LAWRENCE SALISBURY v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA
No. 20-55039
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
April 16, 2021
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-08247-CJC-E
Opinion by Judge Bea
FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 11, 2020
Pasadena, California
Filed April 16, 2021
Before: Carlos T. Bea, Amul R. Thapar*, and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY**
Fair Housing
Affirming the district court‘s summary judgment in favor of the City of Santa Monica, the panel held that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 does not require landlords to accommodate the disability of an individual who neither entered into a lease nor paid rent in exchange for the right to occupy the premises.
Plaintiff lived with his father in a mobile home on land rented from the City of Santa Monica. Upon his father‘s death, plaintiff refused to vacate the mobile home park, and he asked the City to accommodate his disability by waiving park rules to allow him to store his vehicle immediately next to his mobile home.
The panel held that, by its plain language, the FHAA does not apply to claims by plaintiffs who never themselves or through an associate entered into a lease or paid rent to the defendant landlord. As to occupants requesting accommodation, the FHAA‘s disability discrimination provisions apply only to cases involving a “sale” or “rental” for which the landlord accepted consideration in exchange for granting the right to occupy the premises. Applying a federal standard, rather than California landlord-tenant law, the panel concluded that because plaintiff never provided consideration in exchange for the right to occupy a space in the mobile home park, the FHAA did not apply to his claim for relief, and the City was not obligated to provide, offer, or discuss an accommodation.
COUNSEL
Frances M. Campbell (argued) and Nima Farahani, Campbell & Farahani LLP, Sherman Oaks, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michelle M. Hugard (argued), Deputy
OPINION
BEA, Circuit Judge:
Lawrence Salisbury suffers from serious spinal conditions that make it painful to walk.1 Salisbury lived for many years with his elderly father, James, in a mobile home on rented land in the Mountain View Mobilehome Park (“the Park“), which the City of Santa Monica (“the City“) purchased in 2000 to provide housing for low-income persons. It is undisputed that Salisbury never signed a lease for the land nor successfully paid rent to Park management, or indeed, to anyone, in exchange for the right to reside in the Park.
Upon James‘s death, Salisbury refused repeated demands to vacate the Park and sued the City for wrongful eviction in California Superior Court based on several theories of state law implied tenancy. The state court granted summary judgment to the City after determining Salisbury failed
The question presented in this appeal is whether the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (“FHAA“),
I. BACKGROUND
This housing dispute dates back to 1974, when James purchased a mobile home and signed a month-to-month lease for Spot 57 in the Park, then under private ownership. The original lease listed James and Salisbury‘s older brother, Russell, as the only adult occupants of the mobile home. Salisbury and his younger sister, Monique, both teenagers at the time, moved in with James and Russell soon after execution of the lease. Salisbury maintains that he resided continuously in the Park from the 1970s until the present day, decades after Russell and Monique moved out of the mobile home.
It is undisputed, however, that Salisbury‘s name never appeared on any leases signed by his father for residency in the Park. In 1988, James signed a new month-to-month lease that expressly prohibited subletting or assignment without the Park‘s consent and stated that he was the only occupant of Spot 57. In 1990, James signed a resident update form confirming he was the only resident of Spot 57, aside from a cat named Spike. In 2000, the City purchased the Park, classified it as an affordable housing project, and imposed new maximum income and household size restrictions for Park tenants. Existing tenants were exempted from the maximum income restriction on the condition that they sign an estoppel certificate stating the number of persons in their household and promise thereafter not to increase the household‘s size.2 James signed an estoppel certificate declaring, under penalty of perjury, that he was the only resident of Spot 57. In 2005, James recertified his compliance with the household size restriction by declaring that he continued to live alone.
It is also undisputed that James paid rent to Park management exclusively in his own name before and after the City‘s acquisition of the Park. In the mid-2000s, James asked the City to include Russell‘s
The City first contested Salisbury‘s presence in 2011 when other residents complained that Salisbury had violated Park rules by bringing a large dog into the Park. James told the City‘s property managers that Salisbury had lived in the Park “since 1975” and that the dog was a service animal. The City noted it had no record of Salisbury‘s residence in that Park and instructed Salisbury to apply for residence either as an income-restricted tenant or as a live-in caregiver for James. Salisbury submitted an incomplete application for residency and ignored the City‘s request to provide missing financial information required to determine whether Salisbury qualified for residency in the Park as a low-income tenant.3 Meanwhile, Salisbury acquired title to James‘s mobile home without notifying the City (in its capacity as the owner of the land) as required to initiate a new lease under Park rules and
James died in April 2013. The City subsequently refused to accept rent checks drawn by Salisbury against James‘s bank account and repeatedly demanded Salisbury vacate Spot 57 within sixty days. Salisbury sued the City in California Superior Court in July 2013 for wrongful eviction and related tort and contract theories. As noted above, the court granted summary judgment for the City in January 2015 after concluding Salisbury failed to comply with procedural requirements for claims against a municipal defendant.
Thereafter, the City renewed its demand that Salisbury vacate Spot 57 and began to cite Salisbury for violating traffic rules by improperly parking his personal vehicle on neighboring mobile home sites and in common thoroughfares. Under Park rules, all personal vehicles must be registered with management and parked in assigned spaces. The City attempted to enforce these rules by blocking access to vacant lots with bollards but never towed Salisbury‘s vehicle nor collected any of the fines attached to the citations.
Salisbury responded to the City‘s renewed order to vacate in August 2015 by requesting a parking accommodation under the FHAA. In a brief letter, Salisbury informed the City he suffered from spondylolisthesis, spinal osteoarthritis, and disc degenerative disease, all of which made it painful to walk. Accordingly, Salisbury requested the City “remove the barriers to the space next to my unit ... or that you remove the barriers that have been put in front of my trailer [in the thoroughfare] to prevent me from parking there.” The City ignored Salisbury‘s initial request and subsequent requests made as late as December 2016. Salisbury continued to receive citations until July 2018, when the City sold the Park to a private holding company. The Park‘s new owner has executed a lease with Salisbury, accepted payment of rent, and granted his requested parking accommodation.
This lawsuit began in September 2018 when Salisbury sued the City and related
Salisbury has never claimed that he entered into a lease with the City or that the City accepted rent from him prior to the sale of the Park. Instead, Salisbury has maintained that California law somehow established a landlord-tenant relationship between himself and the City prior to the accommodation request in one of three ways. First, because the Park‘s prior owners had consented to his residency in the Park as a teenager in the 1970s; second, because the City‘s failure to initiate unlawful detainer proceedings after discovering Salisbury lived in the Park in 2011 created a tenancy at will; or third, because
After several hearings and the completion of discovery, the district court granted the City‘s motion for summary judgment. The court began by holding that under the FHAA, “[a] landlord has no obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to a resident [who] illegally occupies a dwelling.” To prove the City violated its duty to accommodate under the FHAA, therefore, Salisbury bore the burden of proving he lawfully resided in the Park at the time of the accommodation request. Applying California law, the court concluded Salisbury presented insufficient evidence to establish a landlord-tenant relationship with the City under any of the state law theories noted above.
Salisbury timely appealed, arguing the FHAA prohibits discrimination against “any person” without regard to the existence of a tenancy, that the district court ignored evidence creating triable issues of fact as to the formation of an implied tenancy under California law, and that the City‘s repeated refusals to engage in an “interactive process” after the initial request for accommodation were standalone violations of the FHAA. Jurisdiction is proper. See
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Dubois v. Ass‘n of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III. DISCUSSION
Salisbury brought his disability discrimination claim under
This case, by contrast, presents a threshold question of first impression in this circuit: Whether the FHAA applies at all to claims by plaintiffs who never themselves or through an associate entered into a lease or paid rent to the defendant landlord. The district court found the FHAA presupposed the existence of a valid tenancy as a necessary precondition to applying the statute‘s duty of reasonable accommodation and determined Salisbury failed to establish an express or implied landlord-tenant relationship under California law. We agree with the district court that Salisbury‘s claim falls outside the FHAA‘s domain, but for a different, yet allied reason. We hold that, as to occupants requesting accommodation, the FHAA‘s disability discrimination provisions apply only to cases involving a “sale” or “rental” for which the landlord accepted consideration in exchange for granting the right to occupy the premises.
A. The FHAA‘s “Sale” or “Rental” Requirement
“As usual, we start with the statutory text.” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020); United States ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). The FHAA makes it unlawful:
To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap... [and]
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap[.]
“It is a fundamental canon that where the ‘statutory text is plain and unambiguous,’ a court ‘must apply the statute according to its terms.‘” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)). The relevant operative language of the FHAA bars discrimination ”in the sale or rental” of a dwelling, ”in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,” and ”in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling.”
By its plain language, therefore, the FHAA applies only in cases involving a “sale” or “rental” of a dwelling to a buyer or tenant. There is no doubt that the
Salisbury reads the FHAA quite differently. In his view, the FHAA covers “any person” denied a reasonable housing accommodation without regard for how that person came to occupy the premises in question. Salisbury argues we must set aside plain meaning in favor of a more expansive reading because courts are bound to give the FHAA a “generous construction” that accomplishes the statute‘s underlying purpose. United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972)). We disagree with Salisbury‘s conception of the judicial power.
Federal judges undertake to apply the law as it is written, not to devise alternative language that might accomplish Congress‘s asserted purpose more effectively. “Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) (“[V]ague notions of a statute‘s ‘basic purpose’ are [] inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration.“). Settled principles of statutory interpretation place it beyond dispute that the “generous spirit” with which our court interprets the FHAA, Mobile Home, 29 F.3d at 1416, is not a license to ignore the text. Where, as here, the plain meaning of a statute indicates a particular result, the “judicial inquiry is complete.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (quoting Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)); see also CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2017) (“If the language has a plain meaning or is unambiguous, the statutory interpretation inquiry ends there.” (citing Hartpence, 792 F.3d at 1128)).
B. Meaning of “Rental” under 42 U.S.C. § 3602(e)
To determine whether Salisbury‘s claim involves a “rental” covered by the FHAA, we turn next to the proof required
When interpreting a statutory term, we first give effect to statutory definitions and then to the term‘s “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). The FHAA defines “[t]o rent” as “to lease, to sublease, to let and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not owned by the occupant.”
We hold the FHAA applies to rentals only when the landlord or his designee has received consideration in exchange for granting the right to occupy the premises. Consideration is not further defined by the statute, but this term, also, bore a well-established meaning among the states at the time of the FHAA‘s enactment. The most common form of consideration for a lease is periodic rent. See Consideration, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“Anything regarded as recompense or equivalent for what one does or undertakes for another‘s benefit.“). The term is somewhat broader, however, and may include other forms of remuneration. See, e.g., Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2010) (maintaining an apartment building may serve as consideration for the right to occupy an apartment). For our purposes, it suffices to say “consideration” as used in the FHAA means a performance consisting of “an act other than a promise, or a forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(3)(a)-(c); accord Consideration, Black‘s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) (“Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promisor ... to which the promisor [i]s not lawfully entitled, or any [new] prejudice suffered.” (citing, inter alia,
C. Application to Salisbury‘s Claim
The FHAA‘s predicate “sale” or “rental” requirement makes short work of Salisbury‘s refusal to accommodate claim. As the district court correctly noted, Salisbury conceded that he resided in Spot 57 despite never having entered into a
Notably, Salisbury never claimed the City refused to offer him an equal opportunity to apply for a rental. The FHAA bars landlords from refusing to rent or sell an otherwise available premises based on the disability of the prospective renter or buyer prior to an exchange of consideration. See
Instead, Salisbury argues the district court‘s conclusion that Salisbury lacked a valid tenancy rests on a misapplication of California law. Citing several state cases, Salisbury argues the City inherited an implied tenancy from the Park‘s prior owners, and, in any event, was barred from treating him as a non-tenant by its failure to file an unlawful detainer proceeding and by operation of local rent control laws. None of these state law issues are relevant to whether Salisbury provided the “consideration” required to establish that he had a “rental” under the FHAA. Rather, it is “consideration” as understood at the time of the FHAA‘s enactment that triggers application of the statute to a “rental.” Salisbury failed to provide evidence of such consideration in this case.
The parties also dispute whether Salisbury‘s requested accommodation was “necessary” or “reasonable” under federal law. See United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting parking accommodations for handicapped tenants may be “necessary” and “reasonable“); cf. Howard, 988 F.3d at 1190 (“Necessary suggests something that cannot be done without.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1157 (“[A]n accommodation is reasonable under the FHAA when it imposes no fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or undue financial or administrative burdens.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Whether Salisbury‘s requested accommodation was “necessary” and “reasonable” is immaterial, however, because the City was not obligated to make any accommodations absent its acceptance of consideration from Salisbury in exchange for the right to occupy Spot 57.
Finally, Salisbury argues the City‘s repeated refusals to engage in an “interactive process” to ascertain the precise scope of the accommodation required to ensure equal opportunity for use and enjoyment of Spot 57 constituted standalone violations of the FHAA. The district court did not separately address this argument. However, during the pendency of this appeal, our
IV. CONCLUSION
Salisbury failed to establish that the FHAA applies to his discrimination claim. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
CARLOS T. BEA
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE