REGINALD CORNELIUS LATSON v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, ET AL.
Case No. 1:16CV00039
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ABINGDON DIVISION
James P. Jones, United States District Judge
Caitlin Marie Kasmar and Katherine Katz, BuckleySandler LLP, Washington, D.C., and Deborah Golden and Elliot M. Mincberg, Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff; Nancy Hull Davidson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Defendants.
In this civil rights case, the plaintiff, a Virginia inmate, asserts claims against prison officials and state entities based on the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on numerous grounds. For the reasons that follow, I will grant in part and deny in part the Motion to Dismiss.
I.
The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts, which I must accept as true for the purpose of deciding the pending motion.
Marion Correctional Treatment Center (“MCTC“) is a medium security state prison located in Marion, Virginia. Mr. Latson was confined at MCTC from June 5, 2004 until February 2, 2015. The Commonwealth of Virginia, through the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC“), operates MCTC. MCTC and VDOC receive federal financial assistance.
Defendant Dara Robichaux served as Assistant Warden of MCTC while Latson was incarcerated. Robichaux supervised MCTC employees and had authority to establish and implement policies and procedures. Defendant Larry Jarvis was the Warden of MCTC during part of the time that Latson was incarcerated. He also supervised MCTC employees and had authority to establish and implement policies and procedures. Defendant Harold W. Clarke is the Director of VDOC. Clarke oversees VDOC employees and has authority to establish, alter, and implement VDOC policies and procedures. Latson has also
Latson was diagnosed as disabled and began receiving special education services in kindergarten. He repeated kindergarten due to his impairments. At the age of seven, Latson was assigned a full-scale IQ score of sixty-one and was noted as having delays in receptive grammar and reduced eye contact. He was diagnosed with ASD at age fourteen. He exhibited symptoms such as rocking, obsessive focusing, and atypical behaviors and was placed in special education throughout his adolescence. His ASD caused him to have difficulty with communication, social interaction, and maintaining attention.
It is not uncommon for people with ASD to have unusual sensitivities and difficulty regulating their responses. People with ASD have trouble understanding the actions and motivations of others, lack the ability to read social cues, struggle with complex language, do not easily understand rules of social behavior, and often respond to unexpected situations with anxiety and agitation.
On April 21, 2014, Latson was transferred from the Northwestern Regional Adult Detention Center to the Rappahannock Regional Jail (“Rappahannock“).1
Three days after his arrival at Rappahannock, Latson, who was psychologically distressed, was evaluated by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist concluded that Latson was suicidal, prescribed antipsychotic medication, and ordered Latson moved to a crisis cell for suicide watch. On April 24, 2014, a corrections officer who was placing Latson in the crisis cell ordered Latson to put his hands on the wall and then physically pushed him against the wall. Latson, in the midst of a diagnosed mental health crisis, reacted to this physical force with a fight-or-flight response that is symptomatic of ASD and lashed out, striking the officer.
Three correctional officers then surrounded Latson, and First Sergeant William Diehl tasered Latson for the full five-second Taser cycle, causing neuromuscular incapacitation. Latson collapsed to the floor. At the direction of First Sergeant Diehl, Latson was placed in handcuffs and leg irons and was seen by a nurse, who removed the Taser probes. After the incident, Latson was placed in a Pro-Straint chair in the crisis cell, and at the direction of First Sergeant Diehl, four
Officers checked on Latson every fifteen minutes while he was in the Pro-Straint chair, and for all checks performed within the first hour and a half, he was noted to be either quiet or responsive. For the next four and a half hours, he was noted to be quiet. The officers left him in the Pro-Straint chair, unable to move, eat, or use the restroom, for more than nine hours. When he was released from the Pro-Straint chair, he received a snack bag and milk but was given no dinner.
Following this incident, Latson was placed in a crisis cell on modified suicide watch for one week. The cell contained a safety mattress but had no toilet, toiletries, or other furnishings. He was then removed from the crisis cell and placed in administrative segregation. While Latson was in segregation, Rappahannock mental health staff only conducted suicide watch checks to ensure he was not in immediate physical danger. Rappahannock staff prevented Latson from receiving mental health testing or treatment. Latson remained in segregation for more than one month, until he was transferred to MCTC on June 5, 2014.
Within a day of his arrival at Rappahannock, Latson was placed into the legal custody of the VDOC, despite continuing to be housed at a regional jail. Clarke had discretion to determine the priority for receiving prisoners in VDOC
On April 30, 2014, while Latson was restrained in the Pro-Straint chair, clinical psychologist Susan Williams emailed mental health clinician Richard Feldman, copying Keith Dawkins and Eric Madsen, all of whom were VDOC employees, requesting that Feldman meet with Latson to consider whether he should be transferred to a VDOC facility sooner than planned. Williams wrote that VDOC needed a report of Latson‘s mental status and how he was being managed at Rappahannock.
On May 8, 2014, Feldman met with Latson and reported that Latson was manageable with close monitoring and regular contact with treatment staff. Feldman conveyed his belief that Latson was being singled out by correctional officers for ridicule and mistreatment because the original offense that led to his incarceration was an assault of a police officer. Feldman observed that Latson was not delusional and did not show evidence of perceptual disturbances. Feldman noted that Latson had previously done very well at Northwestern Regional Adult Detention Center, where he had been in a sheltered housing situation.
On May 7, 2014, Latson‘s attorney communicated with VDOC about the possibility of transferring Latson to AdvoServ, a non-VDOC facility, before he had finished serving his active sentence. On May 20, 2014, counsel working on Latson‘s behalf sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia regarding Latson‘s conditions and treatment at Rappahannock and the effects on Latson‘s mental health. Latson‘s advocates continued to contact VDOC and other Commonwealth agencies throughout Latson‘s time at Rappahannock, alerting them to Latson‘s conditions and treatment and his diagnosed disabilities, and requesting that he be transferred to another facility. The Governor directed VDOC to transfer Latson to a VDOC facility as soon as possible, and Latson was transferred to MCTC on June 4, 2015.
Research has shown that the impacts of solitary confinement can be similar to those of torture and can include a variety of negative physiological and psychological reactions. These effects are amplified in individuals with mental illness and can exacerbate underlying conditions, especially in people with intellectual disabilities. Latson alleges that the defendants knew or should have known that placing him in segregation could be devastating to his mental health. In 2003, following a series of inmate suicides at the facility, a suicide consultant issued a report to Rappahannock recommending that isolation should be avoided and suicidal inmates should instead be housed close to staff in the general
In 2012,
While he was in segregation at Rappahannock, Latson was provided no sensory stimulation. Specifically, he had no window, radio, reading materials, television, or means of tracking time. He could see only the walls and door of his cell. He was in segregation for more than a month and a half, during which time he was only removed from his cell when the cell was being cleaned.
Latson was criminally prosecuted for the incident that led to the use of the Pro-Straint chair. Latson pleaded guilty to the charge of assault on a police officer and was sentenced to an additional six months of imprisonment. A prominent corrections expert reviewed the handling of the offense and opined that, in accordance with the standard practices of other jails nationwide, the incident should have been treated as a mental health crisis and not as a criminal matter. The expert commented that criminally prosecuting such violations by mentally ill inmates can lead to a cycle of rule violations, punishment, segregation, and
When he was moved to MCTC, a facility designed to house mentally ill inmates, Latson encountered conditions similar to those he had faced at Rappahannock. He was placed into segregation immediately upon his arrival at MCTC and remained there for nearly six months, with the exception of fourteen days in late September and early October when he was housed in the general population. He again had no access to reading materials, a radio, a television, a clock, or other stimulus while he was in his segregation cell. He could only access these items on days when he was allowed out of his cell for limited periods of time. For most of his incarceration at MCTC, Latson could only stare at the walls of his cell.
An MCTC policy requires a formal hearing when an offender is considered for removal from the general population, an increase in security level, or reduction in good-time earning level outside the annual review process. Nevertheless, Latson was not given a hearing before being placed into segregation. He received a hearing three weeks later.
On June 26, 2014, following his hearing, Latson was given a Segregation Release Plan (“SRP“) that provided for limited temporary release three days per week for at least one hour. During the preceding three weeks, Latson was
Throughout Latson‘s time at MCTC, Risk of Institutional Aggression forms noted that Latson posed a high risk of aggression towards others. The reasons stated for this assessment were that he had been convicted of assaulting a law enforcement officer, had mild ID and ASD, and had a history of low frustration tolerance and aggression. The defendants did not create a protocol to address Latson‘s disabilities, and they responded to his behavioral incidents with punishment rather than treatment.
On June 30, 2014, Latson‘s SRP was suspended and he was placed in disciplinary segregation for one week because he had thrown objects at his cell door and liquid under and around his cell door after becoming upset. He alleges this was an episodic outburst caused by his ASD. Latson was not given a hearing before being placed in disciplinary segregation. Advocates for Latson voiced concerns to an MCTC clinical social worker about the consequences of placing
On July 11, 2014, Latson threw his coffee cup at the wall and pushed his breakfast tray through the slot in his cell door, striking an officer in the abdomen. He was forcibly extracted from his cell and suffered a laceration on his arm that required stitches. He was punished with twenty days of disciplinary segregation, but he was not placed back on an SRP until twenty-eight days after the incident. During his twenty-eight days in segregation, he was not allowed any time outside of his cell. For one month following the incident, he was deprived of a toothbrush. For nearly a month and a half, blood from the laceration on his arm remained in his cell. For more than two months, he was not given toilet paper.
By the time he was transferred to MCTC, Latson had already lost forty-two pounds since his arrest. Within ten days of his arrival at MCTC, he had lost an additional five pounds. Beginning a few days after his transfer, MCTC gave him Ensure twice a day in addition to his meals. However, following the July 11 incident, he no longer received Ensure despite pleas by those advocating on his behalf. In addition, Latson was not permitted to purchase anything from the commissary other than writing materials and hygiene supplies. Though no security reason was stated for the restriction, he was not permitted to order food or discretionary items that other inmates were allowed to order.
On June 18, 2014, an MCTC recreation therapist completed a Recreation Therapy Assessment of Latson. He noted that Latson had a slow learning ability and would need activities to help him cope with his environment. No such activities were implemented. While at MCTC, Latson received no mental health treatment aside from psychiatric medication. His advocates visited him on October 3, 2014, and were not permitted to complete a grievance form.
On October 5, 2014, Latson had an outburst in the cafeteria at breakfast. His SRP was suspended and he was placed in disciplinary segregation for twenty days. During that time, he was not allowed outside of his cell and had no access to music, books, magazines, radio, television, or canteen items. His only source of stimulus was a few Bible pamphlets. Latson alleges that because of his ASD, he is not deterred from future misconduct by discipline in the way that non-disabled inmates are deterred.
Latson avers that throughout his time at MCTC, Robichaux and Jarvis personally reviewed and approved decisions regarding his housing situation. Beginning the day after his arrival at MCTC, people advocating on Latson‘s behalf communicated with Robichaux and Jarvis about his diagnoses and expressed their concerns about his treatment and conditions of confinement, and the effects that isolation would have on his mental state. Latson‘s advocates also communicated with other staff members who were supervised by Robichaux and Jarvis. On June
VDOC employees working under Clarke‘s supervision were also informed of Latson‘s treatment and conditions of confinement throughout his placement at Rappahannock and MCTC. On July 9, 2014, Clarke sent Latson‘s attorney an electronic calendar invitation to speak about Latson on July 14, 2014. Clarke was copied on letters regarding Latson‘s situation at MCTC that Latson‘s counsel sent to the Governor on September 2, 2014, and November 21, 2014.
In late 2014, media sources including the Washington Post and the New York Times began publishing stories about Latson. The
Latson‘s counsel submitted a formal pardon request to the Governor on January 12, 2015. The Governor granted a conditional pardon on January 20,
On January 20, 2015, after Latson was conditionally pardoned, he was returned to segregation. He was stripped of his possessions, had all of his privileges revoked, and was again denied access to books, television, telephone, the commissary, and his music player. Three days later, MCTC staff informed Latson‘s attorney that Latson had been placed in segregation for his own protection, but offered no explanation for the withdrawal of privileges and lack of stimulation. Latson‘s counsel then emailed several representatives of MCTC, VDOC, and the Virginia Department of Behavioral Health & Developmental Services (“DBHDS“), including Robichaux, alerting them to his segregation and removal of stimulus and privileges following the pardon, and expressing concern about the effect these conditions would have on Latson. His counsel had learned that Latson had no water in his segregation cell and was only given drinks at meals, and she had been told that after the pardon, staff had been handling him roughly, mocking and disparaging him, and threatening him about the pardon. Latson‘s counsel included this information in her emails to representatives of MCTC, VDOC, and DBHDS.
Latson was transferred to AdvoServ on February 2, 2015. Though his mental health needs are being addressed there, Latson alleges that the defendants’ actions caused him significant and potentially irreversible damage. He developed post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD“) and other mood, anxiety, and panic disorders. He has had difficulty adapting to his new environment. Authority figures provoke severe anxiety and fear. Latson avers that he once showed promise of leading a relatively independent life in the least restrictive placement and maintaining employment, but it is now unlikely that he will achieve that level of independence in the foreseeable future. He relies on others to manage his heightened fear and reactivity in challenging interpersonal situations, and he is hypervigilant to signs of danger. He alleges that he will require long-term mental health treatment to address his anxiety, depression, social isolation, and sense of
Based on these allegations, Latson asserts seven claims. Count One is an Eighth Amendment claim regarding Latson‘s conditions of confinement, brought pursuant to
Latson initially filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on April 21, 2016, asserting claims against the defendants named here as well as parties associated with Rappahannock. Latson v. Clarke, No. 1:16-cv-00447-GBL-MSN (E.D. Va.). Clarke, MCTC, Robichaux, Jarvis, the Commonwealth, and VDOC moved to sever the claims against them from the claims against the Rappahannock parties and to transfer the severed claims to the Abingdon Division of the Western District of Virginia, in which MCTC is located. The court granted the Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue, finding that the two sets of claims were significantly different from one another and would require the presentation of different evidence and witnesses. Mem. Op. & Order 10-11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2016), ECF No. 79. The court also found that “trying the claims together may cause the jury to hold the Commonwealth Defendants liable for physical force the Complaint alleges occurred at the Rappahannock Jail only,” prejudicing the defendants. Id. at 11.
After the severed claims were transferred to this court, Latson filed an Amended Complaint. The defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, asserting a
III.
“The purpose of a
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must regard as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and must view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). “Where, as here, the motion to dismiss involves a civil rights complaint, [I] must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged and must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might
A. Events that Occurred at Rappahannock.
The defendants contend that they cannot be held responsible for actions taken by representatives of Rappahannock because local jails are operated by independent sheriffs and local jail authorities. The defendants had no authority over Rappahannock. They argue that while Clarke had discretion to transfer Latson from Rappahannock into a Commonwealth facility, he had no duty to do so. They further contend that the facts alleged do not demonstrate that Clarke had personal knowledge of Latson‘s conditions of confinement at Rappahannock.
Latson counters that because he was in VDOC custody while at Rappahannock, and Clarke had the power to remove him from that environment, Clarke can be held liable for constitutional violations that occurred there, as well as for violations of the ADA and RA. He further contends that by alleging that his advocates notified Clarke of constitutional violations, he has plausibly claimed that Clarke knew of the alleged violations, and any further examination of the defendants’ knowledge should be left to a fact-finder.
The defendants are correct that Rappahannock, a regional jail, is operated by a regional jail authority and not by the Commonwealth.
But these cases are not dispositive. As to Latson‘s ADA and RA claims, at least one court of appeals has held that a state cannot escape its obligations under the ADA and RA by housing inmates at third-party county prisons. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010). “At issue are [the state] defendants’ own obligations under the ADA,” and a state must “ensure ADA-compliant conditions for prisoners and parolees being held under its authority, whether it houses such persons in its own facilities or chooses to house them” at other facilities. Id. Here, VDOC has an obligation to ensure that its prisoners’ rights under the ADA and RA are not being violated by the local and regional jails in which it chooses to house its prisoners. Although VDOC cannot control the actions of personnel at local and regional jails, it has the power and duty to house its prisoners where they will be free from discrimination and afforded required accommodations.
With regard to Counts One, Two, and Four, if Clarke knew that Latson‘s constitutional rights were being violated at Rappahannock while Latson was a VDOC-responsible inmate, then Clarke conceivably had a duty to halt any known
Of course, at this procedural stage, I cannot say what Clarke knew or when he knew it. At the summary judgment stage, the undisputed record evidence may show that he did not receive notice of the alleged events occurring at Rappahannock. But in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, I must view the allegations in the light most favorable to Latson. The Amended Complaint alleges that VDOC representatives were notified of Latson‘s conditions and treatment at Rappahannock no more than a week into his approximately one and a half month stay there. A VDOC mental health clinician allegedly met with Latson at Rappahannock and expressed his concerns and recommendations in a written report. The Amended Complaint further alleges that Latson‘s attorneys and advocates contacted VDOC officials on several occasions regarding his treatment and conditions at Rappahannock. The Amended Complaint also alleges that VDOC, the Commonwealth, and Clarke knew or should have known about the ICE report regarding treatment of inmates at Rappahannock. I find that these
B. Statute of Limitations for ADA and RA claims.
The defendants next argue that the asserted ADA and RA claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The plaintiff and the defendants disagree as to what limitations period applies to these claims. The defendants contend that the applicable period is the one-year statute of limitations of the Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act,
Given the similarities between the ADA and the RA, courts apply the same limitations period to claims under both acts. Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017). Because Title II of the ADA does not contain a statute of limitations, courts must either apply the federal four-year catch-all limitations period or the state statute of limitations for the most analogous state-law claim. A Soc‘y Without a Name, for People Without a Home, Millennium Future-Present v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2011). The four-year
Latson argues that his claim was made possible by the ADA Amendments Act because his condition is episodic in nature, and ASD and ID were not consistently recognized as disabilities under the original ADA. The ADA Amendments Act broadened the definition of “disability” under both the ADA and the RA.
Recent regulations clearly indicate that ASD now qualifies as a disability under the amended version of the ADA.
The defendants assert that ASD and ID were recognized as disabilities under the ADA prior to 2008, but they have not pointed to any controlling case actually holding that ASD and ID qualified as disabilities under the pre-amendment ADA. In most of the cases cited by the defendants, the court either assumed these conditions were disabilities without deciding the point, or the parties agreed that ASD and ID were disabilities and did not present the issue to the court. See, e.g., Roe ex rel. Preschooler II v. Nevada, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1340 (D. Nev. 2004) (stating that defendants did not contest that the plaintiff had a disability under the ADA or was handicapped under the RA); Hahn ex rel. Barta v. Linn Cty., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (noting that whether plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability was not in dispute). Additionally, it is not apparent from the face of the Amended Complaint that ASD is an ever-present rather than episodic disorder. The defendants’ arguments about the nature of ASD
“Ordinarily, a defense based on the statute of limitations must be raised by the defendant through an affirmative defense, see
Here, based solely on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, I cannot say for certain that Latson‘s ADA and RA claims would have been cognizable prior to the 2008 ADA Amendments Act. Though it seems unlikely, the evidence may show that Latson‘s impairment is episodic, or that the mediation of his condition through medication and treatment would have negated his claims under the pre-amendment version of the ADA. The statute of limitations issue raised by the defendants is not one that I can resolve at this procedural stage. I will thus deny at this point the Motion to Dismiss to the extent it argues the plaintiff‘s ADA and RA claims are time-barred.
The defendants contend that MCTC must be dismissed because it is a VDOC facility, not a separate legal entity. The defendants note that the Code of Virginia does not grant individual correctional facilities the capacity to sue or be sued. The claims asserted against MCTC are the same as those asserted against VDOC, so the defendants assert that the plaintiff has nothing to gain from separately naming MCTC as a defendant.
Latson does not cite any authority for the proposition that MCTC is a separate legal entity from VDOC, and I am aware of none. The capacity to sue or be sued is determined by state law.
D. Proper Defendants for ADA and RA Claims.
The Amended Complaint asserts claims for violation of the ADA and RA against Robichaux, Jarvis, and Clarke, all in their official capacities, as well as MCTC, VDOC, and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The defendants urge the court to dismiss these claims against Robichaux, Jarvis, and Clarke because a suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is, for all intents and purposes, a suit against the individual‘s employer or principal. The defendants thus argue that naming the individual defendants is redundant. They also move to dismiss the Commonwealth for the same reason, as VDOC is an arm of the Commonwealth and any monetary relief against either of these entities would be paid from the same coffers.
Latson responds that discovery is needed to determine which of the individual defendants are agents of which of the entity defendants. Latson further asserts that the allegations show that VDOC and the Commonwealth played different roles with respect to Latson, as the Commonwealth granted him a conditional pardon and VDOC officials allegedly retaliated against him for seeking that pardon.
E. Viability of ADA Claim.
The defendants have moved to dismiss Count Six of the Amended Complaint for failure to state a cognizable ADA claim. According to the defendants, Latson does not allege that he was excluded from services, programs, or activities at MCTC, nor does he allege that he was treated differently from non-disabled inmates. Pointing to Mason v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2009), the defendants assert that a prison is not required to provide auxiliary aids and services to an inmate if doing so would be unduly
Latson responds that the defendants’ motivation for placing him in segregation is a factual issue that cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss. He contends that his outbursts were inextricably linked to his disabilities, and at least one Court of Appeals has recognized that aggression is a common symptom of autism. Drew P. v. Clarke Cty. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927, 928 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989). Latson also cites Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), in which the district court held that the question of whether autism caused certain behavior was a factual issue that precluded summary judgment.
Latson further notes that the Second Circuit held in Wright v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision, 831 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2016), that preventing a disabled prisoner‘s access to the law library, recreation, and work programs were examples of denial of meaningful access to services, programs, and activities. Another district court has ruled that a prison must evaluate a disabled inmate‘s needs and the accommodations necessary to ensure reasonable access to prison services, and failure to do so violates the ADA and RA as a matter of law. Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 271-72 (D.D.C. 2015).
The defendants do not contest the first element. They appear to argue that Latson was not otherwise qualified because of his asserted disciplinary infractions, but that is a factual issue that is not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. Whether the provision of certain auxiliary aids or services would be unduly burdensome is likewise a factual issue. The defendants’ argument that Latson did
F. Viability of RA Claim.
Though the ADA and RA are quite similar, the RA has a different causation standard: the plaintiff‘s disability must be the sole reason for the alleged discrimination.
Latson asserts that he has pleaded facts that satisfy the RA‘s causation standard. The Amended Complaint alleges that the defendants were aware of plaintiff‘s diagnoses and in spite of that knowledge, they (1) failed to provide appropriate accommodations, and (2) removed Latson from the general prison population solely because of his disabilities, depriving him of benefits and services and subjecting him to destructive conditions.
The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed that the RA has a stricter causation requirement than the ADA, “under which the disability can be one of multiple causes.” Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 641 (4th Cir. 2016). “In order to establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act for disparate treatment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is
Latson has alleged that his behavior was caused by and inextricably linked to his disabilities. He has alleged that the defendants severely punished him for what were essentially symptoms and manifestations of his disabilities. At this procedural stage, I find that Latson has set forth sufficient allegations for his RA claim to move forward. Because I find that he has stated a plausible claim under the RA, I will deny the Motion to Dismiss as to Count Seven.
G. Individual Defendants’ Personal Involvement in Alleged Acts.
The defendants contend that Latson‘s
In response, Latson states that the allegations show that the defendants were continually made aware that he was being treated inhumanely and that his mental state was deteriorating. The Amended Complaint alleges that Robichaux was notified of violations and that Robichaux and Jarvis personally reviewed and approved decisions regarding plaintiff‘s housing situation. The Amended Complaint further alleges that the individual defendants had primary responsibility for operation of MCTC, set policies and procedures, and directly supervised employees. Therefore, according to Latson, the allegations show that the individual defendants were personally aware of and involved in the continued deprivation of his rights.
Under
For supervisory prison officials to be held liable under
§ 1983 for constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates, an inmate must establish that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor‘s response to this knowledge was so inadequate as to showdeliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor‘s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered.
Wilkins v. Upton, 639 F. App‘x 941, 945 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (citing Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). “Receipt of letters by prison officials may be evidence of personal knowledge of unconstitutional conditions.” Wright, 766 F.2d at 850.
Latson‘s allegations fall close to the line separating vicarious liability from direct liability. However, I find that he has pleaded enough facts regarding the involvement of the individual defendants to state plausible claims against them pursuant to
The Amended Complaint‘s allegations with respect to Clarke are somewhat weaker, but I find that they satisfy the elements recited in Wilkins. The plaintiff has alleged that Clarke sent Latson‘s attorney an electronic calendar invitation to speak about Latson, presumably in response to complaints voiced by the attorney. The plaintiff has further alleged that Clarke was copied on letters that Latson‘s
I find that Latson has alleged sufficient facts to establish claims of direct liability under
The defendants contend that, for various reasons, Count One of the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants assert that Latson had no right to avoid uncomfortable prison conditions and that the Eighth Amendment only protected him from conditions that imposed atypical and significant hardships — a standard they argue the alleged facts do not meet as a matter of law. The defendants point to cases in which the Fourth Circuit has held that lengthier periods of solitary confinement did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Mickle v. Moore (In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters), 174 F.3d 464, 471-73 (4th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Branker, 462 F. App‘x 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). The defendants also argue that the plaintiff had no right to choose where he was housed and that the defendants had a duty to protect him from harm caused by other inmates.
The defendants argue that lack of stimulation, inability to purchase food, and inability to purchase discretionary items do not amount to constitutional violations. They argue that Latson‘s weight loss and intermittent receipt of Ensure do not show that he was deprived of adequate food. The defendants likewise argue that the lack of a toothbrush and toilet paper and the extended presence of blood in Latson‘s cell did not violate the Eighth Amendment because they did not deprive
The defendants argue that Latson cannot recover for any mental or emotional injury without showing that he suffered a physical injury. They assert that his alleged conditions of confinement were less severe than others which the Fourth Circuit has found to be constitutional. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503-04 (4th Cir. 1997). They further argue that Latson has not adequately alleged that the defendants had actual knowledge of his conditions of confinement, and that complaints by Latson‘s family and friends do not show actual knowledge on the part of the defendants.
The defendants contend that Latson‘s allegations are insufficient to establish supervisory liability because they do not show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Latson‘s health or safety. They argue that any injuries Latson suffered could have been caused by events that occurred before he was transferred to Rappahannock and MCTC. They contend that he cannot use
Finally, regarding his post-pardon conditions, the defendants note that Latson agreed to remain at MCTC while awaiting transport to AdvoServ.
The Eighth Amendment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). It “imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement and ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016).
To sustain an unconstitutional conditions claim, a prisoner must show that: (1) objectively, he suffered a deprivation that was sufficiently serious, in that the challenged official acts caused denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life‘s necessities“; and (2) subjectively, the defendant prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The prisoner must show “significant physical or emotional harm, or a grave risk of such harm,” resulting from the challenged conditions. Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, “[a] prisoner states a claim under the Eighth Amendment when he plausibly alleges that the conduct in question was motivated by a desire to harass or humiliate rather than by a legitimate justification, such as the need for order and security.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 219 (4th Cir. 2016). Conditions that do not violate the Eighth Amendment on their own may amount to cruel and unusual punishment
I find that Latson has stated a plausible conditions of confinement claim. Several of the defendants’ arguments rely on alleged facts not apparent from the face of the Amended Complaint and require credibility determinations; thus, they cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. While the Fourth Circuit has held that similar conditions of confinement complied with the Eighth Amendment, I cannot say at this stage of the proceedings, without the benefit of any evidence, that Latson‘s conditions were identical or even comparable to those addressed in the other cases cited by the defendants. It is plausible that the alleged conditions combined to deprive Latson of the single, identifiable human need of mental health and sanity.
I find that Latson has pleaded sufficient facts that, if true, could show that the defendants had actual knowledge of his mental health and medical conditions and of his conditions of confinement. The defendants’ actual state of mind is a question of fact. As for the lack of a physical injury, Latson is only required to show a serious risk of physical or emotional harm. Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166. I find that he has alleged facts that plausibly show such a risk. I will deny the Motion to
I. Viability of Lack of Medical Care Claim.
The defendants move for dismissal of Count Two on the ground that it fails to state a cognizable claim for violation of the
“[A] prison official’s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the
Allegations that the plaintiff’s condition was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, and expressly noted by prison officials” are sufficient to show
I find that Count Two states a plausible
The defendants seek dismissal of Count Three, arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. They argue that Latson had no constitutionally protected interest in avoiding segregation, and that he has not alleged that the MCTC policy requiring a pre-segregation hearing was a state regulation sufficient to create a constitutional interest. The defendants argue that their alleged failure to follow an internal policy or procedure does not create a constitutional claim. They further contend that the alleged conditions of confinement were not extreme enough to require procedural protection, and in any event, MCTC’s process was sufficient. Though Latson did not receive a pre-segregation hearing, he alleges that he received one several weeks after being placed in segregation and that his SRP was suspended and reinstated several times, which the defendants contend shows adequate process was provided.
To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he had a protectable liberty interest, and (2) he was not afforded minimally adequate process to protect his liberty interest. Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2015). Prisoners have an interest in avoiding hardships that are “atypical and significant . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Though the constitution itself does not create a protected interest in avoiding specific prison conditions, “a liberty
In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court found that certain conditions of segregated confinement which “standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together . . . impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context.” 545 U.S. at 224. Therefore, the conditions alleged gave rise to a protected liberty interest. Id. The Court focused on the severe limitation of human contact, that placement in segregation was indefinite, and that placement disqualified inmates from parole eligibility. Id. However, the Court found that the state’s policy regarding placement of prisoners in segregation provided sufficient procedural protection of that interest. Id. The Court reached this conclusion in part because the policy offered the inmate notice of the reasons he was being placed in segregation and an opportunity to rebut those reasons. Id. at 226-27. The policy also provided multiple levels of review of decisions recommending segregation, as well as a review thirty days after an inmate’s placement into segregation. Id. at 227.
The Fourth Circuit has held that in order to state a procedural due process claim, “inmates must first establish that an interest in avoiding onerous or restrictive confinement conditions arises from state policies or regulations (e.g., a regulation mandating periodic review).” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527
Here, Latson has alleged conditions of confinement that appear to be analogous to those found to create a liberty interest in Wilkinson. He has plausibly alleged that a policy of the Commonwealth mandated a pre-segregation hearing and that he was not provided one. He has alleged that he was not given timely opportunities to understand the reasons for his confinement or to rebut those reasons. I conclude that Latson has stated a plausible procedural due process claim, and I will deny the Motion to Dismiss to the extent that it contends that Count III fails to state a viable claim.
K. Viability of Equal Protection Claim.
The defendants seek dismissal of Count Four for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The defendants assert that Latson’s equal protection claim is fatally flawed because he has not identified any other prisoners who were treated differently than him. Instead, the defendants argue, Latson complains that
“To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” King, 825 F.3d at 220. If the plaintiff has established disparate treatment, then the court will consider whether the difference in treatment is justified under the applicable level of scrutiny. Id.
I agree with the defendants that Latson has not stated a plausible equal protection claim. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Latson, the Amended Complaint could be read to allege that non-disabled inmates were provided a pre-segregation hearing while he was not. Such an allegation would appear to be speculative at best, since the Amended Complaint does not identify any other inmates or allege any facts regarding the privileges they were afforded or whether they were similarly situated to Latson. Because Latson has failed to plead any disparate treatment on the basis of his disability, it is unnecessary to analyze
L. Viability of First Amendment Claim.
In Count Five, Latson alleges that he exercised his constitutionally protected freedom of speech by communicating with his advocates and the Governor, and that Robichaux and Clarke retaliated against him by placing him in segregation and revoking all of his privileges after he was pardoned. He further alleges that this retaliation adversely affected the exercise of his rights because while in segregation, he could not communicate with people outside the prison, and he feared further retaliation, which had a chilling effect.
The defendants move to dismiss this count for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants contend that the Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing that Robichaux and Clarke intended to retaliate against Latson for exercising his free speech rights. They assert that because Latson was the only pardoned inmate at MCTC, their sole option for housing him separately from the other inmates was to house him solitarily. They note that more than a week passed between when Latson applied for a pardon and when he was returned to segregation following his pardon, asserting that the passage of time shows that his placement into segregation was not a retaliatory act. The defendants also argue that Latson was placed in segregation for his own protection and that by
“The
The Amended Complaint easily satisfies the first element. An inmate has a
To establish that the defendants’ alleged retaliatory action adversely affected Latson’s speech, Latson must aver facts showing that “a similarly situated person of ordinary firmness reasonably would be chilled by the government conduct in
Latson has adequately pleaded this element. He has alleged that following his pardon, when he was no longer a VDOC responsible inmate but was simply awaiting transfer to AdvoServ, he was subjected to severe conditions that are used to punish inmates for disciplinary infractions. He has alleged that the defendants stripped him of all of his privileges and not only housed him in a cell by himself, but deprived him of any kind of stimulus. Though I do not yet know what the evidence will show, it is difficult to imagine a legitimate reason for depriving a pardoned former inmate of things like books or his music player. A jury could conclude that the alleged retaliatory acts would chill the speech of a reasonable person in Latson’s circumstances.
Latson must also show that but for his exercise of his
M. Eleventh Amendment Immunity from ADA Claim.
The defendants contend that the
After Constantine was decided, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). In Georgia, a paraplegic state inmate asserted various claims against the state, including claims for money damages under Title II of the ADA. Id. at 156. The plaintiff had “alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [his] disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs.” Id. at 157.
Finding that these allegations plausibly stated violations of both the
on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the
Fourteenth Amendment ; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate theFourteenth Amendment , whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.
Id. In accord with the Supreme Court’s instruction, I will apply this framework to analyze whether the
In his ADA claim, Latson contends that the defendants failed to accommodate his disabilities and denied him benefits and services because of his disabilities by (1) placing him or allowing him to remain in solitary confinement for extended periods, (2) denying him social interaction and other stimulus, (3) placing him in a generalized, non-accommodating correctional setting, and (4) denying him reasonable standards of hygiene. Latson asserts that he was placed in
With the exception of his placement in a generalized, non-accommodating correctional setting, these allegations overlap with Latson’s
I conclude that Latson’s ADA claim is based on alleged conduct that, if true, violated the
N. Qualified Immunity as to § 1983 Claims.
The defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Latson’s
Qualified immunity “shields government officials from liability for civil damages, provided that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
A court deciding the applicability of qualified immunity must determine “whether a constitutional violation occurred” and “whether the right violated was clearly established.” Tobey, 706 F.3d at 385. Where a plaintiff “(1) allege[s] a violation of a right (2) that is clearly established at the time of the violation,” a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds must be denied. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2012).
I have concluded that Counts One, Two, Three, and Five of the Amended Complaint allege plausible violations of constitutional rights. I must now attempt to define the specific rights alleged to have been violated and determine whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the events alleged in the
Regarding Count One, a prisoner has an
These rights were clearly established at the time of the events described in the Amended Complaint. Because Latson has claimed that several conditions of confinement combined to deprive him of the single, identifiable human need of mental health and sanity, it is difficult to define the rights at issue any more narrowly at this stage without improperly importing the specific facts of this case into the definition of the rights allegedly violated. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (noting that “courts must take care not to define a case’s context in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions”); Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, N.C., 789 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that for a right to have been clearly
As to Count Two, the specific right at issue is defined as “the right of prisoners to receive adequate medical care and to be free from officials’ deliberate indifference to their known medical needs.” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 236. That right, as noted by the Fourth Circuit, has been clearly established for many years. Id. Therefore, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two.
Count Three alleges that the individual defendants violated Latson’s
III.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
- The Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 93, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
- The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Marion Correctional Treatment Center, which is DISMISSED as a defendant;
- The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count Four;
- Counts Six and Seven are DISMISSED as to defendants Robichaux, Jarvis, and Clarke in their official capacities;
- The Commonwealth of Virginia is DISMISSED as a defendant; and
- The Motion to Dismiss on all other grounds is DENIED.
ENTER: April 20, 2017
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge