Williams v. Benjamin

WILLIAMS, Sylvester Emerson

Plaintiff-Appellant, BENJAMIN, Captain, Lieber

Clarence Institution; Shirley J.

Correctional Lieutenant,

Tomlin, Lieber Correctional

Institution, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-7122. Appeals,

United States Court

Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 1995.

Decided March

OPINION MOTZ, Judge: DIANA GRIBBON Circuit prisoner’s appeal This involves a claim that correctional officers violated constitution- mace, rights they sprayed al when him with him in confined restraints on and, refusing bare bed frame metal while mace, him allow to wash off the continued the hours, confinement for more than with- providing out him the benefit of medical care a or the use of toilet.

I. pro se in an complaint and affidavit claim, support Sylvester filed in of his Emer- Williams, son an inmate at the Lieber Cor- Ridgeville, rectional Institution South Carolina, following facts. De- related the On 27, 1991, Shirley cember defendant J. Tom- lin, officer, in- a Lieber correctional became disagreement in a inmate volved with James Pleskac, confined, Williams, who like unit. segregation administrative the. Tomlin threaten to mace Williams heard Along Pleskac. with Pleskac and five other inmates, by protested this Williams threat throwing water out of his cell’s food service Fairey, Fairey, W. Gaston ARGUED: stop window. Tomlin ordered the inmates to Mills, P.A., Columbia, Parise South Car- & and to remove his then ordered Williams Stone, olina, Appellant. for Isaac McDuffie arm from food service window. When Stone, Columbia, III, Lewis, Reeves & South why, an- Williams asked Tomlin instructed Carolina, Appellees. for ON BRIEF: Ro- spray officer mace other correctional Romosca, Mills, Christopher chelle L. J. Williams, him in chest and face. hitting Columbia, Mills, P.A., Fairey, & South Parise in the incident The other inmates involved Lohr, Carolina, Appellant. Amy Dare for were also maced. Lewis, Stone, Columbia, & Reeves South Carolina, Appellees. concede, once the the defendant officers As maced, “immediately were all ceased inmates MICHAEL, HAMILTON, and Before (sic) began Williams at once there actions.” MOTZ, Judges. Circuit burning “hollering in from the mace,” “pleaded Tomlin for a part by with Lt. part Affirmed reversed refused, allegedly Tomlin inform- opinion. Judge wrote the shower.” published MOTZ Williams, joined. ing “you get shower will not opinion, Judge in which MICHAEL food today.” [Williams’] Tomlin then “locked Judge concurred in the HAMILTON all window and turned off the water judgment separate concurring service and wrote a cell.”1 opinion. [his] having through open the cell door. the individu- without 1. A solid metal door secures each of cells; win- its own metal al this door contains food service window also has The food service bars, dow, is covered vertical which is service door Once the smaller food door. opening at the bottom of the window. closed, horizontal completely within "sealed” inmate enough trays opening large food to slide later, Captain eight Ten minutes defendant Clar- after he had suffered in this manner Benjamin approached ence Williams’ cell “given hours was Williams shower and “strange looking gun” with a and ordered medical attention.” Williams to come to the food service window. acknowledge The defendant officials complied and without incident was Williams was maced and confined placed in The other handcuffs. inmates were four-point restraints on a bare steel bed similarly handcuffed resistance or They frame for more than hours. offer cuffed, protest. As Williams was he dispute no evidence to assertions again asked to be allowed to wash the mace opportu- he asked for and was denied an face, eyes, body. Benjamin from his himself, nity to wash that mace fumes request, responding refused the cell, fumigated from his and that he was “your problem.” mace was [Williams’] However, permitted never to use a toilet. Benjamin instructed other officers to take (and officials assert that Williams mattress, everything, including Williams’ bed the other inmates confined in the same man- out of his cell. He then ordered three offi- ner) precipitated macing and confinement place cers to in four-point by throwing cups of unidentified foul-smell- on the metal bed frame. This involved se- ing liquids at Tomlin and another officer. curing Williams to the metal bed frame with The defendants further assert that accor- handcuffs attached to leg his wrists and Depart- dance with a written South Carolina ankles, shackles attached to his so that (SCDC) policy, pris- ment of Corrections Williams was immobilized. While officers on’s medical director authorized the use of restraints, placed “plead- Williams he restraints, four-point a nurse checked to de- Benjamin ed” with for medical attention and applied termine that the restraints were eyes for a shower because his skin and were properly, and a corrections officer monitored burning Benjamin respond- from the mace. every the restrained inmates fifteen minutes. ed, nothing wrong you.” “there’s with After pro complaint, outlining his se after four-point Williams was secured in the re- allegations, alleged above factual straints, again his cell door and window were Eighth the defendants violated his locked. The other inmates were also se- right Amendment to be free from cruel and cured, incident, punishment right unusual and his under the straints. Williams and the other inmates deprived Fourteenth Amendment not to be kept restraints continuous- liberty process. without due The defen- (The ly for the next hours. record is answer, alia, denying, dants filed an inter any concerning silent as to other facts “any rights constitutional of the Plaintiff inmates.) confinement of the other been violated.” ha[d] The defendants then confinement, During eight-hour summary judgment, entirely moved for based permitted Williams was not to wash the mace argument complaint on the that Williams’ face, eyes, from his or skin. He was “never failed to state cause of action under the any provided opportunity to use the toilet Eighth response Amendment. to that Furthermore, during the entire time.” he motion, Williams filed affidavit in which “was forced to inhale chemical munitions he detailed the factual un- above assertions fumes” from the mace and was not “checked der oath. [personnel] during [he] hours “body magistrate judge was restrained.” Williams’ felt as if it The recommended that fumes,” summary judgment granted was on fire because of the chemical to defen- First, pain suffering regard Eighth which caused “intense and dants. with to the claim, whole time he was chained to the bed.” Amendment he found Williams’ “claim alleges great unnecessary that he “suffered with or [was] excessive force sim- difficulty pain inhaling ply supported by and immense while evidence in the Second, judge magistrate the chemical munitions.” The mace caused record.” con- burning eyes.” Only allegation “intense and that the four- cluded Williams’ Throwing liquid objects longer possible. his cell. outside of the cell is no subjective imposed component. are enti point restraints were violation Officials true, appropriate quell if policy, even failed estab- tled use force to the SCDC lish a Due Process claim. The district court disturbances. Because officials must act “in report haste, magistrate judge’s adopted pressure, frequently under with summary granted judg- chance,” recommendation and luxury of a out second deliberate ment to defendants. sufficiently rigorous indifference Albers, 312, Whitley v. standard. U.S.

II. 1084, 320, 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 S.Ct. (1986). Rather, circumstances, in these Eighth prohibits Amendment Eighth order to make out an Amendment punish infliction of “cruel and unusual Const, claim, prisoner must demonstrate that offi amend. VIII. It not ments.” U.S. applied “maliciously cials force and sadistical also only outlaws excessive sentences but very causing ly purpose for the harm.” protects inmates inhumane treatment from 320-21, (quoting imprisoned. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1085 and conditions while Determi (2d Glide, 1028, Eighth Amendment nation whether the Johnson Cir.), subjec requires analysis of has been violated (1973)). objective components. See Wilson

tive 38 L.Ed.2d Seiter, Specifically, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 Although asserting an an inmate analysis in necessitates Eighth Amendment required force claim is thus to meet excessive prison official acted quiry as to whether the demanding regard this more standard sufficiently culpable of mind with a state subjective component (subjective component) and whether the de analysis, objective compo privation suffered or inflicted on of an excessive force claim is less de nent sufficiently (objective inmate serious was manding necessary than that for conditions- with component). What must established inadequate or care of-confinement medical according component regard to each “varies objective This is so because the com claims. alleged to of the constitutional the nature Eighth is ponent of all Amendment claims McMillian, v. 503 U.S. violation.” Hudson responsive ‘contemporary “contextual and to ” 998, 1, 5, 995, 156 112 117 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Hudson, decency.’ U.S. standards of 503 (1992). Estelle, 8, (quoting 112 at 429 at 1000 S.Ct. 290). 103, at 97 at Since “routine U.S. S.Ct. example, an inmate For when claims “society and part prison is of life discomfort” provide to him with prison officials failed that un expect prisoners will have that does adequate or that conditions medical care care,” in to health order qualified access to constitute cruel and unusual confinement objective component of con demonstrate pris punishment, he must demonstrate that claims or medical care ditions-of-confinement acted “deliberate indiffer on officials with depri prisoners must demonstrate “extreme” Eighth an to state Amend ence” order needs. neglect “serious” medical vations or Gamble, v. 429 U.S. ment claim. See Estelle Hudson, 8-9, at 112 S.Ct. at 999- 291, 97, 104, 251 L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. 50 when, here, contrast, a prisoner 1000. In as (1976). situations, of these the sub both “maliciously and have that officials asserts of more jective component requires proof harm, to con sadistically force cause use[d] negligence than malice. than mere but less decency always are temporary standards “the appropriate standard is because This 9, 112 (empha 1000 at S.Ct. at violated.” Id. with responsibility provide inmates State’s added). Williams, assert prisoner, A like sis living or conditions] care decent [or force need and use of ing malicious sadistic competing ad dinarily conflict does not with caused “extreme Hudson, show that such force 503 U.S. at. ministrative concerns.” pain “significant” or deprivation” or “serious” However, an inmate at 998. when S.Ct. Id. of action. injury a cause here, to establish claims, as Williams does de him, necessary proof of more than is All force on he officials used excessive injury. Id. pain or higher minimis standard establish forced to meet 762 determining entire acted

The defendant officers’ whether officials Eighth argument factors, maliciously sadistically. Amendment is directed at These subjective component; they Albers, maintain that originally Whitley set out “their not be as conduct could characterized U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d pain’ an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of (1986),include: jective component was not pain minimal analysis. They The derogation officers do not standard significant enough suffered, do necessary assert that Williams’ question Eighth but only to meet the amount of Amendment.” satisfy relates pain ob relationship sonably perceived cials,” amount of force ^[1] the need for severity ^[4] of a forceful between “any application used, [3] by the efforts that need response.” responsible the threat “rea made to force, temper ^[2] offi subjective component analysis. to the Hudson, at U.S. at Thus, present purposes, they apparently (citations omitted). The absence of serious concede that there is least an of fact issue relevant, dispositive, is a but not addi- regard objective component. to the subjec- factor to tional be considered appears This concession wise. Mankind has analysis. “Whitley tive Id. these fac- With lasting devised some tortures that leave mind, application each tors” we examine Indeed, physical injury.2 evidence of we in turn. force objec specifically recognized have component tive can be met “the A. itself,” if “enduring even an inmate has no injury.” Taylor, Norman 25 F.3d was, first of force (4th Cir.1994) (en banc), 1263 n. 4 course, deployment of mace. The defen - -, 130 dant officers maintain that the use of mace also, L.Ed.2d 791 See Jordan v. justified because and the other Gardner, (9th 1521, 1526, 986 F.2d Cir. liq threw foul-smelling inmates unidentified 1993) (en banc) (majority agree and dissent them, creating uids at a health risk. The psychic pain prisoners female suffer appeared rely court argu district on this subjected when cross-gender pat down it “determine^] ment when that Defendants’ objective component). search satisfies protect necessary actions them and event, the because officers do contest not prisoners from the health risks associated objective component, the but direct instead with the Plaintiffs conduct.” Williams cor subjective justification then* the attention to rectly points considering out that in whether force, for the use of we do not further ad summary judg are the defendants entitled Smith, dress the issue. See Shakka v. 71 ment, accept the court cannot as true defen (4th 162, Cir.1995) (“We F.3d 167 n. 3 do not (the version of dants’ the facts inmates threw objective component address the “foul-smelling liquids” guards) at the —but Eighth analysis ap Amendment it because (the accept as must true Williams’ version pears prison that the officials have conceded See, guards). threw the inmates water at purposes appeal for the of this the evi that Shakka, Nevertheless, e.g., 71 165. F.3d at question dence is sufficient to create a of fact account, by Williams’ own the inmates threw issue.”)3 this on obey at Tomlin water and refused to Turning subjective Applying command to desist. then the first Whit to the factor, component, Supreme ley guards’ directed decision to use some Court has quell justifiable. that several factors should force to be balanced disturbance was reason, wary satisfy objective 2. For this should be of find- Williams had failed to courts com ing pain "merely'' uses of force that inflict but ponent, obligation Williams was under no minimis, injury be- to be de and therefore response with come forward in evidence to show yond Eighth requiring justification under the had or that he suffered sufficient Amendment. satisfy component. See Jones v. Owens- 712, Corning Fiberglas Corp., 7 69 F.3d 719 n. Moreover, officers did not move because (4th Cir.1995). summary judgment ground on the

763 per Peyton, trant inmate.” v. Landman 370 guards’ When the “reasonable (4th Cir.1966), prisoners 2 ception” posed of the threat F.2d 138 & n. cert. (the denied, Whitley factor in the examined third 87 18 is S.Ct. (1967). analysis) it evident that some use of Bailey, is more L.Ed.2d 1367 See also 736 justified. Tomlin the other force was and application F.2d A limited of at 968-69. they targets of guards perceived may mace more be “much humane effec liquids. certainly not foul-smelling It is un tive than a flesh to flesh confrontation with products throw Soto, known for inmates to waste an inmate.” 744 F.2d at 1262. More See, Maass, jailors. e.g., their LeMaire v. over, washing area prompt maced (9th Cir.1993). Hence, 1444 even 12 F.3d body usually provide will immediate relief events, accepting version Furthermore, from a limit pain. Id. because the inmates were guards’ perception that relatively ed use of mace constitutes “mild” reasonable, liquids was throwing “foul” force, response compared to other forms they reasonably perceive conduct such could application initial mace indicates significant more threat. posing “tempered” response by prison officials. Thus, balance, analysis of second on Analysis and fourth of the second Whitley fourth factors also leads us con Whitley complicated. factors more It is not err in clude that the district court did “it recognized that a violation of generally law, the initial deciding, as matter of officials cruel of mace did constitute mace, gas agents tear other chemical use or punishment. and unusual necessary quantities greater than or for purpose pain.” infliction of Soto the sole (7th Cir.1984), 1260, 1270 B. Dickey, 744

v. F.2d denied, 1846,85 U.S. macing, after offi Ten minutes (1985). reason, For this we L.Ed.2d four-point placed restraints. cers gas closely scrutinized the use of tear have society, we like civilized would our Soto, (a gas, tear mace trade name for chaining a human to a believe that 1261) See, facilities. F.2d at correctional position spread-eagled metal frame in a bed (4th Turner, Bailey 736 F.2d 963 e.g., v. Unfortunately, necessary. would never be Cir.1984); Loving, F.2d Greear v. approved is. Courts have thus sometimes (4th Cir.1976). because, even when This is restraints, as a the limited use used, weapons “possess properly such inher resort, forms disci last when other ently capable of dangerous characteristics Ellis, See, pline e.g., failed. have Stenzel inju perhaps irreparable causing serious and Cir.1990). (8th 423, 428-29 916 F.2d Porter, 737 ry to victim.” Slakan (4th Cir.1984), cert. imposi initial The need here for the 84 L.Ed.2d not as evident tion of restraints is Accordingly, although per it is not se uncon application need the initial of as was the for pris spray at guards to mace acknowledge stitutional for mace. defendant officers The cells, necessary maced, in it is that, oners confined their all “inmates immedi upon circumstances, “totality of the Arguably, examine the ately [sic] ceased there actions.” provocation, gas amount of including the the closed the with the food service windows used, gas cells, for the purposes and the which guards in the could inmates sealed their validity the of the use any reasonably perceive [to] determine] used threat longer and, in the environment.” Bai gas of tear other inmates from or the Williams also, thus, at Justice v. ley, F.2d 969. See was not imposition 736 of the restraints the (4th Cir.1987) (en Dennis, F.2d 383 834 necessary. banc), grounds, 490 U.S. vacated on other Nevertheless, has Supreme ex- the Court (1989). 982 104 L.Ed.2d necessity guards’ ac- plained the the inquiry.

However, proper focus tions is not mace can be constitu at 106 “prevent Whitley, 475 U.S. at S.Ct. quantities in tionally used small Instead, the evidence on whether we focus escapes” to control “recalci- riots and or c. supports guards the inference that the wan- tonly punished at Williams. Id. areWe thus left to consider the guards’ at S.Ct. 1085-86. The decision to issue, confining most difficult whether restraints, itself, impose sup- does not four-point eight restraints for port an such inference. When the officers hours, permitting him off to wash decided to confine Williams the re- mace, use toilet or receive medical atten straints, only elapsed tion, minutes since had constitute an could begun, had disturbance Williams was still violation. officers do not claim that (or the other also “hollering,” inmates who were and it was not obvious that the hours) eight anything once restrained did disturbance had ended. view of these four-point confined in that ne restraints facts, undisputed we cannot conclude that They application do cessitated of force. was no there “need” for the inmates, not even assert that the while held guards or that force were unreasonable restraints, verbally or assaulted apparent imposition their belief that the guards. threatened four-point necessary restraints was to ob- Furthermore, Furthermore, severity “order tain and control.” al- to the injury, or closing while the officers though the food service windows point any out Williams did not suffer may necessary have been all that was documented as a result stop liquids the inmates from throwing out- confinement, they any do not offer evidence cells, side their be inmates cannot allowed to counter Williams’ sworn statement to dictate whether their cell windows remain although “hollering pain” he was open or closed. begging permitted off to wash mace, they permit did not him to wash off Analysis of the and fourth second for more than hours.4 A of 5.5 total Whitley imposition factors —whether (CS grams o-chlorobenzyli- mace of the or rationally restraints was related to malonitrile) sprayed dene into cells. the need for force and evidenced effort much, Although this does not sound like one “temper” severity response— medical text indicates that animal based on apply also indicates that the decision studies an “estimated lethal dose” of CS is restraints, alone, standing suggest does not Sullivan, “only” grams. John B. Jr. & malicious sadistic intent. restraints Such Gary Krieger, R. Hazardous Materials Toxi undoubtedly pose significant threat of (1992). also, cology Spain See v. Procu See, physical injury. e.g., Washington v. nier, (9th Cir.1979) (phar 226-27, 110 Harper, 494 U.S. at expert macological gas testified that “tear (“Physical restraints ... can have serious cell”); can be lethal confines of a small physical side resisting effects when used on a Reynolds, & Howard Hu Preston Tear Gas- inmate....”). However, imposition of such Agent Harassing Weap or Toxic Chemical seemingly a not uncommon on, 262 JAMA commands, step, if “next” verbal show of sum, record, present on the force, mace, controlling are ineffective in only only “need” force and the “threat” prisoners. perceived justifying the defendants ex reasons, For these we conclude that cannot tended confinement was that occasioned impose the initial decision to original throwing liquids. They offer straints, itself, in a or ma- dispute evidenced sadistic no to that evidence Williams’ affidavit punish licious intent to long Williams. his confinement without able to Permitting prisoner exposure, 4. who maced to five has been water within minutes of ensure to eyes Moreover, the decontamination.") wash required chemical out of his munitions appropriate the policy governing the use of prisoners permitted fact that were to wash off agents Program prisons. chemical in federal shortly mace after its been a has Statement, 5566.04, Justice, Department CPD of significant upholding factor in the use mace. of 10(d) (June 13, § Federal Bureau of Prisons See, Soto, e.g., 744 F.2d at 1266. ("The 1994) eyes arc to be with cold flushed

765 legitimate refusing pain. purpose ceive for to “immense” of mace caused wash off the Nevertheless, denying to him maintain allow Williams wash and the defendants eight attention, particularly for when his con to confine Williams the decision him wash or to permitting to ex hours without lasted for such an finement restraints constitutionally permissi guards was a period use toilet time. After the had tended of Maybe of official discretion.” ble “exercise imposed prisoners, the the restraints on the Certainly prison administra we afford so. immediacy of was at an end. the disturbance what is neces to determine circumstance, tors “discretion” unnecessary in In such a security.” internal sary “prison’s for the throughout pro pain fliction continued of at 106 Whitley, 475 at S.Ct. U.S. period clearly infer longed supports time an when, here, Moreover, prison administra as acting guards punish, ence that to good apply in a faith effort initially force tors quell the -See rather than to disturbance. long restraint discipline, (4th “[h]ow to maintain Cobb, F.2d 789 United States v. of calls for the exercise may be continued Cir.1990) (“[P]unitive intent a defen behind offi part prison good judgment on may be inferred when the dant’s use force Burton, cials.” Williams reasonably legitimate to a force is not related (11th denied, Cir.1991), 505 U.S. cert. nonpunitive governmental objective.”) (quota (1992). 1208, 112 L.Ed.2d 877 S.Ct. omitted), tions 498 U.S. However, specifically Supreme has Court (1991). 758, 112 L.Ed.2d 778 S.Ct. us that “deference” reminded present reason The record at contains no not prison administrators “does afforded to permit guards’ to Williams to for the refusal taken in bad from review actions insulate wash, not in that Williams was no evidence legitimate purpose.” no Whit and for faith justifi- alleges, and pain” the “immense he 1085. Def at at ley, S.Ct. U.S. period of time cation for the extended give them does not erence to officials left in the restraints. The Williams was to inmates. See license torture constitutional summary judgment on this record award of Utah, 130, 136,25 L.Ed. 99 U.S. Wilkerson precedent. It a harmful would would create any inmate causes a establish whenever that at this must be remembered It something by throwing water or disturbance upon determine are called stage we not obey a guard, and refuses to similar at sufficient evidence whether there was command, fear guards can—without further actually faith acted bad officials violating spray an in- Constitution — Instead, our legitimate purpose. or for no then with mace and confine mate in the face evidence, present inquiry is whether for extended him in light most favorable in the viewed permitting him to period time without Williams, inference of supports a “reliable toilet, fumigating the use the wash or pain.” Whit infliction wantonness cell, allowing him benefit and without 1085. When at at ley, 475 S.Ct. Although the kind. medical attention restraints, guards placed Williams may ultimately be held conduct here officers’ screaming pain allegedly he was Amendment, we are violate the immobilized, face. Once mace “burned” his record, junc- at this that the unable rulé water to begged pleaded ture, light favorable to in the most viewed guards refused off mace. The wash Williams, infer- support a “reliable does not permit off the mace wash pain.” Whit- infliction of the wanton ence of himself, he would him that informing wash 322,106 at 1085. ley, was “his that the mace get a shower and problem.” Williams’ version Under arguments own defendants’ facts, on personnel checked no medical so. why this is The defendant demonstrate helpless and and he was left condition compli rely their asserted heavily on officers hours. immense Department of Carolina ance with the South (SCDC) 1500.12, Policy govern Although should be Corrections great deference restraints, as evi- four-point ing use of officials, con- the it is difficult to prison afforded Leathers, good in they and with- the dence that acted faith restraints. Miller v. Cf. (4th Cir.1990) Policy (guard’s out Pursuant 1500.12: viola malice. regulations tion supports the “inference” applied will Mechanical restraints never intent), of bad punishment discipline, as and will and/or L.Ed.2d 1100 precaution only against be used as a es- transfer; during cape prior to and and to argument The critical flaw in the officers’ self-injury prevent or to oth- inmate point. compliance is in second their Their ers. 1500.12, Policy with rather than uncon-

troverted, hotly disputed. is The officers argue four-point that the use of for restraints only will Four-point restraints be used as a eight supervised hours was and authorized physical prevent last harm or resort required by Policy. the Williams swears that others, danger to or and then him/herself he received no medical attention until after only order/approval physi- of a upon the and, although the restraints were removed cian. .Under no circumstances will such provide the sup- medical records some applied security restraints be enhance port arguments, they for the defendants’ do facility, prevent escape from the facili- support Policy not their that claim was ty, punishment. or for Restraints will be complied respects. in signifi- with all Most longer prevails, used no than the condition insist, cantly, the officers their Answer to beyond period and use of restraints complaint, that Williams’ confinement by approved four hours must be long period the restraints for a was neces- Physician Depart- Medical Chief for the sary danger “to defend themselves from the designee. ment or medical staff his/her imposed by plaintiff.” Williams claims by prescribing phy- addition to review the punish the restraints were maintained to him sician, any inmate so restrained will be the 1500.12), (expressly Policy by forbidden subject monitoring during continuous imposed prevent “as a last resort” to restraint, period and the need for (as harm, escape, physical injury the Poli- will restraint be reevaluated at 15-minute directs). cy Williams offered some evidentia- A log intervals. medical and observation ry support for his claim that the maintained, of such evaluations will be employed “last were as a re- (The (emphasis original). quotation above protection sort” device: memorandum au- Policy is from the version of in effect at Benjamin thored defendant and dated incident; this time of has been modi- 10,1991, September just three months before slightly, substantively, fied but not since that incidents issue this That case. time.) anytime memorandum directs that an inmate (1) compliance officer, The officers maintain that throws a substance at “immedi- ” Policy good with ately question evidences their faith and and witkout medi- (2) they complied the record that cal “four-point establishes director is to be called Policy. point with the The officers’ restraining first has order” and that “[o]nee this order Policy not, course, obtained, merit. 1500.12 it must be adhered to and the requirement compliance constitutional and so placed inmate must be necessarily sum, (emphasis original). it would not demonstrate straints.” constitutionally.5 principal the defendants acted factual basis for the officers’ Nevertheless, compliance Policy argument they with the in good acted faith— powerful provide would their compliance Policy evidence with the in dis- —is tempered pute. severely posi- force was and that This undermines their good imposing summary judgment acted in faith in tion proper. officers reason, guards 5. For same even if the physically this was in and that he was vulnera- Policy respects, macing, found to have violated the in all ble after the and then left him position, this would not mean that would auto- hours in that care kind, prevail matically strongly on his it would indicate that However, swears, if, guards sadistically maliciously claim. as Williams intended to him, guards totally knowing unnecessary pain suffering. immobilized that he cause Williams

767 Moreover, hearing testimony “approximately from nine- legal authority the of- them, witnesses,” cite, ty admitting and “into evidence supporting than ficers rather exhibits, sum- inappropriateness approximately 150 which consisted indicates the also pages at The officers of mary judgment this time. several thousand of material.” Carlson, appellate F.Supp. in which 611 point to three cases Bruscino v. 654 (S.D.111.1987). Posner, Judge of four- have held the for the Sev- courts period Circuit, for evi- point restraints an extended enth twice noted “extensive dentiary hearings” clearly not violate the Amendment. and relied on time did (9th Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 a narrative LeMaire v. record evidence of “remarkable See Burton, Cir.1993); F.2d “[s]ince of violence” conclude (11th denied, Cir.1991), principal murders and armed as- cert. victims of inmates, penitentiary in are 120 L.Ed.2d saults Marion (1992); Carlson, procedures plaintiffs 854 F.2d that the describe Bruscino (7th Cir.1988), very punishment are the cruel and unusual procedures protecting 105 L.Ed.2d 701 that are them from factually by distinguishable prisoners.” fellow In addition to murderous attacks Bruscino, respects important in at 164-65. See also from the case at hand 854 F.2d Williams, plaintiff (upholding at (e.g., involved a who 943 F.2d none permitted strength wash off the on the of factu- lengthy maced and confinement lengthy findings during con- prior imposition of a al his incarceration mace restraints), eighty-four four-point plaintiff in there is convicted of finement had been why in- charges violating prison regulations, these even more fundamental reason major seventy-five The basis “as- cluding not assist defendants. violations for cases do threats, fac- sault, obey, all was an extensive insubordina- three decisions failure to developed tion, intentionally security in the trial court.6 creating tual record hazard riot.”) inciting to and in appellate each to the decision Critical to the holdings of evidence as necessary case was wealth in Le- Similarly to the inmate-plaintiff Maire, Bruscino, or the dangerousness of was evidence appel- prison. Each population officials, subjecting entire in prison heavily on this evidence to court relied late plaintiffs lengthy confinement challenged justify for the extensive the need restraints, complied with correctional had the reasonableness of the confinement provided prison- or otherwise regulations from the in- perception LeMaire, threat officers’ safeguards. In adequate ers with LeMaire, example, in mate-plaintiffs. For upheld the use of four- Ninth Circuit con- in the district court the record made point only imposed “when strict “meticulously evidence documented” tained regulations.” existing prison compliance with viola- egregious “numerous plaintiffs LeMaire, appellate at 1460. repeated including bru- rules” tions find- “agree[d] district court’s with the court guards prisoners, and other on tal assaults following these prison was not ing that the by the Ninth Circuit which was found approved district regulations” and so justify lengthy confinement required it injunction to the extent court’s LeMaire, 12 F.3d 1447-49. restraints. regula- to the prison’s strict adherence “the Indeed, com- specifically the Ninth Circuit already Id. they have established.” tions by the impressed “most that it was mented Bruscino, particularly Judge Posner docu- this case prison records extensive finding that court’s upon the district marked at 1462. Id. menting LeMaire’s misconduct.” in accordance maintained restraints were adopted “procedures that the Bruscino, held evidentia- the trial court Brus- of violence.” days, a crescendo twenty-eight the wake of hearings nearly ry ("[Tjhe dis- portions 12 F.3d at 1450-51 to its decision. Circuit vacated when the Ninth 6. Even provided with an excellent court has us granted trict complete injunctive relief dis- broad permits to de- LeMaire, which us acknowledged only factual record trict court appeal recent clarification based on cide this court's factual to the district its need defer law.”). controlling importance record findings of the factual but the cino, Similarly important 854 F.2d at 164. to III. the Eleventh Circuit Williams was that remaining The appeal issue on is whether supported] “the record the [district court’s] summary judgment properly was granted on adequate precautions decision that tak- were Williams’ claim rights that his Due Process safeguard en prisoner’s physical to the well filings were violated. In his mag- before the

being through monitoring constant and ex- judge, istrate Williams included an assertion by personnel.” aminations rights that those had been when violated the Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575. comply Policy defendants failed to with Policy provi- 1500.12. course, incorporated 1500.12 comparable

Of we have no eviden- of a (commonly sions federal consent decree tiary granting summary judg- record. Decree”) referred as the “Nelson Consent magistrate judge ment the neither nor the that the State had entered into resolve an weigh court did or district could evidence Leeke, Plyler inmate class action suit. See Moreover, findings make of fact. while 82-876-2, (D.S.C. No. 1986 WL 84459 March an affidavit Williams submitted and several 1986). concluded, magistrate judge opposing summary judgment, exhibits in our addressing whether the defendants review of the record indicates that defen- in fact Policy, had violated the “the that use dant officers offered no exhibits or affidavits restraints or chemical munitions in support of their motion. Thus the eviden- is not violation of federal or stat- law tiary record before the district court when it ute. The mere policy fact that institutional considered the summary judg- defendants’ sets forth standards the use of these sparse.7 ment motion was When record things provide does not a claim for relief developed, may is further it be that Williams § under 1983.” prove cannot that he was confined in the alleges. may he manner It be that there was Although argument Williams’ on this applied, need for force that was that point absolutely clear, is not apparently he reasonably perceived officers a continu- violating maintains that in Policy 1500.12and ing it, justifying threat that the extent and necessarily Decree, Consent Nelson severity of the confinement keeping were in defendant officers violated both substan his force, lengthy the need for procedural tive and rights. Due Process As in way confinement was executed tem- claim process his of a substantive due pered severity, its and that the amount violation, it is now well established could, mace used not have caused immense Eighth primary Amendment “serves as the However, pain. on this record we cannot so protection source substantive to convicted juncture, hold. At this surrounding the facts prisoners,” and the Due Process Clause af hour heavily confinement are dis- prisoner fords a greater pro no substantive puted. present, At the evidence as to “than tection does the Cruel and Unusual confinement, lengthy while suffer- Punishments Whitley, Clause.” at mace, ing the effects when “viewed Accordingly, S.Ct. at 1088. light plaintiff, most favorable will Williams’ substantive Due Process claim adds support a reliable inference of wantonness nothing Eighth to his Amendment claim. pain.” Whitley, the infliction of at Accordingly, procedural 106 S.Ct. at process 1085. His due claim cannot grant summary judgment on this disposed quickly. of as appar- claim error. ently Policy was provided claims that 1500.12 him recognized The defendant concluding officers seem have special the basis for measures deficiency albeit, this late. too After the district required to control Williams—even if his — granted summary judgment court defendants past category conduct was not of inmate appeal and after Williams had noted his and filed LeMaire, LeMaire's. See However, 12 F.3d at 1447-49. brief, appellate the defendants filed a motion given opportuni- been has supplement in the district court to on record Indeed, ty challenge this evidence. appeal disciplinary with evidence as to Williams’ granting even considered the district court in history while Licbcr. The district court denied summary judgment. might provide the motion. This evidence well poses atypicai right punish- significant from straints liberty to be free with a that, hardship. ment Total immobilization reason, Poli- guards’ major violation this surely disruption this straints “work[ed] any “process,” con- cy, providing —, him in Id. at his environment.” 115 S.Ct. at procedural due a violation of the Indeed, stituted protections 2301. limitations and rights guaranteed by the process Fourteenth Policy in 1500.12 and consent decree of- response, the defendant Amendment. “atypical significant” demonstrate the Policy argue do not that the does not ficers imposition nature restraints. liberty provide Williams with a interest or Additionally, argu Williams has a forceful Policy provide cannot that a violation Policy ment that 1500.12 and the Nelson Instead, §a claim. defen- the basis for 1983 “unmistakably Consent Decree are written in there has argument dants’ sole is that been mandatory” language and create an enforce Policy. explained As no violation of the expectation part able on the inmate’s that he above, wrong asserting are in the defendants placed four-point will not be in restraints that, record, it has on this been established predicates.9 absent enumerated substantive Policy they complied 1500.12. Be- that regulations provide four-point that re dispute a material exists as to whether cause imposed except straints will not be as a last Policy, we must violated the ad- the officers harm, prevent resort to and with medical of it Williams’ claim that a violation dress interest, approval. (and Decree) liberty To create a such provides the Nelson Consent mandatory language required. See Wash process procedural a due claim.8 the basis for 210, ington Harper, v. 494 U.S. S.Ct. - Conner, v. Williams relies on Sandin 1036, (1990). 1028, 178 108 L.Ed.2d For the 2293, 2300, -, -, 115 S.Ct. 132 U.S. reasons, persuasive ar above Williams has a (1995). Supreme There the L.Ed.2d 418 gument regulations protect that the create a holding Court reaffirmed its well-established liberty merely ed interest. We note may under certain circum that “States arguments persuasive are liberty are stances create interests which issue, deciding forceful without because protected by Nev the Due Process Clause.” accept position, even if we he still cannot his ertheless, that state-creat the Court advised a procedural process due violation. establish liberty generally ed interests “will be limited which, from restraint while not freedom procedural a We decline find unexpect exceeding an the sentence such process violation in case for several due this protection by rise give ed manner as to First, argu made reasons. Williams has force, Due Process of its own Clause procedural protec ment as what sort atypical imposes significant nonetheless Second, required. were restraints tions hardship on the inmate in relation (cita imposed response to a disturbance. ordinary prison life.” Id. incidents of circumstance, omitted). possib argu process is not such tions Williams has forceful Bennett, 1574, 17 F.3d le.10 See v. ment that confinement Lunsford Policy discretion. San- 8. and the Nelson Con- to control correctional officers' din, Because 1500.12 identical, at-, respects sent Decree are all material 115 S.Ct. at 2299. In this -U.S. decree, case, wholly adopt Policy we need not decide whether standing consent the State did not alone, protected liberty can create a but as a of a federal class its own accord result Dep't Kentucky Corrections v. interest. See Thompson, action suit. 454, 5, 465 n. 109 S.Ct. 1904, 5, (1989); n. 104 L.Ed.2d 1911 506 Slezak pause point gives 10.This us some it relates Evatt, (4th Cir.), 21 F.3d 595 n. 5 Simply the initial this case. because denied,-U.S.-, L.Ed.2d 130 distur- occurred soon after a of the restraints not mean that bance does indefinitely. point may time, imposed At some be Moreover, Policy implicate 1500.12 docs not entitled an so restrained would be inmate Supreme Court men- one the concerns procedural protection to ensure that his There, to some tioned Sandin. the Court noted arbitrarily liberty and ca- interest alleged liberty proliferation interests based priciously appeal, wc decline to In this regulations punish denied. language of worked to on the point (laudably) regulations exists. prisons resolve where that those created (7th Cir.1994) (2) (“[Pjredeprivation protec- claim, his and wheth- reasonably applied tions to a [cannot] er qualified the defendants are entitled to prison disturbance situation where institu- immunity on this claim. threatened.”); security tional Albers v. issue, to the respect With first in Norman (D.Or. Whitley, n. 1 F.Supp. court, banc, Taylor, sitting this en held 1982). Third, alleged even Williams has not extraordinary that “absent most circum post-deprivation his state remedies were stances, plaintiff prevail cannot on Burch, inadequate. Zinermon v. Cf. Eighth Amendment if excessive force claim 126-30, 983-86, is de minimis.” 25 F.3d (1990) (discussing significance L.Ed.2d 100 of - (4th Cir.1994), adequate procedures); post-deprivation state -, 909, 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 791 (4th Gentile, Martin v. 849 F.2d Extraordinary present circumstances are Cir.1988). When, here, possible not it is when used ... “the force ... of a sort [is] provide pre-deprivation procedural to full repugnant the ... to conscience of mankind protections emergency because of an situa- pain or properly [is] the itself such that it can tion, particular there is for a reason federal be said to constitute more than de minimis post-deprivation court to conclude that state (citations injury.” at 1263 n. 4 Id. and inter adequately protect remedies state-created omitted). quotation nal marks Zinermon, liberty interests. 494 U.S. at at (explaining 984-85 that in some case, In crystal this the record is clear circumstances, post-deprivation process is Williams suffered from the defen- adequate impracticable provide where it is to particular, dants’ In actions. affi- Williams’ pre-deprivation process). Accordingly, the davit does not contradict the clinic’s granting court district did not err in the he was notes that “OK” after he was released summary judgment defendants on Williams’ 61). (J.A. from the restraints. Process claim. Due Further, report did not back the until clinic some two weeks after the

IV. incident, and his visit was for an unrelated 61). (J.A. Therefore, reason. sum, because we reverse and remand further injury, prevail Williams suffered no on his proceedings portion the district claim, Eighth Amendment he show must judgment granting summary court’s order on “that either force used ... ... of a [was] claim that the violated officers repugnant sort to the conscience of mankind Eighth by him in retaining four- ... or the itself can [was] such that it point restraints in a cell mace-filled properly said to hours, be constitute de more than without allowing him wash off the Norman, injury.” minimis 25 F.3d at 1263 care, or providing any him mace (citations n. 4 quotation and internal marks or even use of a affirm in all toilet. We omitted). respects. other AFFIRMED IN PART AND RE- briefing, argument, The absence VERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. bearing factual on record the issue of wheth extraordinary er this case meets the circum HAMILTON, Judge, concurring Circuit exception recognized stances in Norman judgment: objective component makes the issue too dif

I judgment. event, concur I point. court’s write ficult at to resolve this only remand, emphasize further properly that on not issue is before court to examining subjective compo- addition because defendants’ sole basis for seek nent Williams’ ing summary judgment amendment claim was that Williams on eight-hour light based his subjective confinement failed component. to establish fully record, developed of a Owens-Corning Fiberglas the district court See Jones (4th Cir.1995) is free examine two issues Corp., additional n. 7 69 F.3d (1) (“ raised whether party summary judg defendants: ‘When a moves for A, objective component opponent Williams satisfied the ground ment on is not ground ground B—a respond to quired to presented America, might but did have UNITED

movant STATES Co., ”) Plaintiff-Appellee, (quoting Malhotra v. Cotter & not[.]’ (7th Cir.1989)). But, course, this failure raise the defendants’ XIANG, Defendant-Appellant. Yan preclude from Shaw ground them below does fully If record it on raising remand. No. 95-5071. remand, may developed on this issue on summary judgment appropri- well Appeals, United States Court failed to estab- ate that Williams on basis Fourth Circuit. objective component.1 lish the Argued Dec. 1995. issue, question is As to second Decided March whether, ac time of the defendants’ tions, “clearly violated estab their conduct statutory rights constitutional

lished person have would

which reasonable Fitzgerald, 457 Harlow v.

known.” 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d authority up light line re

holding see, time, periods of for

straints extended Burton,

e.g., Williams v.

(11th Cir.1991) (upholding the use of four- period twenty-eight

point restraints for hours), cert.

and a half (1992), 120 L.Ed.2d 877

may that a reasonable officer would well be actions known that defendants’ have violate

would But, reason,

rights. some the defen objective component is with the

dants —as placed qualified the defense

sue—have course, court,

immunity and of before free to visit this issue on

district court will be should it arise.2

remand summary judgment and no Contrary suggestion, dants moved for the record to the court's event, hearing held on motion. "conccde[d]" the defendants not reflect that docs genuine my here not be construed as comments should material fact the existence of a issue opinion expressing to the merits of whether objective component, as see ante at 762- as to 763; rather, satisfy objective component. can record reflects the issue— in the never raised reason—was whatever facts, objective component, express I with the one draw 2. As court. such cannot district From conceded, de- espe- opinion to the merits of defendants' the issue was the conclusion that immunity. qualified after defen- fense cially was decided since Norman

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. Benjamin

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Mar 6, 1996

Citation: 77 F.3d 756

Docket Number: 94-7122

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.