TODD KURTIN, Plаintiff and Appellant, v. BRUCE ELIEFF, Defendant and Appellant.
No. G043999
Fourth Dist., Div. Three.
Apr. 16, 2013.
215 Cal. App. 4th 455
Andersen Hilbert & Parker, M. Steven Andersen, Jeffrey N. Garland, Jason L. Satterly; Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, McKenna Long and Aldridge and Charles A. Bird for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Miller Barondess, Louis R. Miller, Daniel S. Miller; Snell & Wilmer, Richard A. Derevan, Todd E. Lundell and Andreea V. Micklis for Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, Acting P. J.—We affirm the trial court‘s judgment holding defendant Bruce Elieff liable for misstating his authority to bind a group of real estate businesses known as the “Joint Entities” in the course of agreeing to buy out his former partner, plaintiff Todd Kurtin. We affirm the trial court‘s posttrial order denying Elieff‘s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. And we affirm the trial court‘s grant of a new trial as to the issue of the precise amount of damages which Kurtin may recover.
However, as to one of Kurtin‘s causes of action—for liability under
The proper remedy for inconsistent verdicts is a new trial. (See Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1344 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 446] (Shaw) [“Inconsistent verdicts are ‘against the law,’ and the proper remedy is a new trial.“].) Accordingly, we will modify the new trial order on appeal to provide for the trial of liability under
BACKGROUND
1. The 2005 Settlement Agreement
Kurtin and Elieff had been equal partners in a series of real estate ventures in the 1990‘s, doing business under the rubric of SunCal Companies. In 2003, growing disagreements between the two led Kurtin to sue Elieff to “separate” themselves. By that time SunCal Companies had already been “transformed” into “basically” Elieff‘s company.
The litigation led to a mediation, which in turn led to a settlement agreement. The agreement, signed in August 2005, provided that Elieff was to buy out Kurtin for $48.8 million in four installment payments.
2. Default on the Payments
Elieff made the $21 million first and only installment payment for which he could be held personally responsible. The Joint Entities made the $1.8 million second installment payment for which they alone were responsible. But the Joint Entities paid only about $3.5 million of the $13.1 million third installment payment, and nothing on the final installment of $12.9 million.
Elieff had signed the settlement agreement both “individually and on behalf of the Elieff Separate Entities and the Joint Entities.” Thе agreement had provided that if there was a default in any of the last three payments, Kurtin would be “entitled to have judgment entered pursuant to
But when Kurtin sought to enforce the agreement against the Joint Entities under
Elieff opposed the attempt to enforce the agreement. He argued that the trial judge had correctly determined the Joint Entities had to be added as parties to the lawsuit before any judgment could be entered against them.
The trial judge did not address the question of whether Elieff had the authority to bind the Joint Entities. However, in opposition to a writ petition filed in this court by Kurtin contesting the trial court‘s order, Elieff pointed out that “some of the Joint Entities are majority owned by independent third-parties,” and further asserted “that only his interest in the Joint Entities, if anything, is subject to legal action.” (Italics omitted.) Pursuant to
Two of the Joint Entities, Moorpark 150 LLC (Moorpark), and SJD Partners (SJD), appeared through their own counsel, and argued that Elieff did not have any authority to bind their assets “to resolve his personal dispute with Kurtin.” As they asserted in opposing the writ relief sought by Kurtin, Elieff “might as well have pledged the Brooklyn Bridge to Kurtin.”
3. Arbitration
Kurtin never tried to bring the Joint Entities into the case. Instead he sought arbitration. We will recount the relevant facts involving the arbitration when we discuss whether the arbitration decision precludes any judgment against Elieff in more detail. For the moment, we need only note two things about the result of the arbitration. First, the arbitrator determined that the amount owing to Kurtin was $24,411,433.86. Second, the arbitrator announced a decision that only gave Kurtin the right, along the lines previously advocated by Elieff‘s attorneys in the writ proceeding, to foreclose on Elieff‘s own interests in the Joint Entities to the extent of that amount.
4. The Litigation
a. Phase 1 court trial: accounting
After the arbitration, Kurtin filed this action against Elieff and the Joint Entities. A “distribution” clause in the settlement agreement prompted the trial judge to propose a bifurcated trial. The clause provided that “Elieff shall not take any distribution from any of the Joint Entities if such distribution prevents satisfaction of payment of the Settlement Payments.” With reference to that clause, the trial judge noted that Kurtin was “alleging certain causes of action concerning how the defendant handled certain funds or assets of” the Joint Entities. There was thus a “sub-issue” as to whether “distributions are measured in every entity at the very moment they emerge or whether the alleged pre-existing practice treating the joint entities as a single unified economic force allows somebody to exercise the business judgment to consider it more as a whole and utilize what might be considered net profit from one entity to help preserve the viability of another entity for the purpose allegedly of making more money for everybody as to all the entities.” That is, the judge was concerned whether, if Elieff moved money around from one entity to another for the purpose of maximizing total aggregate profit, such movement might constitute a violation of the agreement.
Phase 1 of the bifurcated proceedings consisted of a five-day trial “concerning the accounting issues arising out” of Kurtin‘s claim that Elieff had breached the settlement agreement by, among other things, taking distributions from entities that prevented repayment of remaining payments. Kurtin
After hearing evidence, the court made certain limited findings. The “evidence received by the Court,” said the judge, “has, in fact, accounted for every penny of the funds that could be classified in any way as a distribution from a joint entity in the period following the August 2005 settlement agreement.”
But the “every penny” comment did not mean the trial judge was ruling that Elieff had taken no “distributions” in contravention of the agreement. In fact, the trial judge did not actually dеfine the word with the exception of ruling, as a matter of law, that the word “distribution” could not “be interpreted as precluding any and all distributions from being utilized for the good of the whole.”
b. Phase 2: jury trial
The result of phase 1 was an elaborate jury instruction (Jury Instruction No. 10 in the record). The jury instruction encapsulates what happened at phase 1. In summary, the court ruled—and only ruled—that the $22.4 million in “distributions” fell into one of five categories, and left to the jury the task of deciding whether money falling into any given one of those categories was a “distribution” in contravention of the settlement agreement. We quote the relevant parts:
“At an earlier trial, the Court found that after the Settlement Agreement between Mr. Elieff and Mr. Kurtin was signed, Mr. Elieff used distributions of money from various of the Joint Entities in the total amount of $22,384,632.22. . . . The Court found that all of this money was used by Mr. Elieff in the following five categories: (1) management services; (2) management expenses; (3) management costs; (4) loan repayment or return of capital; and (5) payments to Mr. Kurtin. . . . [¶] The Court did not decide whether the taking of these distributions of money did or did not violate Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement. The Court found that Paragraph 14 does not preclude Mr. Elieff from taking distributions from the Joint Entities, so long as the distributions were used to enhance, and not prevent or jeopardize, the possibility of Mr. Kurtin being paid the Settlement Payments required under the Settlement Agreement.”
Attached to the instruction was a chart giving the jury a list of 19 spеcific money outflows totaling $22,384,632.22 from various of the Joint Entities, and a recapitulation of the five categories (management services, management expenses, and so on) which the judge had identified. Fourteen of the 19
The remaining five outflows were more specific. About $4 million was used (by Rancho Etiwanda 685 and Serrano Heights East) to reimburse “Elieff/SunCal” for “costs incurred on joint projects.” Another outflow from Moorpark Equity Partners consisted of $1 million to repay a deposit from a third party, another $250,000 going to pay a third party owner, with the balance (roughly half a million dollars) going either to Moorpark Equity Partners itself ($263,000) or to reimburse “Elieff/SunCal for advances made by Elieff” ($241,500). Only one item, a $1.8 million outflow from Rancho Etiwanda, was unambiguously shown to have been used to repay Kurtin. (Presumably this was the same $1.8 million referenced above as the second installment payment.)
Even though the settlement agreement had not personally obligated Elieff to pay more than $21 million of the $48.8 million buyout price, Kurtin sought recovery from Elieff on the theory that Elieff had misrepresented his authority to obligate the Joint Entities to pay the bаlance. Concomitantly, Kurtin also claimed that Elieff had breached a provision in the settlement agreement to execute the customary documents “necessary to perfect this security interest” in Elieff‘s interests in the Joint Entities. And, as just discussed, Kurtin asserted that Elieff had taken distributions from the Joint Entities that should have gone to pay off the buyout price.
From these basic claims the following six causes of action against Elieff were submitted to the jury: No. 2, for breach of warranty of an agent‘s authority under
The jury, however, came back with an anomalous result. On the one hand, it found Elieff liable for breaching the warranty of authority under both
But on the other hand the jury exonerated Elieff on both the intentional and negligent misrepresentation causes of action. It specifically found, in answering the special verdict form, that Elieff did not know his representation that he had authority to obligate the Joint Entities was false when he made it. And it specifically found that Elieff did not make the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth. Further, the jury concluded that Elieff did not lack reasonable grounds to believe his representation was true when he made it. Likewise, the jury found, in answering the special verdict form in regard to liability under
But then again, the jury found liability under
c. Judgment, posttrial motions and appeal
Judgment was filed May 17, 2010, decreeing that Kurtin recover $24,411,433.86 from Elieff. Within 12 days Elieff gave notice of his intent to move for new trial. The notice was supported by four juror declarations аll stating that the jury “solely” looked at the $24,411,433.86 from the arbitration decision, and (as stated in each of the four declarations) did not discuss or “look at any other evidence to determine damages.” The new trial motion focused on the anomaly of liability under
The trial judge denied the motion for JNOV, but granted the new trial motion as to damages only. The judge reasoned that the evidence would not
Elieff filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the judgment, the order denying the JNOV motion, and the order granting in part and denying in part his motion for new trial. Kurtin countered with a notice of cross-appeal, also challenging the order granting in part and denying in part the new trial motion.
DISCUSSION
1. The Effect of the Arbitration
Elieff contends that the arbitration decision precludes the subsequent civil court judgment (either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or both). Because the arbitration issue most clearly brings the various textual provisions of the settlement agreement into sharp relief, we now set them forth:
a. Relevant terms of the settlement agreement
A number of particular features of the settlement agreement are relevant. First, the recitations at the beginning purport to treat Elieff and the Joint Entities as one collective entity. (“This Settlement Agreement is entered into . . . between Todd Kurtin . . . and Bruce Elieff, the Elieff Separate Entities identified in Exhibit ‘A’ and the Joint Projects identified in Exhibit ‘B’ on the other hand (collectively ‘Elieff‘).“)
Second, the text of the agreement is clear that Elieff personally was only responsible for the initial $21 million installment payment, and not for the balance contemplated to come from the Joint Entities. The point is made in three separate instances. Paragraph 2 directly says it: “Elieff and each of the Joint Entities are jointly and severally liable for making the first Settlement Payment in the amount of $21,000,000. The Joint Entities are liable for making the remainder of the Settlement Payments.” Paragraph 3 strongly implies it, both by (a) defining default in terms of the particular “Elieff Party obligated to pay” (thus excluding Elieff parties, like Elieff himself, not
Third, the text of the settlement agreement contemplates that the assets of the Joint Entities would secure the obligations of the Joint Entities under the agreement. It does so in paragraph 14 by both requiring Elieff personally to “execute customary documents necessary to perfect” a security interest to be held by Kurtin and by preventing Elieff from taking distributions which impair that security. Rather than attempting to paraphrase the remainder of that paragraph, we now quote it in full: “Payment to Kurtin of the Settlement Payments shall be secured by the interest of Elieff and the Joint Entities in the projects owned by the Joint Entities. Elieff and the Joint Entities shall execute customary documents necessary to perfect this security interest, including UCC-1 filings, provided however that Kurtin shall, within ten (10) business days of written notice execute those consents and/or subordination agreements necessary for Elieff to refinance the Pacific Point project. Elieff shall not take any distribution from any of the Joint Entities if such distribution prevents satisfaction of payment of the Settlement Payments.”
Fourth, paragraph 15 of the settlement agreement contains an arbitration clause. The arbitration clause reads: “The Parties believe that all of the material terms of their agreement are set forth herein. It is the intent of the parties that this Settlement Agreement shall be final and binding and that this Settlement Agreement shall be enforceable under
Finally, in paragraph 17, the agreement contains an integration clause: “This agreement contains the entire and only understanding between the Parties pertaining to the subject matter contained in it and supersedes any and
b. The arbitration award
Despitе the “sole act” language in the settlement agreement, at the arbitration Kurtin sought a direct award for the balance due. His arbitration brief asserted: “Therefore, the arbitration award here should include an award against Elieff personally for the principal balance owing under the Settlement Agreement which, as explained below, is now $22,934,809.16 plus interest, attorney‘s fees and costs in an amount according to proof at the hearing.”
What Kurtin received, however, was in substance simply an amendment to the terms of the settlement agreement. The arbitrator decreed that any recovery against Elieff would be restricted to Elieff‘s own interests in the Joint Entities, as distinct from the total assets of the Joint Entities themselves: “If payment of $24,411,433.86 is not made to Todd Kurtin by June 30, 2007, then Kurtin shall have the right to require Bruce Elieff to transfer to Kurtin or his designee by July 10, 2007, any and all of Elieff‘s right, title and interest—held directly or indirectly—in and to any or all of the Joint Entities listed on ‘Exhibit B’ to the Settlement Agreement of August 5, 2005 and Elieff shall promptly execute all documents necessary to effectuate such transfer.”
The narrowness of the arbitrator‘s decision (it would be a misnomer to call it an “award,” though the arbitrator himself referred to it as that) was emphasized by a statement which soon followed the sentence quoted above, the essence of which was that Kurtin could still assert further rights under the settlement agreement: “Exercise of this right [to require Elieff to give security in his own interests in the Joint Entities] shаll not, of itself, extinguish Kurtin‘s rights to payment under the Settlement Agreement, but shall only reduce the amount due under the Settlement Agreement by the fair market value of any Elief [sic] right, title or interest transferred to Kurtin.”
The second paragraph of the award then bolstered the right of Kurtin to recover from Elieff‘s own interests in the Joint Entities by prohibiting Elieff from encumbering those interests until Kurtin was “paid in full.” It also provided that Elieff would hold “in constructive trust for Kurtin anything he received from said Joint Entities from this date [(June 11, 2007)] forward.”
The next 2 one-sentence paragraphs suggested that there was no winner in the arbitration. Paragraph one read: “No attorney fees or costs are awarded.” Paragraph two read: “This award is not intended to preclude any other remedy that Kurtin may have at law, or in equity.”
c. Discussion
Elieff argues the arbitration decision, as the result of a prior proceeding, necessarily precluded further litigation of his liability on the unpaid balance under the settlement agreement in this civil action as a matter of res judicata. As summarized by our Supreme Cоurt in Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806, 230 P.3d 342], the doctrine of res judicata requires that the cause of action in the prior proceeding be the same as in the present cause of action, the prior proceeding result in a final judgment on the merits, and the parties be the same as in the prior proceeding. (Or in privity with parties in the prior proceeding.) If applicable, the doctrine “not only precludes the relitigation of issues that were actually litigated, but also precludes the litigation of issues that could have been litigated in the prior proceeding.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 557 [131 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].)
Elieff emphasizes the “could have been” aspect of the res judicata doctrine. He argues that Kurtin asserted his “primary right” to be made whole in the arbitration proceeding, which is the same primary right he subsequently asserted in this civil case, and therefore must be satisfied with the decision the arbitrator handed down.
The flaw in Elieff‘s logic is that he confuses what Kurtin asked for in the arbitration with the arbitrator‘s power to give it in light of the scope of the arbitrator‘s powers to which the parties had agreed. It is well established that the scope of an arbitrator‘s powers are fixed by the agreement to arbitrate. (E.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899] [the “““powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission“‘“]; Kelly Sutherlin McLeod Architecture, Inc. v. Schneickert (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 519, 528 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 83] [“An arbitrator‘s powers ‘derive from, and are limited by, the agreement to arbitrate.’ “].)
Here, the settlement agreement conferred only limited powers on the аrbitrator. There is no provision giving the arbitrator power to make an award
And the arbitrator did just that. He interpreted and amended the agreement to insert terms which had been understood by the parties, but did not find their way into the final text. Thus, to the degree that the agreement was initially ambiguous as to Kurtin‘s right to security involving all the assets of each Joint Entity, the arbitrator cleared up that ambiguity by limiting Kurtin‘s right to security to just Elieff‘s interests in each Joint Entity.
The “primary right,” then, that was adjudicated in the arbitration was not Kurtin‘s “right to be made whole,” but Kurtin‘s right, under the agreement, to have the mediator who midwifed the settlement agreement interpret, and if necessary amend, the agreement. This case thus presents the opposite of the usual could-have-been-decided situation in res judicata analysis, where a litigant seeks to litigate in a second proceeding what could have been litigated in the first place. Here, a litigant sought to litigate more in the first proceeding than he could have possibly obtained from it.
Elieff‘s argument that O‘Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 107 [308 P.2d 9] (O‘Malley), University of San Francisco Faculty Assn. v. University of San Francisco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 942, 954 [191 Cal.Rptr. 346] (University of San Francisco), Felner v. Meritplan Ins. Co. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 540, 544 [86 Cal.Rptr. 178] (Felner), and Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186–187 [260 P.2d 156] (Crofoot) compel a contrary result is unpersuasive. All these cases are distinguishable.
O‘Malley and University of San Francisco both involved second agreements to specifically submit disputes to arbitrators which clearly encompassed the scope of what was later challenged in court. (See O‘Malley, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 108 [submission agreement made after initial collective bargaining agreement specifically included question of arbitrability by arbitrators], 110 [holding employer bound by terms of its submission agreement]; University of San Francisco, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 945, 953–954 [noting that “additional agreement” plus “discussion at the hearing” showed that supplemental pension provisions “were properly a subject of arbitration,” plus “the parties stipulated” that the arbitrator had the power to decide issue of his own “jurisdiction“].)
Crofoot involved an agreement to arbitrate after a “plethora” of litigation which, by its terms, included issues of law as well as fact. The court rejected, as a matter of textual interpretation of the agreement to arbitrate, one party‘s
In the case before us, unlike O‘Malley and University of San Francisco, there was no second agreement specifically to arbitrate which encompassed the arbitrability of some issue which might have been outside some initial agreement. And unlike Crofoot and Felner, the actual text of this arbitration agreement—here, the settlement agreement itself—will not support the resolution by the arbitrator of the question of damagеs. We need only note additionally that while Kurtin may have sought more from the arbitrator than the arbitrator had the power to give, Elieff vigorously opposed Kurtin‘s attempt, and Elieff was successful in that opposition.
2. The Mediation Privilege
What we have just said about the nature of the settlement agreement bears on Elieff‘s main argument against the judgment, namely that Kurtin‘s invocation of the mediation privilege denied Elieff a fair trial. Elieff‘s argument goes like this: Various terms of the settlement agreement were ambiguous, particularly the clauses requiring Elieff to execute “customary” security documents. Typically, in contract litigation, extrinsic evidence is allowed so that the trier of fact may resolve the issue of what the parties intended when they used ambiguous terms in a contract. (E.g., Duncan v. The McCaffrey Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 346, 381 [133 Cal.Rptr.3d 280], disapproved on another point in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1176, 1182 [151 Cal.Rptr.3d 93, 291 P.3d 316] [“extrinsic evidence can be admitted to explain the ambiguity in the contract“].) But here, by asserting the “mediation privilege” (see
There are two flaws in the argument: One, Elieff already had a chance to clear up ambiguities in the settlement agreement before trial in arbitration. In fact, he actually used the arbitration process to clear up, in his favor, at least one ambiguity. (Here the parties acknowledge that the initial out-of-court proceeding was a mediation. The later proceeding which resulted in clarification of the settlement agreement is referred to by the parties as an arbitration. Mediation and arbitration are two different things, as
Two, even if, arguendo, Elieff did not have a chance to clear up ambiguities by way of arbitration prior to going to civil trial, Kurtin still did not forfeit his right to sue Elieff by asserting the mediation privilege. The California Supreme Court has clearly signaled the policy behind the mediation privilege is so strong that California law is willing to countenance the “high price” of the loss of relevant evidence to protect the privilege. (Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113, 138 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, 244 P.3d 1080] (conc. opn. of Chin, J.) (Cassel).)
a. Elieff‘s chance to clear up ambiguities before trial
The first flaw in Elieff‘s mediation privilege argument is that he ignores the opportunity he had to resolve ambiguities in the settlement agreement by returning to the original mediator in arbitration. Accordingly, Elieff cannot now be heard to complain that he was denied the chance to resolve ambiguities at trial. The arbitration paragraph gave each party the right to go to arbitration in front of the one person most familiar with what the parties achieved at their mediation—the mediator himself—where any ambiguity in its terms might be resolved.
As against such an opportunity, Elieff counters with the argument that the arbitration paragraph (giving the parties the right to return to the arbitrator) really is restricted to situations absolutely necessary to make the settlement agreement enforceable. Outside of those situations, he now argues, the arbitrator did not have the power to interpret ambiguous terms in the settlement agreement.
We cannot agree. The text of the arbitration clause is, on balance, most naturally read to set forth three sets of arbitral powers, with only the last of those three tethered to the idea of some need to avoid making the agreement unenforceable.
It is sentences 3 and 5 on which Elieff relies to confine the arbitrator‘s power to interpret or cure ambiguities only to situations where the cure was absolutely needed to preserve enforceability. For reader convenience, we quote those two sentences again here, and include the intervening sentence 4:
“[Sentence 3:] In the event that any Party claims that one or more material terms have been omitted from this Settlement Agreement, or that the Parties failed to reach an agreement as to one or more material terms, or that any other defect exists with respect to this Settlement Agreement that would make it unenforceable, the Parties agree to final and binding arbitration before Tony Piazza or, if Mr. Piazza is unable, before a mutually agreeable arbitrator. [Sentence 4:] At such arbitration, the arbitrator shall imply a reasonable term that the arbitrator finds consistent with the purpose and intent of this Settlement Agreement or otherwise cure any defect in the Settlement Agreement by amending its terms. [Sentence 5:] The sole act of the arbitrator shall be to issue an amendment to this Settlement Agreement implying such additional terms, curing any ambiguity or otherwise curing any defect in this Settlement Agreement that would make this Settlement Agreement unenforceable.”
Readers will see that sentences 3 and 5 are constructed in two parallel series of three clauses, each clause dealing with, in order, (1) omission of material terms; (2) curing ambiguity or disagreement as to those material terms; and (3) unspecified defects. In each sentence, only the last clause, concerning unspecified defects, is unambiguously connected to the idea of remedying unenforceability. Thus, to make the unenforceability language apply to either of the first two clauses, one must relate back to the first and second clauses the unenforceability language one finds in the third clause. And that of course is how Elieff reads sentences 3 and 5 in this appeal.
To be sure, Elieff‘s argument is consistent with the references to “other defect” in sentence 3, and the reference to “otherwise” in sentence 5. Those two references can indeed be stretched to suggest a connection between what happens in the third clause and what has gone before in clauses 1 and 2.
All else being equal, however, courts prefer a more natural reading of text to a less natural one, whether that text be found in a statute (e.g.,
In this case, we conclude Elieff‘s interpretation of the arbitration provision is not the more natural reading and does not give effect to the whole of the arbitration provision.
First, Elieff‘s reading is by no means compelled. Sentence 3‘s phrase “other defect,” and sentence 5‘s use of the word “otherwise” do not necessarily require a connection to the first two clauses. Logically, each of the three clauses can be seen as independent of the others, i.e., the arbitrator has three sets of powers: (1) omission of material terms; (2) curing ambiguity or disagreement as to material terms; and (3) curing any unspecified defects which might make the agreement not enforceable. The independence of the three clauses is confirmed when one realizes that, grammatically, in sentence 3 the third clause is not even necessary to make an intelligible English sentence. Sentence 3 is written so the first two clauses easily survive even if the third were completely omitted. (Thus: “In the event that any Party claims that one or more material terms have been omitted from this Settlement Agreement, or that the Parties failed to reach an agreement as to one or more material terms, the Parties agree to final and binding arbitration . . . .“)
By the same token, sentence 5, like sentence 3, also can be read logically to set forth three independent clauses, though the gerund-based parallel construction (“implying . . . curing . . . or otherwise curing“) makes it impossible to simply omit the third clause. Even so, the “or” separating the third clause from the other two emphasizes the independence of each clause: Either (1), (2) “or otherwise” (3). In that sequence, whatever is attached to (3) is not necessarily attached to (1) or (2).
Second, Elieff‘s reading of the arbitration clause tends to reduce sentence 4 to a meaningless afterthought. Sentence 4 begins by pegging off sentence 3 (“[a]t such arbitration“) but articulates two powers of the arbitrator without any qualification as to enforceability. To be sure (as shown by sentences 1, 2
Third, and most importantly, the last antecedent rule strongly indicates the arbitrator’s powers are not necessarily pinned down by a requirement to only be exercised to “save” the agreement. (See ACS Systems, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 137, 150 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 786] [applying last antecedent rule, which usually applies to statutes, to contracts as well].)
The last antecedent rule is the commonsense presumption that the tail should not wag the dog in sentence construction, i.e., qualifiers apply to words and phrases immediately preceding them, as distinct from words and phrases more remote. (See Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 28 P.3d 876].) In this regard, we note that if the parties really meant to confine the arbitrator’s power to interpret terms or cure ambiguities to only situations where it was absolutely necessary to make the agreement enforceable, they could easily have been much clearer than appending that limitation to the last of three successive clauses. (Here’s one possibility: “In order to make sure this agreement is absolutely enforceable, the arbitrator shall have the power to (1) insert omitted terms, (2) cure ambiguities, or (3) remedy defects, but the arbitrator’s power to do so shall be limited only to those situations where it is necessary to make sure the agreement is enforceable; otherwise the arbitrator shall have no power at all.”)
Fourth, a reading of the arbitrator’s powers not dependent on a need to “save” the agreement was one Elieff himself used with ease at both the trial and appellate levels in other contexts when describing the arbitration clause. At the trial level, in the context of opposing Kurtin’s attempt to obtain judgment under
And finally, in this regard, we also further note that at the arbitration that was actually held, Elieff won an important interpretational victory independent of any need to save the contract—a victоry he certainly has not repudiated as beyond the arbitrator‘s powers. Namely, he established that Kurtin‘s claims under the agreement only extended to Elieff‘s own interests in the Joint Entities, as distinct from being directly against the Joint Entities themselves.
In sum, on balance, we conclude the better reading of the text of the arbitration clause is that Elieff could have cleared up any ambiguities he thought necessary to his defense by going back to the mediator prior to trial. Doing so, we note, would also have been consonant with the zealous regard the law affords the mediation privilege, which we now address.
b. California‘s zealously guarded mediation privilege
Even if the arbitration clause is limited to just clearing up what is minimally necessary to have an enforceable agreement, Elieff‘s more basic argument—that Kurtin forfeited his claims against Elieff by invoking the mediation privilege (see
In Cassel, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action claimed his attorneys had, in a pretrial mediation, pressured, harassed and otherwise coerced him into accepting a lower price than he wanted for certain licensing rights. The
The application of the mediation privilege in Cassel meant, under the particular circumstances of that case, the plaintiff‘s ability to present a claim was hindered. Here, Elieff argues that application of the mediation privilege supposedly hindered his ability as defendant to defend against a claim. And on that difference—the difference between one‘s status as a plaintiff or as a defendant—Elieff hangs all attempts to distinguish Cassel.
But we cannot see any meaningful difference between plaintiffs and defendants in the mediation privilege situation. In fact, differentiating between them makes no sense. One need only think of the consequence of Elieff‘s position to understand it was never intended by the Legislature. Under Elieff‘s theory, parties to a mediation would know that if they were successful in achieving a mediated settlement in which thеy were the obligee, they could not enforce the settlement without running the risk of their adversaries claiming terms of the settlement were ambiguous, and forcing either (1) the disclosure of communications made in the course of the mediation or (2) the loss of the very benefit of that mediation, which was the mediated agreement itself. By contrast, obligors would have a natural advantage over obligees. They could put obligees to the Hobson‘s choice of giving up the benefit of the settlement or allowing the airing of privileged communications. The Legislature obviously never intended such asymmetry.
Due process is an underlying theme of Elieff‘s argument. Somehow, he says, it was fundamentally unfair that he was sued under a mediated agreement but was not allowed to bring evidence bearing on what the parties discussed concerning the actual terms of that agreement. But the Cassel decision itself confronted and rejected the idea that enforcing the mediation privilege statutes “in strict accordance with their plain terms” deprives a civil litigant of due process. (Cassel, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 124.) Said the court: “We further emphasize that application of the mediation confidentiality statutes to legal malpractice actions does not implicate due process concerns so fundamental that they might warrant an exception on constitutional grounds. Implicit in our decisions . . . is the premise that the mere loss of
Moreover, and significantly, a page after the “mere loss of evidence” statement, the Cassel opinion again rejected the notion that somehow due process was implicated by protection of the privilege, but phrased its idea in such a way as to apply to both sides of a dispute: “The Legislature decided that the encouragement of mediation to resolve disputes requires broad protection for the confidentiality of communications exchanged in relation to that process, even where this protection may sometimes result in the unavailability of valuable civil evidence.” (Id. at p. 136, italics added.)
This court followed Cassel in its recent decision in Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289 [135 Cal.Rptr.3d 591] (Provost), where we rejected the claim of a party seeking to disavow a stipulated settlement arrived at through mediation, even though the party claimed coercion from threats of criminal prosecution by the other party if he did not enter into the agreement. (See id. at pp. 1302-1304.) If evidence of coercion in the achievement of a mediated agreement itself was properly excluded by the mediation privilege in Provost, how much less compelling is Elieff‘s contention that Kurtin should forfeit his claim to repayment where the assertion of the privilege entails only an incidental loss of evidence from a mediation bearing on allegedly ambiguous contract terms?
Elieff places great reliance on In re Marriage of Kieturakis (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 56 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 119] (Kieturakis) for his forfeiture theory, but the case does not help him.
Kieturakis is a somewhat complicated case that arose from a mediated divorce settlement which lopsidedly favored the husband, so we must explore it in some detail to show why it does not stand for what Elieff claims. In fact, Kieturakis is a case which strongly upholds the mediation privilege.
After the mediated divorce settlement in Kieturakis the wife attempted to set it aside. Under substantive family law, the question then arose as to whether the husband had exerted undue influence in obtaining the settlement agreement, and, again as a matter of substantive family law, on that issue the husband bore the burden of showing he did not exert undue influence. To ascertain whether the husband had indeed exerted undue influence, the trial court allowed in evidence from the mediation in the interests of “‘justice‘” (Kieturakis, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 75)—something which, we now note, would clearly not be correct under Cassel or Provost. But, having made
Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the order refusing to set aside the agreement. However, in affirming, it took the opportunity to explain that because the settlement was the product of mediation, the trial court had still erred in determining the husband bore the burden of proof. (Id. at p. 85.) To apply a presumption of undue influence from a lopsided agreement arising out of mediation would undermine the Legislature‘s preference for mediation. (Id. at pp. 85-87.)
It was in the process of recognizing that there was indeed a cost to be paid for the Legislature‘s value judgment placing a higher value on mediation than on the substantive family statutes involving possible undue influence, that the Kieturakis court made a comment which Elieff now asserts requires dismissal of Kurtin‘s claims. “However, if there is a price to be paid in fairness to preserve mediation confidentiality, the cases have required that it be paid by parties challenging, not defending, what transpired in the mediation.” (Id. at p. 87.)
We are not persuaded by Elieff‘s argument connecting (a) the observation made by the Kieturakis court and (b) the idea Kurtin was put to a forced choice of giving up the mediation privilege or dropping his claims. Elieff‘s argument is a non sequitur. It does not follow from (a) Kieturakis‘s proposition that a party to a mediated agreement who later wants to get out from under the terms of that agreement cannot use evidence from the mediation to achieve her purpose if the other party asserts the mediation privilege to Elieff‘s proposition that (b) a party seeking to enforce a mediated agreement cannot do so without simultaneously losing the right to assert the mediation privilege.
Kieturakis‘s observation was, in context, a simple recognition that a party, such as the wife in the case before it, who seeks to set aside an agreement resulting from a mediation, will have a “price” to pay in being unable to use what haрpened at the mediation to challenge the agreement. And under Cassel, that recognition is fairly unremarkable. Indeed, as applied to the case before us, the observation only strengthens our conclusion that the mediation privilege statutes mean that it was Elieff, not Kurtin, who was required to pay the “price” of the Legislature‘s policy in favor of mediation confidentiality. The whole point of the passage in Kieturakis was that the mediation statutes reflect such a strong legislative policy that it even allows “unfair agreements
In sum, Kurtin did not lose this case by asserting a mediation privilege which the Legislature has chosen to zealously protect.
3. The “Accounting” and Damages
Elieff argues that cause of action No. 7 (for violation of the “distribution” clause in paragraph 14) is precluded from any retrial because the “accounting” which Kurtin received established that Elieff took no “profits” and spent funds only for authorized purposes. As Elieff‘s trial attorney said after the trial judge delivered her decision in the phase 1 trial from the bench, “I want to address the issue of whether there‘s anything left to submit to a jury on the seventh cause of action.”
The argument overstates what hаppened in the trial court. There was indeed much left after the phase 1 trial. The trial judge did not rule that Elieff took no “distributions.” She ruled, rather, that money which was used by Elieff to maximize the “good of the whole” would not be covered by the distribution clause.
Only one of the five destinations of the outflows identified by the trial court, payments to Kurtin, is unequivocally not a “distribution” taken by Elieff to “prevent” repayment of the unpaid balance. (That distribution was the $1.8 million that was itself a payment to Kurtin.) A reasonable jury might readily conclude that outflows within the other four categories (management services, management expenses, management costs, return of capital) both (a) did not benefit the Joint Entities as a whole and (b) prevented repayment of the unpaid balance. And the ultimate categorization of the various outflows was left to the jury. The trial judge granted a new trial on damages because the numbers of available outflows did not add up to the $24.4 million which the jury awarded on the seventh cause of action.
Put another way, the “gist” or “essence” of Kurtin‘s seventh cause of action was not one in equity. (Cf. De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 482, 507-508 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 438] [explaining when parties are, or are not, entitled to jury trial in context of contract actions involving accountings].) Tracing the various outflows from discrete Joint Entities was only ancillary to the true gravamen of that cause of action, focused as it was
By the same token, we must reject Elieff‘s argument that Kurtin did not prove any damages. While a requirement of actual collectability from the Joint Entities puts a limit on Elieff‘s liability under
4. Inconsistent Verdicts Regarding Section 2343
Kurtin‘s cause of action No. 3 for violation of
“One who assumes to act as an agent is responsible to third persons as a principal for his acts in the course of his agency, in any of the following cases, and in no others:
1. When, with his consent, credit is given to him personally in a transaction;
2. When he enters into a written contract in the name of his principal, without believing, in good faith, that he has authority to do so; or,
3. When his acts are wrongful in their nature.”
The problem is the jury found that Elieff did have a good faith belief he could obligate the Joint Entities, and the only “wrongful” acts which the jury were asked to impute to Elieff were negligent or intentional misrepresentation, and the jury refused to find he engaged in either of those wrongful acts.
Kurtin posits that any “wrongful” act that might be derived from thе facts generally before the jury will satisfy
Case law explicating
Here, however, the jury never determined that Elieff committed any wrongful act in the course of signing on behalf of the Joint Entities. To be sure, he breached his own personal obligations not to take distributions which prevented repаyment and to provide documents to secure his own interests in the Joint Entities, but those were not “acts in the course” of an assumed agency. The jury specifically found, in regard to his signing, that he had a good faith belief in his authority, and made no misrepresentation, intentional or negligent. Because of these inconsistent verdicts, we cannot say that the
The trial court itself rejected Elieff‘s motion for a new trial as to liability under
The law is clear that the proper remedy for inconsistent verdicts is “not to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of one of the parties, but rather, to order a new trial.” (Stillwell v. The Salvation Army (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 360, 376 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 111]; Shaw, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344; e.g., Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 704 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 418] [“Because the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts, we will reverse and remand for a new trial.“].) We have power to modify the new trial order on appeal to have it include a new trial on the issue of liability under
5. Kurtin‘s Cross-appeal
a. The relationship between section 2343 and section 3318
i. No effect on new trial order
The trial court‘s formal order on motion for new trial agreed with Elieff‘s contention that the measure of damages for the violation of
In his cross-appeal, Kurtin now argues that the trial judge‘s ruling that
Preliminarily, we reject Kurtin‘s argument that any error by the trial court on the issue of the applicability of
However, because the question of the proper measure of damages under
As we now show, the trial judge was correct.
ii. Text of sections 2342, 2343 and 3318
For reader convenience we now set out the complete verbatim text of the three statutes at issue, including repeating the text of
iii. Analysis of text
The opening line of
Any argument that
Courts, of course, must prefer statutory interpretations which harmonize and reconcile рotentially conflicting statutory meanings. (E.g., Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 257 P.3d 81]; DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 778-779 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 889 P.2d 1019].) In the present case, the two potentially competing clauses (“responsible . . . as a principal” and “detriment . . . is deemed to be“) may be harmonized by reading
First, the very structure of the Civil Code suggests that very harmonization. Chapter and section headings may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent and are entitled to “‘considerable weight.‘” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036]; see Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Orange (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1385 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 514].) Sections 2342 and 2343 are contained within article 4 (obligations between agents and third persons) which is a subdivision of chapter 1 of title 9 (dealing generally with agency) which is within part 4 (obligations arising from particular transactions) of division 3 (generally dealing with obligations) of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the general subject of relief, including damages, is within part 1 of division 4 (general provisions). Section 3318 is found in article 1 (damages for breach of contract), which is within chapter 2 (measure of damages) which is within part 1, title 2 (compensatory relief), which is within division 4 (dealing with general provisions). One can, from this pattern, divine the general structure of the Civil Code on the subject of breaches of an agent‘s warranty of authority: Spell out the obligation in division 3. Set forth the remеdy in division 4.
Second, textually, we are required to give effect to
The point may be illustrated by examining the original intentions of the parties as the transaction was supposed to occur. Assume, for the sake of argument, that Elieff really did have authority to bind the Joint Entities, that Elieff delivered all the security documents he was required to deliver, and that he took no distributions of any kind (e.g., forwent management fees otherwise legitimately owed to his companies) from any of the Joint Entities. But further assume (as appears indeed to have occurred in this case) that despite Elieff‘s forgoing any distributions from the Joint Entities, the real
The third reason is that to the degree that
To the degree that case law has addressed the question of whether
The question of
From this overlap, the question arises as to what the practical difference between
It does not, however, follow that
At the very least, the “as a principal” clause in
b. The accounting
Kurtin presents another point in his cross-appeal that centers on the phase 1 trial. Like Elieff in the main appeal, Kurtin claims that phase 1 decided
We perceive that Kurtin‘s cross-appeal as it relates to these questions is essentially protective, because he has not been aggrieved by the new trial order on any of these issues. Those issues were tried to the jury by way of Kurtin‘s seventh cause of action for breaching the provision of the settlement agreement not to take distributions which prevented the Joint Entities from paying the balance of the buyout amount. And he prevailed on them. We need only mention here that we do not disturb the new trial order as to Elieff‘s liability on Kurtin‘s seventh cause of action on the distribution issue.
DISPOSITION
The new trial order is modified to include a new trial on Elieff‘s liability under
(1) We affirm the trial court‘s determination that Elieff is liable to Kurtin in an as-yet-to-be-determined amount, if any, on Kurtin‘s causes of action for (a) breach of warranty of an agent‘s authority under
(2) As we modify the trial court‘s new trial order, the issue of both Elieff‘s liability under
(3) Moreover, in the new trial on
Aronson, J., and Fybel, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 2013, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. The petition of appellant Bruce Elieff for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 31, 2013, S210971. Werdegar, J., did not participate therein.
