*1 Utah, Appellee, Plaintiff STATE of GALLI, Defendant
Adam B. Appellant. 960123.
Nos.
Supreme Court of Utah. 16, 1998.
June
Rehearing Denied Nov. *2 Graham, Gen., Dupaix, Att’y Laura
Jan Gen., City, plaintiff. Att’y Lake Asst. Salt Jones, Remal, M. Salt Lake Lisa Linda J. City, for defendant.
HOWE, Chief Justice: B. entered condi- Defendant Adam charges aggravat- pleas guilty to of tional robbery separate cases before ed three judges. All three cases have separate trial appeal. purposes of this consolidated for been (1) the three appeal, Galli contends On suppress his failing trial courts erred (2) Judge B. Brian police; Pat confession pay restitution to ordering him to erred they forfeited when family for amounts bail; Judges K. jumped and Glenn in order- Rigtrup erred Iwasaki and Kenneth prison sen- ing him to serve consecutive assign- each of these tences. We consider of error below. ments
BACKGROUND 1992, string of armed Galli committed brother, City with robberies in Salt Lake cousins, Galli, and Nathan and two Aaron April Christopher On Galli. cousins, Christopher, Nathan and and his two July Galli was King’s English Bookstore. Galli June robbed the robberies and charged with all three armed Christopher went inside bookstore July issued. On warrants for his arrest were purpose for the while Nathan waited outside King County, arrested in running interference if Galli and Christo- Washington. being King While held pointed pher pursued by police. Galli were *3 Seattle, County in he was advised of his Jail gun1 approxi- took at the store clerk and Miranda, rights by from the two detectives mately regis- cash in cash from the two $250 2 City Department. Police He vol- Salt Lake ters at the store. agreed untarily rights and to talk waived his Christopher, May Galli and On During questioning, he the detectives. to Trolley handguns, armed with robbed the himself and confessed to all incriminated Corners Theaters. While Galli and Christo- three robberies. theater, pher were inside the Aaron and Na- below, sup- moved In each case to separate keep in car to than waited outside a police. He con- press his statements lookout. a ran out of the When witness during questioning, he reinvoked tended Christopher, Nathan theater after Galli and right right to counsel and his to both up to pulled and told the witness call silent and that his confession was remain police pursued while he the robbers and ob- in violation of Miranda v. therefore obtained plate tained their license number. Galli and Arizona, 1602, 436, 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. accomplices in from took over cash $900 (1966), and law. The L.Ed.2d Utah the theaters. in his motion judges all three cases denied to suppress. 6, 1992, Galli, disguised in a On June black dates, Prior to his trial Galli was released
wig, pointed gun a entered the Tool Shed and jail family posted a for clerk, said, after his bond Sylvia He at the store Nordoff. However, release. in November stickup, give your money “This is a me all of family absconded from the state. His forfeit- you.” or I’ll kill Ms. Nordoff refused When $40,000 nearly real as a ed cash and estate nearly money, grabbed to hand over flight justice. result of his in cash from the till and out of the ran $180 him store. Ms. Nordoff chased after and recaptured August Galli was son, just him outside the store. Her tackled Upon Minnesota authorities. his return Nordoff, helped Michael her hold Galli down. Utah, pleas he entered conditional of just Christopher waiting out- was guilty charges aggravated robbery side the store. He threatened Ms. Nordoff Judge sentenced in all three cases.3 was weapon a and told them to and her son with Brian sentenced indeterminate go. Christopher ran let Galli Galli and years prison term of five to life in and or- attempt- witnesses their car and fled. When $40,000 pay him to in restitution to his dered men, up pursue the two Nathan drove ed family money they for the forfeited when he police and told them to call the while he Judge Iwasaki sentenced him to absconded. later returned years chased the robbers. Nathan an indeterminate term of five to life gave prison consecutively false information to the run to the scene and with his sentence to Judge Rigtrup police. Brian’s sentence. robberies, during fingerprint 2. Galli’s was found on one of the tills 1.Galli claimed that each of gun. armed with a facsimile of a He King’s English was Bookstore. Galli and at pellet that he armed with a told Christopher picked photo were also out of a gun that looked like an automatic firearm. Un- lineup by witnesses. 76-6-302, person § a der Utah Code Ann. com- dangerous aggravated robbery if he uses a mits pur guilty plea conditional was entered Galli’s robbery. weapon of a the commission Sery, to State v. suant 76-1-601(5) danger- a Utah Code Ann. defines Appeals Ct.App.1988), Court of where the Utah "(a) causing weapon capable item ous plea reserving suppres held that a conditional (b) bodily injury; or a facsimile death or serious appeal agreed that is sion issue representation of the item.” Thus Galli com- permissible prosecutor un defendant and the robbery aggravated Utah mitted under law even 11(i). Utah R.Crim. P. of a firearm. der Utah law. See also if he used facsimile years King’s English. you A: also sentenced him to five to life What do want me say. prison consecutively to run with his sentence imposed by Judge Brian
to the sentences Q: happened. What Judge Iwasaki. A: You know.... assignments Q: you. We now turn to Galli’s know this is hard for error. (Whis- A: I can’t even talk now.
pered) (Oliver) Q: you ANALYSIS If That’s Ok Adam. need minute, that’s fine. I. THE CONFESSION Q: you Do want us to turn this off for a minute. question presented The first is whether *4 failing suppress to trial courts erred aggravated rob- Galh’s confession to all three you guys A: I ... look I to do want beries. He contends that he reinvoked everything I can Ok. rights during questioning and that Miranda Q: let’s do it. Well scrupulously honor the detectives refused to they guys A: But ... FBI told me to rights question- those and terminate further absolutely anybody not talk to at all. ing. un- argues He that his assertion was Q: That’s not true because I talked to the equivocal unambiguous but that and even today got FBI when we here. rights of were his invocations his Miranda prosecuting A: He said talk to the attor- equivocal, required to the detectives were ney. clarifying ques- limit further to discussion Q: That’s not true. to I Don’t lie me. only. tions agent you. talked to the FBI that arrested First, we must determine whether His name is Bicker. Jeff Galli at time reinvoked his Miranda big guy. A: The blonde rights, equivocally or otherwise. After re Q: Big guy. blonde transcripts
viewing taped recordings prosecuting A: He said not to ... confession, Judges of his Brian and Iwasaki attorney. found that he had not reinvoked either me, Q: you’re going If to here and lie to sit right right counsel or to remain silent to you’re my intelligence. insulting I have during questioning. Judge Rigtrup did not yours. insulted Please don’t insult ground rule on Galli’s motion on the mine, today because I talked to Jeff and he Judge ruling precluded relitigation Brian’s of feelings you me were told he had suppression of issue under the doctrine cooperate I going to and I did too when incorpo estoppel. Judge Rigtrup collateral here, you telling but start me walked in conclusions, findings, rated Brian’s you any- FBI told not to talk to and order into his own order. body I can’t that. believe findings We review the trial courts’ factual (Oliver) Adam, Q: happened in these cases suppress underlying the denial of a motion to City. Lake We’re Salt Lake Police Salt error, for while conclusions of law are clear FBI; these are not Federal [sic]. Officer’s Troyer, reviewed for correctness. State v. any_ They eases. don’t have (Utah 1995). 1182, 1186 you Q: only reason the FBI arrested The you looking the FBI was is because although he ini Galli contends that Flight to Avoid Prosecution. Unlawful rights, tially his Miranda he rein- waived It’s called UFAP. rights to remain voked his to counsel and early interrogation. (Oliver) silent on His Q: you Because left the state argument following emphasized relies on the Utah.
portions transcript: of his confession attorney. A: I talk to an He said should any cops. I’m not
Q:
English.
He
talk to
King’s
...
with the
said
to
Let’s start
any-
trying
lie.
I’m not.
I don’t have
April.
Back on the 29th of
to
anything.
I
442 U.S.
99 S.Ct.
61 L.Ed.2d
thing
gain,
to
don’t
What
(request
speak
probation
else can lose.
officer
to
to
counsel).
lot,
you
right
Q:
can
but
can also is not an invocation
You
lose
gain your dignity, your
gain
Likewise,
a lot. You can
request
that a defendant’s
we hold
your redemption,
dignity,
her
respect,
self
prosecutor
speak
to a
does not constitute
respect
you.
her
equivocal
right
of the
even an
assertion
(Oliver)
Q:
probably
It’ll
feel a lot better if
counsel. Thus
are free to continue to
you
your
got it off
chest.
only
question suspect
requested
who has
They’re al-
Q:
charges
are there.
attorney.
speak
prosecuting
to a
ready defined.
incorrectly argues
the case of
to do. I don’t know
A: I don’t know what
State,
108 Idaho
who was a was not an adopt Thus we a rule that decline counsel); State, right Trice v. invocation (re require police stop to limit or would (Okla.Crim.App.1993) merely questioning suspect of a who has speak attorney quest to district C., counsel); request requested prosecutor. to talk to the for Fare v. Michael cf. distraught and emotional. case, statement while clear references to Galli made interpretation of this reasonable attorney. He did not re- prosecuting tempo- emotions had statement is that his represented or to be quest to consult with record, rarily ability speak. Thus overcome his attorney. According to the ambiguously clearly nor assert- of his Galli neither twenty-four years old at the time during question- right to remain silent high intelligence. He ed his confession and was ing.4 the difference between presumably knew attorney. More- a defense
prosecutor and
above,
stated
we conclude
For the reasons
over,
prosecutor were
references to the
his
not reinvoke his Miranda
that Galli did
voluntarily and
shortly after he had
made
to remain silent
rights to counsel or
knowingly
right to counsel.
waived
Therefore, his confession was
questioning.
Miranda.
not obtained in violation of
specific
Although
also made less
ref-
attorney”
attor-
to “an
and “the
erences
brief,
In his
Galli also contends
part
ney,”
were all
of the
these references
I,
12 of the Utah
Consti
article
section
State
prosecutor.
concerning the
same discussion
question
requires police to limit their
tution
discussion,
of the
these
Within the context
suspect
ing
clarifying questions once a
has
than further
nothing
are
more
statements
right
si
equivocally
to remain
reinvoked
attorney.
prosecuting
references
right to counsel. He asserts
lent or his
Therefore,
the trial courts
we find
Supreme
though the
even
United States
concluding
that Galli had
correct
were
required
are not
has held
Court
his Miranda
right
counsel.
not reinvoked
ambiguous request
clarify
suspect’s
Davis,
counsel,
at
512 U.S. at
S.Ct.
that he reinvoked
Galli also contends
protections
law affords broader
Utah
points to his
silent. He
to remain
required Miranda law.5 How
than those
he should not “talk to
statements that
ever,
already
we have
concluded
because
However, these statements were all
cops.”
*6
ambiguously
equivocally nor
as
Galli neither
concerning
during
colloquy
made
the same
right
right
to remain silent or
serted
record,
attorney.
prosecuting
From the
questioning,
that
during
we hold
to counsel
thought
talk
that Galli
he should
it is evident
admissible under
his statements were also
police.
prosecutor,
not to the
Utah law.
stated, “I
During questioning, Galli also
Although
have concluded that
we
right now.” Like his other
can’t even talk
Mi
statements,
is admissible under
clearly not an assertion of Galli’s confession
this is
randa,
must decide whether his con-
made this
we still
right
to remain silent. He
Therefore,
undisput-
because it is
agreed
argument
remain silent.
with Galli’s
4. Even if we
right
voluntarily
ambiguously
both his
to counsel
waived his Miranda
asserted
ed that Galli
during questioning,
right
silent
question
and his
to remain
rights,
were free to
him
the detectives
confession would still be
we believe that his
unambiguously
reinvoked
until and unless
Leyva,
v.
In the recent case of State
admissible.
right
right
remain
to counsel or his
either his
1997),
(Utah
explained that the
P.2d 738
we
951
silent.
Wood,
(Utah
requirement in State v.
fession
coerced and
had not
Nathan
was
had done
determining
correctly points
fingerprint
out
so. The detectives also had
evi
coerced,
dence and
impli
a confession is
we must
witness identifications that
whether
cated him in the
totality
surrounding
‘the
of all the
robberies. While the detec
“consider
tives’
regarding
strength
half-truths
circumstances —both the characteristics of
against
the evidence
interroga
Galli should not be con
the accused and the details of the
”
doned,
Strain,
we are not convinced that this was
tion.’
v.
225
State
(Utah 1989)
sufficient to
spirit.
overcome his free will and
(quoting Schneckloth v. Busta
Edwards,
1062, 1070
monte,
See Ledbetter v.
2041, 2047,
35 F.3d
412 U.S.
93 S.Ct.
(6th Cir.1994)
(1973)).
(stating that
Moreover,
“[a] defendant’s
36 L.Ed.2d
simply
will is not overborne
because he is led
support
finding
sufficient to
“[e]vidence
government’s
to believe that the
knowledge
involuntary
that a confession is
must reveal
is”).
guilt
greater
of his
actually
is
than it
physical
psychological
some
force or ma
nipulation
designed that is
induce the ac
Finally,
argues
police prom-
cused to talk when he otherwise would not
ised
more lenient treatment
if he con-
Hegelman,
have done so.”
State
P.2d
fessed and threatened him with more severe
(Utah 1986) (citation omitted).
1348, 1350
treatment
if he did not. He asserts that
words,
other
the evidence must show that the
Dalling promised
Detective
him lenient treat-
coercive tactics of the
overcame the ment when the detective told him that “[h]ow
Mabe,
defendant’s free will. State v.
serve],
[you
you.”
much time
up
How-
1993) (stating
P.2d
that “there
ever, it seems to us that the detective was
relationship
must be a causal
between the merely pointing out
cooperation
full
confession”).
subsequent
coercion and the
would be in Galli’s best
interests.
See
mind,
principles
With these
we now ad Strain,
(stating
convicted of II. ORDER OF RESTITUTION who, person because of his but also as actions, clearly something own which were Judge consider whether We now judgment an error in am —and ordering pay restitu Brian erred referring leaving jurisdiction to his family they forfeited tion to his for amounts years being almost three absent for jurisdiction af he absconded from the when Particularly, Galli being ter released on bail. added.) incorrectly inter
contends that Brian on the (Emphasis The State relies applied Ann. 76-3- preted and Utah Code foregoing and similar statements statement pay restitution 201 when he ordered argue that Galli did of defense counsel family. the trial court’s to his We review jumping for bail responsibility admit interpretation of a statute for correctness sentencing court. conclusions of and accord no deference to its we do believe Brooks, v.
law. State
of defense counsel are relevant.
statements
(Utah 1995).
3—201(l)(b)
wording of section
plain
76—
Judge Brian’s order of restitution was
respon
requires
admit[ ]
“defendant
76-3-201. Section
pursuant
made
section
court,”
sentencing
not to de
sibility
3-201(4)(a)(i)provides:
added.) Further
(Emphasis
76 -
fense counsel.
more,
of criminal
defense counsel do not
person
is convicted
admissions
When
activity
pecuniary
an admission of criminal
generally
that has resulted
constitute
damages,
responsibility by
other sentence
the defendant.
State
addition
Gibbons,
1987),
we stat
may impose, the court shall order
939 ly imposed or if the sentence relevant factors’ by ordering him to serve their discretion ‘clearly McCovey, v. excessive.’” State The three prison sentences. consecutive 1990) (citations affirmed, and the eases are P.2d convictions are omitted). Moreover, recognized courts resentenee we to the trial remanded opinion. sentencing this in Galli in with that “the of discretion accordance exercise judgment necessarily personal reflects the of Justice, STEWART, concurring: appellate proper court can the court and the only if be said ly find abuse it can that no Mi- agree I that defendant’s Although take [person] reasonable would the view by police violated the rights randa were not court.” State v. adopted the trial Ger ease, I interrogation in this do not believe (Utah 1978) (citation rard, 584 P.2d altogether interrogation was that the omitted). view, benign. my interrogation In the was manipulative psychological point majority The not assert the con- does view, officers who conducted the with the two clearly secutive sentences were excessive. “good interrogation playing almost classic Indeed, acknowledges string it I think it cop,” cop” important roles. “bad “very armed committed were robberies Galli manipulation point psychological can out that majority Nor does the con- serious crimes.” be coercive under the rules de- found to be judges tend that the trial failed consider jurisprudence veloped and to in Miranda legally they all factors when sen- relevant emphasize that courts should not be misled Instead, tenuously tenced Galli.1 it asserts highly sophisticated police tac- subtle and given judges “may not have ade- improper tics the boundaries of that skirt weight mitigating quate to certain circum- not, however, official I do believe conduct. so, doing majority in stances.” interrogation this case in transcend- majority has selected those factors which places that Miranda ed the boundaries on senténcing simply has deems in and relevant police interrogations. coercive imposed judgment granting its without own judges, trial who are deference to the DURHAM, C.J., Associate concurs in the much more this case with familiar with and concurring opinion of Justice STEWART. defendant, in much are better and who Justice, RUSSON, concurring parts I position impose than this court to sentences. dissenting part II III: and and Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the majority opinion I concur with the While judges weigh properly certain fac- failed to II, parts respectfully as to I and dissent as tors, “mitigating circumstances” which III, Judges part Rigtrup which holds that majority hardly mitigat- upon relies are and abused their Iwasaki discretion sen- gravity ing respect at all. and With tencing consecutive serve sentences. offenses, majority of the circumstances my opinion, they did not abuse their dis- (1) mitigating circumstances: offers three majority cretion as the claims but acted well injuries any physical did inflict on statutory right consistently and within their victims; (2) gun which pellet he used prior ordering with our case law consecu- incapable of inflict- the robberies was tive sentences. ing injury; serious amount general wisely rule we have and con- money relatively taken small. addi- sistently is that we will followed not disturb a incorrect, tion to these observations being prescribed sentence “unless it exceeds that wholly are irrelevant. by law or unless the trial court has abused its 76-6-302, Shelby, example, discretion.” State For under section (Utah 1986). “(a) robbery A trial court person aggravated its abuses commits “ legal- dangerous weapon it ‘fails to discretion when consider all uses or to use a threatens character, legally history, 1. The relevant factors are outlined in sec- stances of the and the offenses 76-3-401, provides tion which in determin- the defendant.” Utah rehabilitative needs of sentences, ing impose whether to consecutive 76-3-401(4) (Supp.1997). Code Ann. judge gravity "the must consider and circum- *10 (b) 76-1-601; However, as defined Section causes he absconded to Minnesota. the (c) another; bodily injury upon serious majority ignores or the fact that when operable takes an motor vehicle.” Utah imposed Iwasaki the first consecutive sen- added). 76-6-302(1) § (emphasis tence, Code Ann. history Galli’s criminal included an say To phys- that because did not inflict aggravated robbery conviction. Further- victims, injury upon ical his he should be more, Judge Rigtrup imposed when the sec- leniency saying treated with is tantamount to sentence, ond consecutive Galli’s criminal punishment mitigated by should be history aggravated included robbery two taking the fact that he refrained from Also, convictions. the fact that the State operable Causing motor vehicle. serious charge elected not to jumping Galli with bail bodily injury simply by is one means which cannot be a mitigating considered factor. may guilty aggravated an individual be Indeed, nearly it would be impossible to robbery; absence its does constitute a count the times when the State could have mitigating circumstance. charged an individual with several crimes as opposed just one but chose not to one majority misapprehends also na- the not, reason or another. this does pellet gun. ture aof Common sense indi- any way, preclude sentencing judge the pellet gun, danger- cates that a while as considering the defendant’s actions to magnum, certainly ous as a .357 can cause aggravating be circumstances deserving a injury death or serious if it strikes its victim harsher sentence. parts certain vulnerable body. of the Nev- ertheless, even if Galli had used a facsimile respect majority’s With consider- representation or dangerous weapon, of a character, ation of majority gives Galli’s aggravated still would have committed rob- weight to the fact that while Galli was in bery long so reasonably the victims be- Minnesota, apparently obeyed law, “he likely lieved the facsimile cause death helped neighbors, productive and was a bodily injury. serious See id. 76-1- goes individual.” It saying almost without 601(5). Therefore, majority’s conclusion fugitive justice that a will be on his best that an pellet gun may offender’s use of a be behavior so as not to be noticed mitigating in sentencing directly factor con- Also, majority’s authorities. references purpose travenes the aggravated of the rob- helping neighbors to Galli’s being statute, bery impose which is to a harsher “productive vague individual” are so punishment2 when the offender uses either a they lack majori- substantive merit. The dangerous weapon represen- or a facsimile or ty gives weight further to the fact that Galli weapon tation of such a which creates in the expressed a hope commitment and im- apprehension victim an that the device would prove himself. While Galli should be com- cause injury. death or serious mended for his becoming intentions of a bet-
Lastly,
majority’s
person,
judges
agree
observation that Gal-
ter
most
would
that a
only
li stole
relatively
express
defendant
small amount of
tends to
in-
remorse and
money
travesty
justice.
makes a
tentions of
Will we
conversion
about the time
cal
judge
the next robber
considering
who leaves half the
the defendant’s sen-
money
Nevertheless,
in the till a charitable
tence.
thief and treat
even if a defendant’s
him
leniency
with more
given weight
than the one
desire to reform should be
who
dur-
emptied
ing sentencing,
it?
sentencing judge
—not
equipped
this court —is best
to evaluate the
majority’s
As to the
consideration of Galli’s
credibility
sincerity
defendant’s
in this
history,
criminal
majority
states that he
regard.
had
a minor traffic offense and a misde-
Moreover,
meanor theft conviction.
Finally,
majority suggests
the ma-
that concur-
jority gives weight to the fact that the State
rent rather than consecutive sentences better
charge
did not
jumping
with
bail
when
serve Galli’s
allowing
rehabilitative needs
Robbery
degree felony,
is a
§§
second
whereas
Utah Code Ann.
76-6-301 & -302.
aggravated robbery
degree felony.
is a first
See
*11
Leyva,
Leyva,
to
at 743.
and Parole
release
P.2d
Under
the
the Board
Pardons
only
inquiry
years
the state-
“genuine
him after five
if he has shown
relevant
whether
so,
unequivocal;
ment was
doing
anything
less than an
progress toward rehabilitation.”
Thus,
unequivocal
not
statement will
suffice.
majority recognizes the
the
Board’s discre-
case,
present
in
only
the
we need
determine
prisoners
to release
before their sen-
tion
request
speak
prosecutor
whether
to
with a
ignores
have run
the trial courts’
tences
but
unequivocal
is such an
reinvocation.
to
Nev-
discretion
set minimum sentences.
ertheless,
important
play
those
an
role
courts
emphasize
majority’s holding
I
the
offenders,
sentencing
in
criminal
and I am
change
Ley-
does not
the rule articulated in
unwilling
away
legislature
to
take
what
va; merely
request
it
one
determines
kind of
given to
has
them.
unequivocal
that is
an
not
statement of rein-
not,
agree
I
it
vocation.
that was
and that
majority’s
part III
opinion
The
in
sends a
disposes of
claim
defendant’s
here.
message
they
criminals that
will
would-be
punishment for commit-
receive no harsher
join
I
opinion
also
in Justice
Russon’s
two, three,
twenty
ting
than if
or even
crimes
part
that it dissents
III of
extent
one,
they
long
so
after
only
committed
as
opinion,
Chief Justice Howe’s
which holds
completed
spree they
crime
they have
their
judges
that the
abused
trial
their discretion
help
law-abiding individuals who
become
sentencing
in
to serve
consecutive sen-
neighbors and who desire
reform.
their
agree
tences.
I
with Justice
that the
Russon
Contrary
reasoning,
legislature
judges
such
statutory
trial
have the
discretion to
judges
undoubtedly gave sentencing
impose
discre-
consecutive sentences. This discre-
tion,
part,
broad,
impose
in
consecutive sentences
tion is
it should
be. Unlike the
very
deterring
court,
purpose
only
criminals
trial
for
we have
cold record before
court,
engaging
us. And
unlike the trial
repetitive
in
criminal behav-
also
we have
relatively
experience
ior.
little
with the sentenc-
ing
only
past
functions. The
situations in the
judges
in
Without
evidence
judges
found trial
where we have
have
discretion,
ease
I
abused their
would
abused their discretion were instances in
affirm the consecutive sentences. At a mini-
grossly
which the consecutive sentences were
mum,
majority
should remand this case
Smith,
disproportional.
P.2d
See State
judges
“mitigat-
trial
those
to consider
(Utah
Strunk,
1995);
244-45
State v.
ing
majority
as-
circumstances” which
(Utah 1993).
P.2d
should
1301-02
We
they
Only
weigh.
then can
serts
failed
adhere
that standard. This case does
meaningful
engage
appellate
this court
in
begin
previ-
to meet the standards we have
judges
review to determine
whether
ously set
An
for an abuse
discretion.
fact abused their discretion.
majority’s reasoning
examination of
simply
judg-
substituted its
shows that it has
Justice,
ZIMMERMAN,
concurring and
judges’;
given
it
their
ment
the trial
has
dissenting:
decisions no deference.
opinion.
Al-
concur
Justice Stewart’s
substance,
simply
this court is
redeeid-
I, too, agree
though
police interroga-
ing
question on
the consecutive sentence
tion did
violate defendant’s Miranda
what
to a correctness basis. We
amounts
majority opinion
rights, I believe the
should
appel-
that we are
an
should remember
legal
make the
of this conclusion more
basis
court,
judges.
late
not trial
We each
for the
the bench
clear
benefit of
and bar.
jobs. We should remain within
distinctive
majority
holding
connect its
The
does not
poach
preserve
own
and not
on a trial
our
today
Leyva,
to State v.
a defendant reinvoke his Miranda waiving only by making un-
after them
equivocal of reinvocation. See statement