LATONE JAMES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
SC 19787
Supreme Court of Connecticut
October 17, 2017
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.*
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Pursuant to statute (
The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder and robbery in the first degree, appealed from the denial of his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting, inter alia, that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, had improperly calculated the applicable presentence confinement credit. The petitioner, who had been held in lieu of bond on multiple charges following his arrest, was tried and convicted of robbery. The trial court declared a mistrial on the remaining charges, including the felony murder charge, and sentenced the petitioner to twenty years of imprisonment on the robbery conviction. The respondent subsequently credited the robbery sentence for the petitioner‘s presentence confinement in accordance with
(Two justices dissenting in one opinion)
Argued March 30—officially released October 17, 2017
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
Judie L. Marshall, with whom, on the brief, was Walter C. Bansley IV, for the appellant (petitioner).
Madeline A. Melchionne, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Terrence M. O‘Neill, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (respondent).
EVELEIGH, J. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the calculation of presentence confinement credit should be adjusted for concurrent sentences imposed under one docket number but on different dates. The petitioner, Latone James, appeals from the denial of his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which alleged, inter alia, that the calculation of his presentence confinement credit was incorrect. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, claims that it calculated the petitioner‘s presentence confinement credit pursuant to
The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. The petitioner was arrested and charged, under Docket No. CR-95-0235106,2 with one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of
The petitioner was retried before a jury on the charge of felony murder under Docket No. CR-95-0235106. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The petitioner had originally moved to dismiss this charge on the ground that retrial violated the prohibition against double jeopardy contained within the fifth amendment to the United States constitution.3 See footnote 13 of this opinion. The trial court denied that motion, the petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed. State v. James, 247 Conn. 662, 673-74, 725 A.22 316 (1999).
On August 5, 1999, while the petitioner was imprisoned for robbery, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the felony murder charge. On August 13, 1999, the petitioner was sentenced to fifty years of imprisonment for felony murder, to run concurrently with his prior robbery sentence. The petitioner spent 973 days in the respondent‘s custody from the date he was sentenced for robbery to the date sentenced for felony murder. In
The respondent did not apply any presentence confinement credit to the petitioner‘s felony murder sentence, except for one day of credit pursuant to
The respondent asserts that the 651 days of presentence confinement credit are not applicable to the felony murder sentence. The respondent relies on the language of
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the appropriate standard of review. “Although a habeas court‘s findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review, questions of law are subject to plenary review.” Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 816, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003); see also Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548, 559, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017). The parties do not dispute any of the material facts, and we are asked solely to determine the proper construction of
Therefore, this case presents a question of statutory construction, an issue of law over which we exercise plenary review. Cales v. Office of Victim Services, 319 Conn. 697, 701, 127 A.3d 154 (2015). In determining the meaning of a statute, we look first to the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes.
We begin by examining the statutory text. Section 18-98d governs the crediting of presentence confinement time to prisoners. Section 18-98d (a) (1) provides in relevant part: “[a]ny person who is confined to a community correctional center or a correctional institution for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, under a mittimus or because such person is unable to obtain bail or is denied bail shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of such person‘s sentence equal to the number of days which such person spent in such facility from the time such person was placed in presentence confinement to the time such person began serving the term of imprisonment imposed; provided (A) each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement; and (B) the provisions of this section shall only apply to a person for whom the existence of a mittimus, an inability to obtain bail or the denial of bail is the sole reason for such person‘s presentence confinement, except that if a person is serving a term of imprisonment at the same time such person is in presentence confinement on another charge and the conviction for such imprisonment is reversed on appeal, such person shall be entitled, in any sentence subsequently imposed, to a reduction based on such presentence confinement in accordance with the provisions of this section. . . .”
Although the petitioner is asserting a general challenge to his presentence confinement credit, the challenge can be split into two separate claims. The first claim is that the 651 days of presentence confinement credit originally applied to the robbery sentence should be transferred to the felony murder sentence. The second claim is that the 973 days he spent in prison serving his sentence for robbery should be converted to presentence confinement credit and applied to his felony murder sentence. We address each of these claims in turn.
Whether the 651 days the petitioner was confined while awaiting his first trial, and which was applied to his robbery sentence, can also be applied to the felony murder sentence implicates
The petitioner asserts that if the mistrial had not occurred, “all sentences” for the crimes of robbery and felony murder would have been imposed at once and the 651 days would have been credited toward the sentences for both robbery and felony murder. Because of the mistrial, however, only the robbery sentence was imposed after the petitioner‘s initial trial, and, by the time he was sentenced for felony murder, the 651 days had already been counted once. The text of
We next turn to other related statutes. In the present case, the petitioner‘s sentences for robbery and felony murder run concurrently. Therefore,
Construing
An examination of the brief legislative history of both
Sections 18-976 and 18-98,7 although not operative in the present case, are still persuasive authority in determining the overall intent of granting presentence confinement credit.8 Section 18-97 addressed presentence confinement credit when a prisoner was held due to a mittimus, and § 18-98 addressed presentence confinement credit due to a denial of bail or inability to obtain bail. Section 18-97 was not discussed at any time in its legislative history; see Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1967 Sess., pp. 554-55, 578-80; 12 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1967 Sess., p. 2182; 12 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1967 Sess., pp. 3869-73;9 but has been expanded upon previously by this court in Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981).
In Delevieleuse, we construed
We referenced the enactment of
Section 18-98, unlike
The intent behind
A review of the legislative history reveals no intent by the legislature to treat prisoners in the petitioner‘s position differently, or somehow not to give them credit for time spent in confinement. Specifically, nothing in the legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to deny prisoners credit for time they spent confined for the sole reason that a mistrial had resulted in sentencing on different days. Put a different way, there is no evidence that the legislature intended to penalize prisoners when the state‘s failure to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt gives rise to a mistrial
On the basis of the language of
The respondent asserts that this court‘s decision in Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 271 Conn. 822-23, requires that the 651 day presentence confinement credit not be applied to the petitioner‘s sentence for felony murder. In Harris, this court refused to permit the transfer of presentence confinement credits to a later imposed sentence that was to run concurrently with an earlier sentence. Id., 809–10. In that case, the petitioner, Randy Harris, was arrested for various charges and held in presentence confinement for 780 days. Id., 811–12. While in prison awaiting sentencing on these charges, Harris was charged with certain separate offenses. Id. His total presentence confinement for the later charges was 751 days, which overlapped with the presentence confinement time associated with the earlier charges. Id. When Harris was sentenced on the earlier charges, the respondent applied a presentence confinement credit of 780 days. Id., 813. Harris subsequently received a sentence on the later charges that was to run concurrently with his earlier sentence. Id., 812. The respondent did not apply any presentence confinement credit to his sentence for the later charges because that credit had already been used on the earlier charges and, according to the respondent, the use of the credit was barred by the plain language of
This court concluded that the respondent‘s method of calculating the presentence confinement credit was correct. Id., 829. In doing so, we distinguished this court‘s earlier ruling in Payton v. Albert, 209 Conn. 23, 547 A.2d 1 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 214, 255 n.44, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000). Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 271 Conn. 822-23. This court distinguished the circumstances where concurrent sentences were imposed on the same day such as
In doing so, this court reasoned that “[t]he merger process does not alter the fact that concurrent sentences remain separate terms of imprisonment which the legislature has permitted to be served at one time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 819. Therefore, this court concluded that concurrent sentences imposed on different days must be treated separately for purposes of allocating presentence confinement credit. Id., 820.
In reaching this conclusion, this court relied on several policy reasons for the different treatment of concurrent sentences imposed on the same day as opposed to concurrent sentences imposed on different days. Specifically, this court reasoned as follows: “Indeed, to the extent that the two groups are treated differently, the disparity is likely to have the salutary effect of encouraging defendants to enter pleas with respect to other pending charges and to disclose criminal activities for which charges have not yet been filed so that all outstanding matters may be resolved in a single proceeding. The respondent‘s methodology also may help to conserve scarce judicial resources and reduce the administrative burden on the state by encouraging defendants involved in multiple proceedings to seek a transfer of all pending actions to a single courthouse for sentencing purposes. Sentencing judges cannot be expected to have knowledge of every recent sentence imposed on a defendant and, therefore, the transfer of all pending actions to a single location would provide the sentencing judge with a better understanding of the defendant‘s criminal history in order to determine a fair and equitable sentence.” Id., 835-36.
The policy considerations that informed this court‘s decision in Harris are inapplicable to the present case. The first reason, that it would encourage defendants to disclose criminal matters to consolidate cases and dispose of them in a single proceeding, does not apply to this appeal. Here, the case would have been disposed all on the same day if the state had not failed to sustain its evidentiary burden, resulting in a mistrial. This fact negates any concern regarding the consolidation of cases. The second reason, to encourage defendants to transfer all pending actions to a single court for sentenc-
Harris is, therefore, distinguishable from the present case. In Harris, the presentence confinement credit had been accruing at the same time for two completely separate charges that were prosecuted separately. Id., 811-12. In the present case, however, presentence confinement credit was not accruing for two separate prosecutions but for one prosecution for felony murder that included the predicate lesser included offenses of robbery and assault. If the mistrial had not occurred, there would have been one credit applied to a total sentence for felony murder. Therefore, we conclude that the reasoning of Harris is inapplicable to the present case.10
We conclude that
The petitioner also claims that he should receive credit for the 973 days spent while imprisoned for robbery prior to being sentenced for felony murder, including the time he was pursuing his double jeopardy appeal. The respondent counters that
The petitioner‘s claim requires us to interpret
After oral argument in this court, we issued an order directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the following issue: “Does the well established principle that this court should try, whenever possible, to construe statutes to avoid a constitutional infirmity, but may not do so by rewriting the statute or eschewing its plain language . . . lead to a different construction of . . .
In the present case, the significant delay between the petitioner‘s sentencing for the robbery conviction in 1995 and his subsequent sentencing on felony murder in 1999 was caused by his decision to challenge the reprosecution on the ground that it violated the prohibition against double jeopardy contained within the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. See footnote 3 of this opinion. “It is well established that this court has a duty to construe statutes, whenever possible, to avoid constitutional infirmities . . . . [W]hen called [on] to interpret a statute, we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature‘s underlying intent. . . . This principle directs us to search for a judicial gloss . . . that will effect the legislature‘s will in a manner consistent with constitutional safeguards.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237, 245, 947 A.2d 307 (2008).
In our search for the constitutional construction of
In Boyd, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history at issue in that case. “[The petitioner, Terrence Boyd, was] first arrested and placed in custody on December 15, 1986. Following a jury trial in the Connecticut Superior Court, he was convicted of burglary, larceny, and felony murder. On January 21, 1988, he was sentenced to forty-five years of incarceration for felony murder, fifteen years for
In calculating the presentence confinement credit that Boyd was to receive for time served to reduce a second felony murder sentence following retrial, applying § 18-98d, the respondent excluded the period “from March 7, 1990, the day after his first felony murder conviction was vacated, to January 3, 1997, the date Boyd finished serving his sentence for burglary.” Id., 6. Boyd challenged the respondent‘s denial of credit for the time he was serving his sentence for burglary while pursuing his challenge to reprosecution for felony murder through a state habeas petition. Id. The habeas court denied the petition, the Appellate Court affirmed, and this court denied certiorari. Id., 7; see also Boyd v. Commissioner of Correction, 84 Conn. App. 22, 851 A.2d 1209 (2004), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 929, 859 A.2d 583 (2004); Boyd v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-00-0003130-S (November 15, 2002) (33 Conn. L. Rptr. 399).
In affirming the habeas court‘s denial of Boyd‘s petition, the Appellate Court relied on Steve v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn. App. 455, 469, 665 A.2d 168 (1995), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 929, 667 A.2d 555 (1995). The Appellate Court reasoned that Steve required the respondent to credit Boyd for time served while he challenged his initial felony murder conviction but did not require the respondent to credit Boyd for the time he was challenging the retrial on double jeopardy grounds. Boyd v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 84 Conn. App. 29. The Appellate Court concluded that Boyd‘s double jeopardy challenge was a “collateral . . . attack after the underlying conviction was clearly vacated and [Boyd] was no longer incarcerated on that conviction . . . .” Id., 30. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded that, because Boyd was challenging his reprosecution, not his former conviction, Steve and
Thereafter, Boyd filed a writ of habeas corpus in
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut analyzed Boyd‘s claim under the test established in Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983). The court concluded that a fundamental right was at stake because the double jeopardy clause “protects a criminal defendant‘s right to challenge a prosecution in advance of trial.” Boyd v. Lantz, supra, 487 F. Supp. 2d 11. The court further reasoned that, because the application of
On the basis of the court‘s well reasoned opinion in Boyd v. Lantz, supra, 487 F. Supp. 2d 3, we conclude that interpreting
This judicial gloss is consistent with the legislative purpose behind
Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner is entitled to presentence confinement credit from the date he filed the motion to dismiss on ground of double jeopardy through the date that this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on that motion, February 16, 1999.13 As stated previously in this opinion, the petitioner is also entitled to presentence confinement credit from the date he was held in lieu of bond on the underlying charges, March 3, 1995, through the date of his sentencing for robbery, December 13, 1996.
The judgment of the habeas court is reversed with respect to the issue of presentence confinement credit
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER, MCDONALD and ROBINSON, Js., concurred.
* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille. Although Justice Robinson was not present when the case was argued before the court, he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.