FURMAN v. GEORGIA
No. 69-5003
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 17, 1972—Decided June 29, 1972
408 U.S. 238
*Together with No. 69-5030, Jackson v. Georgia, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 69-5031, Branch v. Texas, on certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dorothy T. Beasley, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. With her on the briefs were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ryan, Jr. Charles Alan Wright argued the cause for respondent in No. 69-5031. With him on the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Robert C. Flowers and Glenn R. Brown, Assistant Attorneys General.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL have filed separate opinions in support of the judgments. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST have filed separate dissenting opinions.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
In these three cases the death penalty was imposed, one of them for murder, and two for rape. In each the determination of whether the penalty should be death or a lighter punishment was left by the State to the discretion of the judge or of the jury. In each of the three cases the trial was to a jury. They are here on petitions for certiorari which we granted limited to the question whether the imposition and execution of the death penalty constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” within the meaning of the
Congressman Bingham, in proposing the
“[M]any instances of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of the United States had provided no remedy and could provide none.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2542.
Whether the privileges and immunities route is followed, or the due process route, the result is the same.
It has been assumed in our decisions that punishment by death is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be inhuman and barbarous. In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447. It is also said in our opinions
The generality of a law inflicting capital punishment is one thing. What may be said of the validity of a law on the books and what may be done with the law in its application do, or may, lead to quite different conclusions.
It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is “unusual” if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.
There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the language of the
“Following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, the old system of penalties, which ensured equality between crime and punishment, suddenly disappeared. By the time systematic judicial records were kept, its demise was almost complete. With the exception of certain grave crimes for which the punishment was death or outlawry, the arbitrary fine was replaced by a discretionary
“The problem of excessive amercements became so prevalent that three chapters of the Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation. Maitland said of Chapter 14 that ‘very likely there was no clause in the Magna Carta more grateful to the mass of the people.’ Chapter 14 clearly stipulated as fundamental law a prohibition of excessiveness in punishments:
“‘A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood; and a merchant likewise, saving his merchandise; in the same way a villein shall be amerced saving his wainage; if they fall into our mercy. And none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the testimony of reputable men of the neighborhood.’ ”
The English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, stated that “excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”3 These were the words chosen for our
“Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments;’ the import of them being too indefinite.
“Mr. LIVERMORE: The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.”
The words “cruel and unusual” certainly include pen-
The Court in McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 198, noted that in this country there was almost from the beginning a “rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted
“In order to meet the problem of jury nullification, legislatures did not try, as before, to refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead they adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact.” Ibid.
The Court concluded: “In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.” Id., at 207.
The Court refused to find constitutional dimensions in the argument that those who exercise their discretion to send a person to death should be given standards by which that discretion should be exercised. Id., at 207-208.
A recent witness at the Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Ernest van den Haag, testifying on H. R. 8414 et al.,10 stated:
“Any penalty, a fine, imprisonment or the death penalty could be unfairly or unjustly applied. The
But those who advance that argument overlook McGautha, supra.
We are now imprisoned in the McGautha holding. Indeed the seeds of the present cases are in McGautha. Juries (or judges, as the case may be) have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die.11
There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal protection is implicit in “cruel and unusual” punishments. “A penalty . . . should be considered ‘unusually’ imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.”12 The same authors add that “[t]he extreme rarity with which applicable death penalty provisions are put to use raises a strong inference of arbitrariness.”13 The President‘s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recently concluded:14
“Finally there is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the
A study of capital cases in Texas from 1924 to 1968 reached the following conclusions:15
“Application of the death penalty is unequal: most of those executed were poor, young, and ignorant.
“Seventy-five of the 460 cases involved co-defendants, who, under Texas law, were given separate trials. In several instances where a white and a Negro were co-defendants, the white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the death penalty.
“Another ethnic disparity is found in the type of sentence imposed for rape. The Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty than a term sentence, whereas whites and Latins are far more likely to get a term sentence than the death penalty.”
Warden Lewis E. Lawes of Sing Sing said:16
“Not only does capital punishment fail in its justification, but no punishment could be invented with so many inherent defects. It is an unequal punishment in the way it is applied to the rich and to the poor. The defendant of wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or to the gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is theoretically impartial, but the defendant with ample means is able to have his case presented with every favourable aspect, while the poor defendant often has a lawyer assigned by the court. Sometimes such assignment is considered part of political patronage; usually the lawyer assigned has had no experience whatever in a capital case.”
Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has said, “It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.”17 One searches our chron-
Jackson, a black, convicted of the rape of a white woman, was 21 years old. A court-appointed psychiatrist said that Jackson was of average education and average intelligence, that he was not an imbecile, or schizophrenic, or psychotic, that his traits were the product of environmental influences, and that he was competent to stand trial. Jackson had entered the house after the husband left for work. He held scissors against the neck of the wife, demanding money. She could find none and a struggle ensued for the scissors, a battle which she lost; and she was then raped, Jackson keeping the scissors pressed against her neck. While there did not appear to be any long-term traumatic impact on the victim, she was bruised and abrased in the struggle but was not hospitalized. Jackson was a convict who had escaped from a work gang in the area, a result of a three-year sentence for auto theft. He was at large for three days and during that time had committed several other offenses—burglary, auto theft, and assault and battery.
Furman, a black, killed a householder while seeking to enter the home at night. Furman shot the deceased through a closed door. He was 26 years old and had finished the sixth grade in school. Pending trial, he was committed to the Georgia Central State Hospital for a psychiatric examination on his plea of insanity tendered by court-appointed counsel. The superintendent reported that a unanimous staff diagnostic conference had concluded “that this patient should retain his present diagnosis of Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder.” The physicians agreed that “at present the patient is not psychotic, but he is not capable of cooperating with his counsel in the preparation of his
Later, the superintendent reported that the staff diagnosis was Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder. He concluded, however, that Furman was “not psychotic at present, knows right from wrong and is able to cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense.”
Branch, a black, entered the rural home of a 65-year-old widow, a white, while she slept and raped her, holding his arm against her throat. Thereupon he demanded money and for 30 minutes or more the widow searched for money, finding little. As he left, Jackson said if the widow told anyone what happened, he would return and kill her. The record is barren of any medical or psychiatric evidence showing injury to her as a result of Branch‘s attack.
He had previously been convicted of felony theft and found to be a borderline mental deficient and well below the average IQ of Texas prison inmates. He had the equivalent of five and a half years of grade school education. He had a “dull intelligence” and was in the lowest fourth percentile of his class.
We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.
Irving Brant has given a detailed account of the Bloody Assizes, the reign of terror that occupied the
“Nobody knows how many hundreds of men, innocent or of unproved guilt, Jeffreys sent to their deaths in the pseudo trials that followed Monmouth‘s feeble and stupid attempt to seize the throne. When the ordeal ended, scores had been executed and 1,260 were awaiting the hangman in three counties. To be absent from home during the uprising was evidence of guilt. Mere death was considered much too mild for the villagers and farmers rounded up in these raids. The directions to a high sheriff were to provide an ax, a cleaver, ‘a furnace or cauldron to boil their heads and quarters, and soil to boil therewith, half a bushel to each traitor, and tar to tar them with, and a sufficient number of spears and poles to fix their heads and quarters’ along the highways. One could have crossed a good part of northern England by their guidance.
“The story of The Bloody Assizes, widely known to Americans, helped to place constitutional limitations on the crime of treason and to produce a bar against cruel and unusual punishments. But in the polemics that led to the various guarantees of freedom, it had no place compared with the tremendous thrust of the trial and execution of Sidney. The hundreds of judicial murders committed by Jeffreys and his fellow judges were totally inconceivable in a free American republic, but any American could imagine himself in Sidney‘s place—executed for putting on paper, in his closet, words that later on came to express the basic principles of republican government. Unless barred by fundamental law, the legal rulings that permitted this
result could easily be employed against any person whose political opinions challenged the party in power.” The Bill of Rights 154-155 (1965).
Those who wrote the
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible “caste” aspect18 of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position. In ancient Hindu law a Brahman was exempt from capital punishment,19 and under that law, “[g]enerally, in the law books, punishment increased in severity as social status diminished.”20 We have, I fear, taken in practice the same position, partially as a result of making the death pen-
The high service rendered by the “cruel and unusual” punishment clause of the
A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000 would be exempt from the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a law that in terms said that blacks, those who never went beyond the fifth grade in school, those who made less than $3,000 a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the only people executed. A law which in the overall view reaches that result in practice21 has no more sanctity than a law which in terms provides the same.
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional
Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
I concur in the judgments of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
The question presented in these cases is whether death is today a punishment for crime that is “cruel and unusual” and consequently, by virtue of the
I
We have very little evidence of the Framers’ intent in including the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause among those restraints upon the new Government enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The absence of such a restraint from the body of the Constitution was alluded to, so far as we now know, in the debates of only two of the state ratifying conventions. In the Massachusetts convention, Mr. Holmes protested:
“What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and deter
mine, what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.” 2 J. Elliot‘s Debates 111 (2d ed. 1876).
Holmes’ fear that Congress would have unlimited power to prescribe punishments for crimes was echoed by Patrick Henry at the Virginia convention:
“... Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into business of human legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offence—petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. What says our [Virginia] bill of rights?—‘that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ Are you not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to ... define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose; you do more—you depart from the genius of your country. . . .
“In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your [Virginia] declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?—
That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.” 3 id., at 447.2
These two statements shed some light on what the Framers meant by “cruel and unusual punishments.” Holmes referred to “the most cruel and unheard-of punishments,” Henry to “tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.” It does not follow, however, that the Framers were exclusively concerned with prohibiting torturous punishments. Holmes and Henry were objecting to the absence of a Bill of Rights, and they cited to support their objections the unrestrained legislative power to prescribe punishments for crimes. Certainly we may suppose that they invoked the specter of the most drastic punishments a legislature might devise.
In addition, it is quite clear that Holmes and Henry focused wholly upon the necessity to restrain the legislative power. Because they recognized “that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine, what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes,” they insisted that Congress must be limited in its power to punish. Accordingly, they
The only further evidence of the Framers’ intent appears from the debates in the First Congress on the adoption of the Bill of Rights.4 As the Court noted in Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 368 (1910),
“Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments;’ the import of them being too indefinite.
“Mr. LIVERMORE.—The [Eighth Amendment] seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. . . . No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.
“The question was put on the [Eighth Amendment], and it was agreed to by a considerable majority.” 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789).5
Livermore thus agreed with Holmes and Henry that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposed a limitation upon the legislative power to prescribe pun
Several conclusions thus emerge from the history of the adoption of the Clause. We know that the Framers’ concern was directed specifically at the exercise of legislative power. They included in the Bill of Rights a prohibition upon “cruel and unusual punishments” precisely because the legislature would otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe punishments for crimes. Yet we cannot now know exactly what the Framers thought “cruel and unusual punishments” were. Certainly they intended to ban torturous punishments, but the available evidence does not support the further conclusion that only torturous punishments were to be outlawed. As Livermore‘s comments demonstrate, the Framers were well aware that the reach of the Clause was not limited to the proscription of unspeakable atrocities. Nor did they intend simply to forbid punishments considered “cruel and unusual” at the time. The “import” of the Clause is, indeed, “indefinite,” and for good reason. A constitutional provision “is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general lan-
It was almost 80 years before this Court had occasion to refer to the Clause. See Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 479-480 (1867). These early cases, as the Court pointed out in Weems v. United States, supra, at 369, did not undertake to provide “an exhaustive definition” of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Most of them proceeded primarily by “looking backwards for examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause,” id., at 377, concluding simply that a punishment would be “cruel and unusual” if it were similar to punishments considered “cruel and unusual” at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.7 In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S., at 136, for instance, the Court found it “safe to affirm that punishments of torture and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden.” The “punishments of torture,” which the Court labeled “atrocities,” were cases where the criminal “was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered,” and cases “of public dissection ... and burning alive.” Id., at 135. Similarly, in In re Kemm-
Had this “historical” interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevailed, the Clause would have been effectively read out of the Bill of Rights. As the Court noted in Weems v. United States, supra, at 371, this interpretation led Story to conclude “that the provision ‘would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct.‘” And Cooley in his book, Constitutional Limitations, said the Court, “apparently in a struggle between the effect to be given to ancient examples and the inconsequence of a dread of them in these enlightened times, hesitate[d] to advance definite views.” Id., at 375. The result of a judicial application of this interpretation was not surprising. A state court, for example, upheld the constitutionality of the whipping post: “In comparison with the ‘barbarities of quartering, hanging in chains, castration, etc.,’ it was easily reduced to insignificance.” Id., at 377.
“[Patrick] Henry and those who believed as he did would take no chances. Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse. But surely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their [jealousy] of power had a saner justification than that. They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they
might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the [Stuarts‘,] or to prevent only an exact repetition of history. We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment was overlooked.” Id., at 372-373.
The Court in Weems thus recognized that this “restraint upon legislatures” possesses an “expansive and vital character” that is “‘essential ... to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom.‘” Id., at 376-377. Accordingly, the responsibility lies with the courts to make certain that the prohibition of the Clause is enforced.8 Referring to cases in which “prominence [was] given to the power of the legislature to define crimes and their punishment,” the Court said:
“We concede the power in most of its exercises. We disclaim the right to assert a judgment
In short, this Court finally adopted the Framers’ view of the Clause as a “constitutional check” to ensure that “when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives.” That, indeed, is the only view consonant with our constitutional form of government. If the judicial conclusion that a punishment is “cruel and unusual” “depend[ed] upon virtually unanimous condemnation of the penalty at issue,” then, “[l]ike no other constitutional provision, [the Clause‘s] only function would be to legitimize advances already made by the other departments and opinions already the conventional wisdom.” We know that the Framers did not envision “so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human rights.” Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1782 (1970). The right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, like the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, “may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.” “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
Judicial enforcement of the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights. The difficulty arises, rather, in formulating the “legal principles to be applied by the courts” when a legislatively prescribed punishment is challenged as “cruel and unusual.” In formulating those constitutional principles, we must avoid the insertion of “judicial conception[s] of ... wisdom or propriety,” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S., at 379, yet we must not, in the guise of “judicial restraint,” abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce the Bill of Rights. Were we to do so, the “constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.” Id., at 373. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would become, in short, “little more than good advice.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 104.
II
Ours would indeed be a simple task were we required merely to measure a challenged punishment against those that history has long condemned. That narrow and unwarranted view of the Clause, however, was left behind with the 19th century. Our task today is more complex. We know “that the words of the [Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static.” We know, therefore, that the Clause “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-
In Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 99, it was said that “[t]he question is whether [a] penalty subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the [Clause].” It was also said that a challenged punishment must be examined “in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment” embodied in the Clause. Id., at 100 n. 32. It was said, finally, that:
“The basic concept underlying the [Clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the [Clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Id., at 100.
At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is “cruel and unusual,” therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.
This formulation, of course, does not of itself yield principles for assessing the constitutional validity of particular punishments. Nevertheless, even though “[t]his Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the [Clause],” ibid., there are principles recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause sufficient to permit a judicial determination whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity.
More than the presence of pain, however, is comprehended in the judgment that the extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of human beings. The barbaric punishments condemned by history, “punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like,” are, of course, “attended with acute pain and suffering.” O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). When we consider why they have been condemned, however, we realize that the pain involved is not the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that they treat
The infliction of an extremely severe punishment, then, like the one before the Court in Weems v. United States, from which “[n]o circumstance of degradation [was] omitted,” 217 U. S., at 366, may reflect the attitude that the person punished is not entitled to recognition as a fellow human being. That attitude may be apparent apart from the severity of the punishment itself. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947), for example, the unsuccessful electrocution, although it caused “mental anguish and physical pain,” was the result of “an unforeseeable accident.” Had the failure been intentional, however, the punishment would have been, like torture, so degrading and indecent as to amount to a refusal to accord the criminal human status. Indeed, a punishment may be degrading to human dignity solely because it is a punishment. A State may not punish a person for being “mentally ill, or a leper, or ... afflicted with a venereal disease,” or for being addicted to narcotics. Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, 666 (1962). To inflict punishment for having a disease is to treat the individual as a diseased thing rather than as a sick human being. That the punishment is not severe, “in the abstract,” is irrelevant; “[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” Id., at 667. Finally, of course, a punishment may be degrading simply by reason of its enormity. A prime example is expatriation, a “punishment more primitive than torture,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 101, for it necessarily involves a
In determining whether a punishment comports with human dignity, we are aided also by a second principle inherent in the Clause—that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. This principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others. Indeed, the very words “cruel and unusual punishments” imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments. And, as we now know, the English history of the Clause16 reveals a particular concern with the establishment of a safeguard against arbitrary punishments. See Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 857-860 (1969).17
“Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities referred to [treatises on military law] are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that
The Court thus upheld death by shooting, so far as appears, solely on the ground that it was a common method of execution.19
As Wilkerson v. Utah suggests, when a severe punishment is inflicted “in the great majority of cases” in which it is legally available, there is little likelihood that the State is inflicting it arbitrarily. If, however, the infliction of a severe punishment is “something different from that which is generally done” in such cases, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 101 n. 32,20 there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the State, contrary to the requirements of regularity and fairness embodied in the Clause, is inflicting the punishment arbitrarily. This principle is especially important today. There is scant danger, given the political processes “in an enlightened democracy such as ours,” id., at 100, that extremely severe punishments will be widely applied. The more significant function of the Clause, therefore, is to protect against the danger of their arbitrary infliction.
A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society. Rejection by society, of course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with human dignity. In applying this principle, however, we must make certain that the judicial determination is as objective as possible.21
The question under this principle, then, is whether there are objective indicators from which a court can conclude that contemporary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable. Accordingly, the judicial task is to review the history of a challenged punishment
The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, cf. Robinson v. California, supra, at 666; id., at 677 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 114 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.
This principle first appeared in our cases in Mr. Justice Field‘s dissent in O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S., at 337.23 He there took the position that:
“[The Clause] is directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned [torturous punishments], but against all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted.” Id., at 339-340.
Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime,24 the more significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment. This view of the principle was explicitly recognized by the Court in Weems v. United States, supra. There the Court, reviewing a severe punishment inflicted for the falsification of an official record, found that “the highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss of many thousand[s] of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public account.” Id., at 381. Stating that “this contrast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgment,” the Court concluded that the punishment was unnecessarily severe in view of the purposes for which it was imposed. Ibid.25
See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 111-112 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).26
There are, then, four principles by which we may determine whether a particular punishment is “cruel and unusual.” The primary principle, which I believe supplies the essential predicate for the application of the others, is that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human dignity. The paradigm violation of this principle would be the infliction of a torturous punishment of the type that the Clause has always prohibited. Yet “[i]t is unlikely that any State at this moment in history,” Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 666, would pass a law providing for the infliction of such a punishment. Indeed, no such punishment has ever been before this Court. The same may be said of the other principles. It is unlikely that this Court will confront a severe punishment that is obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion; no State would engage in a reign of blind terror. Nor is it likely that this Court will be called upon to review a severe punishment that is clearly and totally rejected throughout society; no legislature would be able even to authorize the infliction of such a punishment. Nor, finally, is it likely that this Court will have to consider a severe punishment that is patently unnecessary; no State today would inflict a severe punishment knowing that there was no reason whatever for doing so. In short, we are unlikely to have occasion to determine that a punishment is fatally offensive under any one principle.
Since the Bill of Rights was adopted, this Court has adjudged only three punishments to be within the prohibition of the Clause. See Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910) (12 years in chains at hard and painful labor); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958) (expatriation); Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for narcotics addiction). Each punishment, of course, was degrading to human dignity, but of none could it be said conclusively that it was fatally offensive under one or the other of the principles. Rather, these “cruel and unusual punishments” seriously implicated several of the principles, and it was the application of the principles in combination that supported the judgment. That, indeed, is not surprising. The function of these principles, after all, is simply to provide means by which a court can determine whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity. They are, therefore, interrelated, and in most cases it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that a punishment is “cruel and unusual.” The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
III
The punishment challenged in these cases is death. Death, of course, is a “traditional” punishment, Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 100, one that “has been employed throughout our history,” id., at 99, and its constitu-
There is, first, a textual consideration raised by the Bill of Rights itself. The
There is also the consideration that this Court has decided three cases involving constitutional challenges to particular methods of inflicting this punishment. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879), and In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), the Court, expressing in both cases the since-rejected “historical” view of the Clause, see supra, at 264-265, approved death by shooting and death by electrocution. In Wilkerson, the Court concluded that shooting was a common method of execution, see supra, at 275-276;30 in Kemmler, the Court held that the Clause did not apply to the States, 136 U. S., at 447-449.31
The question, then, is whether the deliberate infliction of death is today consistent with the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict punishments that do not comport with human dignity. I will analyze the punishment of death in terms of the principles
Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ultimate sanction. This natural human feeling appears all about us. There has been no national debate about punishment, in general or by imprisonment, comparable to the debate about the punishment of death. No other punishment has been so continuously restricted, see infra, at 296-298, nor has any State yet abolished prisons, as some have abolished this punishment. And those States that still inflict death reserve it for the most heinous crimes. Juries, of course, have always treated death cases differently, as have governors exercising their commutation powers. Criminal defendants are of the same view. “As all practicing lawyers know, who have defended persons charged with capital offenses, often the only goal possible is to avoid the death penalty.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting). Some legislatures have required particular procedures, such as two-stage trials and automatic appeals, applicable only in death cases. “It is the universal experience in the administration of criminal justice that those charged with capital offenses are granted special considerations.” Ibid. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 103 (1970) (all States require juries of 12 in death cases). This Court, too, almost
The only explanation for the uniqueness of death is its extreme severity. Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical and mental suffering. Although our information is not conclusive, it appears that there is no method available that guarantees an immediate and painless death.35 Since the discon-
execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon.” Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 14 (1950) (dissenting opinion). The “fate of ever-increasing fear and distress” to which the expatriate is subjected, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 102, can only exist to a greater degree for a person confined in prison awaiting death.37
The unusual severity of death is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself. Expatriation, for example, is a punishment that “destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development,” that “strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community,” and that puts “[h]is very existence” in jeopardy. Expatriation thus inherently entails “the total destruction of the individual‘s status in organized society.” Id., at 101. “In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.” Id., at 102. Yet, demonstrably, expatriation is not “a fate worse than death.” Id., at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).38 Although death, like expatriation, destroys the
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person‘s humanity. The contrast with the plight of a person punished by imprisonment is evident. An individual in prison does not lose “the right to have rights.” A prisoner retains, for example, the constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and to treatment as a “person” for purposes of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. A prisoner remains a member of the human family. Moreover, he retains the right of access to the courts. His punishment is not irrevocable. Apart from the common charge, grounded upon the recognition of human fallibility, that the punishment of death must inevitably be inflicted upon innocent men, we know that death has been the lot of men whose convictions were unconstitutionally secured in view of later, retroactively applied, holdings of this Court. The punishment itself may have been unconstitutionally inflicted, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), yet the finality of death precludes relief. An executed person has indeed “lost the right to have rights.” As one 19th century proponent of punishing criminals by death declared, “When a man is hung, there is an end of our relations with him. His execution is a way of saying, ‘You are not fit for this world, take your chance elsewhere.’ ”39
The outstanding characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort to it. The evidence is conclusive that death is not the ordinary punishment for any crime.
There has been a steady decline in the infliction of this punishment in every decade since the 1930‘s, the earliest period for which accurate statistics are available. In the 1930‘s, executions averaged 167 per year; in the 1940‘s, the average was 128; in the 1950‘s, it was 72; and in the years 1960-1962, it was 48. There have been a total of 46 executions since then, 36 of them in 1963-1964.40 Yet our population and the number of capital crimes committed have increased greatly over the past four decades. The contemporary rarity of the infliction of this punishment is thus the end result of a long-continued decline. That rarity is plainly revealed by an examination of the years 1961-1970, the last 10-year period for which statistics are available. During that time, an average of 106 death sentences
When a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied. To dispel it would indeed require a clear showing of nonarbitrary infliction.
Although there are no exact figures available, we know that thousands of murders and rapes are committed annually in States where death is an authorized punishment for those crimes. However the rate of infliction is characterized—as “freakishly” or “spectacularly” rare, or simply as rare—it would take the purest sophistry to deny that death is inflicted in only a minute fraction of these cases. How much rarer, after all, could the infliction of death be?
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system. The States claim, however, that this rarity is evidence not of arbitrariness, but of informed selectivity: Death is inflicted, they say, only in “extreme” cases.
Informed selectivity, of course, is a value not to be denigrated. Yet presumably the States could make precisely the same claim if there were 10 executions per
Although it is difficult to imagine what further facts would be necessary in order to prove that death is, as my Brother STEWART puts it, “wantonly and ... freakishly” inflicted, I need not conclude that arbitrary infliction is patently obvious. I am not considering this punishment by the isolated light of one principle. The probability of arbitrariness is sufficiently substantial that it can be relied upon, in combination with the other principles, in reaching a judgment on the constitutionality of this punishment.
When there is a strong probability that an unusually severe and degrading punishment is being inflicted arbitrarily, we may well expect that society will disapprove of its infliction. I turn, therefore, to the third principle. An examination of the history and present operation of the American practice of punishing criminals by death reveals that this punishment has been almost totally rejected by contemporary society.
I cannot add to my Brother MARSHALL‘S comprehensive treatment of the English and American history of
Our practice of punishing criminals by death has changed greatly over the years. One significant change has been in our methods of inflicting death. Although this country never embraced the more violent and repulsive methods employed in England, we did for a long time rely almost exclusively upon the gallows and the firing squad. Since the development of the supposedly
Also significant is the drastic decrease in the crimes for which the punishment of death is actually inflicted. While esoteric capital crimes remain on the books, since 1930 murder and rape have accounted for nearly 99% of the total executions, and murder alone for about 87%.51 In addition, the crime of capital murder has itself been limited. As the Court noted in McGautha v. California, 402 U. S., at 198, there was in this country a “rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers.” Initially, that rebellion resulted in legislative definitions that distinguished between degrees of murder, retaining the mandatory death sentence only for murder in the first degree. Yet “[t]his new legislative criterion for isolating crimes appropriately punishable by death soon proved as unsuccessful as the concept of ‘malice aforethought,’ ” ibid., the common-law means of separating murder from manslaughter. Not only was the distinction between degrees of murder confusing and uncertain in practice, but even in clear cases of first-degree murder juries continued to take the law into
their own hands: if they felt that death was an inappropriate punishment, “they simply refused to convict of the capital offense.” Id., at 199. The phenomenon of jury nullification thus remained to counteract the rigors of mandatory death sentences. Bowing to reality, “legislatures did not try, as before, to refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead they adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact.” Ibid. In consequence, virtually all death sentences today are discretionarily imposed. Finally, it is significant that nine States no longer inflict the punishment of death under any circumstances,52 and five others have restricted it to extremely rare crimes.53In addition, six States, while retaining the punishment on the books in generally applicable form, have made virtually no use of it. Since 1930, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyoming have carried out a total of 22 executions. Id., at 10-11. As of January 1, 1971, these six States had a total of three prisoners under sentences of death. Id., at 18-19. Hence, assuming 25 executions in 42 years, each State averaged about one execution every 10 years.
Thus, although “the death penalty has been employed throughout our history,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 99, in fact the history of this punishment is one of successive restriction. What was once a common punishment has become, in the context of a continuing moral debate, increasingly rare. The evolution of this punishment evidences, not that it is an inevitable part of the American scene, but that it has proved progressively more troublesome to the national conscience. The result of this movement is our current system of administering the punishment, under which death sentences are rarely imposed and death is even more rarely inflicted. It is, of course, “We, the People” who are responsible for the rarity both of the imposition and the carrying out of this punishment. Juries, “express[ing] the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death,” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S., at 519, have been able to bring themselves to vote for death in a mere 100 or so cases among the thousands tried each year where the punishment is available. Governors, elected by and acting for us, have regularly commuted a substantial number of those sentences. And it is our society that insists upon due process of law to the end that no person will be unjustly put to death, thus ensuring that many more of those sentences will not be carried out. In sum, we have made death a rare punishment today.
The progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment today. The States point out that many legislatures authorize death as the punishment for certain crimes and that substantial segments of the public, as reflected in opinion polls and referendum votes, continue to support it. Yet the availability of this punishment through statutory authorization, as well as the polls and refer
The final principle to be considered is that an unusually severe and degrading punishment may not be excessive in view of the purposes for which it is inflicted. This principle, too, is related to the others. When there is a strong probability that the State is arbitrarily inflicting an unusually severe punishment that is subject to grave societal doubts, it is likely also that the punishment cannot be shown to be serving any penal purpose that could not be served equally well by some less severe punishment.
The States’ primary claim is that death is a necessary punishment because it prevents the commission of capital crimes more effectively than any less severe punishment. The first part of this claim is that the infliction of death is necessary to stop the individuals executed from committing further crimes. The sufficient answer to this is that if a criminal convicted of a capital crime poses a danger to society, effective administration of the State‘s pardon and parole laws can delay or deny his release from prison, and techniques of isolation can elim
The more significant argument is that the threat of death prevents the commission of capital crimes because it deters potential criminals who would not be deterred by the threat of imprisonment. The argument is not based upon evidence that the threat of death is a superior deterrent. Indeed, as my Brother MARSHALL establishes, the available evidence uniformly indicates, although it does not conclusively prove, that the threat of death has no greater deterrent effect than the threat of imprisonment. The States argue, however, that they are entitled to rely upon common human experience, and that experience, they say, supports the conclusion that death must be a more effective deterrent than any less severe punishment. Because people fear death the most, the argument runs, the threat of death must be the greatest deterrent.
It is important to focus upon the precise import of this argument. It is not denied that many, and probably most, capital crimes cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment. Thus the argument can apply only to those who think rationally about the commission of capital crimes. Particularly is that true when the potential criminal, under this argument, must not only consider the risk of punishment, but also distinguish between two possible punishments. The concern, then, is with a particular type of potential criminal, the rational person who will commit a capital crime knowing that the punishment is long-term imprisonment, which may well be for the rest of his life, but will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is death. On the face of it, the assumption that such persons exist is implausible.
In any event, this argument cannot be appraised in the abstract. We are not presented with the theoretical question whether under any imaginable circumstances the
The question, however, is not whether death serves these supposed purposes of punishment, but whether death serves them more effectively than imprisonment. There is no evidence whatever that utilization of imprisonment rather than death encourages private blood feuds and other disorders. Surely if there were such a danger, the execution of a handful of criminals each year would not prevent it. The assertion that death alone is a sufficiently emphatic denunciation for capital crimes suffers from the same defect. If capital crimes require the punishment of death in order to provide moral reinforcement for the basic values of the community, those values can only be undermined when death is so rarely inflicted upon the criminals who commit the crimes. Furthermore, it is certainly doubtful that the infliction of death by the State does in fact strengthen the community‘s moral code; if the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our values. That, after all, is why we no longer carry out public executions. In any event, this claim simply means that one purpose of punishment is to indicate social disapproval of crime. To serve that purpose our
There is, then, no substantial reason to believe that the punishment of death, as currently administered, is necessary for the protection of society. The only other purpose suggested, one that is independent of protection for society, is retribution. Shortly stated, retribution in this context means that criminals are put to death because they deserve it.
Although it is difficult to believe that any State today wishes to proclaim adherence to “naked vengeance,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 112 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the States claim, in reliance upon its statutory authorization, that death is the only fit punishment for capital crimes and that this retributive purpose justifies its infliction. In the past, judged by its statutory authorization, death was considered the only fit punishment for the crime of forgery, for the first federal criminal statute provided a mandatory death penalty for that crime.
In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four principles: Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment. The function of these principles is to enable a court to determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity. Death, quite simply, does not.
IV
When this country was founded, memories of the Stuart horrors were fresh and severe corporal punishments were common. Death was not then a unique punishment. The practice of punishing criminals by death, moreover, was widespread and by and large acceptable to society. Indeed, without developed prison systems, there was frequently no workable alternative. Since that time, successive restrictions, imposed against the background of a continuing moral controversy, have drastically curtailed the use of this punishment. Today death is a uniquely and unusually severe punishment. When examined by the principles applicable under the
I concur in the judgments of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
For these and other reasons, at least two of my Brothers have concluded that the infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances under the
The opinions of other Justices today have set out in admirable and thorough detail the origins and judicial history of the
Legislatures—state and federal—have sometimes specified that the penalty of death shall be the mandatory punishment for every person convicted of engaging in certain designated criminal conduct. Congress, for example, has provided that anyone convicted of acting as a spy for the enemy in time of war shall be put to death.3 The Rhode Island Legislature has ordained the death penalty for a life term prisoner who commits murder.4 Massachusetts has passed a law imposing the death penalty upon anyone convicted of murder in the commission of a forcible rape.5 An Ohio law imposes the mandatory penalty of death upon the assassin of the President of the United States or the Governor of a State.6
If we were reviewing death sentences imposed under these or similar laws, we would be faced with the need to decide whether capital punishment is unconstitutional for all crimes and under all circumstances. We would need to decide whether a legislature—state or federal—could constitutionally determine that certain criminal conduct is so atrocious that society‘s interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator, and that, despite the inconclusive empirical evidence,7 only
On that score I would say only that I cannot agree that retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they “deserve,” then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.
The constitutionality of capital punishment in the abstract is not, however, before us in these cases. For the Georgia and Texas Legislatures have not provided that the death penalty shall be imposed upon all those who are found guilty of forcible rape.8 And the Georgia Legislature has not ordained that death shall be the automatic punishment for murder.9 In a word, neither State
Instead, the death sentences now before us are the product of a legal system that brings them, I believe, within the very core of the
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,11 many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously
For these reasons I concur in the judgments of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
The facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder, or for rape would present quite different issues under the
The narrower question to which I address myself concerns the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes under which (1) the legislature authorizes the imposition of the death penalty for murder or rape; (2) the legislature does not itself mandate the penalty in any particular class or kind of case (that is, legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed), but delegates to judges or juries the decisions as to those cases, if any, in which the penalty will be utilized; and (3) judges and juries have ordered the death penalty with such infrequency that the odds are now very much against imposition and execution of the penalty with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist. It is in this context that we must consider whether the execution of these petitioners would violate the
I begin with what I consider a near truism: that the death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the criminal justice system. It is perhaps true that no matter how infrequently those convicted of rape or murder are executed, the penalty so imposed is not disproportionate to the crime and those executed may deserve exactly what they received. It would also be clear that executed defendants are finally and completely incapacitated from again committing rape or murder or any other crime. But when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said with confidence that society‘s need for specific deterrence justifies death
Most important, a major goal of the criminal law—to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal—would not be substantially served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to influence the conduct of others. For present purposes I accept the morality and utility of punishing one person to influence another. I accept also the effectiveness of punishment generally and need not reject the death penalty as a more effective deterrent than a lesser punishment. But common sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced laws become ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and that the death penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be exacted.
The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel in the dictionary sense. But the penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve. At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the
It is also my judgment that this point has been reached with respect to capital punishment as it is presently ad
I need not restate the facts and figures that appear in the opinions of my Brethren. Nor can I “prove” my conclusion from these data. But, like my Brethren, I must arrive at judgment; and I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries—a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence as well as guilt or innocence—has so effectively achieved its aims that capital punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has for all practical purposes run its course.
Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect,
In this respect, I add only that past and present legislative judgment with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in light of the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any statutory policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime. Legislative “policy” is thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them. In my judgment what was done in these cases violated the
I concur in the judgments of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
These three cases present the question whether the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
The criminal acts with which we are confronted are ugly, vicious, reprehensible acts. Their sheer brutality cannot and should not be minimized. But, we are not called upon to condone the penalized conduct; we are asked only to examine the penalty imposed on each of the petitioners and to determine whether or not it violates the
The elasticity of the constitutional provision under consideration presents dangers of too little or too much self-restraint.3 Hence, we must proceed with caution to answer the question presented.4 By first examining the historical derivation of the
Candor is critical to such an inquiry. All relevant material must be marshaled and sorted and forthrightly examined. We must not only be precise as to the standards of judgment that we are utilizing, but exacting in examining the relevant material in light of those standards.
Candor compels me to confess that I am not oblivious to the fact that this is truly a matter of life and death. Not only does it involve the lives of these three petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other condemned men and women in this country currently awaiting execution. While this fact cannot affect our ultimate decision, it necessitates that the decision be free from any possibility of error.
I
The
Cruel punishments were not confined to those accused of crimes, but were notoriously applied with even greater relish to those who were convicted. Blackstone described in ghastly detail the myriad of inhumane forms of punishment imposed on persons found guilty of any of a large number of offenses.7 Death, of course, was the usual result.8
The treason trials of 1685—the “Bloody Assizes“—which followed an abortive rebellion by the Duke of Monmouth, marked the culmination of the parade of horrors, and most historians believe that it was this event that finally spurred the adoption of the English Bill of Rights containing the progenitor of our prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.9 The conduct of Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys at those trials has been described as an “insane lust for cruelty” which was “stimulated by orders from the King” (James II).10 The assizes received wide publicity from Puritan pamphleteers and doubtless had some influence on the adoption of a cruel and unusual punishments clause. But,
This legislative history has led at least one legal historian to conclude “that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was, first, an objection to the imposition of punishments that were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties,”13 and not primarily a reaction to the torture of the High Commission, harsh sentences, or the assizes.
The precise language used in the Eighth Amendment first appeared in America on June 12, 1776, in Virginia‘s “Declaration of Rights,” § 9 of which read: “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”15 This language was drawn verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Other States adopted similar clauses,16 and there is evidence in the debates of the various state conventions that were
The Virginia Convention offers some clues as to what the Founding Fathers had in mind in prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. At one point George Mason advocated the adoption of a Bill of Rights, and Patrick Henry concurred, stating:
“By this Constitution, some of the best barriers of human rights are thrown away. Is there not an additional reason to have a bill of rights? . . . Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into business of human legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offence—petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But, when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. What says our bill of rights?—‘that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ Are you not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials and define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose; you do more—you depart from the genius of your country. . . .
“In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.”18
Henry‘s statement indicates that he wished to insure that “relentless severity” would be prohibited by the Constitution. Other expressions with respect to the proposed Eighth Amendment by Members of the First Congress indicate that they shared Henry‘s view of the need for and purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.19
II
This Court did not squarely face the task of interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments language for the first time until Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879), although the language received a cursory examination in several prior cases. See, e. g., Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867). In Wilkerson, the Court unanimously upheld a sentence of public execution by shooting imposed pursuant to a conviction for premeditated murder. In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Clifford wrote:
“Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.” 99 U. S., at 135-136.
Thus, the Court found that unnecessary cruelty was no more permissible than torture. To determine whether the punishment under attack was unnecessarily cruel, the Court examined the history of the Utah Territory and the then-current writings on capital punishment, and compared this Nation‘s practices with those of other countries. It is apparent that the Court felt it could not dispose of the question simply by referring to traditional practices; instead, it felt bound to examine developing thought.
Eleven years passed before the Court again faced a challenge to a specific punishment under the Eighth
Two years later in O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the Court reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment was not applicable to the States. O‘Neil was found guilty on 307 counts of selling liquor in violation of Vermont law. A fine of $6,140 ($20 for each offense) and the costs of prosecution ($497.96) were imposed. O‘Neil was committed to prison until the fine and the costs were paid; and the court provided that if they were not paid before a specified date, O‘Neil was to be confined in the house of corrections for 19,914 days (approximately 54 years) at hard labor. Three Justices—Field, Harlan, and Brewer—dissented. They maintained not only that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was applicable to the States, but that in O‘Neil‘s case it had been violated. Mr. Justice Field wrote:
“That designation [cruel and unusual], it is true, is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which
are attended with acute pain and suffering. . . . The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive. . . .” Id., at 339-340.
In Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126 (1903), the Court, in essence, followed the approach advocated by the dissenters in O‘Neil. In rejecting the claim that 10-year sentences for conspiracy to defraud were cruel and unusual, the Court (per Mr. Justice Brewer) considered the nature of the crime, the purpose of the law, and the length of the sentence imposed.
The Court used the same approach seven years later in the landmark case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). Weems, an officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands, was convicted of falsifying a “public and official document.” He was sentenced to 15 years’ incarceration at hard labor with chains on his ankles, to an unusual loss of his civil rights, and to perpetual surveillance. Called upon to determine whether this was a cruel and unusual punishment, the Court found that it was.21 The Court emphasized that the Constitution was not an “ephemeral” enactment, or one “designed to meet passing occasions.”22 Recognizing that “[t]ime works changes, [and] brings into existence new conditions and purposes,”23 the Court commented that “[i]n the application of a constitu-
In striking down the penalty imposed on Weems, the Court examined the punishment in relation to the offense, compared the punishment to those inflicted for other crimes and to those imposed in other jurisdictions, and concluded that the punishment was excessive.25 Justices White and Holmes dissented and argued that the cruel and unusual prohibition was meant to prohibit only those things that were objectionable at the time the Constitution was adopted.26
Weems is a landmark case because it represents the first time that the Court invalidated a penalty prescribed by a legislature for a particular offense. The Court made it plain beyond any reasonable doubt that excessive punishments were as objectionable as those that were inherently cruel. Thus, it is apparent that the dissenters’ position in O‘Neil had become the opinion of the Court in Weems.
Weems was followed by two cases that added little to our knowledge of the scope of the cruel and unusual language, Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916), and United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921).27 Then
Francis had been convicted of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. The first time the current passed through him, there was a mechanical failure and he did not die. Thereafter, Francis sought to prevent a second electrocution on the ground that it would be a cruel and unusual punishment. Eight members of the Court assumed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the States.28 The Court was virtually unanimous in agreeing that “[t]he traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain,”29 but split 5-4 on whether Francis would, under the circumstances, be forced to undergo any excessive pain. Five members of the Court treated the case like In re Kemmler and held that the legislature adopted electrocution for a humane purpose, and that its will should not be thwarted because, in its desire to reduce pain and suffering in most cases, it may have inadvertently increased suffering in one particular case.30
As in Weems, the Court was concerned with excessive punishments. Resweber is perhaps most significant because the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment questions first advocated by the dissenters in O‘Neil was at last firmly entrenched in the minds of an entire Court.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958), marked the next major cruel and unusual punishment case in this Court. Trop, a native-born American, was declared to have lost his citizenship by reason of a conviction by court-martial for wartime desertion. Writing for himself and Justices Black, DOUGLAS, and Whittaker, Chief Justice Warren concluded that loss of citizenship amounted to a cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment.31
Emphasizing the flexibility inherent in the words “cruel and unusual,” the Chief Justice wrote that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”32 His approach to the problem was that utilized by the Court in Weems: he scrutinized the severity of the penalty in relation to the offense, examined the practices of other civilized nations of the world, and concluded that involuntary statelessness was an excessive and, therefore, an unconstitutional punishment. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, urged that expatriation was not punishment, and that even if it were, it was not excessive. While he criticized the conclusion arrived at by the Chief Justice, his approach to the Eighth Amendment question was identical.
We distinguished Robinson in Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968), where we sustained a conviction for drunkenness in a public place and a fine of $20. Four Justices dissented on the ground that Robinson was controlling. The analysis in both cases was the same; only the conclusion as to whether or not the punishment was excessive differed. Powell marked the last time prior to today‘s decision that the Court has had occasion to construe the meaning of the term “cruel and unusual” punishment.
Several principles emerge from these prior cases and serve as a beacon to an enlightened decision in the instant cases.
Perhaps the most important principle in analyzing “cruel and unusual” punishment questions is one that is reiterated again and again in the prior opinions of the Court: i. e., the cruel and unusual language “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”35 Thus, a penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation‘s history is not necessarily permissible today.
The fact, therefore, that the Court, or individual Justices, may have in the past expressed an opinion that the death penalty is constitutional is not now binding on us. A fair reading of Wilkerson v. Utah, supra; In re Kemmler, supra; and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra, would certainly indicate an acceptance sub silentio of capital punishment as constitutionally permissible. Several Justices have also expressed their individual opinions that the death penalty is constitutional.36 Yet, some of these same Justices and others have at times expressed concern over capital punishment.37
There is no violation of the principle of stare decisis in a decision that capital punishment now violates the Eighth Amendment. The last case that implied that capital punishment was still permissible was Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 99. Not only was the implication purely dictum, but it was also made in the context of a flexible analysis that recognized that as public opinion changed, the
There is no holding directly in point, and the very nature of the Eighth Amendment would dictate that unless a very recent decision existed, stare decisis would bow to changing values, and the question of the constitutionality of capital punishment at a given moment in history would remain open.
Faced with an open question, we must establish our standards for decision. The decisions discussed in the previous section imply that a punishment may be deemed cruel and unusual for any one of four distinct reasons.
First, there are certain punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them—e. g., use of the rack, the thumbscrew, or other modes of torture. See O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S., at 339 (Field, J., dissenting). Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of these punishments in a particular case or at any one moment in history, the Constitution prohibits it. These are punishments that have been barred since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Third, a penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose. Weems v. United States, supra. The decisions previously discussed are replete with assertions that one of the primary functions of the cruel and unusual punishments clause is to prevent excessive or unnecessary penalties, e. g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S., at 134; O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S., at 381; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra; these punishments are unconstitutional even though popular sentiment may favor them. Both THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE POWELL seek to ignore or to minimize this aspect of the Court‘s prior decisions. But, since Mr. Justice Field first suggested that “[t]he whole inhibition [of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
Fourth, where a punishment is not excessive and serves a valid legislative purpose, it still may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it. For example, if the evidence clearly demonstrated that capital punishment served valid legislative purposes, such punishment would, nevertheless, be unconstitutional if citizens found it to be morally unacceptable. A general abhorrence on the part of the public would, in effect, equate a modern punishment with those barred since the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. There are no prior cases in this Court striking down a penalty on this ground, but the very notion of changing values requires that we recognize its existence.
It is immediately obvious, then, that since capital punishment is not a recent phenomenon, if it violates the Constitution, it does so because it is excessive or
We must proceed to the history of capital punishment in the United States.
IV
Capital punishment has been used to penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of civilization. Its precise origins are difficult to perceive, but there is some evidence that its roots lie in violent retaliation by members of a tribe or group, or by the tribe or group itself, against persons committing hostile acts toward group members.38 Thus, infliction of death as a penalty for objectionable conduct appears to have its beginnings in private vengeance.39
As individuals gradually ceded their personal prerogatives to a sovereign power, the sovereign accepted the authority to punish wrongdoing as part of its “divine right” to rule. Individual vengeance gave way to the vengeance of the state, and capital punishment became a public function.40 Capital punishment worked its way into the laws of various countries,41 and was inflicted in a variety of macabre and horrific ways.42
It was during the reign of Henry II (1154-1189) that English law first recognized that crime was more than a personal affair between the victim and the per-
By 1500, English law recognized eight major capital crimes: treason, petty treason (killing of husband by his wife), murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson.44 Tudor and Stuart kings added many more crimes to the list of those punishable by death, and by 1688 there were nearly 50.45 George II (1727-1760) added nearly 36 more, and George III (1760-1820) increased the number by 60.46
By shortly after 1800, capital offenses numbered more than 200 and not only included crimes against person and property, but even some against the public peace. While England may, in retrospect, look particularly brutal, Blackstone points out that England was fairly civilized when compared to the rest of Europe.47
By the 18th century, the list of crimes became much less theocratic and much more secular. In the average colony, there were 12 capital crimes.51 This was far fewer than existed in England, and part of the reason was that there was a scarcity of labor in the Colonies.52 Still, there were many executions, because “[w]ith county jails inadequate and insecure, the criminal population seemed best controlled by death, mutilation, and fines.”53
Even in the 17th century, there was some opposition
In 1776 the Philadelphia Society for Relieving Distressed Prisoners organized, and it was followed 11 years later by the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons.56 These groups pressured for reform of all penal laws, including capital offenses. Dr. Benjamin Rush soon drafted America‘s first reasoned argument against capital punishment, entitled An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals and upon Society.57 In 1793, William Bradford, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania and later Attorney General of the United States, conducted “An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania.”58 He concluded that it was doubtful whether capital punishment was at all necessary, and that until more information could be obtained, it should be immediately eliminated for all offenses except high treason and murder.59
The “Enquiries” of Rush and Bradford and the Pennsylvania movement toward abolition of the death
During the 1830‘s, there was a rising tide of sentiment against capital punishment. In 1834, Pennsylvania abolished public executions,63 and two years later, The Report on Capital Punishment Made to the Maine Legislature was published. It led to a law that prohibited the executive from issuing a warrant for execution within one year after a criminal was sentenced by the courts. The totally discretionary character of the law was at odds with almost all prior practices. The “Maine Law” resulted in little enforcement of the death penalty, which was not surprising since the legislature‘s idea in passing the law was that the affirmative burden placed on the governor to issue a warrant one full year
Anti-capital-punishment feeling grew in the 1840‘s as the literature of the period pointed out the agony of the condemned man and expressed the philosophy that repentance atoned for the worst crimes, and that true repentance derived, not from fear, but from harmony with nature.66
By 1850, societies for abolition existed in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Ohio, Alabama, Louisiana, Indiana, and Iowa.67 New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania constantly had abolition bills before their legislatures. In 1852, Rhode Island followed in the footsteps of Michigan and partially abolished capital punishment.68 Wisconsin totally abolished the death penalty the following year.69 Those States that did not abolish the death penalty greatly reduced its scope, and “[f]ew states outside the South had more than one or two . . . capital offenses” in addition to treason and murder.70
But the Civil War halted much of the abolition furor. One historian has said that “[a]fter the Civil War, men‘s finer sensibilities, which had once been revolted by the execution of a fellow being, seemed hardened and
One great success of the abolitionist movement in the period from 1830-1900 was almost complete elimination of mandatory capital punishment. Before the legislatures formally gave juries discretion to refrain from imposing the death penalty, the phenomenon of “jury nullification,” in which juries refused to convict in cases in which they believed that death was an inappropriate penalty, was experienced.73 Tennessee was the first State to give juries discretion, Tenn. Laws 1837-1838, c. 29, but other States quickly followed suit. Then, Rep. Curtis of New York introduced a federal bill that ultimately became law in 1897 which reduced the number of federal capital offenses from 60 to 3 (treason, murder, and rape) and gave the jury sentencing discretion in murder and rape cases.74
By 1917 12 States had become abolitionist jurisdictions.75 But, under the nervous tension of World War I,
It is not easy to ascertain why the movement lost its vigor. Certainly, much attention was diverted from penal reform during the economic crisis of the depression and the exhausting years of struggle during World War II. Also, executions, which had once been frequent public spectacles, became infrequent private affairs. The manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the general public.77
In recent years there has been renewed interest in modifying capital punishment. New York has moved toward abolition,78 as have several other States.79 In 1967, a bill was introduced in the Senate to abolish
At the present time, 41 States, the District of Columbia, and other federal jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for at least one crime. It would be fruitless to attempt here to categorize the approach to capital punishment taken by the various States.81 It is sufficient to note that murder is the crime most often punished by death, followed by kidnaping and treason.82 Rape is a capital offense in 16 States and the federal system.83
The foregoing history demonstrates that capital punishment was carried from Europe to America but, once here, was tempered considerably. At times in our history, strong abolitionist movements have existed. But, they have never been completely successful, as no more than one-quarter of the States of the Union have, at any one time, abolished the death penalty. They have had partial success, however, especially in reducing the number of capital crimes, replacing mandatory death sentences with jury discretion, and developing more humane methods of conducting executions.
This is where our historical foray leads. The question now to be faced is whether American society has
V
In order to assess whether or not death is an excessive or unnecessary penalty, it is necessary to consider the reasons why a legislature might select it as punishment for one or more offenses, and examine whether less severe penalties would satisfy the legitimate legislative wants as well as capital punishment. If they would, then the death penalty is unnecessary cruelty, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
There are six purposes conceivably served by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economy. These are considered seriatim below.
A. The concept of retribution is one of the most misunderstood in all of our criminal jurisprudence. The principal source of confusion derives from the fact that, in dealing with the concept, most people confuse the question “why do men in fact punish?” with the question “what justifies men in punishing?”84 Men may punish for any number of reasons, but the one reason that punishment is morally good or morally justifiable is that someone has broken the law. Thus, it can correctly be said that breaking the law is the sine qua non of punishment, or, in other words, that we only
The fact that the State may seek retribution against those who have broken its laws does not mean that retribution may then become the State‘s sole end in punishing. Our jurisprudence has always accepted deterrence in general, deterrence of individual recidivism, isolation of dangerous persons, and rehabilitation as proper goals of punishment. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a government in a free society.
Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries,85 and the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance.
In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S., at 381, the Court, in the course of holding that Weems’ punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, contrasted it with penalties provided for other offenses and concluded:
“[T]his contrast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice. The State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal.” (Emphasis added.)
To preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has consistently denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment.86 It is undoubtedly correct that there is a demand for vengeance on the part of many persons in a community against one who is convicted of a particularly offensive act. At times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance to evi-
Mr. Justice Story wrote that the Eighth Amendment‘s limitation on punishment “would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct.”88 I would reach an opposite conclusion—that only in a free society would men recognize their inherent weaknesses and seek to compensate for them by means of a Constitution.
The history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that retribution for its own sake is improper.
B. The most hotly contested issue regarding capital punishment is whether it is better than life imprisonment as a deterrent to crime.89
While the contrary position has been argued,90 it is my firm opinion that the death penalty is a more severe sanction than life imprisonment. Admittedly, there are
It must be kept in mind, then, that the question to be considered is not simply whether capital punishment is
There is no more complex problem than determining the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. “Capital punishment has obviously failed as a deterrent when a murder is committed. We can number its failures. But we cannot number its successes. No one can ever know how many people have refrained from murder because of the fear of being hanged.”93 This is the nub of the problem and it is exacerbated by the paucity of useful data. The United States is more fortunate than most countries, however, in that it has what are generally considered to be the world‘s most reliable statistics.94
The two strongest arguments in favor of capital punishment as a deterrent are both logical hypotheses devoid of evidentiary support, but persuasive nonetheless. The first proposition was best stated by Sir James Stephen in 1864:
“No other punishment deters men so effectually from committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all. The whole experience of mankind is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute necessity for producing some result. . . . No one goes to certain
inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the other way. Was there ever yet a criminal who, when sentenced to death and brought out to die, would refuse the offer of a commutation of his sentence for the severest secondary punishment? Surely not. Why is this? It can only be because ‘All that a man has will he give for his life.’ In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly.”95
This hypothesis relates to the use of capital punishment as a deterrent for any crime. The second proposition is that “if life imprisonment is the maximum penalty for a crime such as murder, an offender who is serving a life sentence cannot then be deterred from murdering a fellow inmate or a prison officer.”96 This hypothesis advocates a limited deterrent effect under particular circumstances.
Abolitionists attempt to disprove these hypotheses by amassing statistical evidence to demonstrate that there is no correlation between criminal activity and the existence or nonexistence of a capital sanction. Almost all of the evidence involves the crime of murder, since murder is punishable by death in more jurisdictions than are other offenses,97 and almost 90% of all executions since 1930 have been pursuant to murder convictions.98
Thorsten Sellin, one of the leading authorities on capital punishment, has urged that if the death penalty
“(a) Murders should be less frequent in states that have the death penalty than in those that have abolished it, other factors being equal. Comparisons of this nature must be made among states that are as alike as possible in all other respects—character of population, social and economic condition, etc.—in order not to introduce factors known to influence murder rates in a serious manner but present in only one of these states.
“(b) Murders should increase when the death penalty is abolished and should decline when it is restored.
“(c) The deterrent effect should be greatest and should therefore affect murder rates most powerfully in those communities where the crime occurred and its consequences are most strongly brought home to the population.
“(d) Law enforcement officers would be safer from murderous attacks in states that have the death penalty than in those without it.”99 (Footnote omitted.)
Sellin‘s evidence indicates that not one of these propositions is true. This evidence has its problems, however. One is that there are no accurate figures for capital murders; there are only figures on homicides and they, of course, include noncapital killings.100 A second problem is that certain murders undoubtedly are misinterpreted as accidental deaths or suicides, and there
Sellin‘s statistics demonstrate that there is no correlation between the murder rate and the presence or absence of the capital sanction. He compares States that have similar characteristics and finds that irrespective of their position on capital punishment, they have similar murder rates. In the New England States, for example, there is no correlation between executions102 and homicide rates.103 The same is true for Midwestern States,104 and for all others studied. Both the United Nations105 and Great Britain106 have acknowledged the validity of Sellin‘s statistics.
Sellin also concludes that abolition and/or reintroduction of the death penalty had no effect on the homicide rates of the various States involved.107 This conclusion is borne out by others who have made similar
Statistics also show that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is no greater in those communities where executions take place than in other communities.112 In fact, there is some evidence that imposition of capital punishment may actually encourage crime, rather than deter it.113 And, while police and law enforcement offi-
There is also a substantial body of data showing that the existence of the death penalty has virtually no effect on the homicide rate in prisons.116 Most of the persons sentenced to death are murderers, and murderers tend to be model prisoners.117
The United Nations Committee that studied capital punishment found that “[i]t is generally agreed between the retentionists and abolitionists, whatever their opinions about the validity of comparative studies of deterrence, that the data which now exist show no correlation between the existence of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime.”121
Despite the fact that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society. This is all that they must do. We would shirk our judicial responsibilities if we failed to accept the presently existing statistics and demanded more proof. It may be that we now possess all the proof that anyone could ever hope to assemble on the subject. But, even if further proof were to be forthcoming, I believe there is more than enough evidence presently available for a decision in this case.
In 1793 William Bradford studied the utility of the death penalty in Pennsylvania and found that it prob-
In light of the massive amount of evidence before us, I see no alternative but to conclude that capital punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent effect.125
D. The three final purposes which may underlie utilization of a capital sanction—encouraging guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and reducing state expenditures—may be dealt with quickly. If the death penalty is used to encourage guilty pleas and thus to deter suspects from exercising their rights under the Sixth Amendment to jury trials, it is unconstitutional. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).128 Its elimination would do little to impair the State‘s bargaining position in criminal cases, since life imprisonment remains a severe sanction which can be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas or confessions in exchange either for charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of leniency.
Moreover, to the extent that capital punishment is used to encourage confessions and guilty pleas, it is not being used for punishment purposes. A State that justifies capital punishment on its utility as part of the conviction process could not profess to rely on capital punishment as a deterrent. Such a State‘s system would be structured with twin goals only: obtaining guilty pleas and confessions and imposing imprisonment as the maximum sanction. Since life imprisonment is sufficient for bargaining purposes, the death penalty is excessive if used for the same purposes.
In light of the previous discussion on deterrence, any suggestions concerning the eugenic benefits of capital punishment are obviously meritless.129 As I pointed out above, there is not even any attempt made to discover which capital offenders are likely to be recidivists, let alone which are positively incurable. No test or procedure presently exists by which incurables can be screened from those who would benefit from treatment. On the one hand, due process would seem to require that we have some procedure to demonstrate incurability before execution; and, on the other hand, equal protection would then seemingly require that all incurables be executed, cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In addition, the “cruel and unusual” language
As for the argument that it is cheaper to execute a capital offender than to imprison him for life, even assuming that such an argument, if true, would support a capital sanction, it is simply incorrect. A disproportionate amount of money spent on prisons is attributable to death row.131 Condemned men are not productive members of the prison community, although they could be,132 and executions are expensive.133 Appeals are often automatic, and courts admittedly spend more time with death cases.134
During the period between conviction and execution, there are an inordinate number of collateral attacks on the conviction and attempts to obtain executive clemency, all of which exhaust the time, money, and effort of the State. There are also continual assertions that the condemned prisoner has gone insane.136 Because there is a formally established policy of not executing insane persons,137 great sums of money may be spent on detecting and curing mental illness in order to perform the execution.138 Since no one wants the responsibility for the execution, the condemned man is likely to be passed back and forth from doctors to custodial officials to courts like a ping-pong ball.139 The entire process is very costly.
When all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it costs more to execute a man than to keep him in prison for life.140
E. There is but one conclusion that can be drawn from all of this—i. e., the death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth
In addition, even if capital punishment is not excessive, it nonetheless violates the Eighth Amendment because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history.
In judging whether or not a given penalty is morally acceptable, most courts have said that the punishment is valid unless “it shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people.”142
Judge Frank once noted the problems inherent in the
“[The court,] before it reduces a sentence as ‘cruel and unusual,’ must have reasonably good assurances that the sentence offends the ‘common conscience.’ And, in any context, such a standard—the community‘s attitude—is usually an unknowable. It resembles a slithery shadow, since one can seldom learn, at all accurately, what the community, or a majority, actually feels. Even a carefully-taken ‘public opinion poll’ would be inconclusive in a case like this.”143
While a public opinion poll obviously is of some assistance in indicating public acceptance or rejection of a specific penalty,144 its utility cannot be very great. This is because whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention “shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people,” but on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.145
This is not to suggest that with respect to this test of unconstitutionality people are required to act rationally; they are not. With respect to this judgment, a violation of the Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the predictable subjective, emotional reactions of informed citizens.146
It has often been noted that American citizens know almost nothing about capital punishment.147 Some of the conclusions arrived at in the preceding section and the supporting evidence would be critical to an informed judgment on the morality of the death penalty: e. g., that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life imprisonment, that convicted murderers are
This information would almost surely convince the average citizen that the death penalty was unwise, but a problem arises as to whether it would convince him that the penalty was morally reprehensible. This problem arises from the fact that the public‘s desire for retribution, even though this is a goal that the legislature cannot constitutionally pursue as its sole justification for capital punishment, might influence the citizenry‘s view of the morality of capital punishment. The solution to the problem lies in the fact that no one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society. Defenses of capital punishment are always mounted on deterrent or other similar theories. This should not be surprising. It is the people of this country who have urged in the past that prisons rehabilitate as well as isolate offenders, and it is the people who have injected a sense of purpose into our penology. I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I believe that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the material already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional.
But, if this information needs supplementing, I believe that the following facts would serve to convince
Regarding discrimination, it has been said that “[i]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the minority group—the man who, because he is without means, and is defended by a court-appointed attorney—who becomes society‘s sacrificial lamb. . . .”148 Indeed, a look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of the discrimination. A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were Negro.149 Of the executions, 3,334 were for murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were white and 1,630 were Negro;150 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape.151 It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial discrimination.152
There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed against men and not women. Only 32 women have been executed since 1930, while 3,827 men have met a similar fate.153 It is difficult to understand why women have received such favored treatment since the purposes allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes.154
It also is evident that the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the under-
Just as Americans know little about who is executed and why, they are unaware of the potential dangers of executing an innocent man. Our “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof in criminal cases is intended to protect the innocent, but we know it is not foolproof. Various studies have shown that people whose innocence is later convincingly established are convicted and sentenced to death.156
No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error remain all too real.158
While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the degree to which the death penalty is discriminatorily imposed or the number of innocent persons sentenced to die, there is one conclusion about the penalty that is universally accepted—i. e., it “tends to distort the course of the criminal law.”159 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
“I am strongly against capital punishment . . . When life is at hazard in a trial, it sensationalizes the whole thing almost unwittingly; the effect on juries, the Bar, the public, the Judiciary, I regard as very bad. I think scientifically the claim of deterrence is not worth much. Whatever proof there may be in my judgment does not outweigh the social loss due to the inherent sensationalism of a trial for life.”160
Assuming knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.163 For this reason alone capital punishment cannot stand.
To arrive at the conclusion that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, we have had to engage in a long and tedious journey. The amount of information that we have assembled and sorted is enormous. Yet, I firmly believe that we have not deviated in the
At a time in our history when the streets of the Nation‘s cities inspire fear and despair, rather than pride and hope, it is difficult to maintain objectivity and concern for our fellow citizens. But, the measure of a country‘s greatness is its ability to retain compassion in time of crisis. No nation in the recorded history of man has a greater tradition of revering justice and fair treatment for all its citizens in times of turmoil, confusion, and tension than ours. This is a country which stands tallest in troubled times, a country that clings to fundamental principles, cherishes its constitutional heritage, and rejects simple solutions that compromise the values that lie at the roots of our democratic system.
In striking down capital punishment, this Court does not malign our system of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it. Only in a free society could right triumph in difficult times, and could civilization record its magnificent advancement. In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute. We achieve “a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism”164 and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.165
I concur in the judgments of the Court.
[Appendices I, II, and III follow.]
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1846-1968
(States are listed according to year most recent action was taken)
| State | Year of partial abolition | Year of complete abolition | Year of restoration | Year of reabolition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19651 | — | — | — |
| Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19652 | — | — | — |
| West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1965 | — | — |
| Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1872 | 1878 | 1965 |
| Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1914 | 1920 | 1964 |
| Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 18473 | 1963 | — | — |
| Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1958 | 1961 | — |
| Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1957 | — | — |
| Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1957 | — | — |
| South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1915 | 1939 | — |
| Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1907 | 1935 | — |
| Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1917 | 1919 | — |
| Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19154 | — | 1919 | — |
| Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1913 | 1919 | — |
| Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19165 | — | 1918 | — |
| North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . | 19156 | — | — | — |
| Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1911 | — | — |
| Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1897 | 1901 | — |
| Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1876 | 1883 | 1887 |
| Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | — | 1853 | — | — |
| Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . | 18527 | — | — | — |
1 Death penalty retained for persons found guilty of killing a peace officer who is acting in line of duty, and for prisoners under a life sentence who murder a guard or inmate while in confinement or while escaping from confinement.
2 Death penalty retained for persons convicted of first-degree murder who commit a second “unrelated” murder, and for the first-degree murder of any law enforcement officer or prison employee who is in the performance of the duties of his office.
3 Death penalty retained for treason. Partial abolition was voted in 1846, but was not put into effect until 1847.
4 Death penalty retained for rape.
5 Death penalty retained for treason.
6 Death penalty retained for treason, and for first-degree murder committed by a prisoner who is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder.
7 Death penalty retained for persons convicted of committing murder while serving a life sentence for any offense.
Based on National Prisoner Statistics No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1968, p. 30 (Aug. 1969).
CRUDE HOMICIDE DEATH RATES, PER 100,000 POPULATION, AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS IN CERTAIN AMERICAN STATES: 1920-1955
| Year | Maine* | N. H. | Vt. | Mass. | R. I.* | Conn. | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rates | Rates | Exec. | Rates | Exec. | Rates | Exec. | Rates | Rates | Exec. | |
| 1920 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 1 | ||
| 1921 . . . . . . . . . . | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2 | |||
| 1922 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 1 | |||
| 1923 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | 2.7 | 1.4 | 2.8 | 1 | 3.5 | 3.1 | |||
| 1924 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.5 | 1.5 | .6 | 2.7 | 1 | 2.0 | 3.5 | |||
| 1925 . . . . . . . . . . | 2.2 | 1.3 | .6 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 3.7 | ||||
| 1926 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.1 | .9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 1 | ||
| 1927 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.9 | .7 | .8 | 2.1 | 6 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2 | ||
| 1928 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 3 | 2.7 | 2.7 | |||
| 1929 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 6 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 1 | ||
| 1930 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.8 | .9 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 2 | |||
| 1931 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 1 | 2.0 | 2 | 2.2 | 2.7 | ||
| 1932 . . . . . . . . . . | 2.0 | .2 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 1 | 1.6 | 2.9 | |||
| 1933 . . . . . . . . . . | 3.3 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1934 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | |||
| 1935 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.4 | 1.0 | .3 | 1.8 | 4 | 1.6 | 1.9 | |||
| 1936 . . . . . . . . . . | 2.2 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2 | 1.2 | 2.7 | 1 | ||
| 1937 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1 | |||
| 1938 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 3 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 1 | ||
| 1939 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.2 | 2.3 | 1 | .8 | 1.4 | 2 | 1.6 | 1.3 | ||
| 1940 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.5 | 1.4 | .8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2 | |||
| 1941 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.1 | .4 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1 | .8 | 2.2 | |||
| 1942 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | .2 | .9 | 1.3 | 2 | 1.2 | 2.5 | |||
| 1943 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | .9 | .6 | .9 | 3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2 | ||
| 1944 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.5 | 1.1 | .3 | 1.4 | .6 | 1.9 | 1 | |||
| 1945 . . . . . . . . . . | .9 | .7 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1 | |||
| 1946 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.4 | .8 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 3 | ||
| 1947 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.2 | .6 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.6 | 2 | 1.5 | 1.9 | ||
| 1948 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | 1.0 | .8 | 1.4 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 1 | |||
| 1949 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | 1.5 | .5 | 1.1 | .5 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1950 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.5 | 1.3 | .5 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | ||||
| 1951 . . . . . . . . . . | 2.3 | .6 | .5 | 1.0 | .9 | 2.0 | ||||
| 1952 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.0 | 1.5 | .5 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.7 | ||||
| 1953 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.4 | .9 | .3 | 1.0 | .6 | 1.5 | ||||
| 1954 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.7 | .5 | 1.6 | 2 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.3 | |||
| 1955 . . . . . . . . . . | 1.2 | 1.1 | .5 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 3 | |||
*Maine has totally abolished the death penalty, and Rhode Island has severely limited its imposition. Based on ALI, supra, n. 98, at 25.
CRUDE HOMICIDE DEATH RATES, PER 100,000 POPULATION, AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS IN CERTAIN AMERICAN STATES: 1920-1955
| Year | Mich.* | Ohio | Ind. | Minn.* | Iowa | Wis.* | N.D.* | S.D.*** | Neb. | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rate | Rate | Ex. | Rate | Ex. | Rate | Rate | Ex. | Rate | Rate | Rate | Rate | Ex. | |
| 1920 . . . . . . | 5.5 | 6.9 | 3 | 4.7 | 2 | 3.1 | ** | 1.7 | ** | ** | 4.2 | ||
| 1921 . . . . . . | 4.7 | 7.9 | 10 | 6.4 | 4.4 | 2.2 | 4.9 | ||||||
| 1922 . . . . . . | 4.3 | 7.3 | 12 | 5.7 | 2 | 3.6 | 3 | 1.8 | 4.5 | ||||
| 1923 . . . . . . | 6.1 | 7.8 | 10 | 6.1 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 2 | 2.2 | 4.1 | ||||
| 1924 . . . . . . | 7.1 | 6.9 | 10 | 7.3 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 1 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 4.4 | |||
| 1925 . . . . . . | 7.4 | 8.1 | 13 | 6.6 | 1 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 2 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 4.0 | ||
| 1926 . . . . . . | 10.4 | 8.6 | 7 | 5.8 | 3 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.7 | |||
| 1927 . . . . . . | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8 | 6.3 | 1 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 3.5 | |||
| 1928 . . . . . . | 7.0 | 8.2 | 7 | 7.0 | 1 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 3.7 | |||
| 1929 . . . . . . | 8.2 | 8.3 | 5 | 7.0 | 1 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 3.0 | |||
| 1930 . . . . . . | 6.7 | 9.3 | 8 | 6.4 | 1 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 1.9 | 3.5 | ||
| 1931 . . . . . . | 6.2 | 9.0 | 10 | 6.5 | 1 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 1 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 3.6 | |
| 1932 . . . . . . | 5.7 | 8.1 | 7 | 6.7 | 2 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 3.7 | ||
| 1933 . . . . . . | 5.1 | 8.2 | 11 | 5.6 | 3 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 3.2 | ||
| 1934 . . . . . . | 4.2 | 7.7 | 7 | 7.1 | 4 | 3.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 4.4 | ||
| 1935 . . . . . . | 4.2 | 7.1 | 10 | 4.4 | 3 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 3 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 3.4 | |
| 1936 . . . . . . | 4.0 | 6.6 | 6 | 5.2 | 2 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 2.5 | ||
| 1937 . . . . . . | 4.6 | 5.7 | 1 | 4.7 | 5 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.6 | .1 | 2.0 | ||
| 1938 . . . . . . | 3.4 | 5.1 | 12 | 4.4 | 3 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 4 | 2.0 | 2.4 | .9 | 1.6 | |
| 1939 . . . . . . | 3.1 | 4.8 | 10 | 3.8 | 3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 2.1 | ||
| 1940 . . . . . . | 3.0 | 4.6 | 2 | 3.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 1.0 | ||
| 1941 . . . . . . | 3.2 | 4.2 | 4 | 3.1 | 1 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 2.1 | |
| 1942 . . . . . . | 3.2 | 4.6 | 2 | 3.2 | 1 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.4 | .9 | 1.8 | ||
| 1943 . . . . . . | 3.3 | 4.4 | 5 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.1 | .6 | 1.4 | 2.4 | |||
| 1944 . . . . . . | 3.3 | 3.9 | 2 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1 | .9 | .9 | 1.6 | 1.3 | ||
| 1945 . . . . . . | 3.7 | 4.9 | 7 | 4.0 | 1 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1 |
| 1946 . . . . . . | 3.2 | 5.2 | 2 | 3.9 | 1 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2 | .9 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 2.1 | |
| 1947 . . . . . . | 3.3 | 4.9 | 5 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.4 | .4 | 1.0 | 2.2 | 1 | ||
| 1948 . . . . . . | 3.4 | 4.5 | 7 | 4.2 | 1.9 | 1.4 | .9 | .9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 1 | ||
| 1949 . . . . . . | 3.5 | 4.4 | 15 | 3.2 | 3 | 1.1 | .9 | 1 | 1.3 | .7 | 2.3 | 1.8 | |
| 1950 . . . . . . | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4 | 3.6 | 1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 | .5 | 1.1 | 2.9 | ||
| 1951 . . . . . . | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4 | 3.9 | 1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.1 | .5 | .9 | 1.0 | ||
| 1952 . . . . . . | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4 | 3.8 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1 | 1.6 | .8 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1 | |
| 1953 . . . . . . | 4.6 | 3.6 | 4 | 4.0 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.0 | |||
| 1954 . . . . . . | 3.3 | 3.4 | 4 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | .5 | 1.5 | 2.3 | |||
| 1955 . . . . . . | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | .8 | 1.8 | 1.3 | ||||
*Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have completely abolished capital punishment. North Dakota has severely restricted its use.
**Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota were not admitted to the national death registration area until 1923, 1924, and 1930 respectively.
***South Dakota introduced the death penalty in 1939.
Based on ALI, supra, n. 98, at 28. See also id., at 32-34.
At the outset it is important to note that only two members of the Court, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, have concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for all crimes and under all circumstances. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS has also determined that the death penalty contravenes the Eighth Amendment, although I do not read his opinion as necessarily requiring final abolition of the penalty.1 For the reasons set forth in Parts I-IV of this opinion, I conclude that the constitutional prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” cannot be construed to bar the imposition of the punishment of death.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE have concluded that petitioners’ death sentences must be set aside because prevailing sentencing practices do not comply with the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons set forth in Part V of this opinion, I believe this approach fundamentally misconceives the nature of the Eighth Amendment guarantee and flies directly in the face of controlling authority of extremely recent vintage.
I
If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either join with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL or, at the very least, restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes. Our constitutional inquiry, however, must be divorced from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy of the death penalty, and be confined to the meaning and applicability of the uncertain language of the Eighth Amendment. There is no novelty in being called upon to interpret a constitutional provision that is less than
Although the Eighth Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments that are both “cruel” and “unusual,” history compels the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits all punishments of extreme and barbarous cruelty, regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed.
The most persuasive analysis of Parliament‘s adoption of the English Bill of Rights of 1689—the unquestioned source of the Eighth Amendment wording—suggests that the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” was included therein out of aversion to severe punishments not legally authorized and not within the jurisdiction of the courts to impose. To the extent that the term “unusual” had any importance in the English version, it was apparently intended as a reference to illegal punishments.2
From every indication, the Framers of the Eighth Amendment intended to give the phrase a meaning far different from that of its English precursor. The records of the debates in several of the state conventions called to ratify the 1789 draft Constitution submitted prior to the addition of the Bill of Rights show that the Framers’ exclusive concern was the absence of any ban on tortures.3 The later inclusion of the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause was in response to these objections. There was no discussion of the interrelationship of the terms “cruel” and “unusual,” and there is nothing in the debates supporting the inference that the Founding Fathers would have been receptive to torturous or excessively cruel punishments even if usual in character or authorized by law.
The cases decided under the Eighth Amendment are consistent with the tone of the ratifying debates. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), this Court held that execution by shooting was not a prohibited mode of carrying out a sentence of death. Speaking to the mean-
ing of the
“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.” Id., at 136.
The Court made no reference to the role of the term “unusual” in the constitutional guarantee.
In the case of In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), the Court held the
“So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the . . . [prohibition of the New York constitution]. And we think this equally true of the
Eighth Amendment , in its application to Congress.“. . . Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.” Id., at 446-447.
This language again reveals an exclusive concern with extreme cruelty. The Court made passing reference to the finding of the New York courts that electrocution was an “unusual” punishment, but it saw no need to discuss the significance of that term as used in the
Opinions in subsequent cases also speak of extreme cruelty as though that were the sum and substance of the constitutional prohibition. See O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 339-340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 372-373 (1910); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947). As summarized by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 n. 32 (1958):
“Whether the word ‘unusual’ has any qualitative meaning different from ‘cruel’ is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. See Weems v. United States, supra; O‘Neil v. Vermont, supra; Wilkerson v. Utah, supra. These cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word ‘unusual.‘”
I do not suggest that the presence of the word “unusual” in the
Counsel for petitioners properly concede that capital punishment was not impermissibly cruel at the time of the adoption of the
In the 181 years since the enactment of the
“Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 99.
It is only one year since Mr. Justice Black made his feelings clear on the constitutional issue:
“The
Eighth Amendment forbids ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment by the Amendment.” McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (separate opinion).
By limiting its grants of certiorari, the Court has refused even to hear argument on the
Before recognizing such an instant evolution in the law, it seems fair to ask what factors have changed that capital punishment should now be “cruel” in the constitutional sense as it has not been in the past. It is apparent that there has been no change of constitutional significance in the nature of the punishment itself. Twentieth century modes of execution surely involve no greater physical suffering than the means employed at the time of the
However, the inquiry cannot end here. For reasons unrelated to any change in intrinsic cruelty, the
The Court‘s quiescence in this area can be attributed to the fact that in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people. For this reason, early commentators suggested that the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause was an unnecessary constitutional provision.5 As acknowledged in the principal brief for petitioners, “both in constitutional contemplation and in fact, it is the legislature, not the Court, which responds to public opinion and immediately reflects the society‘s standards of decency.”6
Beyond any doubt, if we were today called upon to review such punishments, we would find them excessively cruel because we could say with complete assurance that contemporary society universally rejects such bizarre penalties. However, this speculation on the Court‘s probable reaction to such punishments is not of itself significant. The critical fact is that this Court has never had to hold that a mode of punishment authorized by a domestic legislature was so cruel as to be fundamentally at odds with our basic notions of decency. Cf. Weems v. United States, supra. Judicial findings of impermissible cruelty have been limited, for the most part, to offensive punishments devised without specific authority by prison officials, not by legislatures. See, e. g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968); Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519 (CA2 1967). The paucity of judicial decisions invalidating legislatively prescribed punishments is powerful evidence that in this country legislatures have in fact been responsive—albeit belatedly at times—to changes in social attitudes and moral values.
I do not suggest that the validity of legislatively authorized punishments presents no justiciable issue under the
There are no obvious indications that capital punishment offends the conscience of society to such a degree that our traditional deference to the legislative judgment must be abandoned. It is not a punishment such as burning at the stake that everyone would ineffably find to be repugnant to all civilized standards. Nor is it a punishment so roundly condemned that only a few aberrant legislatures have retained it on the statute books. Capital punishment is authorized by statute in 40 States, the District of Columbia, and in the federal courts for the commission of certain crimes.7 On four occasions in the last 11 years Congress has added to the list of federal crimes punishable by death.8 In looking for reliable indicia of contemporary attitude, none more trustworthy has been advanced.
One conceivable source of evidence that legislatures have abdicated their essentially barometric role with respect to community values would be public opinion polls, of which there have been many in the past decade addressed to the question of capital punishment. Without assessing the reliability of such polls, or intimating that any judicial reliance could ever be placed on them,
Counsel for petitioners rely on a different body of empirical evidence. They argue, in effect, that the number of cases in which the death penalty is imposed, as compared with the number of cases in which it is statutorily available, reflects a general revulsion toward the penalty that would lead to its repeal if only it were more generally and widely enforced. It cannot be gainsaid that by the choice of juries—and sometimes judges10—the death penalty is imposed in far fewer than half the cases in which it is available.11 To go further and char-
acterize the rate of imposition as “freakishly rare,” as petitioners insist, is unwarranted hyperbole. And regardless of its characterization, the rate of imposition does not impel the conclusion that capital punishment is now regarded as intolerably cruel or uncivilized.
It is argued that in those capital cases where juries have recommended mercy, they have given expression to civilized values and effectively renounced the legislative authorization for capital punishment. At the same time it is argued that where juries have made the awesome decision to send men to their deaths, they have acted arbitrarily and without sensitivity to prevailing standards of decency. This explanation for the infrequency of imposition of capital punishment is unsupported by known facts, and is inconsistent in principle with everything this Court has ever said about the functioning of juries in capital cases.
In McGautha v. California, supra, decided only one year ago, the Court held that there was no mandate in the
The responsibility of juries deciding capital cases in our system of justice was nowhere better described than in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra:
“[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.”
“And one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society‘” 391 U. S., at 519 and n. 15 (emphasis added).
The selectivity of juries in imposing the punishment of death is properly viewed as a refinement on, rather than a repudiation of, the statutory authorization for that penalty. Legislatures prescribe the categories of crimes for which the death penalty should be available, and, acting as “the conscience of the community,” juries are entrusted to determine in individual cases that the ultimate punishment is warranted. Juries are undoubtedly influenced in this judgment by myriad factors. The motive or lack of motive of the perpetrator, the degree of injury or suffering of the victim or victims, and the degree of brutality in the commission of the crime would seem to be prominent among these factors. Given the general awareness that death is no longer a routine punishment for the crimes for which it is made available, it is hardly surprising that juries have been increasingly meticulous in their imposition of the penalty. But to
It would, of course, be unrealistic to assume that juries have been perfectly consistent in choosing the cases where the death penalty is to be imposed, for no human institution performs with perfect consistency. There are doubtless prisoners on death row who would not be there had they been tried before a different jury or in a different State. In this sense their fate has been controlled by a fortuitous circumstance. However, this element of fortuity does not stand as an indictment either of the general functioning of juries in capital cases or of the integrity of jury decisions in individual cases. There is no empirical basis for concluding that juries have generally failed to discharge in good faith the responsibility described in Witherspoon—that of choosing between life and death in individual cases according to the dictates of community values.12
The rate of imposition of death sentences falls far short of providing the requisite unambiguous evidence that the legislatures of 40 States and the Congress have turned their backs on current or evolving standards of decency in continuing to make the death penalty available. For, if selective imposition evidences a rejection of capital punishment in those cases where it is not imposed, it surely evidences a correlative affirmation of the penalty in those cases where it is imposed. Absent some clear indication that the continued imposition of the death penalty on a selective basis is violative of prevailing standards of civilized conduct, the
IV
Capital punishment has also been attacked as violative of the
The
The apparent seed of the “unnecessary cruelty” argument is the following language, quoted earlier, found in Wilkerson v. Utah, supra:
“Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.” 99 U. S., at 135-136 (emphasis added).
To lift the italicized phrase from the context of the Wilkerson opinion and now view it as a mandate for assessing the value of punishments in achieving the aims of penology is a gross distortion; nowhere are such aims even mentioned in the Wilkerson opinion. The only fair reading of this phrase is that punishments similar to torture in their extreme cruelty are prohibited by the
Apart from these isolated uses of the word “unnecessary,” nothing in the cases suggests that it is for the courts to make a determination of the efficacy of punishments. The decision in Weems v. United States, supra, is not to the contrary. In Weems the Court held that for the crime of falsifying public documents, the punishment imposed under the Philippine Code of 15 years’ imprisonment at hard labor under shackles, followed by perpetual surveillance, loss of voting rights, loss of the right to hold public office, and loss of right to change domicile freely, was violative of the
By pursuing the necessity approach, it becomes even more apparent that it involves matters outside the purview of the
The less esoteric but no less controversial question is whether the death penalty acts as a superior deterrent. Those favoring abolition find no evidence that it does.21 Those favoring retention start from the intuitive notion that capital punishment should act as the most effective deterrent and note that there is no convincing evidence that it does not.22 Escape from this empirical stalemate is sought by placing the burden of proof on the States and concluding that they have failed to demonstrate that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment. Numerous justifications have been advanced for shifting the burden, and they
V
Today the Court has not ruled that capital punishment is per se violative of the
As I have earlier stated, the
The critical factor in the concurring opinions of both MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE is the infrequency with which the penalty is imposed. This factor is taken not as evidence of society‘s abhorrence
To be sure, there is a recitation cast in Eighth Amendment terms: petitioners’ sentences are “cruel” because they exceed that which the legislatures have deemed necessary for all cases;26 petitioners’ sentences are “unusual” because they exceed that which is imposed in most cases.27 This application of the words of the
This novel formulation of Eighth Amendment principles—albeit necessary to satisfy the terms of our limited grant of certiorari—does not lie at the heart of these concurring opinions. The decisive grievance of the opinions—not translated into Eighth Amendment terms—is that the present system of discretionary sentencing
This ground of decision is plainly foreclosed as well as misplaced. Only one year ago, in McGautha v. California, the Court upheld the prevailing system of sentencing in capital cases. The Court concluded:
“In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.” 402 U. S., at 207.
In reaching this decision, the Court had the benefit of extensive briefing, full oral argument, and six months of careful deliberations. The Court‘s labors are documented by 130 pages of opinions in the United States Reports. All of the arguments and factual contentions accepted
Although the Court‘s decision in McGautha was technically confined to the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the
While I would not undertake to make a definitive statement as to the parameters of the Court‘s ruling, it is clear that if state legislatures and the Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment, significant statutory changes will have to be made. Since the two pivotal concurring opinions turn on the assumption that the punishment of death is now meted out in a random and unpredictable manner, legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance with the Court‘s ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed.30 If such standards can be devised or
Real change could clearly be brought about if legislatures provided mandatory death sentences in such a way as to deny juries the opportunity to bring in a verdict on a lesser charge; under such a system, the death sentence could only be avoided by a verdict of acquittal. If this is the only alternative that the legislatures can safely pursue under today‘s ruling, I would have preferred that the Court opt for total abolition.
As a general matter, the evolution of penal concepts in this country has not been marked by great progress, nor have the results up to now been crowned with significant success. If anywhere in the whole spectrum of criminal justice fresh ideas deserve sober analysis, the sentencing and correctional area ranks high on the list. But it has been widely accepted that mandatory sentences for
VI
Since there is no majority of the Court on the ultimate issue presented in these cases, the future of capital punishment in this country has been left in an uncertain limbo. Rather than providing a final and unambiguous answer on the basic constitutional question, the collective impact of the majority‘s ruling is to demand an undetermined measure of change from the various state legislatures and the Congress. While I cannot endorse the process of decisionmaking that has yielded today‘s result and the restraints that that result imposes on legislative action, I am not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have been given the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment. If today‘s opinions demonstrate nothing else, they starkly show that this is an area where legislatures can act far more effectively than courts.
The legislatures are free to eliminate capital punishment for specific crimes or to carve out limited exceptions to a general abolition of the penalty, without adherence to the conceptual strictures of the
The world-wide trend toward limiting the use of capital punishment, a phenomenon to which we have been urged to give great weight, hardly points the way to a judicial solution in this country under a written Constitution. Rather, the change has generally come about through legislative action, often on a trial basis and with the retention of the penalty for certain limited classes of crimes.31 Virtually nowhere has change been wrought by so crude a tool as the
Quite apart from the limitations of the
The highest judicial duty is to recognize the limits on judicial power and to permit the democratic processes to deal with matters falling outside of those limits. The “hydraulic pressure[s]”32 that Holmes spoke of as being generated by cases of great import have propelled the Court to go beyond the limits of judicial power, while fortunately leaving some room for legislative judgment.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
I join the respective opinions of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and add only the following, somewhat personal, comments.
1. Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood‘s training and life‘s experiences, and is not compatible
2. Having lived for many years in a State that does not have the death penalty,1 that effectively abolished it in 1911,2 and that carried out its last execution on February 13, 1906,3 capital punishment had never been a part of life for me. In my State, it just did not exist. So far as I can determine, the State, purely from a statistical deterrence point of view, was neither the worse nor the better for its abolition, for, as the concurring opinions observe, the statistics prove little, if anything. But the State and its citizens accepted the fact that the death penalty was not to be in the arsenal of possible punishments for any crime.
3. I, perhaps alone among the present members of the Court, am on judicial record as to this. As a member of the United States Court of Appeals, I first struggled silently with the issue of capital punishment in Feguer v. United States, 302 F. 2d 214 (CA8 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 872 (1962). The defendant in that case may have been one of the last to be executed under federal auspices. I struggled again with the issue, and once more refrained from comment, in my writing for an en banc court in Pope v. United States, 372 F. 2d 710 (CA8 1967), vacated (upon acknowledgment by the Solicitor General of error revealed by the subsequently decided United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968)) and remanded, 392 U. S. 651 (1968). Finally, in Max
4. The several concurring opinions acknowledge, as they must, that until today capital punishment was accepted and assumed as not unconstitutional per se under the
Suddenly, however, the course of decision is now the opposite way, with the Court evidently persuaded that somehow the passage of time has taken us to a place of greater maturity and outlook. The argument, plausible and high-sounding as it may be, is not persuasive, for it is only one year since McGautha, only eight and one-half years since Rudolph, 14 years since Trop, and 25 years since Francis, and we have been presented with nothing that demonstrates a significant movement of any kind in these brief periods. The Court has just decided that it is time to strike down the death penalty. There would have been as much reason to do this
The Court has recognized, and I certainly subscribe to the proposition, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S., at 378. And Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for a plurality of the Court, referred to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 101. Mr. Jefferson expressed the same thought well.7
5. To reverse the judgments in these cases is, of course, the easy choice. It is easier to strike the balance in favor of life and against death. It is comforting to relax in the thoughts—perhaps the rationalizations—that this is the compassionate decision for a maturing society; that this is the moral and the “right” thing to do; that thereby we convince ourselves that we are moving down the road toward human decency; that we value life even though that life has taken another or others or has grievously scarred another or others and their families; and that we are less barbaric than we were in 1879, or in 1890, or in 1910, or in 1947, or in 1958, or in 1963, or a year ago, in 1971, when Wilkerson, Kemmler, Weems, Francis, Trop, Rudolph, and McGautha were respectively decided.
This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense. But it is good argument and it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way and not as a judicial expedient. As I have said above, were I a legislator, I would do all I could to sponsor and to vote for legislation abolishing the death penalty. And were I the chief executive of a sovereign State, I would be sorely tempted to exercise executive clemency as Governor Rockefeller of Arkansas did recently just before he departed from office. There—on the Legislative Branch of the State or Federal Government, and secondarily, on the Executive Branch—is where the authority and responsibility for this kind of action lies. The authority should not be taken over by the judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue.
I do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator, responsive, at least in part, to the will of constituents.
6. The Court, in my view, is somewhat propelled toward its result by the interim decision of the California Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, that the death penalty is violative of that State‘s constitution. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880 (Feb. 18, 1972). So far as I am aware, that was the first time the death penalty in its entirety has been nullified by judicial decision. Cf. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786, 793 (CA4 1970), cert. denied, post, p. 942. California‘s moral problem was a profound one, for more prisoners were on death row there than in any other State. California, of course, has the right to construe its constitution as it will. Its construction, however, is hardly a precedent for federal adjudication.
7. I trust the Court fully appreciates what it is doing when it decides these cases the way it does today. Not only are the capital punishment laws of 39 States and the District of Columbia struck down, but also all those provisions of the federal statutory structure that permit the death penalty apparently are voided. No longer is capital punishment possible, I suspect, for, among other crimes, treason,
8. It is of passing interest to note a few voting facts with respect to recent federal death penalty legislation:
A. The aircraft piracy statute,
B. The presidential assassination statute,
C. The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 was approved January 2, 1971. Title IV thereof added the congressional assassination statute that is now
It is impossible for me to believe that the many lawyer-members of the House and Senate—including, I might add, outstanding leaders and prominent candidates for higher office—were callously unaware and insensitive of constitutional overtones in legislation of this type. The answer, of course, is that in 1961, in 1965, and in 1970 these elected representatives of the people—far more conscious of the temper of the times, of the maturing of society, and of the contemporary demands for man‘s dignity, than are we who sit cloistered on this Court—took it as settled that the death penalty then, as it always had been, was not in itself unconstitutional. Some of those Members of Congress, I suspect, will be surprised at this Court‘s giant stride today.
9. If the reservations expressed by my Brother STEWART (which, as I read his opinion, my Brother WHITE shares) were to command support, namely, that capital punishment may not be unconstitutional so long as it be mandatorily imposed, the result, I fear, will be that statutes struck down today will be re-enacted by state legislatures to prescribe the death penalty for specified crimes without any alternative for the imposition of a lesser punishment in the discretion of the judge or jury, as the case may be. This approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation that is regressive and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the imposition of punishment. I thought we had passed beyond that point in our criminology long ago.
10. It is not without interest, also, to note that, although the several concurring opinions acknowledge the heinous and atrocious character of the offenses committed by the petitioners, none of those opinions makes
Although personally I may rejoice at the Court‘s result, I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped. It has sought and has achieved an end.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The Court granted certiorari in these cases to consider whether the death penalty is any longer a permissible form of punishment. 403 U. S. 952 (1971). It is the judgment of five Justices that the death penalty, as customarily prescribed and implemented in this country today, offends the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The reasons for that judgment are stated in five separate opinions, expressing as many separate rationales. In my view, none of these opinions provides a constitutionally adequate foundation for the Court‘s decision.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concludes that capital punishment is incompatible with notions of “equal protection” that he finds to be “implicit” in the
Although the central theme of petitioners’ presentations in these cases is that the imposition of the death penalty is per se unconstitutional, only two of today‘s opinions explicitly conclude that so sweeping a determination is mandated by the Constitution. Both MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL call for the abolition of all existing state and federal capital punishment statutes. They intimate as well that no capital statute could be devised in the future that might comport with the
Whatever uncertainties may hereafter surface, several of the consequences of today‘s decision are unmistakably clear. The decision is plainly one of the greatest im-
The Court rejects as not decisive the clearest evidence that the Framers of the Constitution and the authors of the
In terms of the constitutional role of this Court, the impact of the majority‘s ruling is all the greater because the decision encroaches upon an area squarely within the historic prerogative of the legislative branch—both state and federal—to protect the citizenry through the designation of penalties for prohibitable conduct. It is the very sort of judgment that the legislative branch is competent to make and for which the judiciary is ill-equipped. Throughout our history, Justices of this Court have emphasized the gravity of decisions invalidating legislative judgments, admonishing the nine men who sit on this bench of the duty of self-restraint, especially when called upon to apply the expansive due process and cruel and unusual punishment rubrics. I can recall no case in which, in the name of deciding constitutional questions, this Court has subordinated national and local democratic processes to such an extent. Before turning to address the thesis of petitioners’ case against capital punishment—a thesis that has proved, at least in large measure, persuasive to a majority of this Court—I first will set out the principles that counsel against the Court‘s sweeping decision.
I
The Constitution itself poses the first obstacle to petitioners’ argument that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. The relevant provisions are the Fifth,
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
Thus, the Federal Government‘s power was restricted in order to guarantee those charged with crimes that the prosecution would have only a single opportunity to seek imposition of the death penalty and that the death penalty could not be exacted without due process and a grand jury indictment. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted about 77 years after the Bill of Rights, imposed the due process limitation of the Fifth Amendment upon the States’ power to authorize capital punishment.
The Eighth Amendment, adopted at the same time as the Fifth, proscribes “cruel and unusual” punishments. In an effort to discern its meaning, much has been written about its history in the opinions of this Court and elsewhere.3 That history need not be restated here since, whatever punishments the Framers of the Constitution may have intended to prohibit under the “cruel and unusual” language, there cannot be the slightest doubt that they intended no absolute bar on the Government‘s authority to impose the death penalty. McGautha v.
Of course, the specific prohibitions within the Bill of Rights are limitations on the exercise of power; they are not an affirmative grant of power to the Government. I, therefore, do not read the several references to capital punishment as foreclosing this Court from considering whether the death penalty in a particular case offends the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor are “cruel and unusual punishments” and “due process of law” static concepts whose meaning and scope were sealed at the time of their writing. They were designed to be dynamic and to gain meaning through application to specific circumstances, many of which were not contemplated by their authors. While flexibility in the application of these broad concepts is one of the hallmarks of our system of government, the Court is not free to read into the Constitution a meaning that is plainly at variance with its language. Both the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the history of the Eighth Amendment confirm beyond doubt that the death penalty was considered to be a constitutionally permissible punishment. It is, however, within the historic process of constitutional adjudication to challenge the imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric manner or as a penalty wholly disproportionate to a particular criminal act. And in making such a judgment in a case before it, a court may consider contemporary standards to the extent they are relevant. While this weighing of a punishment against the Eighth Amendment standard on a case-by-case basis is consonant with history and precedent, it is not what
II
Petitioners assert that the constitutional issue is an open one uncontrolled by prior decisions of this Court. They view the several cases decided under the Eighth Amendment as assuming the constitutionality of the death penalty without focusing squarely upon the issue. I do not believe that the case law can be so easily cast aside. The Court on numerous occasions has both assumed and asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment. In several cases that assumption provided a necessary foundation for the decision, as the issue was whether a particular means of carrying out a capital sentence would be allowed to stand. Each of those decisions necessarily was premised on the assumption that some method of exacting the penalty was permissible.
The issue in the first capital case in which the Eighth Amendment was invoked, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), was whether carrying out a death sentence by public shooting was cruel and unusual punishment. A unanimous Court upheld that form of execution, noting first that the punishment itself, as distinguished from the mode of its infliction, was “not pretended by the counsel of the prisoner” (id., at 137) to be cruel and unusual. The Court went on to hold that:
“Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities . . . are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that category . . . .” Id., at 134-135.
Eleven years later, in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), the Court again faced a question involving the
“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
More than 50 years later, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Court considered a case in which, due to a mechanical malfunction, Louisiana‘s initial attempt to electrocute a convicted murderer had failed. Petitioner sought to block a second attempt to execute the sentence on the ground that to do so would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In the plurality opinion written by Mr. Justice Reed, concurred in by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black and Jackson, relief was denied. Again the Court focused on the manner of execution, never questioning the propriety of the death sentence itself.
“The case before us does not call for an examination into any punishments except that of death. . . . The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence . . . .”
“. . . The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.” Id., at 463-464.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, unwilling to dispose of the case under the Eighth Amendment‘s specific prohibition, approved the second execution attempt under the Due Process Clause. He concluded that “a State may be found to deny a person due process by treating even one guilty of crime in a manner that violates standards of
The four dissenting Justices, although finding a second attempt at execution to be impermissibly cruel, expressly recognized the validity of capital punishment:
“In determining whether the proposed procedure is unconstitutional, we must measure it against a lawful electrocution. . . . Electrocution, when instantaneous, can be inflicted by a state in conformity with due process of law. . . .”
“The all-important consideration is that the execution shall be so instantaneous and substantially painless that the punishment shall be reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of death itself.” Id., at 474 (original emphasis).
Each of these cases involved the affirmance of a death sentence where its validity was attacked as violating the Eighth Amendment. Five opinions were written in these three cases, expressing the views of 23 Justices. While in the narrowest sense it is correct to say that in none was there a frontal attack upon the constitutionality of the death penalty, each opinion went well beyond an unarticulated assumption of validity. The power of the States to impose capital punishment was repeatedly and expressly recognized.
In addition to these cases in which the constitutionality of the death penalty was a necessary foundation for the decision, those who today would have this Court undertake the absolute abolition of the death penalty also must reject the opinions of other cases stipulating or assuming the constitutionality of capital punishment. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99, 100 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382, 409 (1910)
The plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, supra, is of special interest since it is this opinion, in large measure, that provides the foundation for the present attack on the death penalty.6 It is anomalous that the standard urged by petitioners—“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (356 U.S., at 101)—should be derived from an opinion that so unqualifiedly rejects their arguments. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, DOUGLAS, and Whittaker, stated flatly:
“At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.” Id., at 99.
The issue in Trop was whether forfeiture of citizenship was a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on
“While the State has the power to punish, the [Eighth] Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.” Id., at 100.
The plurality‘s repeated disclaimers of any attack on capital punishment itself must be viewed as more than offhand dicta since those views were written in direct response to the strong language in Mr. Justice Frankfurter‘s dissent arguing that denationalization could not be a disproportionate penalty for a concededly capital offense.8
The most recent precedents of this Court—Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and McGautha v. California, supra—are also premised to a significant degree on the constitutionality of the death penalty. While the scope of review in both cases was limited to questions involving the procedures for selecting juries
III
Petitioners seek to avoid the authority of the foregoing cases, and the weight of express recognition in the Constitution itself, by reasoning which will not withstand analysis. The thesis of petitioners’ case derives from several opinions in which members of this Court
“[T]he words of the Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
But this was not new doctrine. It was the approach to the Eighth Amendment taken by Mr. Justice McKenna in his opinion for the Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Writing for four Justices sitting as the majority of the six-man Court deciding the case, he concluded that the clause must be “progressive“; it is not “fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” Id., at 378. The same test was offered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his separate concurrence in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, at 469. While he rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Eighth Amendment fully applicable to the States, he nonetheless found as a matter of due process that the States were prohibited from “treating even one guilty of crime in a manner that violates standards of decency more or less universally accepted.”
Whether one views the question as one of due process or of cruel and unusual punishment, as I do for convenience in this case, the issue is essentially the same.13 The fundamental premise upon which either standard is based is that notions of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or due process do evolve.
But we are not asked to consider the permissibility of any of the several methods employed in carrying out the death sentence. Nor are we asked, at least as part of the core submission in these cases, to determine whether the penalty might be a grossly excessive punishment for some specific criminal conduct. Either inquiry would call for a discriminating evaluation of particular means, or of the relationship between particular conduct and its punishment. Petitioners’ principal argument goes far beyond the traditional process of case-by-case inclusion and exclusion. Instead the argument insists on an unprecedented constitutional rule of absolute prohibition of capital punishment for any crime, regardless of its depravity and impact on society. In calling for a precipitate and final judicial end to this form of penalty as offensive to evolving standards of decency, petitioners would have this Court abandon the traditional and more refined approach consistently followed in its prior Eighth Amendment precedents. What they are saying, in effect, is that the evolutionary
The prior opinions of this Court point with great clarity to reasons why those of us who sit on this Court at a particular time should act with restraint before assuming, contrary to a century of precedent, that we now know the answer for all time to come. First, where as here, the language of the applicable provision provides great leeway and where the underlying social policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great. It is too easy to propound our subjective standards of wise policy under the rubric of more or less universally held standards of decency. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 103 (Warren, C. J.), 119-120 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, at 470-471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, at 378-379 (McKenna, J.).
The second consideration dictating judicial self-restraint arises from a proper recognition of the respective roles of the legislative and judicial branches. The designation of punishments for crimes is a matter peculiarly within the sphere of the state and federal legislative bodies. See, e. g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, at 447; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 103. When asked to encroach on the legislative prerogative we are well counseled to proceed with the utmost reticence. The review of legislative choices, in the performance of our duty to enforce the Constitution, has been characterized most appropriately by Mr. Justice Holmes as “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-148 (1927) (separate opinion).
“What is always basic when the power of Congress to enact legislation is challenged is the appropriate approach to judicial review of congressional legislation. . . . When the power of Congress to pass a statute is challenged, the function of this Court is to determine whether legislative action lies clearly outside the constitutional grant of power to which it has been, or may fairly be, referred. In making this determination, the Court sits in judgment on the action of a co-ordinate branch of the Government while keeping unto itself—as it must under our constitutional system—the final determination of its own power to act. . . .”
“Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of power—between questions of authority and questions of prudence—requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a
See also Mr. Justice White‘s dissenting opinion in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, at 382.
IV
Although determining the range of available punishments for a particular crime is a legislative function, the very presence of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause within the Bill of Rights requires, in the context of a specific case, that courts decide whether particular acts of the Congress offend that Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the judiciary a similar obligation to scrutinize state legislation. But the proper exercise of that constitutional obligation in the cases before us today must be founded on a full recognition of the several considerations set forth above—the affirmative references to capital punishment in the Constitution, the prevailing precedents of this Court, the limitations on the exercise of our power imposed by tested principles of judicial self-restraint, and the duty to avoid encroachment on the powers conferred upon state and federal legislatures. In the face of these considerations, only the most con
Petitioners’ contentions are premised, as indicated above, on the long-accepted view that concepts embodied in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments evolve. They present, with skill and persistence, a list of “objective indicators” which are said to demonstrate that prevailing standards of human decency have progressed to the final point of requiring the Court to hold, for all cases and for all time, that capital punishment is unconstitutional.
Briefly summarized, these proffered indicia of contemporary standards of decency include the following: (i) a worldwide trend toward the disuse of the death penalty;16 (ii) the reflection in the scholarly literature of a progressive rejection of capital punishment founded essentially on moral opposition to such treatment;17 (iii) the decreasing numbers of executions over the last 40 years and especially over the last decade;18 (iv) the
small number of death sentences rendered in relation to the number of cases in which they might have been imposed;19 and (v) the indication of public abhorrence of
Petitioners concede, as they must, that little weight can be given to the lack of executions in recent years. A de facto moratorium has existed for five years now while cases challenging the procedures for implementing the capital sentence have been re-examined by this Court. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The infrequency of executions during the years before the moratorium became fully effective may be attributable in part to decisions of this Court giving expanded scope to the criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights, especially under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. E. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Additionally, decisions of the early 1960‘s amplifying the scope of the federal habeas corpus remedy also may help account for a reduction in the number of executions. E. g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The major effect of either expanded procedural protections or extended collateral remedies may well have been simply to postpone the date of execution for some capital offenders, thereby leaving them ultimately in the moratorium limbo.
No fully reliable statistics are available on the nationwide ratio of death sentences to cases in which death was a statutorily permissible punishment. At oral argument, counsel for petitioner in No. 69-5003 estimated that the ratio is 12 or 13 to one. Tr. of Oral Arg. in Furman v. Georgia, No. 69-5003, p. 11. Others have found a higher correlation. See McGee, Capital Punishment as
Any attempt to discern contemporary standards of decency through the review of objective factors must take into account several overriding considerations which petitioners choose to discount or ignore. In a democracy
Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 Fed. Prob., No. 2, pp. 11, 12 (1964) (one out of every five, or 20%, of persons convicted of murder received the death penalty in California); Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1964) (between 1916 and 1955, 157 out of 652 persons charged with murder received the death sentence in New Jersey—about 20%; between 1956 and 1960, 13 out of 61 received the death sentence—also about 20%); H. Kalven & H. Ziesel, The American Jury 435-436 (1966) (21 of 111 murder cases resulted in death sentences during three representative years during the mid-1950‘s); see also Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 Crime & Delin. 132 (1969).
At the state level, New York, among other States, has recently undertaken reconsideration of its capital crimes. A law passed in 1965 restricted the use of capital punishment to the crimes of murder of a police officer and murder by a person serving a sentence of life imprisonment.
I pause here to state that I am at a loss to under-
In addition to the New York experience, a number of other States have undertaken reconsideration of capital punishment in recent years. In four States the penalty has been put to a vote of the people through public referenda—a means likely to supply objective evidence of community standards. In Oregon a referendum seeking abolition of capital punishment failed in 1958 but was subsequently approved in 1964.26 Two years later the penalty was approved in Colorado by a wide margin.27
“What our legislative representatives think in the two score states which still have the death penalty may be inferred from the fate of the bills to repeal or modify the death penalty filed during recent years in the legislatures of more than half of these states. In about a dozen instances, the bills emerged from committee for a vote. But in none except Delaware did they become law. In those states where these bills were brought to the floor of the legislatures, the vote in most instances wasn‘t even close.”30
This recent history of activity with respect to legislation concerning the death penalty abundantly refutes the abolitionist position.
The second and even more direct source of information
“[T]he jury is given broad discretion to decide whether or not death is ‘the proper penalty’ in a given case, and a juror‘s general views about capital punishment play an inevitable role in any such decision.
“A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror. . . . Guided by neither rule nor standard, . . . a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.”
“[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ Trop v. Dulles, . . .”31
Any attempt to discern, therefore, where the prevailing standards of decency lie must take careful account of
V
Petitioners seek to salvage their thesis by arguing that the infrequency and discriminatory nature of the actual resort to the ultimate penalty tend to diffuse public opposition. We are told that the penalty is imposed exclusively on uninfluential minorities—“the poor and powerless, personally ugly and socially unacceptable.”38 It is urged that this pattern of application assures that large segments of the public will be either uninformed or unconcerned and will have no reason to measure the punishment against prevailing moral standards.
Implicitly, this argument concedes the unsoundness of petitioners’ contention, examined above under Part IV, that objective evidence shows a present and widespread community rejection of the death penalty. It is now said,
Apart from the impermissibility of basing a constitutional judgment of this magnitude on such speculative assumptions, the argument suffers from other defects. If, as petitioners urge, we are to engage in speculation, it is not at all certain that the public would experience deep-felt revulsion if the States were to execute as many sentenced capital offenders this year as they executed in the mid-1930‘s.39 It seems more likely that public reaction, rather than being characterized by undifferentiated rejection, would depend upon the facts and circumstances surrounding each particular case.
Members of this Court know, from the petitions and appeals that come before us regularly, that brutish and revolting murders continue to occur with disquieting frequency. Indeed, murders are so commonplace
In pursuing the foregoing speculation, I do not suggest that it is relevant to the appropriate disposition of these cases. The purpose of the digression is to indicate that judicial decisions cannot be founded on such speculations and assumptions, however appealing they may seem.
But the discrimination argument does not rest alone on a projection of the assumed effect on public opinion of more frequent executions. Much also is made of the undeniable fact that the death penalty has a greater impact on the lower economic strata of society, which
AS MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL‘S opinion today demonstrates, the argument does have a more troubling aspect. It is his contention that if the average citizen were aware of the disproportionate burden of capital punishment borne by the “poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged,” he would find the penalty “shocking to his conscience and sense of justice” and would not stand for its further use. Ante, at 365-366, 369. This argument, like the apathy rationale, calls for further speculation on the part of the Court. It also illuminates the quicksands upon which we are asked to base this decision. Indeed, the two contentions seem to require contradictory assumptions regarding the public‘s moral attitude toward capital punishment. The apathy argument is predicated on the assumption that the penalty is used against the less influential elements of society, that the public is fully aware of this, and that it tolerates use of capital punishment only because of a callous indifference to the offenders who are sentenced. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL‘S argument, on the other hand, rests on the contrary assumption that the public does not know against whom the penalty is enforced and that if the public were educated to this fact it would find the punishment intolerable. Ante, at 369. Neither assumption can claim to be an entirely accurate portrayal of public attitude; for some acceptance of capital punishment might be a conse-
Certainly the claim is justified that this criminal sanction falls more heavily on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society. The “have-nots” in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens. This is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but it is not an argument of constitutional proportions under the
Finally, yet another theory for abolishing the death penalty—reflected in varying degrees in each of the concurring opinions today—is predicated on the discriminatory impact argument. Quite apart from measuring the public‘s acceptance or rejection of the death penalty under the “standards of decency” rationale, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS finds the punishment cruel and unusual because it is “arbitrarily” invoked. He finds that “the basic theme of equal protection is implicit” in the
Although not presented by any of the petitioners today, a different argument, premised on the Equal Protection Clause, might well be made. If a Negro defendant, for instance, could demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment than others charged with the same offense, a constitutional violation might be established. This was the contention made in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F. 2d 138 (CA8 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 398 U. S. 262 (1970), in which the Eighth Circuit was asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus setting aside a death sentence imposed on a Negro defendant convicted of rape. In that case substantial statistical evidence was introduced tending to show a pronounced disproportion in the number of Negroes receiving death sentences for rape in parts of Arkansas and elsewhere in the South. That evidence was not excluded but was found to be insufficient to show discrimination in sentencing in Maxwell‘s trial. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, then sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, concluded:
“The petitioner‘s argument is an interesting one and we are not disposed to say that it could not have some validity and weight in certain situations. Like the trial court, however . . . we feel that the argument does not have validity and pertinent application to Maxwell‘s case.
“We are not yet ready to condemn and upset the result reached in every case of a Negro rape defendant in the State of Arkansas on the basis of broad theories of social and statistical injustice. . . . “We do not say that there is no ground for suspicion that the death penalty for rape may have been discriminatorily applied over the decades in that large area of states whose statutes provide for it. There are recognizable indicators of this. But . . . improper state practice of the past does not automatically invalidate a procedure of the present. . . .” Id., at 146-148.
I agree that discriminatory application of the death penalty in the past, admittedly indefensible, is no justification for holding today that capital punishment is invalid in all cases in which sentences were handed out to members of the class discriminated against. But Maxwell does point the way to a means of raising the equal protection challenge that is more consonant with precedent and the Constitution‘s mandates than the several courses pursued by today‘s concurring opinions.
A final comment on the racial discrimination problem seems appropriate. The possibility of racial bias in the trial and sentencing process has diminished in recent years. The segregation of our society in decades past, which contributed substantially to the severity of punishment for interracial crimes, is now no longer prevalent in this country. Likewise, the day is past when juries do not represent the minority group elements of the community. The assurance of fair trials for all citizens is greater today than at any previous time in our history. Because standards of criminal justice have “evolved” in a manner favorable to the accused, discriminatory imposition of capital punishment is far less likely today than in the past.
Petitioner in Branch v. Texas, No. 69-5031, and to a lesser extent the petitioners in the other cases before us today, urge that capital punishment is cruel and unusual because it no longer serves any rational legislative interests. Before turning to consider whether any of the traditional aims of punishment justify the death penalty, I should make clear the context in which I approach this aspect of the cases.
First, I find no support in the language of the Constitution, in its history, or in the cases arising under it—for the view that this Court may invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology. While the cases affirm our authority to prohibit punishments that are cruelly inhumane (e. g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 135-136; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447), and punishments that are cruelly excessive in that they are disproportionate to particular crimes (see Part VII, infra), the precedents of this Court afford no basis for striking down a particular form of punishment because we may be persuaded that means less stringent would be equally efficacious.
Secondly, if we were free to question the justifications for the use of capital punishment, a heavy burden would rest on those who attack the legislatures’ judgments to prove the lack of rational justifications. This Court has long held that legislative decisions in this area, which lie within the special competency of that branch, are entitled to a presumption of validity. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 103; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 378-379; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 449.
“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.” Id., at 248.
It is clear, however, that the Court did not reject retribution altogether. The record in that case indicated that one of the reasons why the trial judge imposed the death penalty was his sense of revulsion at the “shocking details of the crime.” Id., at 244. Although his motivation was clearly retributive, the Court upheld the trial judge‘s sentence.42 Similarly, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL noted in his plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 530 (1968), that this Court “has never held that anything in the Constitution requires that penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects.”43
“Many are inclined to test the efficacy of punishment solely by its value as a deterrent: but this is too narrow a view. Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. If this were so, we should not send to prison a man who was guilty of motor manslaughter, but only disqualify him from driving; but would public opinion be content with this? The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.”44
The view expressed by Lord Denning was cited approvingly in the Royal Commission‘s Report, recognizing “a Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470-471 (1947) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter‘s admonition that the Court is not empowered to act simply because of a “feeling of revulsion against a State‘s insistence on its pound of flesh“); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[p]unishment presupposes an offense, not necessarily an act previously declared criminal, but an act for which retribution is exacted“).
Deterrence is a more appealing justification, although opinions again differ widely. Indeed, the deterrence issue lies at the heart of much of the debate between the abolitionists and retentionists.48 Statistical studies, based primarily on trends in States that have abolished the penalty, tend to support the view that the death penalty has not been proved to be a superior deterrent.49 Some dispute the validity of this conclusion,50 pointing
“The general conclusion which we reach, after careful review of all the evidence we have been able to obtain as to the deterrent effect of capital punishment, may be stated as follows. Prima facie the penalty of death is likely to have a stronger effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of punishment, and there is some evidence (though no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so. But this effect does not operate universally or uniformly, and there are many offenders on whom it is limited and may often be negligible. It is accordingly important to view this question in a just perspective and not base a penal policy in relation to murder on exaggerated estimates of the uniquely deterrent force of the death penalty.”51
Only recently this Court was called on to consider the deterrence argument in relation to punishment by fines for public drunkenness. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968). The Court was unwilling to strike down the Texas statute on grounds that it lacked a rational foundation. What MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL said there would seem to have equal applicability in this case:
“The long-standing and still raging debate over the validity of the deterrence justification for penal sanctions has not reached any sufficiently clear conclusions to permit it to be said that such sanctions are ineffective in any particular context or for any
As I noted at the outset of this section, legislative judgments as to the efficacy of particular punishments are presumptively rational and may not be struck down under the
VII
In two of the cases before us today juries imposed sentences of death after convictions for rape.53 In these cases we are urged to hold that even if capital punishment is permissible for some crimes, it is a cruel and unusual punishment for this crime. Petitioners in these cases rely on the Court‘s opinions holding that the
The Court, in Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), adopted Mr. Justice Field‘s view. The defendant, in Weems, charged with falsifying Government documents, had been sentenced to serve 15 years in cadena temporal, a punishment which included carrying chains at the wrists and ankles and the perpetual loss of the right to vote and hold office. Finding the sentence grossly excessive in length and condition of imprisonment, the Court struck it down. This notion of disproportionality—that particular sentences may be cruelly excessive for particular crimes—has been cited with approval in more recent decisions of this Court. See Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, 667; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100; see also Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 135-136 (1903).
These cases, while providing a rationale for gauging the constitutionality of capital sentences imposed for rape,
Operating within these narrow limits, I find it quite impossible to declare the death sentence grossly excessive for all rapes. Rape is widely recognized as among the most serious of violent crimes, as witnessed by the very fact that it is punishable by death in 16 States and by life imprisonment in most other States.55 The several reasons why rape stands so high on the list of serious crimes are well known: It is widely viewed as the most atrocious of intrusions upon the privacy and dignity of the victim; never is the crime committed accidentally; rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated;
The argument that the death penalty for rape lacks rational justification because less severe punishments might be viewed as accomplishing the proper goals of penology is as inapposite here as it was in considering per se abolition. See Part VI supra. The state of knowledge with respect to the deterrent value of the sentence for this crime is inconclusive.57 Moreover, what has been said about the concept of retribution applies with equal force where the crime is rape. There are many cases in which the sordid, heinous nature of a particular crime, demeaning, humiliating, and often physically or psychologically traumatic, will call for public condemnation. In a period in our country‘s history when the frequency of this crime is increasing alarmingly,58 it is indeed a grave event for the Court to take from the States whatever deterrent and retributive weight the death penalty retains.
Other less sweeping applications of the disproportionality concept have been suggested. Recently the Fourth Circuit struck down a death sentence in Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (1970), holding that the death penalty was an appropriate punishment for rape
It seems to me that both of these tests depart from established principles and also raise serious practical problems. How are those cases in which the victim‘s life is endangered to be distinguished from those in which no danger is found? The threat of serious injury is implicit in the definition of rape; the victim is either forced into submission by physical violence or by the threat of violence. Certainly that test would provide little comfort for either of the rape defendants in the cases presently before us. Both criminal acts were accomplished only after a violent struggle. Petitioner Jackson held a scissors blade against his victim‘s neck. Petitioner Branch had less difficulty subduing his 65-year-old victim. Both assailants threatened to kill their victims. See MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS’ opinion, ante, at 252-253. The alternate test, limiting the penalty to cases in which the victim suffers physical or emotional harm, might present even greater problems of application. While most physical effects may be seen and objectively measured, the emotional impact may be impossible to gauge at any particular point in time. The extent and duration of psychological trauma may not be known or ascertainable prior to the date of trial.
While I reject each of these attempts to establish specific categories of cases in which the death penalty may be deemed excessive, I view them as groping
VIII
I now return to the overriding question in these cases: whether this Court, acting in conformity with the
The sobering disadvantage of constitutional adjudication of this magnitude is the universality and permanence of the judgment. The enduring merit of legislative action is its responsiveness to the democratic process, and to revision and change: mistaken judgments may be corrected and refinements perfected. In England60 and Canada61 critical choices were made after studies canvassing all competing views, and in those countries revisions may be made in light of experience.62
As recently as 1967 a presidential commission did consider, as part of an overall study of crime in this country, whether the death penalty should be abolished.
“The question whether capital punishment is an appropriate sanction is a policy decision to be made by each State. Where it is retained, the types of offenses for which it is available should be strictly limited, and the law should be enforced in an evenhanded and nondiscriminatory manner, with procedures for review of death sentences that are fair and expeditious. When a State finds that it cannot administer the penalty in such a manner, or that the death penalty is being imposed but not carried into effect, the penalty should be abandoned.”63
The thrust of the Commission‘s recommendation, as presently relevant, is that this question “is a policy decision to be made by each State.” There is no hint that this decision could or should be made by the judicial branch.
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws also considered the capital punishment issue. The introductory commentary of its final report states that “a sharp division [existed] within the Commission on the subject of capital punishment,” although a
With deference and respect for the views of the Justices who differ, it seems to me that all these studies—both in this country and elsewhere—suggest that, as a matter of policy and precedent, this is a classic case for the exercise of our oft-announced allegiance to judicial restraint. I know of no case in which greater gravity and delicacy have attached to the duty that this Court is called on to perform whenever legislation—state or federal—is challenged on constitutional grounds.67 It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a
“[T]he whole of [Mr. Justice Holmes‘] work during his thirty years of service on this Court should be a constant reminder that the power to invalidate legislation must not be exercised as if, either in constitutional theory or in the art of government, it stood as the sole bulwark against unwisdom or excesses of the moment.” 356 U. S., at 128.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The Court‘s judgments today strike down a penalty that our Nation‘s legislators have thought necessary since our country was founded. My Brothers DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL would at one fell swoop invalidate laws enacted by Congress and 40 of the 50 state legislatures, and would consign to the limbo of unconstitutionality under a single rubric penalties for offenses as varied and unique as murder, piracy, mutiny, highjacking, and desertion in the face of the enemy. My Brothers STEWART and WHITE, asserting reliance on a more limited rationale—the reluctance of judges and juries actually to impose the death penalty in the majority of capital
The answer, of course, is found in Hamilton‘s Federalist Paper No. 78 and in Chief Justice Marshall‘s classic opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). An oft-told story since then, it bears summarization once more. Sovereignty resides ultimately in the people as a whole and, by adopting through their States a written
The Founding Fathers thus wisely sought to have the best of both worlds, the undeniable benefits of both democratic self-government and individual rights protected against possible excesses of that form of government.
The courts in cases properly before them have been entrusted under the
“[W]hile unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.” 297 U. S. 1, 78-79 (1936).
Rigorous attention to the limits of this Court‘s authority is likewise enjoined because of the natural desire that beguiles judges along with other human beings into imposing their own views of goodness, truth, and justice upon others. Judges differ only in that they have the power, if not the authority, to enforce their desires. This is doubtless why nearly two centuries of judicial precedent from this Court counsel the sparing use of that power. The most expansive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not remotely suggest that this Court has been granted a roving commission, either by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the
“The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power.” On Liberty 28 (1885).
The task of judging constitutional cases imposed by
“I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the
Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardlyany limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. Yet I can think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present and the earlier decisions to which I have referred. Of course the words ‘due process of law,’ if taken in their literal meaning, have no application to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they have been given a much more extended and artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in theFourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide but the Court‘s own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the States may pass.” 281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissenting opinion).
More than 20 years ago, Justice Jackson made a similar observation with respect to this Court‘s restriction of the States in the enforcement of their own criminal laws:
“The use of the
due process clause to disable the States in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic experimentation.” Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 174 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
If there can be said to be one dominant theme in the
This philosophy of the Framers is best described by one of the ablest and greatest of their number, James Madison, in Federalist No. 51:
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself.”
Madison‘s observation applies to the Judicial Branch with at least as much force as to the Legislative and Executive Branches. While overreaching by the Legislative and Executive Branches may result in the sacrifice of individual protections that the
The very nature of judicial review, as pointed out by Justice Stone in his dissent in the Butler case, makes the courts the least subject to Madisonian check in the event that they shall, for the best of motives, expand judicial authority beyond the limits contemplated by the Framers. It is for this reason that judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review. The Court‘s holding in these cases has been reached, I believe, in complete disregard of that implied condition.
Notes
Henry continued:
“But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.” 3 J. Elliot‘s Debates 447-448 (2d ed. 1876).
Although these remarks have been cited as evidence that the Framers considered only torturous punishments to be “cruel and unusual,” it is obvious that Henry was referring to the use of torture for the purpose of eliciting confessions from suspected criminals. Indeed, in the ensuing colloquy, see n. 3, infra, George Mason responded that the use of torture was prohibited by the right against self-incrimination contained in the Virginia Bill of Rights.
See dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 380; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, ante, at 282-285; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, at 333-341; dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 421-424. 268 Parl. Deb., H. L. (5th ser.) 703 (1965) (Lord Chancellor Gardiner).See Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 852-860 (1969). Earlier drafts of the Bill of Rights used the phrase “cruel and illegal.” It is thought that the change to the “cruel and unusual” wording was inadvertent and not intended to work any change in meaning. Ibid. The historical background of the English Bill of Rights is set forth in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, ante, at 316-318.
It is intimated in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, ante, at 242-245, that the term “unusual” was included in the English Bill of Rights as a protest against the discriminatory application of punishments to minorities. However, the history of capital punishment in
It is significant that the response to Henry‘s plea, by George Nicholas, was simply that a Bill of Rights would be ineffective as a means of restraining the legislative power to prescribe punishments:
“But the gentleman says that, by this Constitution, they have power to make laws to define crimes and prescribe punishments; and that, consequently, we are not free from torture. . . . If we had no security against torture but our [Virginia] declaration of rights, we might be tortured to-morrow; for it has been repeatedly infringed and disregarded.” 3 J. Elliot‘s Debates, supra, at 451.
George Mason misinterpreted Nicholas’ response to Henry:
“Mr. GEORGE MASON replied that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that the [Virginia] bill of rights did not prohibit torture; for that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.” Id., at 452.
Nicholas concluded the colloquy by making his point again:
“Mr. NICHOLAS acknowledged the [Virginia] bill of rights to contain that prohibition, and that the gentleman was right with respect to the practice of extorting confession from the criminal in those countries where torture is used; but still he saw no security arising from the bill of rights as separate from the Constitution, for that it had been frequently violated with impunity.” Ibid.
There was thus no denial that the legislative power should be restrained; the dispute was whether a Bill of Rights would provide a realistic restraint. The Framers, obviously, believed it would.
Many of the state courts, “feeling constrained thereto by the incidences of history,” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 376 (1910), were apparently taking the same position. One court “expressed the opinion that the provision did not apply to punishment by ‘fine or imprisonment or both, but such as that inflicted at the whipping post, in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,’ etc.” Ibid. Another court “said that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like. . . . Other cases . . . selected certain tyrannical acts of the English monarchs as illustrating the meaning of the clause and the extent of its prohibition.” Id., at 368.
Many statistical studies—comparing crime rates in jurisdictions with and without capital punishment and in jurisdictions before and after abolition of capital punishment—have indicated that there is little, if any, measurable deterrent effect. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 258-332 (1967 rev. ed.). There remains uncertainty, however, because of the difficulty of identifying and holding constant all other relevant variables. See Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1275-1292. See also dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 395; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, at 346-354. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *376-377. See also 1 J. Chitty, The Criminal Law 785-786 (5th ed. 1847); Sherman, “... Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted,” 14 Crime & Delin. 73, 74 (1968). See Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930-1970, p. 50 (Aug. 1971). Since the publication of the Department of Justice report, capital punishment has been judicially abolished in California, People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880, cert. denied, 406 U. S. 958 (1972). The States where capital punishment is no longer authorized are Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. “Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. . . . I know . . . that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. . . . Let us follow no such examples, nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs. Let us, as our sister States have done, avail ourselves of our reason and experience, to correct the crude essays of our first and unexperienced, although wise, virtuous, and well-meaning councils. And lastly, let us provide in our Constitution for its revision at stated periods.” Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 40-42 (Memorial ed. 1904). In footnote 32, at 100-101, the plurality opinion indicates that denationalization “was never explicitly sanctioned by this Government until 1940 and never tested against the Constitution until this day.”The Court had earlier emphasized this point in In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), even while stating the narrow, “historical” interpretation of the Clause:
“This [English] Declaration of Rights had reference to the acts of the executive and judicial departments of the government of England; but the language in question as used in the constitution of the State of New York was intended particularly to operate upon the legislature of the State, to whose control the punishment of crime was almost wholly confided. So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, ... it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition. And we think this equally true of the [Clause], in its application to Congress.” Id., at 446-447 (emphasis added).
Georgia law, at the time of the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner in No. 69-5030, left the jury a choice between the death penalty, life imprisonment, or “imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years.”It was said in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 100-101, n. 32, that “[o]n the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the [Clause], precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. . . . If the word ‘unusual’ is to have any meaning apart from the word ‘cruel,’ however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different from that which is generally done.” There are other statements in prior cases indicating that the word “unusual” has a distinct meaning:
“We perceive nothing ... unusual in this [punishment].” Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 480 (1867). “[T]he judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was not only an unusual but a cruel one. . . .” O‘Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). “It is unusual in its character.” Weems v. United States, supra, at 377. “And the punishment
It is fair to conclude from these statements that “[w]hether the word ‘unusual’ has any qualitative meaning different from ‘cruel’ is not clear.” Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 100 n. 32. The question, in any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of the Clause simply by parsing its words.
The New York Court of Appeals had recognized the unusual nature of the execution, but attributed it to a legislative desire to minimize the pain of persons executed. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401 (1958); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 37-39 (1968); M. Cohen, Reason and Law 41-44 (1950); Report of Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, ¶ 52, pp. 17-18 (1953); Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433, 446-455 (1957); H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 60-69 (1963). See, e. g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1783 (1970). But see F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 97-98 (1956) (reprint of testimony before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment).It may, in fact, have appeared earlier. In Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall., at 480, the Court stated:
“We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in this [punishment]. The object of the law was to protect the community against the manifold evils of intemperance. The mode adopted, of prohibiting under penalties the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors, without license, is the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States. It is wholly within the discretion of State legislatures.”
This discussion suggests that the Court viewed the punishment as reasonably related to the purposes for which it was inflicted.
Ibid. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 531 (1968) (MARSHALL, J.) (plurality opinion). Canada has recently undertaken a five-year experiment—similar to that conducted in England—abolishing the death penalty for most crimes. Stats. of Canada 1967-1968, 16 & 17 Eliz. 2, c. 15, p. 145. However, capital punishment is still prescribed for some crimes, including murder of a police officer or corrections official, treason, and piracy.The victim surprised Furman in the act of burglarizing the victim‘s home in the middle of the night. While escaping, Furman killed the victim with one pistol shot fired through the closed kitchen door from the outside. At the trial, Furman gave his version of the killing:
“They got me charged with murder and I admit, I admit going to these folks’ home and they did caught me in there and I was coming back out, backing up and there was a wire down there on the floor. I was coming out backwards and fell back and I didn‘t intend to kill nobody. I didn‘t know they was behind the door. The gun went off and I didn‘t know nothing about no murder until they arrested me, and when the gun went off I was down on the floor and I got up and ran. That‘s all to it.” App. 54-55.
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted that version:
“The admission in open court by the accused ... that during the period in which he was involved in the commission of a criminal act at the home of the deceased, he accidentally tripped over a wire in leaving the premises causing the gun to go off, together with other facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased by violent means, was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of murder....” Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 254, 167 S. E. 2d 628, 629 (1969).
About Furman himself, the jury knew only that he was black and that, according to his statement at trial, he was 26 years old and worked at “Superior Upholstery.” App. 54. It took the jury one hour and 35 minutes to return a verdict of guilt and a sentence of death. Id., at 64-65.
G. Haskins, The Capitall Lawes of New-England, Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 10-11 (Feb. 1956). See, e. g., H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 260 (1967 rev. ed.); National Commission, supra, n. 16, at 1352.This analysis parallels in some ways the analysis used in striking down legislation on the ground that it violates
The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due process become so close as to merge when the substantive due process argument is stated in the following manner: because capital punishment deprives an individual of a fundamental right (i. e., the right to life), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), the State needs a compelling interest to justify it. See Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1324-1354 (1968). Thus stated, the substantive due process argument reiterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment—i. e., punishment may not be more severe than is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the State.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE asserts that if we hold that capital punishment is unconstitutional because it is excessive, we will next have to determine whether a 10-year prison sentence rather than a five-year sentence is also excessive, or whether a $5 fine would not do equally well as a $10 fine. He may be correct that such determinations will have to be made, but, as in these cases, those persons challenging the penalty will bear a heavy burden of demonstrating that it is excessive. These cases arise after 200 years of inquiry, 200 years of public debate and 200 years of marshaling evidence. The burden placed on those challenging capital punishment could not have been greater. I am convinced that they have met their burden. Whether a similar burden will prove too great in future cases is a question that we can resolve in time.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS recognized this fact when he wrote:
“One who reviews the records of criminal trials need not look long to find an instance where the issue of guilt or innocence hangs in delicate balance. A judge who denies a stay of execution in a capital case often wonders if an innocent man is going to his death . . .
“Those doubts exist because our system of criminal justice does not work with the efficiency of a machine—errors are made and innocent as well as guilty people are sometimes punished. . . .
“. . . We believe that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned.
“Yet the sad truth is that a cog in the machine often slips: memories fail; mistaken identifications are made; those who wield the power of life and death itself—the police officer, the witness, the prosecutor, the juror, and even the judge—become overzealous in their concern that criminals be brought to justice. And at times there is a venal combination between the police and a witness.” Foreword, J. Frank & B. Frank, Not Guilty 11-12 (1957).
There has been an “incredible lag” between the development of modern scientific methods of investigation and their application to criminal cases. When modern methodology is available, prosecutors have the resources to utilize it, whereas defense counsel often may not. Lassers, Proof of Guilt in Capital Cases—An Unscience, 58 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 310 (1967). This increases the chances of error.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that this conclusion is speculative, and he is certainly correct. But the mere recognition of this truth does not undercut the validity of the conclusion. MR. JUSTICE POWELL himself concedes that judges somehow know that certain punishments are no longer acceptable in our society; for example, he refers to branding and pillorying. Whence comes this knowledge? The answer is that it comes from our intuition as human beings that our fellow human beings no longer will tolerate such punishments.
I agree wholeheartedly with the implication in my Brother POWELL‘S opinion that judges are not free to strike down penalties that they find personally offensive. But, I disagree with his suggestion that it is improper for judges to ask themselves whether a specific punishment is morally acceptable to the American public. Contrary to some current thought, judges have not lived lives isolated from a broad range of human experience. They have come into contact with many people, many ways of life, and many philosophies. They have learned to share with their fellow human beings common views of morality. If, after drawing on this experience and considering the vast range of people and views that they have encountered, judges conclude that these people would not knowingly tolerate a specific penalty in light of its costs, then this conclusion is entitled to weight. See Frankel, Book Review, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 354 (1971). Judges can find assistance in determining whether they are being objective, rather than subjective, by referring to the attitudes of the persons whom most citizens consider our “ethical leaders.” See Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, at 154 (Frank, J., dissenting).
I must also admit that I am confused as to the point that my Brother POWELL seeks to make regarding the underprivileged members of our society. If he is stating that this Court cannot solve all of their problems in the context of this case, or even many of them, I would agree with him. But if he is opining that it is only the poor, the ignorant, the racial minorities, and the hapless in our society who are executed; that they are executed for no real reason other than to satisfy some vague notion of society‘s cry for vengeance; and that knowing these things, the people of this country would not care, then I most urgently disagree.
There is too much crime, too much killing, too much hatred in this country. If the legislatures could eradicate these elements from our lives by utilizing capital punishment, then there would be a valid purpose for the sanction and the public would surely accept it. It would be constitutional. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE POWELL point out, however, capital punishment has been with us a long time. What purpose has it served? The evidence is that it has served none. I cannot agree that the American people have been so hardened, so embittered that they want to take the life of one who performs even the basest criminal act knowing that the execution is nothing more than bloodlust. This has not been my experience with my fellow citizens. Rather, I have found that they earnestly desire their system of punishments to make sense in order that it can be a morally justifiable system. See generally Arnold, The Criminal Trial As a Symbol of Public Morality, in Criminal Justice In Our Time 137 (A. Howard ed. 1967).