Case Information
*1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020
Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
Syllabus ET AL . v. TANVIR ET AL .
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 19–71. Argued October 6, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was enacted in
the wake of
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.
v.
,
Held : RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appro-
priate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their indi- vidual capacities. Pp. 3–9. (a) RFRA’s text provides that persons may sue and “obtain appro-
priate relief against a government,” 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(c), includ-
ing an “official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United
States,” §2000bb–2(1). RFRA supplants the ordinary meaning of “gov-
ernment” with a different, express definition that includes “official[s].”
It then underscores that “official[s]” are “person[s].” Under RFRA’s
definition, relief that can be executed against an “official . . . of the
Unites States”
is
“relief against a government.” This reading is con-
firmed by RFRA’s use of the phrase “persons acting under color of law,”
which has long been interpreted by this Court in the 42 U. S. C. §1983
context to permit suits against officials in their individual capacities.
See,
e.g.
,
Memphis Community School Dist. Stachura,
Syllabus
305–306. Pp. 3–5.
(b) RFRA’s term “appropriate relief” is “open-ended” on its face;
thus, what relief is “ ‘appropriate’ ” is “inherently context dependent.”
Sossamon Texas,
T HOMAS , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem- bers joined, except B ARRETT , J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 19–71 _________________ FNU TANZIN, ET AL ., PETITIONERS MUHAMMAD
TANVIR, ET AL .
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[December 10, 2020]
J USTICE T HOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substan- tial burdens on religious exercise, absent a compelling in- terest pursued through the least restrictive means. 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. It also gives a person whose religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the right to seek “appropriate relief.” The question here is whether “appropriate relief ” includes claims for money damages against Government officials in their individual capacities. We hold that it does.
I
A
RFRA secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise
under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy to
redress violations of that right. Congress passed the Act in
the wake of this Court’s decision in
Employment Div., Dept.
of Human Resources of Ore.
,
B
Respondents Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims who claim that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents placed them on the No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as inform- ants against their religious communities. Respondents sued various agents in their official capacities, seeking re- moval from the No Fly List. They also sued the agents in their individual capacities for money damages. According to respondents, the retaliation cost them substantial sums of money: airline tickets wasted and income from job oppor- tunities lost.
More than a year after respondents sued, the Department of Homeland Security informed them that they could now fly, thus mooting the claims for injunctive relief. The Dis- trict Court then dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit mon- etary relief.
The Second Circuit reversed. 894 F. 3d 449 (2018). It
determined that RFRA’s express remedies provision, com-
bined with the statutory definition of “Government,” au-
thorizes claims against federal officials in their individual
capacities. Relying on our precedent and RFRA’s broad pro-
tections for religious liberty, the court concluded that the
*5
open-ended phrase “appropriate relief ” encompasses
money damages against officials. We granted certiorari,
II
As usual, we start with the statutory text.
E.g., Mission
Product Holdings, Inc. Tempnology, LLC
,
A
We first have to determine if injured parties can sue Gov-
ernment officials in their personal capacities. RFRA’s text
provides a clear answer: They can. Persons may sue and
obtain relief “against a government,” §2000bb–1(c), which
is defined to include “a branch, department, agency, instru-
mentality, and
official
(
or other person acting under color of
law
) of the United States.” §2000bb–2(1) (emphasis added).
The Government urges us to limit lawsuits against offi-
cials to suits against them in their official, not personal, ca-
pacities. A lawsuit seeking damages from employees in
their individual capacities, the Government argues, is not
really “against a government” because relief “can be exe-
cuted only against the official’s personal assets.”
Kentucky
v.
Graham
,
The problem with this otherwise plausible argument is
that Congress supplanted the ordinary meaning of “govern-
ment” with a different, express definition. “ ‘When a statute
includes an explicit definition, we must follow that defini-
tion,’ even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.”
Dig-
ital Realty Trust, Inc.
v.
Somers
,
Not only does the term “government” encompass officials,
it also authorizes suits against “other person[s] acting un-
der color of law.” §2000bb–2(1). The right to obtain relief
against “a person” cannot be squared with the Govern-
ment’s reading that relief must always run against the
United States. Moreover
,
the use of the phrase “official (
or other
person . . . )” underscores that “official[s]” are treated
like “person[s].”
Ibid.
(emphasis added). In other words,
the parenthetical clarifies that “a government” includes
both individuals who are officials acting under color of law
and
other, additional individuals who are nonofficials act-
ing under color of law. Here, respondents sued the former.
The legal “backdrop against which Congress enacted”
RFRA confirms the propriety of individual-capacity suits.
Stewart Dutra Constr. Co.
,
B
The question then becomes what “appropriate relief ” en-
tails. Without a statutory definition, we turn to the
phrase’s plain meaning at the time of enactment. See
FCC
v.
AT&T Inc.
, 562 U. S. 397, 403 (2011). “Appropriate”
means “[s]pecially fitted or suitable, proper.” 1 Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary, at 586; see also Merriam-Webster’s Colle-
giate Dictionary 57 (10th ed. 1996) (“especially suitable or
compatible”). Because this language is “open-ended” on its
face, what relief is “ ‘appropriate’ ” is “inherently context
dependent.”
Sossamon
v.
Texas
,
In the context of suits against Government officials, dam-
ages have long been awarded as appropriate relief. In the
early Republic, “an array of writs . . . allowed individuals to
test the legality of government conduct by filing suit
against government officials” for money damages “payable
by the officer.” Pfander & Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Govt Accountability in the Early
Republic, 85 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1862, 1871–1875 (2010); see
id
., at 1875, n. 52 (collecting cases). These common-law
causes of action remained available through the 19th cen-
tury and into the 20th. See,
e.g.
,
Little
v.
Barreme
, 2 Cranch
170 (1804);
Elliott Swartwout
,
Damages are also commonly available against state and
local government officials. In 1871, for example, Congress
passed the precursor to §1983, imposing liability on any
person who, under color of state law, deprived another of a
constitutional right. 17 Stat. 13; see also
Myers
v.
Ander-
son
,
This availability of damages under §1983 is particularly salient in light of RFRA’s origins. When first enacted, RFRA defined “ ‘government’ ” to include an “official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State .” 107 Stat. 1489 (empha- sis added). It made no distinction between state and federal officials. After this Court held that RFRA could not be en- forced against the States, see City of Boerne Flores , 521 U. S. 507, 511 (1997), Congress narrowly amended the def- inition “by striking ‘a State, or a subdivision of a State.’ ” 114 Stat. 806. That context is important because RFRA made clear that it was reinstating both the pre- Smith sub- stantive protections of the First Amendment and the right to vindicate those protections by a claim. §2000bb(b). *9 There is no doubt that damages claims have always been available under §1983 for clearly established violations of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Sause v. Bauer , 585 U. S. ___ (2018) ( per curiam ) (reversing grant of qualified im- munity in a case seeking damages under §1983 based on alleged violations of free exercise rights and Fourth Amend- ment rights); Murphy Missouri Dept. of Corrections , 814 F. 2d 1252, 1259 (CA8 1987) (remanding to enter judgment for plaintiffs on a §1983 free speech and free exercise claims and to determine and order “appropriate relief, which . . . may, if appropriate, include an award” of damages). Given that RFRA reinstated pre- Smith protections and rights, parties suing under RFRA must have at least the same av- enues for relief against officials that they would have had before . That means RFRA provides, as one avenue for relief, a right to seek damages against Government em- ployees.
A damages remedy is not just “appropriate” relief as
viewed through the lens of suits against Government em-
ployees. It is also the
only
form of relief that can remedy
some RFRA violations. For certain injuries, such as re-
spondents’ wasted plane tickets, effective relief consists of
damages, not an injunction. See,
e.g.
,
DeMarco
v.
Davis
,
The Government also posits that we should be wary of damages against government officials because these awards could raise separation-of-powers concerns. But this exact remedy has coexisted with our constitutional system since the dawn of the Republic. To be sure, there may be policy reasons why Congress may wish to shield Govern- ment employees from personal liability, and Congress is free to do so. But there are no constitutional reasons why we must do so in its stead.
To the extent the Government asks us to create a new policy-based presumption against damages against individ- ual officials, we are not at liberty to do so. Congress is best suited to create such a policy. Our task is simply to inter- pret the law as an ordinary person would. Although back- ground presumptions can inform the understanding of a word or phrase, those presumptions must exist at the time of enactment. We cannot manufacture a new presumption now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that acted 27 years ago.
——————
* Both the Government and respondents agree that government offi-
cials are entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense when sued in
their individual capacities for money damages under RFRA. Indeed, re-
spondents emphasize that the “qualified immunity defense was created
for precisely these circumstances,” Brief for Respondents 22, and is a
“powerful shield” that “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who flout clearly established law,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42; see
District of Co-
lumbia Wesby
,
* * *
We conclude that RFRA’s express remedies provision per- mits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec- ond Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered. J USTICE B ARRETT took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.