INTRODUCTION
T1 Dеfendant Luke Zachary Baker entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone in violation of Utah Code section 58-87-8. Mr. Baker was the passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a broken taillight. He claims that the police exceeded the permissible length and scope of the stop when they conducted a dog sniff on the car and then ordered him out of the car and searched him. He moved to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia obtained during the search of his person. The district court denied his motion to suppress, but the court of appeals reversed.
12 We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision on two issues: first, whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as to the permissible length and seope of detention of the passengers in a vehicle that police have stopped; and second, whether the court of appeals erred in its сonstruction or application of the Fourth Amendment relating to the cireumstances under which searches for weapons may be conducted. Although we conclude that the officers improperly extended the duration of the stop by having a drug dog sniff the perimeter of the vehicle, we hold that the evidence should not be excluded on this basis because the officers relied in good-faith on settled judicial precedent when they conducted the dog sniff. However, we also conclude that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous at the time they frisked him and discovered the drugs and drug paraphernalia that were the subject of the motion to suppress. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
BACKGROUND
13 Sometime after midnight on January 30, 2005, Officer Raymond Robertson of the Pleasant Grove Police Department stopped the car in which Mr. Baker was a backseat passenger because it had no light iluminat-ing the back license plate. Upon a records search of the driver's identification, Officer Robertson discovered that her driver license had been suspended for a drug violation. He then called for a K-9 unit and arrested the driver for driving on a suspended license.
T4 While Officer Robertson was placing the driver under arrest, two other officers, Officer Mike Bartell and Officer Chris Rock-wood, arrived as backup. Officer Bartell made contact with the passengers in the vehicle. The middle backseat passenger, not Mr. Baker, immediately advised the officer that he had a knife and handed it over to *656 Officer Bartell for the duration of the stop. Officer Bartell asked if there were any other knives or weapons in the vehicle. The four passengers proceeded to give him twelve other knives, including pocket knives and small throwing knives. Officer Bartell confiscated the knives, left the passengers in the car, and waited for the K-9 unit to arrive. Officer Bartell considered the passengers to be nonthreatening and cooperative.
15 Officer Robertson estimates that twelve minutes elapsed between the time when he initially placed the driver under arrest and the arrival of the K-9 unit. He estimates that he had finished searching the driver incident to arrest and had placed her in the back of the patrol car about a minute before the K-9 unit arrived. When Officer Lopez, the K-9 officer, arrived and walked his dog around the car, the dog indicated the presence of drugs on the rear driver's side door handle and on the trunk. Officer Robertson and the two assisting officers then ordered the passengers out of the car and frisked them. When Officer Rockwood frisked Mr. Baker, he discovered a marijuana pipe. During booking, officers also discovered a small bag of methamphetamine in his possession. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Robertson testified that he did not fear for his safety at the time he authorized Officer Rockwood to frisk the passengers.
16 As part of his defense, Mr. Baker moved to suppress the marijuana pipe and the bag of methamphetamine that the officers found in his possession. Officers Bar-tell, Rockwood, and Robertson all testified at the motion hearing. Officer Bartell testified that the passengers cooperated with him when they offered him their knives and that they did nothing to make him fear fоr his safety. Although he testified that all the passengers gave him knives, and that some were pocket knives, while others were larger, he did not identify what type of knife or knives Mr. Baker gave him. Officer Rock-wood testified that he frisked Mr. Baker because the K-9 unit indicated on the vehicle and "because on any traffic stop a police officer is always aware of officer safety." But Officer Robertson agreed that "in this particular case the reason that [he] decided to search Mr. Baker was not because [he] was afraid for [his] safety." After the district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, Mr. Baker entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of appeals reversed the district court, and we granted certiorari. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code seetion 78A-8-102(8)(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
17 On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt.,
ANALYSIS
18 The State argues that the court of appeals erred in its construction of the Fourth Amendment when it reversed the district court's denial of Mr. Baker's motion to suppress. The court of appeals held that the officers impermissibly extended the duration of the stop for the twelve minutes between the arrest of the driver and the arrival of the K-9 unit. State v. Baker,
T9 We first hold that the officers imper-missibly detained Mr. Baker after concluding the purpose of the initial stop, which was to investigate and then arrest the vehicle driver. We then adopt the good-faith exeeption to the exclusionary rule and apply it to the facts of this case, concluding that the officers reasonably relied on settled judicial precedent when they impermissibly extended Mr. Baker's detention by having the drug dog sniff the vehicle. We then consider whether the positive indication of the drug dog justified the subsequent frisk of Mr. Baker, either because it gave rise to an objectively reasonable belief on the part of law enforcement that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous or because it gave rise to probable cause that Mr. Baker possessed illegal drugs under exigent cireumstances that exeused the need for a warrant. Wе conclude that the search of Mr. Baker's person was not justified based on grounds of officer safety because the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that the passengers posed a threat to their safety at the time they conducted the pat-down search of Mr. Baker. And while the drug dog sniff may have provided the officers with justification to search Mr. Baker for drugs, either because the officers had probable cause to arrest him or because exigent cireumstances justified a warrantless search, the State does not raise this argument on appeal. We therefore do not address it.
I. THE OFFICERS IMPROPERLY EXTENDED MR. BAKERS DETENTION AFTER THEY FINISHED PROCESSING THE DRIVERS ARREST
§ 10 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures" of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects" by the government. U.S. Const. amend IV. "[The 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," which "is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Ohio v. Robinette,
T11 Although police must have a warrant to conduct most searches and seizures, "officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of eriminal activity for the purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion." State v. James,
112 We apply a two-step test to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Applegate,
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113 During a lawful traffic stop, "[the temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, - U.S. -, -,
T14 In this case, Officer Robertson was justified at the inception of the stop to detain the vehicle to investigate the broken taillight. See Lopez,
A. When a Traffic Stop Culminates in the Arrest of a Vehicle Driver, the Purpose of the Stop as to the Passengers Ends When the Officers Have Finished the Activities Incident to the Arrest
115 Mr. Baker argues that the police officers exceeded the lawful scope and duration. of the stop by detaining the passengers once they had decided to arrest the driver, The State contends that police may lawfully detain passengers until all purposes of the stop have concluded. If the stop results in the arrest of the driver, they argue that passengers are lawfully detained until officers have concluded all actions incident to the arrest of the driver. We agree with the State. However, we find that the police had concluded all actions incident to the arrest of the driver when they detained Mr. Baker to await the arrival of the K-9 unit.
116 The United States Constitution permits three types of police stops:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is nee-essary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; (8) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being committed.
State v. Johnson,
117 "Once a traffic stop is made, the detеntion 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at
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1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer,
118 In this case, the court of appeals held that the detention of the passengers became illegal as soon as the arrest was made. State v. Baker,
119 The lawful purpose of a traffic stop that results in the arrest of the vehicle driver is complete when all procedures incident to the arrest have taken place. At that time, officers must release any passengers who were detained incident to the detention of the vehicle. We now examine whether the officers had lawful justification to extend the stop in order to conduct a search incident to arrest. We then assess whether officer safety concerns justified the continued detention of the passengers.
1. Arizona v. Gant Prohibits Routine Searches Incident to the Arrest of a Vehicle Occupant
120 Prior to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. -,
121 Gant did not overrule the Knowles and Belton line of cases, but it narrowed the situations in which officers can conduct a search incident to arrest to times "when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search" or when the police could expect to find evidence of the offense for which the arrestee had been arrested.
1
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Gant,
122 The State argues that Gont does not prevent officers from conducting a search incident to arrest when some of the vehicle passengers have not been arrested because officers still have a need to control the scene. Mr. Baker contends that Gant prevents officers from conducting routine searches of an arrestee's vehicle and that the presence of passengers does not affect this holding. We agree with Mr. Baker. Gant clearly holds that absent evidence-preservation concerns, "[plolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search ... unless police obtain a wаrrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies." Id. at 1728-24 (emphasis added). Gant does not limit this holding to situations where there are no passengers in the vehicle.
123 Under Gant, the officers in this case were not permitted to conduct a search incident to the arrest of the vehicle driver and thus had concluded the purpose of the stop when they completed processing her arrest. Both sides agree that the arrested vehicle driver did not have access to the vehicle after she was handcuffed and placed in the back of the police cruiser. And Officer Robertson's testimony makes clear that there was at least a minute delay between completion of the driver's arrest and the arrival of the K-9 unit. Prior to Gant, officers could have lawfully detained the passengers after processing the arrest in order to conduct a search of the arrestee's vehicle regardless of actual officer safety or evidence preservation concerns. But under the new interpretation of Belton announced in Gant, the officers were required to release the passengers, including Mr. Baker, when they finished processing the arrest unless they had reasonable articu-lable suspicion that the passengers were engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity.
124 The State argues that we should not apply Gant retroactively because it represents a "clear break" from prior Supreme Court precedent. But Griffith v. Kentucky eliminated the "clear break" exception to retroactive application of newly declared constitutional rules for cases pending on direct review.
2. Officer Safety Did Not Justify Continued Detention
125 The State also argues that even if the officers were not permitted to detain Mr. Baker, at the time the dog sniff occurred, the officers had reasonable articula-ble suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous, which meant the purрoses of the stop were not complete until the officers had frisked Mr. Baker to ensure officer safety. We disagree.
$26 During a lawful traffic stop, officers may conduct a pat-down search of the driver and other vehicle occupants "upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous." Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S Ct. at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). As with all level two Terry stops, officers must " 'diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.'" Worwood, 2007
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UT 47, ¶ 28,
127 The State urges us to find that the officers' reasonable belief that Mr. Baker and his fellow passengers were armed and dangerous justified continued detention to allow the officers to conduct a search of the passengers at the time of the officers' choosing. In support of this argument, they point to the lateness of the hour and the unusual number of knives collected from the vehicle occupants. In order to determine whether the officers illegally extended the time of Mr. Baker's detention, we need not address whether these factors provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective pat-down search of the vehicle occupants because the officers did not conduct such a search during the lawful duration of the stop. Rather, the officers detained Mr. Baker without searching him while they waited for the K-9 unit and conducted a dog sniff of the exterior of the vehicle prior to conducting any search. Reasonable belief that an individual is armed and dangerous justifies a protective pat-down search, not an extended detention. Thus, even if the officers had a reasonable belief that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous, they illegally prolonged his detention by not taking steps to confirm or dispel this suspicion.
B. No De Minimis Exception Allows Of-fAicers to Conduct a Dog Sniff After the Purpose of the Stop Has Concluded
T28 The State also argues that because there was only a short amount of time between the completion of the arrest of the driver and the arrival of the K-9 unit, we should hold that any extension of the detention of the passengers was de minimis. But "even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially lawful sеarch is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." Schlosser,
{29 Because a trained narcotics-detection dog alerts police only to the presence of contraband, and there is no Fourth Amendment right to possess contraband, the United States Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Place,
[ 30 Some jurisdictions have held that because police may conduct a dog sniff of the exterior of the vehicle during the course of a lawful traffic stop, they may also detain vehicle occupants for a short amount of time after thе purpose of the stop has concluded in order to conduct a dog sniff search. See United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency,
381 Although this court has never considered whether a stop can be extended for a brief period of time in order to conduct a dog sniff, we have made clear that any detention of an individual after the purpose for the initial detention has concluded violates the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we have specifically held that an officer cannot prolong a driver's detention after concluding the purpose of the original stop without reasonable belief that the driver of the car was involved in other illegal activity. Hansen,
1 32 In Hansen, the officer pulled the driver over for an illegal lane change and lack of car insurance. Id. 16, 8. After returning the driver's license and registration and giving him a verbal warning to get insurance on his car, the officer inquired if there were drugs and alcohol in the car and asked the driver for consent to search, which he gave. Id. T§12-14. We ruled that the driver's consent was the fruit of an illegal detention because the officer continued to question him after the purpose of the stop had concluded. Id. I 82.
1383 Similarly, in this case, the officers conducted the dog sniff after the lawful purposes of the stop-investigating the broken taillight and arresting the driver for driving with a suspended license-had concluded. We fail to see how detaining the occupants of the vehicle beyond the lawful purpose of the stop in order to conduct a dog sniff differs in any meaningful way from detaining occupants in order to request consent to search their car. Both a dog sniff and a consent search are legal under the Fourth Amendment only when they are performed during the course of a lawful stop. Further, in this case it appears that the officers had already determined to cоnduct a routine search of the vehicle incident to the arrest of the driver at the time the dog sniff occurred. Such a search is unconstitutional, and the fact that officers used a dog to initiate the search cannot cure the search's infirmities under the Fourth Amendment.
134 Having determined that the officers unlawfully detained Mr. Baker after effectuating the arrest of the driver, we now consider whether we should apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence found during the dog sniff of the car.
II. THE OFFICERS REASONABLY RELIED ON STATE V. BELTON AND ITS PROGENY WHEN THEY IMPROPERLY EXTENDED THE DURATION OF THE STOP
135 The United States Supreme Court has adopted a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in some situations when application of the rule would not serve a
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deterrent effect.
2
Herring v. United States, - U.S. -, -,
136 A good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule exists when an officer acts in reasonable reliance on a warrant, Leon,
37 The officers in the case at hand reasonably relied on settled judicial precedent when they conducted the search incident to arrest. As recently as 2004, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the holding in New York v. Belton,
138 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth and the Tenth Cireuits have come to opposite conclusions about whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to evidence found in searches conducted in violation of Gant. Compare United States v. Gonzalez,
{39 In this case, the officers relied on a practice deemed constitutional by both the Supreme Court and this court in order to conduct their search. Thus, admitting the evidence police found during the time when the officers reasonably believed they had not completed the lawful purpose of their stop would not serve to deter officers from unconstitutionally detaining vehicle passengers. We note that this is not a case where police interpreted аn ambiguous law in their own favor. See State v. Shoulderblade,
140 Having declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence gathered during the unconstitutional detention of Mr. Baker, we now turn to the question of whether officers could frisk him after the drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, either because they believed he was armed or dangerous or because the dog sniff gave rise to probable cause that Mr. Baker was in possession of illegal drugs. We hold that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Baker may be armed and dangerous sufficient to justify a protective frisk. 3 And because the State did not argue, either on appeal or in the district court, that the evidence obtained during the dog sniff gave rise to probable cause justifying a warrantless search for illegal drugs, we do not consider that argument.
III. POLICE OFFICERS HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MR. BAKER WAS ARMED AND DANGEROUS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A PAT-DOWN SEARCH
T 41 "(Officers who conduct 'routine traffic stop[s]' may 'perform a pat-down of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous."" Arizona v. Johnson, - U.S. -, -,
*665 142 In order to determine whether a stop was reasonable, we look to whether the "specific facts ..., considered with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. The State argues that the presence of the knives voluntarily relinquished to the officers prior to the arrest of the driver was sufficient to give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous. The State further argues that the officers did not have to take Mr. Baker's word that he did not possess more knives or another weapon, that they could consider the drug dog's alert on the car as support that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous, and that the court of appeals put too much weight on the officers' subjective lack of fear and unlawful actual purpose for searching the рassengers.
143 We hold that when an individual voluntarily relinquishes a knife, particularly when it is just a small pocket knife, the knife alone does not give an officer automatic justification to conduct a protective frisk. Rather, we evaluate the officer's reasonable artic-ulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances.
A. We Do Not Consider the Thirteen Knives Recovered From the Passengers in Isolation From the Totality of the Circumstances
T44 In considering whether police had reasonable articulable suspicion that an individual posed a threat to their safety, "Iclourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Warren,
{45 The State argues that the cireum-stances in this case are indistinguishable from those justifying the weapons search in Michigan v. Long,
1 46 The only commonalities between Long and this case are the lateness of the hour and the presence of a knife. , The officers in this case did not believe that Mr. Baker was engaged in any illegal activity-in fact he was only detained incidental to the detention of the driver. The officers also reported that Mr. Baker and his fellow passengers all cooperated with the officers during their investigation. Further, the officers denied fearing for their safety. And while the officers suspected drug possession, that is not a.crime for which an offender is likely armed. See section III. A. 2. infra.
1 47 We note that in this case Mr. Baker's cooperation, the officers' subjective lack of fear for their safety, and lack of suspicion that Mr. Baker was involved in a crime associated with violence mitigates the presence of the thirteen knives. As a result, we cannot conclude that the presence of the knives automatically justified a pat-down search of Mr. Baker. Taking all the facts together, we agree with the court of appeals in that the police offiсers in this case did not have an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous sufficient to justify a frisk for weapons.
*666 B. The Court of Appeals Properly Considered the Officers' Subjective Belief Concerning Their Safety and the Purpose for the Pat-Down Search of Mr. Baker
148 The State argues that the court of appeals placed undue weight on the officers' lack of subjective fear and unlawful actual purpose to conduct the pat-down search. Specifically, it argues that while the officers did not testify to being afraid, they testified that traffic stops always present safety concerns, particularly when the passengers possess knives. The State argues that the court of appeals invalidated the search because the officers had an improper purpose when conducting the search-they were looking for drugs not weapons.
149 Although a pat-down search will not be invalidated merely because the officers on the scene did not actually fear for their safety, we give "an officer's subjective factual determination based on experience and specialized training ... due weight as part of the objective analysis." Warren,
50 As an important factor in its totality of the circumstances determination, the court of appeals noted that "all three officers [on the scene during the traffic stop] testified as to having no heightened fear for their safety." State v. Baker,
C. Suspicion of Drug Possession Does Not Support Reasonable Suspicion That an Individual Is Armed and Dangerous
T 51 If an officer suspects that an individual "'has committed, was committing or was about to commit a type of crime for which the offender would likely be armed," the officer automatically has the right to frisk the individual to search for weapons. State v. White,
152 Officers in this case knew that the license of the driver had been suspended for drugs and that a drug sniff had revealed the presence of narcotics in the vehicle. Thus, they had rеasonable suspicion that the car's occupants, including Mr. Baker, may possess narcotics. But the suspected possession of narcotics does not logically support an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Baker was armed and dangerous. Unless officers can point to a specific reason why suspected possession of narcotics by an individual led them to believe the individual to be armed and dangerous, their suspicion of drug possession cannot support a reasonable belief that the individual posed a threat.
D. Considering the Totality of the Circumstances, the Officers Did Not Have an Objectively Reasonable Belief That Mr. Baker Was Armed and Dangerous
153 We have previously applied the totality of the cireumstances test in a similar situation and held that an officer did not have objectively reasonable suspicion that a detained individual posed a threat. Warren
154 On appeal, we ruled that the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the driver was armed and dangerous. Id. 188. We reasoned that the pat-down search could be "supported by the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop, the lateness of the hour, the deserted downtown location, the lie by [the defendant] regarding the status of his license, the need to impound [the defendant's] car, and [the officer's] suspicion that [the defеndant] was involved in drug activity or prostitution." Id. 132. However, considering the totality of the circumstances, "including [the defendant's] cooperative behavior, his response that he did not have any weapons on him, his willing compliance with the order to exit his vehicle," and the officer's subjective belief that the defendant was not armed or dangerous, we concluded that the officer had no objectively reasonable belief that the defendant posed a threat to the officer's safety. Id. M9 832-38.
1 55 The frisk in this case is similar to the officer's frisk of the defendant in Warren. As in Warren, the officers' suspicion that Mr. Baker could pose a threat could be supported by the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops, the lateness of the hour, a hunch that Mr. Baker may be involved in drug-related activity, and the potential need to impound the car in which he was traveling. Additionally, Mr. Baker and the defendant in Warren were similarly cooperative. But unlike the defendant in Warren, Mr. Baker had not told officers a verifiable lie, was suspected only of drug possession not drug trade, and was not the individual who had precipitated the initial traffic stop. The only material difference between the two cases was Mr. Baker's voluntary relinquishment of a knife, a fact mitigated by Mr. Baker's cooperation, lack of threatening behavior, and the officers' subjective lack of fear for their safety. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that the police did not have objective reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Mr. Baker.
1 56 The court of appeals properly considered the presence of the knives as part of the totality of the cireumstances and found that "in this particular situation, the mere presence of the knives, which had been confiscated at the time the officers decided to search the passengers, is not a 'specific and articula-ble fact[] which, taken together with the rational inferences from [that] fact[ ], would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous.' " State v. Baker,
IV. WE DO NOT ADDRESS WHETHER THE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH MR. BAKER FOR DRUGS
T57 The issue of whether a drug dog's positive indication on a vehicle gives rise to probable cause to arrest or search the passengers of that vehicle under exigent circumstances, excusing the requirement of a warrant, is an issue of first impression in this court. The drug dog's positive indication on the rear driver's side door of the vehicle may have given police probable cause to arrest the occupants of the car including Mr. Baker or to seek a search warrant. And the difficulty of obtaining a warrant in the middle of the night combined with a likelihood that Mr. Baker would destroy evidence before police could obtain a warrant could have created exigent cireumstances sufficient to justify the pat-down search. See State v. Duran,
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dence" can satisfy the "exigent cireum-stances" requirement (internal quotations marks omitted)). State v. Rodriguez,
CONCLUSION
T 58 Because officers had finished processing the arrest of the driver and were not allowed to conduct a search incident to her arrest, we hold that they had improperly extended the duration of Mr. Baker's detention at the time the dog sniff occurred. However, we decline to apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence obtained as a result of this violation because the officers acted in good faith reliance on previous precedent that allowed them to conduct a search of the vehicle incident to arrest. But we find that the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that the passengers posed a threat to their safety at the time they conducted the pat-down search of Mr. Baker. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Notes
. Because the driver of the vehicle was arrested for driving with a suspended license, the State *660 does not argue that there was any evidence-preservation justification for searching the vehicle once the arrest was processed.
. We have not had the opportunity to determine whether such an exception exists under the Utah Constitution, and we do not do so today. See Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n,
. Mr. Baker argues that we should strike the portion of the State's brief that mentions FBI statistics about assaults on police officers during traffic stops and a news article about a mentally imbalanced woman who shot a police officer during a traffic stop because the statistics and news article were not part of the record on appeal. However, the State is not using the statistics or news article as proof of any fact in evidence, but rather using them to bolster its claim that traffic stops are dangerous and require extra safety precautions to protect officers. Compare Northland Ins. Co. v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co.,