998 F.3d 852
9th Cir.2021Background
- Salisbury lived for decades in a mobile home on land owned by the City of Santa Monica but never signed a lease with the City or paid rent to the City; his father James signed leases and paid rent in his own name.
- When the City bought the park in 2000 it required estoppel certificates; James certified he was the only resident of Spot 57.
- James died in 2013; the City demanded Salisbury vacate, rejected rent checks from Salisbury, and cited him for parking violations.
- Salisbury, who has serious spinal conditions that make walking painful, requested a parking accommodation under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA); the City denied the request because Salisbury was not an authorized tenant.
- Salisbury sued under the FHAA; the district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding Salisbury lacked a tenancy; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the FHAA’s accommodation provisions apply only to a sale or rental supported by consideration (e.g., rent or other performance).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FHAA’s duty to make reasonable accommodations applies to an occupant who never leased or paid rent to the defendant | FHAA protects “any person” and covers requests for accommodations regardless of how the occupant came to be on the premises | FHAA governs discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings; it applies only where a landlord granted occupancy in exchange for consideration | FHAA applies only to sales/rentals supported by consideration; Salisbury had not provided consideration, so FHAA did not obligate the City to accommodate |
| Whether state-law theories (implied tenancy, tenancy at will, Mobilehome Residency Law) can convert Salisbury into a FHAA-covered tenant | California-law doctrines could create an implied tenancy or bar eviction, making him a tenant under FHAA | Even if state law created some occupancy rights, FHAA’s federal definition requires consideration for a rental; state rules do not alter FHAA’s textual requirement | Court applied a federal common-law standard: consideration is required under FHAA; state-law disputes over tenancy were immaterial to FHAA coverage |
| Whether the City’s failure to engage in an “interactive process” is a standalone FHAA violation | City’s repeated refusal to discuss or grant the accommodation was independently unlawful | Ninth Circuit precedent rejects standalone “interactive process” liability; the duty to engage arises only in the context of an existing FHAA-covered tenancy | Rejected: no standalone liability and, in any event, no FHAA duty existed absent a rental supported by consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2021) (elements for an FHAA failure-to-accommodate claim)
- Dubois v. Ass’n of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2006) (FHAA accommodation framework)
- Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (landlord must offer reasonable accommodation to allow equal opportunity to reside)
- United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1997) (parking accommodations may be necessary and reasonable for handicapped tenants)
- Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (federal common-law principles inform statutory interpretation)
- Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (start with statutory text when interpreting a statute)
- Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2018) (use of uniform federal rules in FHAA context)