced to LWOP for an aggravated kidnapping in which no one was killed and which was unaccompanied by the type of bodily and dignitary harm associated with sexual assaults. We agree that murder is generally a more serious crime than aggravated kidnapping. And sexual crimes,
¶51 Having provided some guidance as to the proper proportionality analysis for the court on remand, we turn our attention to the second interests-of-justice factor in the Utah Code, the defendant‘s capacity for rehabilitation.
2. Proper Consideration of the Interests of Justice Includes Deference to the Role of the Board of Pardons and Parole
¶52 As noted above, one of the goals of the Utah Criminal Code is to promote justice through the imposition of penalties “which permit recognition [of] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.”
¶54 Sentencing courts must consider all of the factors relevant to a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. We have previously indicated that a defendant’s age at the time of the commission of the crime is relevant. State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300-02 (Utah 1993). Other relevant factors include the extent to which a defendant’s crime was tied to alcohol or drug addiction and the defendant’s prospects for treatment. The extent to which a defendant’s criminal history evidences continual violence is also relevant to his rehabilitative potential. Finally, the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines, several of which relate to a defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation, may prove helpful to sentencing courts in their analysis. We emphasize, however, that sentencing courts should consider all relevant factors when evaluating the defendant’s rehabilitative potential.
¶55 In sum, sentencing courts should consider the proportionality of a sentence to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation when determining whether the interests of justice support a lesser sentence. The sentencing court in this case failed to properly consider the interests of justice when sentencing Mr. LeBeau. We therefore reverse and remand for a new sentencing. Because the sentencing court on remand will be required to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as part of its interests-of-justice analysis, and because Mr. LeBeau argued that the sentencing court previously erred in evaluating several of his proposed mitigating factors, we take this opportunity to provide guidance to the sentencing court on remand.
¶56 Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court erroneously rejected several of his proposed mitigating factors, including (1) his claim that he acted under strong provocation, (2) his relatively minor criminal history, (3) his employment history, and (4) his family ties. Because the district court will be required to assess these factors in its interests-of-justice analysis on remand, we take this opportunity to provide guidance as to the appropriate legal standards.
A. The District Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard when It Rejected Mr. LeBeau’s Claim that He Acted Under Provocation
¶57 At sentencing, Mr. LeBeau argued that he acted under provocation the night he kidnaped Stephanie because he was upset at the thought that she was having an affair with another man. The district court rejected this claimed mitigating circumstance, stating, “There was no evidence presented that [Stephanie] was having an affair. There was no evidence that she was involved in a sexual relationship. You came to that conclusion, but I found no basis for that.” Mr. LeBeau argues that he was not required to prove that Stephanie was actually engaged in a sexual relationship with Mark. Rather, it was enough that Mr. LeBeau believed Stephanie was having an affair and reacted in the heat of the moment because of that belief.
¶58 We agree with Mr. LeBeau that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard in its analysis of this mitigating factor. Though we have never expressly addressed the question in this context, we recently reiterated the proper legal standard to be applied in the context of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶¶ 27–33, 293 P.3d 345. In Ross, we held that “the fact finder must determine whether (1) subjectively, the defendant committed the [crime] while under the influence of extreme emotional distress, and (2) objectively, a reasonable person would have experienced an extreme emotional reaction and loss of self-control under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 28. By analogy, determining whether Mr. LeBeau acted under strong provocation the night he kidnaped Stephanie requires the court to undertake a similar analysis, taking into account both Mr. LeBeau’s subjective experience and the objective reasonableness of that experience.
¶59 In this case, the district court rejected Mr. LeBeau’s claim of provocation on the basis that Mr. LeBeau had not established that
¶60 Stephanie’s testimony paints the picture of a man acting, at least in part, out of jealousy and corroborates Mr. LeBeau’s claim that he reacted emotionally on the night in question. Though this does not excuse Mr. LeBeau’s deplorable actions, his subjective emotional state was relevant to the mitigating factor of provocation. On remand, the sentencing court should examine Mr. LeBeau’s actions in light of the proper legal standard to determine whether Mr. LeBeau acted under provocation the night he kidnaped Stephanie.
B. The District Court Improperly Weighed Mr. LeBeau’s Criminal History
¶61 Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court improperly rejected his relatively minor criminal history as a mitigating factor. We agree. Mr. LeBeau’s criminal history includes a single conviction from 1989 for first degree robbery, when Mr. LeBeau was a juvenile, and a conviction for possession of marijuana in 1993. The presentence report also showed that Mr. LeBeau had been arrest free since 2001.
¶62 At sentencing, the district court rejected Mr. LeBeau’s criminal history as a mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau had an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Alabama and was living under an assumed name at the time he kidnaped Stephanie. The court also noted Mr. LeBeau’s admitted drug use as a reason to find Mr.
¶63 Because the Legislature established a separate sentencing scheme for aggravated kidnapping, we agree with the district court judge that the sentencing guidelines established by the Utah Sentencing Commission are not strictly applicable to Mr. LeBeau’s case. However, the sentencing guidelines were not rendered totally irrelevant. In particular, the criminal history matrices still inform the inquiry into the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history. The Sentencing Commission is charged with developing sentencing guidelines designed to “increase equity in criminal sentencing.”
¶64 As Mr. LeBeau notes, his criminal history scores relatively low on the general offender matrix.7 His score corresponds to a recommended sentence of eight years for a first degree felony involving injury to a person. According to the matrix, an offender with Mr. LeBeau’s criminal history score would receive a recommended sentence of twenty years for first degree murder. Though the sentencing matrices do not carry the same weight in light of the sentencing scheme set out by the Legislature in the aggravated kidnapping statute, they still provide insight into the relative seriousness of a defendant’s criminal history and provide an important check against arbitrary sentencing. Thus, the district court erred in completely disregarding the sentencing matrices when considering whether Mr. LeBeau’s criminal history was a mitigating factor. On remand, the sentencing court should consider the seriousness of Mr. LeBeau’s criminal history, in light of the
C. The District Court Improperly Discounted Mr. LeBeau’s Employment History
¶65 Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court failed to properly credit his employment history as a mitigating factor. The court refused to consider Mr. LeBeau’s employment history as a mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau was unemployed at the time he committed his crime. However, the presentence report makes clear that Mr. LeBeau was employed as a painter by the same employer from May 2005, until he was laid off in December 2008, only two months prior to his arrest. Though a defendant’s employment status at the time of his crime is certainly a relevant factor, it is not solely determinative. In light of the severe economic recession that gripped the country in 2008, which was particularly devastating in the construction sector, the fact that Mr. LeBeau was laid off and had yet to find new employment within a two-month period cannot fairly be held against him. The district court erred when it relied solely on the fact that Mr. LeBeau was unemployed at the time he committed his crime. On remand, the court should consider the reasons for Mr. LeBeau’s unemployment and the totality of his employment history when determining whether his employment history should be considered a mitigating factor.
D. The District Court Improperly Discounted Mr. LeBeau’s Family Support
¶66 The district court refused to consider Mr. LeBeau’s family support structure as a mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau “hadn’t seen [his] mother or [his] sister for years at the time they came to testify at trial.” Again, while a defendant’s physical contact with his family is relevant, it cannot be determinative. Mr. LeBeau’s family all resides out of state. In large part due to the expense of travel, prolonged physical separation of family members is a reality for many today. But with technological innovations, families can remain in close contact, even when physically separated. For example, Mr. LeBeau’s mother told the presentence investigator that she and Mr. LeBeau talked on the phone monthly during the time he was in Utah. Again, the district court’s focus on only one aspect of a potential mitigating factor was in error. On remand, the sentencing court should consider the full extent of Mr. LeBeau’s family support and whether that can be considered a mitigating factor.
¶67 The court of appeals erred in affirming the district court’s imposition of a sentence of LWOP under
STATE v. LEBEAU
Utah Supreme Court
2014 UT 39
JUSTICE LEE, dissenting
JUSTICE LEE, dissenting:
¶68 Utah law has long committed a range of sentencing decisions to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The statute at issue here,
¶69 The majority turns that discretionary standard on its head. Instead of deferring to the historically broad discretion conferred on trial judges, the court interprets the “interests of justice” standard to require a sentencing judge to carefully consider specific factors that the court deems relevant to an assessment of the “proportionality” of a sentence and to the defendant’s “potential for rehabilitation.” Supra ¶ 55. I respectfully dissent. I find no basis in the statute for imposing this rigid framework—imported from constitutional jurisprudence in a case in which no constitutional challenge has been asserted—on a judge exercising discretion under
I
¶70 In Utah as elsewhere, our law has long recognized a wide berth of discretion for judges exercising the important duty of
¶71 With a few limited exceptions, the law has also long deferred to the trial judge’s discretion in identifying the range of offense-based and offender-based considerations relevant to the ultimate decision as to where to fix the sentence within a statutory range.3 For the most part, we have left it up to individual judges to
¶72 Our Utah system of “indeterminate” sentencing circumscribes the trial judge’s discretion to some degree. It does so by generally prescribing indeterminate sentencing ranges for various categories of offenses, with the ultimate amount of time served being decided not by the sentencing judge at the outset but by the parole board in subsequent hearings.5 Under this system of indeterminate sentencing, for example, a second-degree felony is generally subject to a sentence of a prison term of one to fifteen years.
¶74 The process for exercising this discretion is regulated by statute and by rule. Under
¶75 The point of these provisions is straightforward: Both the defense and the prosecution have the opportunity to make a presentation as to any considerations or information they deem relevant to sentencing; and the judge then exercises his broad discretion to impose a sentence based on the considerations he
¶76 We have applied these standards in upholding the exercise of the discretion of a trial judge in making the decision whether to suspend a sentence on condition of probation. See State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 191 P.3d 17, 23 (Utah 2008) (affirming decision to commit adoptive mother to prison instead of probation on conviction of child abuse homicide).10 In affirming such sentencing decisions, we have confirmed that the trial courts have wide discretion, while explaining that the exercise of such discretion is not to be overridden on appeal absent a showing of abuse. Baine, 347 P.2d at 556; Williams, 149 P.2d at 642.
¶77 The sentencing judge’s discretion as to the considerations relevant to sentencing is not unlimited. But its limits are found in the terms of the constitution. Thus, in State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), we held that the information set forth in a presentence report may not be considered in sentencing unless it is provided to the defendant for the purpose of review and response. And we based that decision on principles of notice and due process, explaining that “fundamental fairness requires that procedures . . . in the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding be designed to insure that the decision-making process is based on accurate information,” and holding that a “defendant’s right to be sentenced on the basis of
¶78 We have also identified another limitation on sentencing in cases where such discretion is exercised in a manner interfering with the authority afforded to the Board of Pardons and Parole by statute and by the Utah Constitution. See
¶79 Courts in other jurisdictions have identified additional factors that may not be considered at sentencing without running afoul of the constitution11—factors such as race,12 national origin,13 and gender.14 Except in these limited circumstances,
¶80 The breadth of this sentencing discretion is not without controversy. The flipside of broad discretion is the potential for inconsistency. And that potential has generated a number of responses to the traditional regime of discretionary sentencing described above. One well-known response is the invocation of “sentencing guideline” schemes aimed at replacing the individual judge’s discretion with a formulaic sentencing system adopted pursuant to sentencing reform initiatives.15 Such schemes have been
¶81 Other responses to the traditional system of discretionary sentencing have come in the form of constitutional challenges in the courts. First was a challenge under the Eighth Amendment to the imposition of the death penalty, based on the allegation that
¶82 The second main constitutional challenge to discretionary sentencing came in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Supreme Court struck down the imposition of a life sentence (under a recidivism statute) for a conviction of passing a “no account” check of $100. In so doing the court rejected the proposition that the Eighth Amendment is limited to the proscription of the sorts of “cruel and unusual punishments” decried as barbaric at the time of the founding of the constitution, and embraced in addition a principle of “proportionality.” Id. at 285, 288, 290. That principle, as the majority notes, is one under which a court considering the constitutionality of a sentence under an Eighth Amendment challenge could assess the gravity of the offense at issue and the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction for similar offenses, and the sentences imposed for imposition of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 290–91.
¶83 The Solem standard, however, is not a generally applicable limitation on sentencing discretion. It is a constitutional standard, which is properly invoked only upon the assertion of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a given sentence.18
¶84 This history provides the background necessary for our interpretation of the sentencing discretion prescribed in
¶85 The hazy terms of the statute seem to me to emphasize the breadth of the judge’s discretion in sentencing. As used in our sentencing scheme and elsewhere, this phrase appears to be little more than a reinforcement of the court’s broad discretion to impose a sentence that it deems appropriate in light of the relevant circumstances as perceived by the judge.
¶86 Most often, the notion of “interests of justice” is used to impart discretion for a judge to depart downward from a presumptive statutory sentence for a particular crime.19 The implication, without more, is simply to reinforce the broad range of a judge’s discretion. And the phrase’s general use in other wide-ranging provisions of the code seems to reinforce this notion of broad discretion.20
¶87 I find no room in the statutory authority to impose a sentence “in the interests of justice” for the complex, detailed sentencing standards prescribed by the majority. Granted, the legislature does not always use “the phrase . . . in the same manner in all the[] different contexts” in which it appears in our code. Supra ¶ 28. But to me that only reinforces the understanding of this phrase as a general placeholder for a principle of broad judicial discretion—discretion that may be exercised in different ways in different contexts, but that is broad and not easily subject to reversal on appeal.
¶88 I agree that the current version of
¶89 The majority presumes that any rejection of the old mitigation-aggravation construct must have been a preference for something even more restrictive. Thus, after announcing its conclusion that the statute is not “equivalent to the previous aggravating-and-mitigating circumstances language,” the court assumes that the existing statutory standard must necessarily be more restrictive than the one it replaced. Supra ¶ 32. And it then proceeds to develop such a standard from the general “goals” stated
¶90 I find no basis for such a standard in
¶91 Instead, the terminology of the statute is a straightforward reiteration of the longstanding principle of broad sentencing discretion. Our opinion in State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (1990), hammers this point home. There we rejected the notion that discretion in sentencing is a matter that may be “surrendered to a mathematical formula,” and reiterated instead the wide-ranging discretion afforded to the sentencing judge. Id. at 192. And our articulation of the essence of that discretion is telling. We stated that the “overriding consideration” for a judge imposing a sentence “is that the sentence be just.” Id. (Emphasis added.)23
¶92 I would accordingly read the terms of the governing statute as a straightforward reiteration of the longstanding discretion afforded to the sentencing judge. And I would not deem those terms
¶93 As the majority notes,
¶94 The majority cites this provision as a basis for importing an analysis of the principles of proportionality and rehabilitation, since the third of the four general purposes identified in
¶95 I cannot agree with this approach. The general purposes cited by the majority are purposes of the criminal code—not of trial judges exercising discretion in sentencing. Thus, the general purposes invoked by the court have no apparent connection to our interpretation of the “interests of justice” consideration in sentencing under
¶96 The court’s standard turns the above-recounted history on its head. Traditionally, the principal limits on the judge’s discretion in sentencing have been constitutional in nature. Thus, except where limited by the Eighth Amendment, principles of due process, or otherwise, our law has long left it up to the judge to determine the considerations that seem most salient to him and to impose an appropriate sentence in light of those considerations. The court’s
¶97 This will surely come as a shock to the district judge in this case, who could not possibly have imagined being reversed for not engaging an Eighth Amendment analysis of proportionality in a case where no one had ever invoked the Eighth Amendment. And I suppose it will even come as a shock to counsel for LeBeau, who are being granted broad license to challenge the presumptive sentence endorsed by the legislature on grounds they never advanced in the proceedings below and thus have not preserved.
III
¶98 For the above reasons, I would interpret the terms of
¶99 I can understand a degree of discomfort with the sentence imposed on LeBeau. From what I can tell on the face of the cold record before us on this appeal, I suspect I may not have imposed the sentence that was handed down in this case. But sentences in Utah are not imposed on the basis of cold records. They are imposed by trial judges, who are informed by a wealth of understanding and firsthand experience that appellate judges lack. That is why our law affords those judges such broad discretion, and why we limit our review on appeal for the rare abuse of discretion.
¶100 I can also appreciate a degree of discomfort with the discretionary sentencing scheme that we have adopted in Utah. As I noted above, and as proponents of sentencing reform have been advocating for decades, the downside of discretion is the potential for arbitrariness.25 And that potential is certainly troubling. My point is not to express a preference for a more regimented, guidelines-based approach to sentencing, or even disapproval of our existing regime. The tradeoffs between case-by-case discretion and guidelines-based sentencing formulas pose intractable dilemmas for policymakers, and my understanding of the matter is far too limited to feel confident in advocating for one over the other. Thus, my point is more narrow. It is simply that despite the limitations of our current regime, it is not our prerogative to remake it by judicial fiat. I dissent from a decision that strikes me as a baseless move in that direction.
Notes
- (3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of:
- (a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years and which may be for life;
- (b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or
- (c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
- (4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
- (a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or
- (b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
- (i) 10 years and which may be for life; or
- (ii) six years and which may be for life.