DISABILITY RIGHTS MONTANA, INC., оn behalf of all prisoners with serious mental illness confined to the Montana State Prison, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MIKE BATISTA, in his official capacity as Director of the Montana Department of Corrections; LEROY KIRKEGARD, in his official capacity as warden of Montana State Prison, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-35770
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed July 19, 2019
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00022-SEH. Argued and Submitted March 7, 2019, Seattle, Washington.
Before: Ronald M. Gould
FOR PUBLICATION
SUMMARY**
Prisoner Civil Rights
The panel reversed the district court‘s dismissal of a prisoner civil rights complaint, remanded for further proceedings, and reassigned the case to a different district court judge.
Plaintiff, Disability Rights Montana, alleged pursuant to
The panel held that the complaint, which described the horrific treatment of prisoners, was supported by factual allegations more than sufficient to “state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face” under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The panel noted that the complaint alleged that prisoners with serious mental illness werе denied diagnosis and treatment of their conditions, described a distressing pattern of placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement for “weeks and months at a time” without significant mental health care, alleged the frequent, improper use of this punishment for behavior arising from mental illness, marshalled relevant quotations from national prison health organizations about the unacceptability of subjecting prisoners to extensive solitary confinement, and alleged that the defendants did not respond appropriately to threats of suicide by mentally ill prisoners, increasing the risk of suicide. With respеct to the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint also included more than sufficient allegations that defendants knew that prisoners with serious mental illness were being exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm and were indifferent to that risk.
The panel held that reassignment to a different district court judge was required to preserve the appearance of justice. The panel noted that the district court had mistaken this case for another case brought by plaintiff against a different defendant and upon being advised of its mistake, had declined to revisit its decision, thereby letting an obviously incorrect decision stand.
COUNSEL
Jeffrey A. Simmons (argued), Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison, Wisconsin; Alex Rate (argued), American Civil Liberties Union of Montana, Missoula, Montana; Kyle Gray and Adrian Miller; Holland & Hart LLP, Billings, Montana; Plaintiff-Appellant.
Thomas J. Leonard (argued), William L. Crowley, Mary Cile Glover-Rogers, Boone Karlberg P.C., Missoula, Montana; Colleen E. Ambrose, Special Assistant Attorney General, Montana Department of Corrections, Helena, Montana; for Defendants-Appellees.
Elisabeth Centeno Lopez, Alexandre H. Rene, Helen Vera, and Jonathan R. Ference-Burke, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washington, D.C.; Diane Smith Howard, National Disability Rights Network, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae National Disability Rights Network аnd Ten Jurisdictions’ Protection and Advocacy Agencies.
OPINION
GOULD, Circuit Judge:
Disability Rights Montana, Inc. (“DRM“) alleges, pursuant to
I
A
The Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act,
The complaint alleges that the defendants act under the color of state law in administering the prison and that they remain responsible for administering the policies and practices that are the subject of the complaint. Specifically, the complaint isolates nine prison practices and/or policies that DRM contends are constitutionally suspect:
- placing prisoners with serious mental illness in various forms of solitary confinement for 22 to 24 hours per day for months and years at a time;
- placing prisoners with serious mental illness on behavior management plans that involve solitary confinement and extreme restrictions of privileges;
- having no standards for determining whether placing a prisoner with serious mental illness in solitаry confinement or on a behavior management plan will be harmful to the prisoner‘s mental health;
- engaging in a pattern of refusing to properly diagnose prisoners as suffering from serious mental illness;
- engaging in a pattern of refusing to provide prisoners with medications for serious mental illness;
- failing to have a system in place to review and evaluate the diagnosing and prescribing practices of its mental health staff;
- failing to have a system to classify prisoners according to their mental health needs;
- failing to adequately consider prisoners’ serious mental illnesses when making decisions about prisoners’ housing and custody levels; and
- having no system in place for auditing, evaluating or ensuring the effectiveness of its mental health care program in treating prisoners with serious mental illness.
The complaint goes on to allege specific facts supporting the existence of these policies and their effect on prisoners with serious mental illness. For instance, the
The second section of the complaint provides allegations, consistent with the system-wide allegations, concerning nine individual prisoners. In substance, the allegations are horrifying, involving prisoners with very severe symptoms of mental illness who went largely untreated and who were subjected to extreme and lengthy solitary confinement punishments. The policies and practices DRM alleged to be in place at the prison are evident in these examples. The facts alleged in these illustrative examples include numerous instances of prison mental health staff deciding to limit prisonеrs’ access to prescribed mental health medication, including staff denying mentally ill inmates their medications entirely. In graphic detail, DRM‘s complaint describes how these policies and practices allegedly harm the mental health of prisoners, harm that allegedly culminated in the suicides of three of the described prisoners.2
The third section of DRM‘s complaint specifically alleges the DOC defendants’ involvement in the complained of policies and practices. DRM alleges that defendants are aware of the fact that solitary confinement harms prisoners with serious mental illnеss, are aware of prison mental health standards that contradict their practices, have no standards for guiding mental health staff in the punishment of prisoners misbehaving because of mental illness, have been made aware of the plight of seriously mentally ill prisoners through repeated administrative and grievance proceedings, have been sued twice in Montana for their treatment of mentally ill prisoners, and have been repeatedly informed of the deficiencies of their treatment of prisoners with serious mental illness by DRM itself. Based on this description of the DOC defendants’ knowledge of the objectionable policies, DRM finally alleges that “[g]iven their knowledge of these practices, and their knowledge of the serious harm that can be caused by these practices,
B
DRM initially included these Eighth Amendment claims against the DOC defendants in a broader suit that also alleged due process claims against the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (“DPHHS“). The due process claims concerned hоw people convicted as “Guilty But Mentally Ill” were transferred between the Montana State Hospital and the Montana State Prison. At a status conference, the district court orally ordered DRM to replead its claims in separate complaints, confusingly theorizing that there should be three separate cases.3 DRM then filed two separate complaints—separating the Eighth Amendment claims against the DOC defendants from the due process claims against the DPHHS. This appeal only concerns the case against the DOC defendants.
Shortly after the claims were separated, the DOC defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment case for failure to state a claim under
II
A
We review dismissals under rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2019). The standard for surviving a motion to dismiss under
B
With respect to the substance of DRM‘s complaint asserting a
“A prison official‘s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)); see also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014); Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995). Where a plaintiff alleges systemwide deficiencies, “policies and practices of statewide and systematic application [that] expose all inmates in [the prison‘s] custody to a substantial risk of serious harm,” we assess the claim through a two-pronged inquiry.4 Parsons, 754 F.3d at 676; see also Plata, 563 U.S. at 505 n.3 (noting that “[р]laintiffs rely on systemwide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in California to ‘substantial risk of harm‘“). The first, objective, prong requires that the plaintiff show that the conditions of the prison pose “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (1994) (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35). The second, subjective, prong requires that the plaintiff show that a prison official was deliberately indifferent by being “aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and “also draw[ing] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Consistent with this well-established precedent, DRM‘s complaint states a claim and survives a motion to dismiss under
III
The district court‘s oral ruling on the motion appears to have confused this case with the case filed against the DPHHS. Despite ostensibly ruling that DRM had failed to meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, the district court did not engage with the factual allegations in DRM‘s complaint, chоosing instead to discuss the possible existence of a due process liberty interest based on the facts alleged against the DPHHS in the other case. Because the district court declined to reconsider or further explain its ruling, our de novo review of the district court‘s order is the first application of the Iqbal/Twombly standard to DRM‘s complaint. We conclude that DRM has stated a claim on which relief could be granted. DRM‘s complaint plausibly alleges that the DOC defendants were deliberately indifferent under the established two-prong test, and it alleges specific facts to support each element.5
A
DRM‘s complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to make it plausible that the prison‘s policies and practices pose a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners with serious mental illness, satisfying the objective element. DRM made extensive factual allegations about the effect that the prison‘s punishment practices have on prisoners with serious mental illness. DRM‘s complaint alleged that prisoners with serious mental illness are denied diagnosis and treatment of their conditions, described a distressing pattern of placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement for “weeks and months at a time” without signifiсant mental health care, alleged the frequent, improper use of this punishment for behavior arising from mental illness, marshalled relevant quotations from national prison health organizations about the unacceptability of subjecting prisoners to extensive solitary confinement, and alleged that the defendants did not respond appropriately to threats of suicide by mentally ill prisoners, increasing the risk of suicide. Far from being “a wholly conclusory statement” of its claim, DRM‘s complaint provides detailed allegations on each of these points, reflecting significant information about thе function of the prison and its policies with respect to the seriously mentally ill. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
These allegations, by themselves, were enough to make it plausible that prison policies and practices pose a substantial risk of serious harm. See Sheppard, 694 F.3d at 1048–49. But these allegations make up only a portion DRM‘s complaint. About half of the complaint included further factual allegations supporting the existence of harmful prison policies and the risk of serious harm that they pose. There were allegations that the defendants’ policies caused prisoners’ mental health to get substantially worse, resulted in prisonеrs inflicting self-harm, and contributed, on at least three occasions, to prisoners committing suicide. To require more would overstate what needs to be alleged to state a claim at the beginning of a lawsuit before discovery. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
B
With respect to the subjective prong of DRM‘s Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint аlso includes more than sufficient allegations. DRM provides four different kinds of support for its claim that the DOC defendants knew that prisoners with serious mental illness are being exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm and were indifferent to that risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (holding that “it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm“). DRM‘s complaint alleged (1) that Montana‘s prison has been sued twice complaining about factually similar conditions at the prison, (2) that the prison sought certification from a national prison health care body whose mental health care standards wоuld put them on notice of these problems, (3) that the DOC defendants receive regular grievances and appeals from prisoners complaining about the prison‘s treatment of their mental illness, and (4) that DRM itself has “repeatedly informed Prison officials of the serious deficiencies in the Prison‘s treatment of prisoners with serious mental illness.” Each of these allegations, if taken as true, plausibly supports the view that the DOC defendants knew about the risks to which prisoners were exposed and that the DOC defendants deliberately chose to maintain the harmful policies. See, e.g., Lemire v. Cal. Dep‘t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that plaintiffs stated a сlaim for deliberate indifference where “litigation specifically alerted prison officials to the acute problem of inmate suicides“); Hunt v. Dental Dep‘t, 865 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a dispute of fact prevented summary judgment on deliberate indifference where a grievance form could have put defendant on notice to plaintiff‘s request for treatment).
Defendants argue that these allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on the subjective prong of the Eighth
IV
DRM contends that the case should be reassigned to a different district court judge on remand. “Absent proof of personal bias on the part of the district judge, remand to a different judge is proper only under unusual circumstances.” United States v. Reyes, 313 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). We have lоng held that whether these unusual circumstances obtain depends on three factors:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.
United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc)); see also Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying these factors from Arnett). These factors are not evenly wеighed, however, and we have established that “[t]he first two factors are equally important, and a finding of either is sufficient to support reassignment on remand.” Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2017).
In this case, although we do not suggest that the district court acted with ill will or with actual bias against plaintiffs, we hold that reassignment is required to preserve the appearance of justice. When the district court dismissed DRM‘s claims, its oral reasoning concerned the case against the DPHHS defendants, and in our view had nothing to do with this case. The district court was then presented with a motion by the DPHHS defendants pointing out that the district court had erred in confusing the case against the DOC defendants with the case against the DPHHS defendants. Yet, the district court declined to revisit its decision, letting an obviously incorrect decision stand that resulted in this appeal with the issues it presents. Because the district court did not correct its mistake and issue a reasoned decision, the district court‘s error has more impact on plaintiffs than a mere oversight.
As we have previously held, “adamancy in erroneous rulings may justify remand to [a] different judge.” Reyes, 313 F.3d at 1159–60 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d at 780). This holding reflects the sound reasoning that judges who have insisted on erroneous rulings, even when their errors are obvious and have been highlighted for the court, might nоt appear to the disfavored parties to be likely to decide in accord with the law in the future. When a district court errs in this way, especially when the court gives no plausible justification for its decision, parties and observers may justifiably doubt whether the future disposition of their
V
This case is controlled by the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Brown v. Plata and in Farmer v. Brennan. Under Brown v. Plata, an Eighth Amendment claim is made out if prisoners with serious mental illnesses face a substantial risk of serious harm, and this is met with deliberate indifference to their condition. This makes good sense because once persons are incarcerated, they can no longer see to their own medical needs. In these circumstances, the state, which incarcerated them and limited their ability to seek care for themselves, stands in a unique relation that requires it to provide necessary medical care and protect against serious medical risks. Under Farmer, a prisoner meets the first prong of the test for cruel and unusual punishment if he or she can show that prison policies or practices pose a “substantial risk of serious harm.” The sеcond prong is met upon showing of deliberate indifference, which, as Farmer makes clear, is shown adequately when a prison official is aware of the facts from which an inference could be drawn about the outstanding risk, and the facts permit us to infer that the prison official in fact drew that inference, but then consciously avoided taking appropriate action. Here, the facts alleged are adequate to support the claim that has been asserted under these principles.
Iqbal and Twombly require only that a plausible claim be alleged, not that it can be proven with certainty. Enough facts are plausibly alleged in the complaint so that this matter should not have been dismissed without further process. We reverse the district court‘s judgment and remand to a different district court judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.