Delevieleuse v. Manson
439 A.2d 1055
Conn.
1981
Check Treatment

*1 the plaintiff has filed a certified copy New Jersey decree in the office of the Superior Court at Danhury. the decree is Accordingly, entitled to be as if it enforced were a decree rendered this state. by a court of

There is error, judgment set and the aside, case is remanded with direction that the New Jersey be given decree full recognition and enforcement under UCCJA.

In this opinion the judges other concurred.

Mark M. Delevieleuse v. John R. Manson,

Commissioner Correction Pakskey J., Peteks, Healey, C. Bogdanski, Armentano, Js. Argued March decision released 1981 June *2 Jon Blue, G. for the appellant (plaintiff). J.

Stephen O’Neill, assistant attorney general, was Carl B. A with on j ello, attor- whom, the brief, ney for the general, appellee (defendant). C. J. As a result of court proceedings

Bogdaxskt, for seven the larceny fifty-six counts, plaintiff spent days in presentenee under a mittimus con- custody taining one docket number. Each the seven counts related to one of seven stolen checks. The plaintiff wrongfully took the seven on a checks single occasion and cashed each one subsequently the separately, forging name and payor’s keeping the of each proceeds transaction. On August he pleaded to all seven counts and guilty received a six month each count. The court ordered that the first five sentences run con- secutively one another and that the sixth and seventh sentences run concurrently with the first five. the total Thus, effective sentence thirty was months.

For the fifty-six days presentence custody, defendant credited the with served plaintiff having his total In effective sentence. doing defendant followed advice so, attorney general allocated once jail time credit for each docket number contained in mittimus. that he had not full Complaining received the credit required General Statutes §18-97,1 provides, part: person “Any receiving ... sentence to a correctional institution or a com- munity correctional center receive eredit towards . . .

plaintiff applied corpus. for a writ of habeas He asserted that General Statutes 18-97 entitles separate inmates to credit toward each of their sen- presentenee custody. tences for the entire time in Superior interpreted The Court the statute to for- any multiple judgment bid credit and rendered judgment plaintiff the defendant. Prom that appealed. has serving has finished his sentence.

Although parties this is not a class action, the have *3 stipulated approxi- that the issue before us affects mately parties join request- 200 inmates and both ing this court to decide the issue.

“ general ‘It is a well-settled rule that the exist- controversy requi- ence of an actual an is essential appellate jurisdiction; province site to it is not the appellate questions, courts to decide moot discon- granting nected from the of actual relief or from practical the determination of which no can relief Reynolds follow.’ v. 130 Vroom, Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d v. 22; Commissioner Motor Phaneuf 166 Vehicles, Conn. 352 A.2d Harkins 449, 452, 291; Roy v. 165 Driscoll, Conn. 334 A.2d 407, 409, 901; Mulcahy, 161 Conn. 288 A.2d 324, 328, 64; Malt- App. Conn. bie, Proc. 21. In the absence of an existing controversy adjudicate actual and for us to may . . . the courts of this state not a be used as judicial opinions upon points vehicle to obtain Reply Judges, law; 33 Conn. and where 586; question presented purely is must we academic, Tynan, appeal. Young refuse to entertain the 148 Conn. 172 A.2d 456, 459, 190.” portion suspended of such sentence as to which execution is not any days custody spent in under mittimus as a result of court proceeding for the offense or acts for which . . such . sentence imposed.”

437 Co. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 411 1 A.2d 17, 19, (1979). See Manor Development v. Conserva Corporation tion Commission, A.2d

In Liistro v. Robinson, 365 A.2d Conn. 116, Taylor Robinson, and (1976), reached (1976), we of claims merits inmates were entitled to bail the out pending come of parole Uniform proceedings Administrative Procedure Act; §§ through 4-189; applied parole release hearings, even though had plaintiffs been granted parole before we considered the appeals. Those cases could afford practical relief because the issues involved (1) were capable repetition, yet evading review; affected an (2) ongoing pro gram state’s penal system; could (3) very well affect should plaintiffs be con they victed in the future. Taylor Robinson, 694-95. We also noted that (4) public impor *4 tance of the questions made it to desirable decide the points. Id., 694, citing Winnick Reilly, Conn. 291, 123 A. 440 296, four (1924). Those con siderations control the present appeal.2 disapprove Foundry We Co. v. International Ladies Union, Garment 21, Workers to 17, (1979), 177 Conn. Taylor Robinson, the extent it is inconsistent with 171 Conn. Taylor Robinson, 372 A.2d 102 (1976). We observe Bradford, noted similarity of its circumstances Weinstein v. to specifically U.S. 96 S. (1975), Ct. 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 but declined Foundry to follow case which Connecticut Co. v. Inter Union, national supra, 20-21, quoted Ladies Garment as Workers requirement. source for its expectation” “reasonable Connectiout Taylor Co. did not overrule v. Robinson establish diver gent Furthermore, mootness in parole standards cases. labor Foundry Co. to Connectiout did not discuss the extent which the public importance question compensates weight of a for the reduced question. of other against factors that militate mootness of provides: “Any person

receiving ... a sentence to a correctional institu community tion or a correctional center any portion . . . of such receive credit towards suspended for sentence as to which execution is not any days spent custody in under mittimus a any proceeding result of court for the offense or imposed.” . . The acts for which such . sentence is purpose give recognition 18-97 “is to to period presentence permit time served to prisoner, serving his to commence effect, compelled remain sentence from the time he was custody Holmquist Man to a mittimus.” due son, 389, 393-94, thirty asserts that his month effec- comprises tive five and two sentence consecutive concurrent six month sentences and that he custody presentence entitled to goes up his credit on each sentence which to make plaintiff’s total effective sentence. Each of the larceny degree, B crimes was a in the third a class for see General Statutes misdemeanor; 53a-124; which the maximum sentence is a term of six §53a-36(2). A months. General Statutes thirty months cannot be one plaintiff’s plaintiff, individual crimes. The separate received seven distinct and therefore, “sentences.” language legislative interpreting In “the of a ‘[w] e are confined to the intention

enactment, expressed legisla which is the words which the ture has used.’ Ricci, Baston *5 ‘ legis (1978). “The intention of say, to but lature is found not what it meant say.” meaning Real it did Colli v. what 169 364 A.2d Commission, Estate Conn.

439 Luttrell 167 Luttrell, (1975).’” Conn. Haven, see Lukas New A.2d (1981); A.2d 205, 212-13, 949

legislature’s sin repeated use unmodified noun gular “sentence” leads us to conclude General Statutes 18-97 requires § receive time credit on each sentence. with agree

We the trial court that in Gen nothing eral Statutes supports argu § defendant’s ment number docket assigned numbers to the charges an against inmate controls the com putation of jail time credit. The trial court’s rule Man against multiple credit, however, overlooks cinone Warden,

(1972), which General interpreted Statutes §18-97 to the award of compel to multiple jail credit inmates who were held both simultaneously parole violators and under a mittimus issued offenses committed while on con parole. Although current sentences had been imposed Mancinone Warden, we did not cite that factor as having any effect on our decision. Furthermore, General Statutes 18-97 does distinguish not between consecutive and concurrent sentences. 18-97 contrasts with the stat-

ute to relating multiple sentences, 53a-37, states: multiple “When sentences of imprisonment are on a imposed at the person same or when time, a who is person to subject term undischarged of imprisonment aat previous time by court of this state sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, sentences imposed by the court run concurrently either or consecutively with to respect each other and *6 term or terms in such manner undischarged at the time of

the court directs sentence. The court state whether maxima respective run minima shall with concurrently consecutively and shall to each state conclusion respect other, A careful the effective sentence ...” imposed. of statutes demonstrates that these reading terms “sentence” and “effective sentence” are tech nical The terms which refer to different things. use of the noun “sentence” singular unmodified 18-97 each of requires day presentence jail § to be credited each individual against received which the disposition charges inmate was held under a mittimus. If the legisla ture had meant such time to be presentence credited one sentence” only against “effective ultimately individual it would receives, have said so. In fact legislature has chosen make the “effective sentence” the standard by which time”3 is “good General Statutes 18-7 computed. § “[wjhen under provides is held prisoner more than one the several conviction, terms imprisonment thereunder shall be con strued as one continuous term for the purpose estimating the amount of commutation he earn may under the of this provisions section.” fact that the legislature chose to make the explicitly “effective sentence” the benchmark for time” “good under 18-7 the usual it strengthens inference that § did not omit the word “effective” from by inadvertence. provisions Under the 18-7, receiving of General Statutes after may sentence inmates good hasten their release conduct obedience to the rules the correctional institution. 4Although subsequent legislature the views of a a hazardous form inferring City basis one; of an the intent earlier Milwaukee Illinois, 304, 332n, U.S. 2d 114 S. Ct. 68 L. Ed. 18-97 required the plain- *7 tiff receive a time credit of on each his seven sentences. The credit on his two concurrent sentences applied concurrently. There- fore General Statutes 18-97 requires the defend- ant to apply against the plaintiff’s total effective sentence a credit of 280 days.

There is error, the judgment is set the aside and case is remanded with direction to credit the plain- tiff on each sentence with jail time in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion Parskey Peters, Armentano, Js., concurred. H. J. I (dissenting). would not

Arthur Healey, reach the merits of this appeal because I believe is moot. appeal This court has recently adopted (1981) ; Safety Consumer Sylvania, Product Commission v. G.T.E. Inc., 102, 117-18, 447 U.S. 100 S. Ct. 64 L. 2d (1980); Ed. legislature we note that recently has made General Statutes inapplicable to offenses July 1, 1981, committed on or after and has grants enacted General Statutes 18-98d credit for presentenee resulting confinement from an offense committed or July 1, after 1981. In the course of the senate’s consideration of substitute house “An Revising Sentencing Laws,” bill Act Senator successfully Salvatore DePiano offered senate amendment A, by which, legislature schedule time, specified for the first that day presentenee “each only confinement shall be counted purpose once for the reducing all sentences after such presentence delayed confinement. His amendment also the effec sentencing tive date of July 1, bill from October 1980 to urging passage 1981. In bill, of the amended Senator DePiano said anybody being prior bill . . . makes it so that that is held “[T]his being get good every charge is convicted cannot for pending against Under him that has a number. different docket present procedure you charged today, if with several crimes are they every day you all numbers, have different docket wait you bond, you gotten trial when have not made means that have days day you’ve or four two three credit for that one served

and adhered to the principle, expounded United States Supreme Court; see Weinstein Bradford, U.S. 96 S. 147, 149, Ct. 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 in the (1975); that, absence of a class action, “ a case is not moot inter there if, alia, ‘rea same complaining sonable expectation party would be subjected to the same action ” Co. International again.’ Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 21, CEUI see CSEA, ; (1979) Con 249-50, (1981); DeFonce struction Corporation Connecticut Resources *8 Recovery Authority, 177 Conn. 472, 475, 418 A.2d and problem.” we’ve eliminated that 23 Proc., 10, Sess., S. Pt. 1980 p. Although reject 3429. we Senator opinion DePiano’s that the number of jail docket numbers credit, passage controls the of his legislative amendment change indicates intent both to from a system multiple awarded credit for not to time and implement change that July crimes committed 1, before 1981. Equal Opportunities See New Haven Commission v. Yale Univer sity, 495, 502, (1981). 183 Conn. 439 A.2d 404 specifically 1 We that, stated “in the absence of action, a class the ‘capable repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine was limited to the situation where two (1) challenged elements combined: the action was in its duration fully litigated too short to prior be to its cessation expiration, (2) expectation there was reasonable complaining party that the same subjected would be to the same again.” Foundry action Connecticut Co. v. International Ladies Union, Garment 17, Workers 177 20-21, (1979), Conn. quoting Bradford, Weinstein v. 147, 423 U.S. 96 S. 46 Ct. L. Ed. 2d (1975). 350 Foundry, In Connecticut supra, defendants, although the con- ceding appeal may that their moot, urged have been us to address the issue raised in appeal their provide and “to a definitive inter- pretation of question in preclude statute so as to the recurrence any dispute similar in protect generally the future and to labor from the abuses injunctions unrestrained issuance of in industrial Id., controversies.” 20. holding We appeal moot, dismissed the that such a reason was “capable repeti- insufficient to meet tion, yet evading review” standard since the record before us was demonstrating “devoid evidence the existence of a ‘reason- expectation’ able again subjected these defendants will be to the action complained of Id., here.” 21. Rosnick Zoning Commission, (1979); Conn. 306, 309, A.2d 245 Even if we are to as the assume, majority notes, did not our overrule two earlier cases, Taylor Robinson, A.2d 102 and Liistro Robinson, (1976), A.2d 109 (1976), those cases we noted specifically issue be “could “might resolved well” or well” Taylor very affect See plaintiffs. Robinson, supra, 695; Liistro Robinson, 121-22.

Even under very interpretation liberal “reasonable expectation” I to see standard, fail how the plaintiff this case well be may subject to the same statute in General Stat- question, i.e., utes 18-97, when, as the statute now provides, as the majority opinion out in points footnote statute is not applicable to offenses committed on or after 1, 1981. an July Absent indication record before us to the if contrary, there is little, any, chance that will again subject be to the statute he now challenges. this Moreover, same observation to the other unnamed applies *9 inmates referred to in the It is majority opinion. my view that parameters the “reasonable expectation” as elucidated in standard, our prior are so cases, broadened to blur majority the predictable limitations of the mootness doctrine. I dissent would

Therefore, dismiss this matter as moot.