Lead Opinion
Opinion
In November of 1990, the voters of Napa County enacted Measure J, an initiative that amends the land-use element of the county’s general plan to preserve agricultural land. Measure J made the redesignation of existing agricultural land and open space essentially conditional on voter approval, with certain exceptions, until the year 2021. The questions before the court are whether a county’s general plan can be amended by an initiative of the county’s electorate acting pursuant to article II, section 11 of the California Constitution, and whether the electorate can properly impose the 30-year voter approval requirements provided in Measure J. We conclude that the statutory provisions governing local planning, Government
I. Facts
The material facts are not in dispute. County voters approved Measure J at the November 6, 1990, election. By its terms, the initiative confirms and readopts, until the year 2021, existing portions of the land use element of the general plan that designate land as either “Agricultural, Watershed and Open Space” or “Agricultural Resource” land (agricultural land). Moreover, Measure J readopts certain general plan policies regarding minimum parcel size and maximum building densities. Measure J also adds a new subsection 9 to the “Land Use Element,” providing that until December 31, 2020, the provisions of the general plan and map readopted by Measure J can be amended only on a vote of the people, except that the land can be redesignated: (1) in conjunction with its annexation to a city; (2) after the board of supervisors makes certain specified findings, including that the land is physically unusable for agriculture, that it is unlikely to be annexed in the future, and that the proposed use of the land is compatible with agriculture; (3) to accommodate the siting of a solid waste disposal facility; or (4) to avoid an unconstitutional taking of property.
On March 6, 1991, Richard M. DeVita and four other Napa County residents, as well as the Building Industry Association of Northern California, a nonprofit association, and Security Owners Corporation, Inc., a California corporation (hereafter collectively plaintiffs), filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandate against Napa County and its board of supervisors (County)
In its written decision, the trial court noted that there was “no evidentiary showing that the amendment either facially will result or as applied has resulted in any internal inconsistency between ... the amended Land Use Element . . . and the other elements of the General Plan including the housing or circulation elements.” The trial court then concluded that Measure J was a valid exercise of the initiative power, and denied plaintiffs all relief.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It found that Elections Code section 9111 explicitly contemplated the amendment of general plans by initiative. The Court of Appeal also rejected various arguments by plaintiffs that the planning law had exclusively delegated the authority to amend the general plan to the board of supervisors. We granted review to resolve the important question of whether a general plan can be amended by initiative.
II. The Validity of General Plan Amendment Initiatives
A. Statutory Framework and Case Law Background
We begin our discussion with a brief review of the planning law and its relation to the right of initiative. Although California law has prescribed that cities and counties adopt general or master plans since 1927 (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, pp. 1899-1913), the general plan prior to 1972 has been characterized as merely an “interesting study,” and no law required local land use decisions to follow the general plan’s dictates. (City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove (1979)
The general plan consists of a “statement of development policies . . . setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals.” (Gov. Code, § 65302.) The plan must include seven elements—land use, circulation, conservation, housing, noise, safety and open space—and address each of these elements in whatever level of detail local conditions require (id., § 65301). General plans are also required to be “comprehensive [and] long[]term” (id., § 65300) as well as “internally consistent.” (Id., § 65300.5.) The planning law thus compels cities and counties to undergo the discipline of drafting a master plan to guide future local land use decisions.
Once a general plan is adopted, it may be amended by the legislative body (Gov. Code, § 65358, subd. (a))
The amenability of land-use and planning measures, such as the general plan, to the power of initiative and referendum is not a novel issue in this state. Wé have held that zoning ordinances are subject to amendment by initiative (Arnel Development v. City of Costa Mesa (1980)
Those courts that have examined the planning law have concluded that “[t]he adoption and amendment of a general plan is a local legislative matter and not of statewide concern,” and therefore the proper subject of initiative. (Duran v. Cassidy, supra,
The correctness of the Attorney General’s view seemed confirmed by our own opinion the following year in Yost, supra,
We endorsed the position that general plans can be amended by initiative in Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988)
As set forth below, we now find that the Courts of Appeal and the Attorney General have correctly concluded that general plans can be amended by initiative.
B. Scope of an Initiative and the General Plan
Any discussion of whether a general plan amendment can be enacted by initiative must begin with the recognition that the local electorate’s right to initiative and referendum is guaranteed by the California Constitution, article II, section 11,
The presumption in favor of the right of initiative is rebuttable upon a definite indication that the Legislature, as part of the exercise of its power to preempt all local legislation in matters of statewide concern, has intended to restrict that right. (See VFRR, supra,
In COST, supra,
With this framework in mind, we turn to consideration of the present case.
C. Elections Code Section 9111
The County contends, and the Court of Appeal held, that Elections Code section 9111 specifically recognizes that general plans can be amended by initiative. We agree. That section, originally enacted in 1987 as Elections Code section 3705.5, provides in subdivision (a) that during the circulation of a countywide initiative petition, or before voting on whether to adopt an initiative measure, a board of supervisors “may refer the proposed initiative measure to any county agency or agencies for a report on any or all of the following: [¶] ... [¶] [The proposed initiative’s] effect on the internal consistency of the county’s general and specific plans including the housing element, the consistency between planning and zoning,” as well as certain other matters. (Elec. Code, §9111, subd. (a), italics added.) The term “internal consistency” refers to the statutory requirement that the “general plan and elements and parts thereof comprise an integrated, internally consistent and compatible statement of policies . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 65300.5; see Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors (1985)
Elections Code section 9111 was part of a package of amendments (Assem. Bill No. 2202 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.)) designed to better inform the county electorate and the board of supervisors about proposed initiatives.
Plaintiffs contend Elections Code section 9111 ’s reference to the “internal consistency of the general plan” should not be construed as evidence of legislative intent to permit general plan amendment initiatives. They argue that the views of the Legislature in 1987, when the predecessor to section 9111 was enacted, do not have bearing on the intentions of the earlier Legislatures that enacted the planning law. They cite Del Costello v. State of California (1982)
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, therefore, the question is not whether Elections Code section 9111 in some fashion misconstrues the planning law, but rather how that statute can be reconciled with the planning law, specifically the provision governing a general plan’s amendment found in Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a). When two statutes touch upon a common subject, they are to be construed in reference to each other, so as to “harmonize the two in such a way that no part of either becomes surplus-age.” (Mar v. Sakti Internat. Corp. (1992)
Therefore, to construe both Government Code section 65358 and Elections Code section 9111 without surplusage in either statute, we must assume that the Legislature in 1987 acknowledged the fact that the general plan could be amended by initiative, and sought to establish a means by which the board and the electorate could gain information about such proposed initiatives and respond appropriately. The Legislature that passed the predecessor to Elections Code section 9111 could have addressed the problem of general plan amendment initiatives in a different manner: it could have prohibited such initiatives altogether. Instead, the Legislature chose to establish procedures designed to better equip the board and the electorate to evaluate this type of initiative. As such, Elections Code section 9111 is an unmistakable confirmation of legislative intent to allow general plans to be amended by initiative.
D. Exclusive Delegation Under COST
In addition to Elections Code section 9111, the planning law itself confirms that the Legislature did not intend to exclude the electorate from
As an initial matter, there is no question that a general plan amendment is a legislative act, for the planning law itself declares as much. (Gov. Code, § 65301.5.) Therefore it will be presumed that the general plan can be amended by initiative unless there is a “clear showing of [legislative] intent” to exclusively delegate the authority to amend the plan to the governing body. (VFRR, supra,
The statutory language of the planning law is by itself inconclusive on the question of exclusive delegation. Government Code sections 65356 and 65358 do, it is true, refer to the “legislative body” adopting and amending general plans. But as we observed in COST: “[m]any powers conferred by statute on the ‘legislative body’ of a local entity have been held to be subject to initiative and referendum.” (
To determine whether the reference to “legislative body” signifies an intent to exclusively delegate authority to that body, we look to whether and to what extent the statute or statutory scheme in question pertains to matters of statewide concern. As we stated in COST, supra,
But we never suggested in COST that courts are to automatically infer that a statutory scheme restricts the power of initiative or referendum merely
In some cases, exclusive delegation has been inferred as a means of promoting a particular regional project or intergovernmental relationship. (See COST, supra,
The amendment of a general plan, in contrast, is an act of formulating basic land use policy, for which localities have been constitutionally
The Legislature, in its zoning and planning legislation, has recognized the primacy of local control over land use. It has declared that in enacting zoning laws, “it is its intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters.” (Gov. Code, § 65800.) “The power of cities and counties to zone land use in accordance with local conditions is well entrenched. [Citations.] The Legislature has specified certain minimum standards for local zoning regulations [citation] but has carefully expressed its intent to retain the maximum degree of local control . . . .” (IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors (1991)
The planning law does not alter this local control over land use matters. In enacting the law, the Legislature found “that the diversity of the state’s communities and their residents requires planning agencies and legislative bodies to implement this article in ways that accommodate local conditions and circumstances, while meeting its minimum requirements.” (Gov. Code, § 65300.7, italics added.) In other words, the planning law incorporates the state’s interest in placing some minimal regulation on what remains essentially locally determined land use decisions. “[T]he Legislature has been sensitive to the fact that planning and zoning in the conventional sense have traditionally been deemed municipal affairs. It has thus made no attempt to deprive local governments ... of their right to manage and control such matters, but rather has attempted to impinge upon local control only to the limited degree necessary to further legitimate state interests.” (City of Los Angeles v. State of California (1982)
The minimal regulation set forth in the planning law requires cities and counties to adopt a general plan with certain mandatory elements that will
The autonomy given to localities to amend their general plans is further confirmed by Government Code section 65700, subdivision (a), which sets forth precisely what “matters of statewide concern” are to be found in the planning law. That subdivision states: “The provisions of this chapter [pertaining to the planning law] shall not apply to a charter city, except to the extent that the same may be adopted by charter or ordinance of the city; except that charter cities shall adopt general plans in any case, and such plans shall be adopted by resolution of the legislative body of the city, or the planning commission if the charter so provides, and such plans shall contain the mandatory elements required by Article 5 [Gov. Code, § 65302] . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.)
In order to understand the significance of Government Code section 65700, subdivision (a), it will be recalled that the concepts of “statewide concern” and “municipal affair” originally arose in the context of determining whether state laws apply to charter cities. A charter city is constitutionally entitled to exercise exclusive authority over all matters deemed to be “municipal affairs.” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5.) In such cases, the city charter supersedes conflicting state law. If the statute in question addresses an area of “statewide concern,” however, then it is deemed applicable to charter cities. (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991)
Thus, if a given statute governing local law is applicable to charter cities, then it ipso facto involves matters of statewide concern, and therefore is also some evidence, when coupled with reference to the “legislative” or “governing body,” of legislative intent to exclude ballot measures. (See COST, supra,
Plaintiffs argue that the mere fact that general plan amendments may have extra-local effects, in such areas as housing and traffic circulation, compels the conclusion that the Legislature intended to restrict the power of initiative. But this argument misreads prior case law. The probability that general plan amendments will have regional or statewide impacts certainly supports the contention that the Legislature possesses the constitutional authority to limit the power of initiative in this area if it chose to do so. (COST, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 511-512.) But whether the Legislature actually intended to limit the power of initiative is another matter. Our examination of the planning law, with its deference to local autonomy, leads us to the conclusion that the Legislature had no such intention, and that therefore the land use element of a general plan can be amended by initiative.
1. Procedural Arguments
Plaintiffs argue that the intent to bar initiative amendments to the general plan can be inferred from the numerous procedural requirements for adopting and amending general plans, as set forth above. In essence, plaintiffs contend that the general plan process requires not only that the amendment be approved by the legislative body, but also that it be prepared by the local planning agency and reviewed by the planning commission. Moreover, plaintiffs point to statutory requirements that the planning agency consult with other public agencies and the public at large when a general plan amendment is being prepared. The exercise of the initiative power circumvents these preparation and review procedures and cannot have been intended, they argue, by the Legislature. For a number of reasons, we disagree.
First, as discussed above, the procedural provisions for amending the general plan do not apply to charter cities. (Gov. Code, § 65700, subd. (a).) Since the Legislature did not consider these statutory procedures of sufficient statewide importance to impose on charter cities, it is highly doubtful that it intended to give them precedence over the constitutional right to initiative.
Second, it is well established in our case law that the existence of procedural requirements for the adoptions of local ordinances generally does not imply a restriction of the power of initiative or referendum. (Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo, supra,
Similarly, in Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo, supra,
These cases exemplify the rule that statutory procedural requirements imposed on the local legislative body generally neither apply to the electorate nor are taken as evidence that the initiative or referendum is barred. The rule is a corollary to the basic presumption in favor of the electorate’s power of initiative and referendum. When the Legislature enacts a statute pertaining to local government, it does so against the background of the electorate’s right of local initiative, and the procedures it prescribes for the local governing body are presumed to parallel, rather than prohibit, the initiative process, absent clear indications to the contrary.
With this rule in mind, we turn to the particular procedural provisions found in the planning law. As stated above, the process for amending the general plan is principally that of holding noticed public hearings before the planning commission and legislative body. (Gov. Code, §§ 65353-65355.) These are precisely the procedures we found consistent with the right of initiative in Associated Home Builders, supra,
Nor do we infer from Government Code section 65351, prescribing public participation during the formulation of a general plan amendment, an intent to preclude amendment by initiative. We find it highly doubtful that the Legislature, in the name of these nonspecific requirements for obtaining community input on general plan amendments, sought to prohibit this most direct form of such input—amendment by initiative. Obviously, when the governing body votes on a general plan amendment, the expression of public opinion on the amendment must come before that vote. When the people exercise their right of initiative, then public input occurs in the act of proposing and circulating the initiative itself, and at the ballot box. We cannot conclude that, for the sake of eliciting public involvement, the Legislature intended to preclude this more direct form of public participation.
Nor do we find the statutory provisions regarding consultation with public agencies prior to the enactment of general plan amendments to implicitly bar
Nor do we take the injunction contained in Government Code section 65103, subdivision (a), that planning departments prepare, review and periodically revise the general plan to bar the right of initiative. The planning law nowhere requires that amendments to the general plan must be initially prepared by the planning agency. Rather, Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a) declares that “[a]n amendment to the general plan shall be initiated in the manner specified by the legislative body.”
In sum, none of the procedural requirements imposed on the legislative body by the planning law can be presumed to limit the right to amend the general plan by initiative.
Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a), authorizes the legislative body to amend the general plan when it “deems it to be in the public interest.” Elections Code section 9125, on the other hand, provides that no initiative adopted by either the voters or the board of supervisors “shall be repealed or amended except by a vote of the people, unless provision is otherwise made in the original ordinance.” Plaintiffs claim that Elections Code section 9125, by forbidding the board of supervisors to further amend general plan amendments that have been enacted by initiative, interferes with the board’s authority to amend the general plan whenever it is in the “public interest” to do so, and could not have been what the Legislature intended. Plaintiffs therefore conclude that the Legislature must not have contemplated general plan amendment by initiative. We disagree.
As discussed above, the planning law is intended to grant a large degree of legislative discretion to local jurisdictions in the general plan amendment process. The governing body’s power to amend the general plan in Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a) is stated as a discretionary authority, rather than a mandatory duty. It is true that “[l]ocal agencies must periodically review and revise their general plans as circumstances warrant . . . .” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990)
On the other hand, Elections Code section 9125 has its roots in the constitutional right of the electorate to initiative, ensuring that successful initiatives will not be undone by subsequent hostile boards of supervisors. Although Elections Code section 9125 limits a board’s authority to pass general plan amendments, it is true that all initiatives place limits on a governing body’s capacity to legislate in areas that are otherwise statutorily authorized, some of those limitations quite severe. In Associated Home
Plaintiffs argue, nonetheless, that the rigidity of a general plan initiative amendment frustrates the basic purposes of the planning law. They claim that one of the hallmarks of good planning is that it be “flexible and responsive to changing circumstances and values.” (Curtin & Jacobson, Growth Control by the Ballot Box: California’s Experience (1991) 24 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 1073, 1102.) A static general plan is one that will be ineffective and eventually obsolete. Since legislation should be construed to effectuate its purpose (Dubois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993)
It is certainly true that “[w]hen uncertainty arises in a question of statutory interpretation, consideration must be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. [Citation.] In this regard, it is presumed the Legislature intended reasonable results consistent with its expressed purpose, not absurd consequences.” (Harris v. Capitol Growth Investors XTV (1991)
There is no doubt that some degree of flexibility is desirable in the planning process. On the other hand, it is also desirable that plans possess some degree of stability so that they can be “comprehensive [and] long-term” guides to local development. (Gov. Code, § 65300; see also Perry, The Local “General Plan” in California (1971) 9 San Diego L.Rev. 1, 5-6.) As we stated in Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973)
Commentators have noted the tension between the ideal of the general plan as a long-range vision of local land use, and the reality that general plans are often amended in a fragmentary fashion to accommodate new development. One survey of California city and county planning departments shows that approximately 75 percent of proposed planning and zoning amendments are privately initiated in conjunction with development applications, and that approximately 66 to 75 percent of these amendments are ultimately approved. (Dalton, Limits of Regulation: Evidence from Local Plan Implementation in California (1989) 55 J. Am. Planning Assn., 151,156, 159 [hereafter Limits of Regulation]; see also Fulton, Guide to California Planning (1991) p. 66; Glickfeld, Local Initiatives in the 90s: Coming to Terms with an Imperfect Voice of Democracy in 1 Land Use Forum (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) pp. 99, 100 [hereafter Local Initiatives in the 90’s]; and see, e.g., Yost v. Thomas, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 569; Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985)
The planning law leaves it largely to each locality to balance the competing values of flexibility and stability in the planning process. The law allows cities and counties the discretion to determine how often a general plan is to be amended, with two exceptions: (1) that the housing element of the general plan must be amended at least once every five years (Gov. Code, § 65588, subd. (b)); and (2) as stated above, with certain narrow exceptions, amendments to a mandatory element of the general plan are limited to four per
General plan amendments such as the County’s Measure J are one response to what some localities view as unwelcome development pressures. (See, Local Initiatives in the 90’s, supra, at pp. 99-100.) The purpose of the initiative, as articulated in an amicus curiae brief by the cities of Napa County (the Cities) in support of the County, is to protect agricultural land from the encroachment of suburban development. The phenomenon of sprawling development has been identified as a serious land use problem in this state. (See, e.g., Bank of America et al., Beyond Sprawl: New Patterns of Growth to Fit the New California (1995) [report examining the increasing economic and environmental costs of suburban sprawl and calling for fundamental changes in state growth patterns]; Sierra Club v. City of Hayward (1981)
Measure J does not eliminate the ability of local governing bodies to accommodate new development. As explained at greater length in part III of this opinion, Measure J does not, and indeed cannot, interfere with the ability of cities to annex adjacent territory, because the municipal annexation of land is a matter of statewide concern beyond the reach of the initiative process. (Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispo (1983)
Measure J is, in short, an attempt to manage growth so as to protect both Napa County’s environment and its economically productive resources in
Our ruling today does not imply that localities may allow their general plans to become obsolete. Indeed, since the passage of Measure J, the Napa County General Plan has continued to be amended and updated, as the trial court found. It is of course conceivable that the Napa County General Plan will, as the result of Measure J, fall so far behind changing local conditions that the County will fail to fulfill an implied statutory duty to keep its general plan current. (See Garat v. City of Riverside, supra,
So it is in this case. The planning agency will continue to be able to review and propose revisions to the plan pursuant to Government Code section 65103, subdivision (a), and the board of supervisors will continue to amend the general plan in ways that do not conflict with the provisions of Measure J. If a future board determines that a part of the general plan enacted by voter initiative must be amended for the sake of general plan currency, then the board can propose such an amendment to the electorate, as Measure J provides.
3. Lack of Environmental Review
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature intended all general plan amendments to undergo environmental review, arid that because initiatives are exempt from such review, the Legislature must not have contemplated amendment of the general plan by initiative. We find this argument also without merit.
General plan amendments are indeed generally subject to environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public
On the other hand, the CEQA guidelines specifically exempt initiatives from environmental review. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15378, subd. (b)(4); see also Northwood Homes, Inc. v. Town of Moraga, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1206-1207; Stein v. City of Santa Monica (1980)
Several attempts have been made to amend the Elections Code in the years following the 1987 enactment of the predecessor to section 9111 to require environmental scrutiny. Assembly Bill No. 4678, 1987-1988 Regular Session, as introduced on March 1, 1988, would have subjected all initiatives considered “projects” under Public Resources Code section 21065—which, as we have noted, includes general plan amendments—to environmental review after the initiative was approved. The initiative would become effective only on the filing of a notice of approval of an environmental impact report or other document required under Public Resources Code section 21152, subdivision (a). These environmental review provisions were never enacted.
Assembly Bill No. 628, 1989-1990 Regular Session, would have required that all proposed local land use initiatives be referred to the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research for extensive environmental and economic analysis before being submitted to the voters. Moreover, Assembly Bill No. 628 would have allowed the local legislative body to place amendments to the proposed initiative concurrently on the ballot. Assembly Bill No. 628 also contained a declaration that local land use initiative measures “are not matters of purely local concern. They are matters in which there is a
While only limited inferences can be drawn from bills that the Legislature failed to enact (see Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993)
In conclusion, we find none of plaintiffs’ arguments against the validity of general plan initiative amendments to be persuasive. Although we have focused in the above discussion primarily on legislative intent, it is worth recalling the probable intention of those who framed and adopted the 1911 amendments granting the rights of initiative and referendum. As is too well known to merit recounting, the major impetus behind these amendments was to enable the people of this state, on the local level and statewide, to reclaim the legislative power from the influence of what in contemporary parlance is called the “special interests.” (See Key & Crouch, Initiative and Referendum in Cal. (1938) pp. 431-434.) So the voters of Napa County have attempted to do with Measure J and, regardless of the wisdom of the initiative, article II, section 11 of the California Constitution guarantees their right to do so absent the clear indication that the Legislature intended to preempt that power pursuant to a statewide purpose. As shown above, none of plaintiffs’ arguments convincingly demonstrates such intent. Nor do their arguments overcome the persuasive force of Elections Code section 9111. We therefore
III. The Validity of the 30-year Term of Measure J and Its Voter Approval Provisions
Plaintiffs contend that even if general plan amendments by initiative are generally valid, the particular initiative in question in this case— Measure J—is unlawful because of its mandatory voter approval requirements. As stated above, Measure J adds section 9 to the land use element of the general plan. That section provides that, with certain exceptions, the land use designations enacted by initiative can be changed during a 30-year period only by a majority vote of the county electorate. We do not agree that these voter approval provisions render Measure J invalid.
As discussed above, Elections Code section 9125 provides that initiative measures cannot be repealed “except by a vote of the people, unless provision is otherwise made in the original [initiative] ordinance.” Thus, if the 30-year voter-approval provisions had not been included in Measure J, redesignation of the land included in that measure could have been accomplished only by voter approval in any case. Section 9 of Measure J merely formalizes the voter approval requirement implied by Elections Code section 9125 and limits the term such requirement will remain in effect.
In Builders Assn, of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Court (1974)
Plaintiffs argue that the present case is distinguishable from Builders Assn, of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties because the planning law, unlike the zoning law in the latter case, expressly provides in Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a), that the legislative body may amend a general plan whenever it deems it to be in the public interest. But, as explained in part H.E.2. of this opinion, ante, we are unable to discern in Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a), any intention to limit the power of local initiative. Neither can we discern a design in the planning law to limit the operation of Elections Code section 9125 in prohibiting supervisorial repeal of initiatives.
Plaintiffs would also have us distinguish Builders Assn, of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties because the latter entailed a two-year freeze, while Measure J provides for thirty years. But we have no principled basis for converting this quantitative distinction into a qualitative one. Elections Code section 9125 sets no limit on the length of time an initiative can remain in force, and the 30-year period set by Measure J is lawful.
Plaintiffs cite L.I.F.E. Committee v. City of Lodi (1989)
Plaintiffs cite cases concluding that certain initiatives imposing voter approval requirements on local legislative action were invalid. (Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court (1991)
The present case is distinguishable from Citizens for Responsible Behavior and Patterson in an important respect. It may indeed be the case that initiative ordinances broadly limiting the power of future legislative bodies to carry out their duties pursuant to either a governing charter or their own inherent police power, are, as it were, “constitutional” rather than legislative measures. Such measures may therefore be either improper amendments to a city or county charter, or else may improperly create a charter-like provision in a city or county that does not possess one. But if the electorate enacts a
We therefore find the voter approval provisions of Measure J to be lawful.
IV. Disposition
For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
Lucas, C. J., Kennard, J., George, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
Notes
On January 1, 1995, after this case had been briefed and argued, the repeal and reenactment of the Elections Code went into effect. Although none of the Elections Code provisions pertinent to this case underwent any substantive modification, they were reorganized and renumbered. For the sake of currency and consistency, all Elections Code references will be to the newly enacted code.
A number of amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of both plaintiffs and the County. For the sake of convenience, amici curiae’s arguments will be attributed to the parties in this case.
The dissent eruditely recounts the pre-1971 history of the planning law, and in particular the planning law’s antecedents in the Standard Planning Act. A comparison between Standard Planning Act and the current planning law makes clear, however, that the Legislature has decisively rejected the Standard Planning Act’s model of planning as something distinct from the local legislative function, to be performed by an apolitical planning commission. Instead, the current planning law recognizes unequivocally that planning is a legislative undertaking (see Gov. Code, § 65301.5), and therefore, as explained below, presumptively the proper subject of popular initiative.
Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a), states in pertinent part that “[i]f it deems it to be in the public interest, the legislative body may amend all or part of an adopted general plan. An amendment to the general plan shall be initiated in the manner specified by the legislative body.”
California Constitution, article II, section 11 provides: “Initiative and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city and county under procedures that the Legislature shall provide. This section does not affect a city having a charter.”
Elections Code section 9116 provides that, once a board of supervisors is presented with a legally valid initiative petition, it may either “[p]ass the ordinance without alteration” or call a special election “at which the ordinance, without alteration, shall be submitted to a vote of the voters of the county.”
Plaintiffs further argue that there are types of initiatives that could affect the internal inconsistency of a general plan, but are not themselves plan amendments. They cite only one example of such initiative, derived from Marblehead v. City of San Clemente (1991)
Plaintiffs also contend that this language in Government Code section 65358, subdivision (a), implies a prohibition of the right of initiative. We disagree. In view of the foregoing discussion, we presume that the Legislature intended to give local governing bodies the authority to establish procedures for initiating general plan amendments that come before them, rather than the authority to bar initiatives.
We also disagree with plaintiffs’ argument that Government Code section 65356, because it prescribes that the general plan shall be amended “by resolution,” indicates a legislative intent to bar the initiative. Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to “ordinances” being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an “ordinance” or “resolution.” (Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915)
The dissent refers to the “logical impossibility of reconciling the initiative process with the planning agency’s express statutory mandate [under Gov. Code, § 65103, subd. (a)] to periodically review and revise, as necessary, the general plan.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 805.) No such logical impossibility exists. First it is clear, when Government Code section 65103,
It is therefore no more “logically impossible” for a local planning agency to continue to propose amendments to the general plan in the face of Measure J’s voter approval requirements than it is impossible for the agency to propose such amendments in the face of the voters’ right to disapprove general plan amendments by their exercise of the power of refererendum. (See Yost v. Thomas, supra,
In deciding today that the land use element of the general plan may be amended by initiative, we have no occasion to consider whether the same is true for the housing element. As noted above, the housing element, unlike the other mandatory elements, must be amended according to a fixed schedule—at least once every five years. (Gov. Code, § 65588, subd. (b).) Moreover, any draft amendment to the housing element must be submitted to the State Department of Housing and Community Development for review and comments. (Gov. Code, § 65585.)
In the present case, Measure J neither purports to amend the housing element nor was found inconsistent with it. Thus, we do not decide the status of an initiative that either amends or conflicts with the housing element of a general plan.
We emphasize that an initiative amendment must conform to all the formal requirements imposed on general plan amendments enacted by the legislative body. The amendment itself may not be internally inconsistent, or cause the general plan as a whole to become internally inconsistent (Gov. Code, § 65300.5), or to become insufficiently comprehensive (id., § 65300), or to lack any of the statutory specifications for the mandatory elements of the general plan set forth in Government Code section 65302. (See Garat v. County of Riverside, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 293-294.) If a general plan amendment is substantively deficient, then it may be challenged on that basis, and courts have sufficient remedies to correct the problem. (See Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors, supra,
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent.
The question before the court is whether a county’s comprehensive general plan for land use and development may be amended by initiative. The issue turns on the meaning to be accorded certain provisions of the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov. Code, § 65000 et seq.)
Discussion
A. Elections Code Section 9111
It is telling that the majority begins its analysis not with the language, structure and history of the planning law, but with a temporally and textually unrelated provision of the Elections Code. The latter, Elections Code section 9111, was part of a package of amendments first enacted in 1987 (50 years
Once an initiative petition containing the requisite number of signatures is submitted to the county clerk, the law requires that the board of supervisors either enact the proposed ordinance without alteration, or submit it to the voters. (Elec. Code, § 9116.) Elections Code section 9111 created an additional step in the process by authorizing the board to submit a proposed initiative measure to any county agency for a report on its fiscal impact, its “effect on the internal consistency of the county’s general plan and specific plans including the housing element, the consistency between planning and zoning,” or any other matters requested by the board.
The majority claims that the reference in Elections Code section 9111 to “internal consistency of the county’s general plan” provides decisive evidence of the Legislature’s intention to subject general plans to amendment by initiative. As evidence of the legislative intent underlying the planning act, however, the Elections Code provision is decidedly inapposite. The views of the Legislature in 1987 have little relevance to the intentions of an earlier Legislature in assigning responsibility for general plan amendments to the local “legislative body.” (Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984)
Nor does Elections Code section 9111 persuasively establish a contemporary legislative “understanding” that a general plan may be amended by initiative. The statute does not purport to define the scope of the initiative power. It was enacted as part of an overall revision of the initiative notice provisions, and was aimed at providing the board of supervisors with information to better deal with proposed initiatives. As one committee staff analysis observed, the purpose of the provision was to accord the board of supervisors the “opportunity to make an informed decision on a proposed initiative . . . .” (Assem. Com. on Elections, Reapportionment and Constitutional Amendments, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2202 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) May 4, 1987.)
The majority’s argument rests entirely on the supposition that Elections Code section 9111 cannot be “reconciled” with any conclusion other than a
It is illogical and unnecessary, therefore, to infer a legislative stamp of approval on the kinds of information that may be contained in the notice provisions of Election Code section 9111. Indeed, since it was part of an overall legislative revision of the initiative notice provisions, it appears much more likely that the statute was designed to enhance the response capabilities of the local legislative body rather than to define the scope of the initiative power. Given the uncertain intentions underlying the statute, it is dubious at best to conclude that it rebuts the clear inference of a legislative intent to vest exclusive authority in the local “legislative body.”
B. The Planning Law
1. The Text Specifically Contemplates Amendment by the Local Legislature
Turning to the more pertinent provisions of the planning law itself, one finds at the outset that the relevant statutes strongly support the inference of a legislative intent to repose specific authority over general plan enactments and amendments with the local governing bodies of cities and counties. The adoption or amendment of a general plan begins with the local “planning agency,” which may consist of a planning department, planning commission, or the legislative body itself. (§ 65100.) Each planning agency is charged with the initial responsibility to “prepare, periodically review, and revise, as necessary, the general plan,” and then forward its recommendations to the local legislative body. (§ 65103, subd. (a).) “The legislative body shall [in turn] adopt or amend a general plan by resolution, which resolution shall be adopted by the affirmative vote of not less than a majority of the total membership of the legislative body. The legislative body may approve, modify, or disapprove the recommendation of the planning commission, if
As guided by our seminal decision in Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988)
This bare inference finds additional support in the statute. As discussed more fully in the part that follows, the planning law creates a unique, process-intensive structure for the enactment and amendment of general plans. It begins with the planning agency, a highly specialized body of individuals charged with the responsibility to review proposed amendments to the general plan and, when necessary, to propose revisions of its own. (§ 65103, subd. (a).) Thus, from the outset the statutory procedure for the amendment of general plans is irreconcilable with the initiative process, since the latter requires no planning agency review before submission to the voters.
Furthermore, section 65356 provides for enactment of a general plan by “resolution . . . adopted by the affirmative vote of not less than a majority of the total membership of the legislative body.” Plainly only a representative legislative body can adopt a law by “resolution.” Furthermore, the explicit statutory reference to a majority of the legislative body’s “membership” clearly suggests an assemblage composed of individual “members.” Thus, it is reasonably clear from the plain text that the Legislature specifically contemplated the city council or county board of supervisors when it provided for adoption and amendment of the general plan by the local “legislative body.”
It is apparent that the Legislature not only specifically contemplated the local representative body to be the source of amending authority, but considered it to be the exclusive source of such authority. The text of the planning law offers substantial guidance here, as well. As explained below, the express statutory goals of the general plan—comprehensiveness and consistency—are integrally related to, and can only be fully accomplished by, the elaborate legislative process designed to achieve them. The legislative ends, in short, dictate the legislative means.
In determining legislative intent, it is well settled that courts may look to a variety of sources, including the overall statutory scheme of which the law is a part, the ostensible objects to be achieved, and, where available, the legislative history. (People v. Woodhead (1987)
As noted earlier, the process of adopting or amending a general plan begins with the local planning agency. The latter is charged with the initial responsibility to prepare a plan. (§ 65103, subd. (a).) To ensure comprehensiveness, the planning agency may “enter upon any land and make examinations and surveys” (§ 65105), and must “[d]uring the preparation or amendment of the general plan . . . provide opportunities for the involvement of citizens, public agencies, public utility companies, and civic, education, and other community groups . . . .” (§65351.) Furthermore, to
As the statutory provisions summarized above make clear, comprehensiveness and consistency represent the fundamental guiding principles of the general plan, and the elaborate planning process—with its emphasis on widespread public involvement during general plan preparation and periodic review and revision by the planning agency to maintain the general plan’s internal consistency—represent the essential means of achieving these goals. Thus understood, the conclusion logically and inescapably follows that the Legislature must have considered the local legislative body to be the exclusive means of general plan adoption and amendment. For the requirement of broad public input at the preparation stage, where competing interests may be balanced, demographic studies and surveys may be consulted, alternatives may be debated, and language may be modified and fine-tuned, can only be accomplished by the planning agency and the local legislative body acting through the traditional deliberative process.
The initiative offers many advantages as a legislative model, but it can not accommodate the planning law’s clear mandate for broad community input at the formulative stage of general plan development. An initiative measure may be conceived and drafted with the involvement of numerous community interests, or one. It may seek to balance competing development policies, or elevate one approach to the exclusion of all others. An initiative measure is offered to the public on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and cannot be altered, amended or fine-tuned. An initiative can not achieve, in short, the fundamental legislative goal of a comprehensive blueprint for physical development formulated through widespread community involvement.
What is the majority’s answer to the logical conundrum of reconciling the initiative process with the express statutory requirement of community involvement at the formulative stage? It declares the evidence to be “doubtful” and moves on, which is somewhat akin to declaring victory and abandoning the field.
Consistency represents the second major goal of the general plan, as explained in section 65300.5: “[T]he Legislature intends that the general plan and elements and parts thereof comprise an integrated, internally consistent and compatible statement of policies for the adopting agency.” (See
If a general plan were subject to amendment by initiative rather than through the prescribed statutory process, the oversight function performed by the planning agency would be destroyed, and an ad hoc element introduced into a process that places the ultimate premium on comprehensiveness and consistency. Consistency, moreover, requires flexibility. As transportation conditions change, for example, noise, air quality, safety, and housing patterns are affected. If the general plan or some element thereof were subject to amendment solely by means of the initiative power because of the constraints of Elections Code sections 9125 and 9217, the planning agency’s statutory responsibility to periodically revise or update the general plan to correlate its parts (§ 65103, subd. (a); Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra,
What is the majority’s response to the logical impossibility of reconciling the initiative process with the planning agency’s express statutory mandate to periodically review and revise, as necessary, the general plan? It declares that nothing in the statute “suggests that a general plan that has not been prepared or reviewed by a planning department is invalid,” but conspicuously omits any reference to the equally important requirement of revising, as necessary, the general plan to address changing conditions and to maintain internal consistency. Thus, the majority violates the cardinal principle that one must conform theory to facts, not arrange facts to fit theory.
Finally, the majority opinion places substantial reliance on Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976)
The majority’s inference from Associated Home Builders, supra,
The present facts and circumstances are, indeed, wholly distinguishable from Associated Home Builders, supra,
Enactment of a zoning ordinance, moreover, is a generally routine procedure, not the process-intensive exercise of the general plan. To be sure,
Furthermore, unlike the general plan which is regional in scope and thus a matter of statewide concern, zoning has been consistently characterized as a matter of local concern and hence a purely “municipal affair.” (COST, supra,
“The hallmarks of good land use planning are that decisions are well informed, [that] the planning process is flexible and responsive to changing circumstances and values, and that decisions reflect a comprehensive planning process and accommodate competing public interests.” (Curtin & Jacobson, Growth Control by the Ballot Box: California’s Experience (1991) 24 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 1073, 1102.) These “hallmarks of good land use planning” represent, in fact, the fundamental principles and objectives of the general plan as expressly delineated by the Legislature in the planning law. The accomplishment of these objectives, as explained above, is dependent upon the legislative process mandated by the planning law, and thus excludes resort to the initiative power.
C. Legislative History
Although neither the parties nor the majority has mined the extensive history of the planning law for whatever light it might shed on the problem before us, a review of that history reveals certain broad themes which strongly support the inference of a legislative intent to vest exclusive authority over the adoption and amendment of general plans in the local legislative body.
Planning and zoning laws in the United States were among a number of reforms associated with the multifaceted movement known as Progressivism that arose during the first decades of this century. Like other Progressive reforms such as the commission form of government, at-large voting districts, health and sanitation measures, and the “city beautiful” movement, the impetus behind planning and zoning reflected a broader “search for order” and faith in the power of scientific planning to solve social ills.
Although a subject of considerable academic interest, planning and zoning laws had been enacted in only a few states before the mid-1920’s. The pace of legislation increased dramatically, however, after an advisory committee to the United States Department of Commerce, under the leadership of then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, promulgated model legislation for zoning and planning titled, respectively, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (Advisory Com. on City Planning and Zoning, U.S. Dept, of Commerce (1926) and A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (Advisory Com. on City Planning and Zoning, U.S. Dept, of Commerce (1928) (Standard Planning Act or Act)). Both model acts exerted wide influence almost immediately; by the end of 1927, some 29 states had adopted zoning enabling legislation based largely on the standard zoning act (Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan (1955) 68 Harv. L.Rev. 1154, 1155-1156); many states also adopted separate planning statutes, including California, which in 1927 adopted the state’s original planning law, modeled to a large extent on a draft of the Standard Planning Act. (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, p. 1899; Standard Planning Act, p. iv; see also Kent, The Urban General Plan (1964) pp. 13, 32-64; Perry, The Local “General Plan” in California (1971) 9 San Diego L.Rev. 1, 2-3.)
The authors of the Standard Planning Act expressed their ideas and the purposes underlying the Act’s provisions in a series of explanatory footnotes appended to the original report to the Department of Commerce. These comments are remarkable in a number of respects, not least for their clarity
The authors devoted considerable attention in their comments to the nature and functions of the planning commission, which in turn reflected their conception of the master plan itself. The latter was envisioned as a broad statement of development policies and goals for the city as a whole, “designed to cover a long period of future years.” (Standard Planning Act, pp. 7-8, fn. 10.) This distinguished the master plan from other planning devices, such as zoning and subdivision maps, which were seen as simply tools to implement short-term land-use decisions in a manner consistent with the master plan’s general scheme. (Kent, The Urban General Plan, supra, p. 35.) To ensure internal consistency within the plan itself, piecemeal drafting and frequent amendments were also discouraged: “The city plan is an organic whole, every part of which, whether considered territorially or as to subject matter, is organically interrelated with every other part.” (Standard Planning Act, p. 17, fn. 42.) The planning process itself was viewed as a highly specialized discipline requiring consultation with experts in city planning, architecture, engineering, and the like. (Id. at p. 12.)
The powers and functions of the planning commission reflected the master plan concept. Under the Standard Planning Act, the commission was vested with plenary authority over the promulgation and adoption of the master plan. “It shall be the function and duty of the commission to make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the municipality, including any areas outside of its boundaries which, in the commission’s judgment,
Thus, the authors’ conception of the master plan as a comprehensive statement of long-term development policies, requiring the application and integration of multiple disciplines in fields as diverse and exacting as economics, engineering, geology, architecture and city planning, by definition disqualified the city council from direct participation; the local legislative body, in the authors’ view, was more properly concerned with short-term political and fiscal problems than long-term, technical planning issues. (See Kent, The Urban General Plan, supra, pp. 53-59.) Of course, this did not preclude the city council from participating in all land-use decisions. On the contrary, as earlier noted, the same advisory committee that created the Standard Planning Act promulgated a standard zoning law which expressly vested authority over zoning decisions in the local “legislative body.” (A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, reprinted in Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (1949) pp. 547-551.) The authors’ differing treatment of zoning and planning undoubtedly reflected their perception of zoning as basically one of several conventional means of implementing the master plan, and therefore properly subject to short-term political pressures and
2. The Planning Act in California
As noted above, California adopted its first planning law in 1927 modeled, to a large extent, upon the Standard Planning Act. (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, pp. 1899-1913.) Consistent with the Act, the California law authorized cities and counties to create a planning commission composed of members appointed by the chief executive officer and the local legislative body. In terms nearly identical to the Act, the California law vested primary authority in the planning commission to “make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the municipality, or county, and of any land outside its boundaries which, in the commission’s judgment, bears relation to the planning thereof.” (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, § 4, p. 1901.) Also in accordance with the Act, the California planning law charged the commission with the essential task of making “careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of present conditions and future growth of the municipality, or county, with due regard to its relation to neighboring territory,” for the ultimate “purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the municipality, or county, and its environs . . . .” (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, § 5, pp. 1901-1902.) Also consistent with the Act, the California statute required the commission to hold at least one public hearing before adopting the master plan or any substantial revision thereof.
In a departure from the Standard Planning Act, the California law provided for referral of the master plan adopted by the planning commission to the local “legislative body.” (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, § 7, p. 1902.) The latter, following notice and a hearing, was empowered to adopt the plan wholesale. However, any changes or additions by the legislative body had to be referred to the planning commission for study and approval. In the event of the commission’s disapproval, the legislative body was authorized to override the commission, but only by a “two-thirds vote of the entire membership of the legislative body . . . .” (Ibid.) Thus, although the planning commission retained primary authority over the drafting and implementation of the master plan, California’s enabling act provided for some participation by the local legislative body.
The planning law was amended in 1929. New provisions were added requiring that the general plan contain specific elements addressing traffic, transportation, transit and parks systems. (Stats. 1929, ch. 838, § 4, p. 1808.) The powers of the planning commission were further enhanced by authorizing the commission to contract with architects, city planners, engineers,
A comprehensive revision of the planning law in 1947 authorized additional elements covering conservation of natural resources, as well as land use, recreation, streets and highways, public services and buildings, community design and housing. (Stats. 1947, ch. 807, §§ 38-46, pp. 1914-1915.) The law continued to place primary responsibility for the drafting and implementation of the master plan on the planning commission, and continued to require the commission to “promote the public interest in and understanding of the master plan and of official plans and regulations relating thereto.” {Id., § 50, p. 1915.) The law further charged the commission with the affirmative duty to “consult and advise with public officials and agencies, public utility companies, civic, educational, professional and other organizations, and with citizens generally with relation to the carrying out of such plans.” {Ibid.) The commission, and its members, were also authorized “in the performance of their functions, [to] enter upon any land and make examinations and surveys,” and were broadly vested with “such power as may be necessary to enable [them] to fulfill [their] functions and carry out the purposes of this act.” {Ibid.) However, while the law continued to require that any revisions suggested by the legislative body be referred to the commission for review and comment, it no longer required a legislative override of those changes disapproved by the commission, leaving the final decision in the hands of the legislative body.
Legislative amendments to the planning law in 1951 (Stats. 1951, ch. 334, p. 675), 1953 (Stats. 1953, ch. 1355, p. 2913), 1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1644, p. 2967), 1965 (Stats. 1965, ch. 1880, p. 4334) and 1971 (Stats. 1971, ch. 1446, p. 2852) gradually expanded the substantive content and enhanced the relative status of the master plan as the fundamental constitution of local development, but left largely intact the respective roles of the planning commission and the local legislative body in the adoption and amendment process.
3. Legislative Intentions
Although the history of the planning law summarized above yields no direct evidence bearing on the role, if any, of the initiative power, it reveals some very relevant themes. Foremost among these is the principle that the legislative process established by the planning law is integral to the achievement of its goals, and that reliance on the initiative power would effectively thwart these goals.
Clearly the authors of the Standard Planning Act did not consider the initiative to be a viable means of enacting or amending the master plan. Indeed, by defining the planning process itself to be a unique and highly specialized function, largely outside the scope and competence of the local legislative body, the Act virtually insulated the master plan from the power of the initiative and referendum. For it was, and is, generally understood that the initiative and referendum extend only to matters that are legislative in nature. (Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915)
California, as noted, never erected the solid wall between the planning commission and the legislative body contemplated by the Standard Planning Act. Although the planning commission retained primary responsibility for the drafting and implementation of the master plan, the local “legislative body” was empowered to review and ultimately approve or disapprove it.
Equally evident from the foregoing history is the fact that from its inception the California planning law embraced the model act’s vision of the master plan as a complex end product requiring a special commission to undertake “careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of present conditions and future growth,” to consult with experts and other interested civic groups and public agencies, to conduct public hearings, and to balance all of these interests in the pursuit of “accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development. . . .” (Stats. 1927, ch. 874, § 5, p. 1901; see also id., §§ 3, 4, p. 1901.)
What the California law mandated, in short, was a particularized process the final outcome of which would serve as the community master plan. The latter constituted a new and unique form of municipal legislation; it was not merely a mundane ordinance dealing with transitory political or fiscal issues, but a comprehensive statement of long-term development policy, the complex culmination of a statutorily mandated process involving demographic surveys, economic studies, expert analyses and consultations, referrals to outside agencies, and public hearings. True to the spirit of the original Standard Planning Act, in sum, the California Legislature enacted a genuine “planning" statute; it mandates not merely a local “plan” but a plan of action, a particularized process or methodology designed ultimately to yield a long-term, comprehensive and harmonious blueprint for future growth.
Thus, the history of the planning law strongly supports the conclusion that amendment of the general plan by the local legislative body represents a necessary and critical component in the achievement of the Legislature’s essential goals.
D. Statewide Concern
As the majority correctly notes, an “important factor” (COST, supra,
Although the distinction can be elusive, this court has made it clear that the term “ ‘statewide’ refers to all matters of more than local concern” (COST, supra,
That land-use planning in general, and the formulation and implementation of the general plan in particular, constitute matters of manifest statewide importance, becomes evident from an examination of the text and the purposes of the planning law as a whole. Although the law ensures that most land-use decisions remain within local control, it also recognizes that those decisions may have profound ramifications for neighboring entities, the region and the state, and therefore requires that each planning agency be guided by and implement certain fundamental state policies and goals. In a prefatory statement of policy and intent, the Legislature has broadly identified those critical state concerns as follows: “The Legislature finds and declares that California’s land is an exhaustible resource, not just a commodity, and is essential to the economy, environment and general well-being of the people of California. It is the policy of the state and the intent of the Legislature to protect California’s land resource, to insure its preservation and use in ways which are economically and socially desirable in an attempt to improve the quality of life in California.” (§ 65030.)
The Legislature has further declared that land-use planning, and the general plan in particular, represent the basic means of ensuring orderly growth throughout the state. Thus, the Legislature has decreed that all “decisions involving the future growth of the state,” while generally subject to local control, must be “guided by an effective planning process, including the local general plan, and should proceed within the framework of officially approved statewide goals and policies directed to land use, population growth and distribution, development, open space, resource preservation and utilization, air and water quality, and other related physical, social and economic development factors.” (§ 65030.1, italics added.) The Legislature has further evidenced its conviction that the general plan and its implementation constitute matters of fundamental statewide interest by requiring that charter cities adopt general plans containing all of the mandatory elements set forth in the act. (§ 65700.)
This court has also recognized the important statewide interest in ensuring effective land-use planning and controlled growth at the local level. As we have observed: “The deleterious consequences of haphazard community growth in this state and the need to prevent further random development are
The “extramunicipal” dimension of the general plan is further evidenced by the nature of its mandatory elements and the process of its formulation. Comprehensive planning necessarily requires consideration and balancing of numerous interrelated social, geographic and economic issues, denominated under the planning law as mandatory “elements”; these currently consist of land use, circulation, housing, conservation, open space, noise and safety. (§ 65302.) The planning law requires that local planning agencies “Promote the coordination of local plans and programs with the plans and programs of other public agencies.” (§ 65103, subd. (f).) To this end, it requires that proposed general plans or amendments thereto must, prior to adoption, be referred for review and comments to abutting cities and counties, the local agency formation commission, and any affected special districts, areawide planning agency, school districts and water suppliers. (§ 65352.)
The planning law also explicitly requires, with respect to certain of the mandatory elements, that the planning agency take into account regional concerns and consult with pertinent regional or state agencies. Safety elements or amendments thereto must be submitted to the Division of Mines and Geology of the State Department of Conservation. (§ 65585, subd. (b).) The housing element must expressly identify and analyze the locality’s housing stock and set forth goals, policies and quantified objectives in relation to the locality’s share of the regional housing needs (§§ 65583, subd. (a)(1), 65584); the local planning agency must submit a draft housing element or draft amendment to the State Department of Housing and Community Development for review and comments. (§ 65585, subd. (b).)
The housing element may be the most obvious, but is far from the only mandatory element with significant regional ramifications. As the General Plan Guidelines formulated by the Office of Planning and Research observe, it is increasingly important for planning agencies “to view the local general plan in its regional context. Traditionally, the concept of ‘community’ encompassed only a local entity—the city or county. With increasing urbanization and the growing interdependence of local governments, particularly in metropolitan areas, the concept has developed a regional perspective. Each local planning agency carries a responsibility to coordinate its general plan with regional planning efforts as much as possible. ...[¶] Issues of regional importance may include transportation, housing, schools, commerce, employment, growth management, public utility service, communications, infrastructure, solid and hazardous waste management, water and air quality,
The regional perspective mandated by the planning law has been recognized by the courts as well. As we observed in Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972)
Notwithstanding the evidence summarized above, the majority concludes that the general plan cannot be deemed to be a matter of statewide concern. The flaws in the majority’s reasoning are self-evident. First, it confuses local control with local interest, erroneously concluding that because land-use decisions remain primarily within the control of local entities the general plan must be a matter of purely municipal concern. The retention of local control is not dispositive, however. Indeed, this court rejected a similar argument in COST, supra,
The Legislature has made it clear that each local entity must implement the provisions of the planning act “in ways that accommodate local conditions and circumstances, while meeting its minimum [statutory] requirements.” (§ 65300.7, italics added.) Local decisions, including the general plan, must “proceed within the framework of officially approved statewide
An additional fallacy underlying the majority’s conclusion lies in its failure to appreciate the fundamental general plan principles of comprehensiveness and consistency. For example, the circulation element is not simply an internal transportation plan; it has “direct relationships with the housing, open space, noise and safety elements” (General Plan Guidelines, supra, ch. 3, p. 91), and must be specifically correlated with the land use element, as well. (§ 65302, subd. (b).) Transportation routes affect human and physical settlement patterns throughout the region, which in turn have a major impact on air quality, plant and animal habitats, and noise, as well as a significant influence on the regional economy in terms of delivery of materials, products, and workers. (Ibid., see Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Tuolumne (1982)
Similar interrelationships and regional interests are inherent in every element of the general plan. Indeed, the initiative measure in this case provides a classic illustration of the profound regional ramifications of amending simply one element—the land-use element—of the general plan. The provisions of Measure J, classifying substantial portions of county land as agricultural, open space or watershed, obviously affect population density and building intensify, which in turn influence transportation and other infrastructure needs, as well as environmental, safety, and aesthetic interests. The statement of “findings and purpose” in Measure J explicitly recognized the interrelated regional interests at stake, observing: “Uncontrolled urban encroachment into agricultural and watershed areas will impair agriculture and threaten the public ... by causing increased traffic congestion, associated air pollution, and potentially serious water problems. . . . Such urban encroachment, or ‘leap-frog development,’ would eventually result in both the unnecessary, expensive extension of public services and facilities and inevitable conflicts between urban and agricultural areas.” The impact on the county’s current and future housing stock, its ability to meet its regional share of housing for all economic segments, was equally plain. As the ballot argument in favor of Measure J pointedly observed: “Napa County is under tremendous pressure to grow from the same forces that produced mushrooming urban sprawl in Contra Costa and Solano Counties. Napa County is a desirable place to live within commuting distance to Bay area jobs, putting it in danger of going the way of other Bay area counties.” Thus, the provisions
The majority’s reliance on case law is equally flawed. It is noted that several dated Court of Appeal decisions held that the general plan concerns matters of purely local rather than statewide interest. (See Duran v. Cassidy (1972)
Finally, the majority’s assertion that the Legislature’s decision to apply the general plan requirement to charter cities somehow undermines the finding of statewide interests can only be described as astonishing, and cannot be taken at face value. As noted, the fact that the Legislature has required the adoption of general plans by charter cities means, by definition, that the Legislature considers the general plan to be a subject of statewide importance. (Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra,
Although certainly deserving of full marks for inventiveness, the argument is nonetheless entirely specious. This court has decided on numerous prior occasions that a matter was of sufficient statewide importance that the legislative decision to vest power in the local representative body implied an exclusion of the local electorate. (See, e.g., Riedman v. Brison (1933)
In a long and reputable series of cases, culminating most recently with Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors (1995) 8 Cal.4th
Our analysis and conclusion in Voters, supra,
I fully agree with the proposition that courts must, whenever reasonably possible, construe an initiative measure to ensure its validity. (Lesher, supra,
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Baxter, J., concurred.
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
Although the term “legislative body” is not expressly defined in the planning law, section 34000 in title 4, pertaining to “Government of Cities,” states that it “means board of trustees, city council, or other governing body of a city.”
The majority observes in a footnote that the planning agency’s statutory mandate to revise the general plan remains subject to final approval by the local legislative body. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 792-793, fn. 10.) This obvious statement underscores my point, since the planning
On Progressivism as an effort by a new class of professionals to achieve order and efficiency through techniques of scientific and administrative control, see the seminal work by Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (1967); see also Hawley, The Great War and a Search for a New Order 1919-1933 (1979); Chambers, The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1900-1917 (1980); and Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (1964).
Although California’s original zoning law was adopted several years before the promulgation of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (Stats. 1917, ch. 734, p. 1419), it contains remarkably similar provisions. (See Comment, The Initiative and Referendum’s Use in Zoning (1976) 64 Cal.L.Rev. 74, 79.)
Although the term “general plan” eventually displaced “master plan” in the statutory scheme, they refer to the same document and are used interchangeably herein.
The authors of the Standard Planning Act explained why a general plan is necessary in terms that apply as well today as when they were written over 60 years ago: “The plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and future needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development; including, among other things, adequate provision for traffic, the promotion of safety from fire and other dangers, adequate provision of light and air, the promotion of healthful and convenient distribution of population, the promotion of good civic design and arrangement, wise and efficient expenditure of public funds, and the adequate provision of public utilities and other public requirements.” (Standard Planning Act, p. 17, fn. 41.)
Although originally discretionary, general plans were eventually made mandatory for all cities and counties. (See Curtin, California Land Use and Planning Law (14th ed. 1994) p. 7.) Perhaps the most significant amendment, however, occurred in 1971, when the Legislature explicitly provided that zoning regulations and subdivision approvals must be consistent with the general plan. (§ 65860, added by Stats. 1971, ch. 1446, p. 2858.) This express requirement solidified the general plan as the fundamental “constitution” for all land use development in the city or county. (Lesher, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 540-541; Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board
The only recent judicial statement even arguably to the contrary is contained in COST, supra,