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Walsh v. Jodoin
925 A.2d 1086
Conn.
2007
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*1 JODOIN v. JEFFREY ROBIN WALSH 17837) (SC Zаrella, Katz, Borden, Norcott, Js. Palmer and officially July 17, April Argued released *2 attorney Nagy, general, Robert A. assistant with Crean, attorney whom were Thomas P. assistant gen- brief, Blumenthal, attorney on the Richard eral, and, appellant general, (state). for the

Opinion in NORCOTT, appeal J. The sole issue this is whether which 2004, (P.A. 04-100),1 Public Acts No. 04-100 part: 2004, 04-100,provides in Public Acts No. relevant “Section 1. Subdi general statutes, (1) (2) (a) of section 17b-745of the visions and of subsection by repealed public following and the as amended section 70 of act are 1, 2004): (Effective in lieu thereof October is substituted family support “(a) (1) Superior magistrate have Court or a shall authority payment to make and enforce orders for of to the Commis- or, support cases, IV-D state sioner of Administrative Services to the and, by acting through agency, and the IV-D directed to the husband or wife twenty-one or, patient person and after if the or is on October [under yеars 1972,] age eighteen provided under the of or as otherwise in this subsection, any parent any patient person being supported by of or the to wholly institution, any state, part, under or in in a state humane or welfare by Department Services, program the of Social as the court administered family provisions support magistrate finds, or in accordance with the 17b-179, 17a-90, 17b-81, 17b-223, (b) subsection of section or section 46b- reasonably amended, 46b-130, as or to be commensurate with the ability any person unmarried, is financial such relative. such a If full- high residing parent, time school student and with the custodial such according parents’ respective abilities, to the shall continue if person support, person completes is in need until such such twelfth nineteen, Any grade whichever occurs. court or or attains the first order, family support upon magistrate called to make or enforce such an upon by relative, including a determination consented to shall one based ability light to insure that such order is reasonable of the relative’s pay. . . . (1) (2) (a) of subsection of section 46b-171 of “Sec. Subdivisions and general repealed following statutes are and the is substituted in lieu (Effective 2004): thereof October support a child parental obligation extended child, the court “(a) (1) is be the father of If the defendant found to charged family support magistrate to stand order defendant shall or child, of the with the assistance and maintenance of such with the familysupport financially able, as the court or if such is mother mother [said] (b) of magistrate finds, of subsection with the in accordance 17b-81,17b-223,17b-745, 17a-90, 17b-179, amended as or section section 46b-129, 17b-179, 17a-90,] act, as (b) of section section this [subsection reasonably act, 46b-215, amended, amended this be 46b-130 or as ability defendant, pay commensurate with the financial eighteen years periodically age of until the child attains the certain sum unmarried, provided in this subsection. such child as otherwise full- If residing parent, high such with the custodial time school student abilities, parents’ respective according shall continue if *3 completes support, such the child is until child such in need twelfth of age nineteen, grade or occurs. The court or attains the whichever of first pay family support magistrate to the shall order the defendant to such sum paid expense, complainant, or, has to the town if a town or the state such state, grant be, as for the same and or the the case and shall execution actions, together with of suit taxed as in other civil a reasonable costs attorney’s fee; may require become bound with suffi- and the defendant to surety support perform cient to such orders for and maintenance. general (b) (c) and statutes “Sec. 3. Subsections of section 46b-172 repealed following (Effective аre in lieu thereof Octo- and the is substituted 1, 2004): ber by agreement support payment periodic “(b) to the child of a sum An years age eighteen provided until the child attains the of or as otherwise subsection, provisions past together in this for for due with reimbursement support ability upon pay provisions based to with the of in accordance (b) 17b-179, 17a-90,17b-81,17b-223, subsection of section or section [subsec- 17b-179, 17a-90,]46b-129, amended, (b) of as or 46b- tion section section with[,] expense prosecution petition, of and reasonable of the when filed approved by judge Superior Court, of the or in IV-D a court] [said 46b-213v, support brought cases under 46b-212 and matters sections to inclusive, any family support magistrate time, a have force at shall the same effect, retroactively prospectively or with the terms of accordance support by court, agreement, an order of entered the and shall said as [that] subj providеd to manner be enforceable and ect modification the same as is unmarried, by law for of the court in such cases. such child is orders If high parent, residing the a school student and with custodial full-time respective abilities, support according parents’ continue to the such shall completes support, such child in need until such child the twelfth if of grade age nineteen, Past due or attains the whichever occurs. of first years preceding support in shall be to the next the such cases limited three Payments agreements support. filing date of the such to under such of cases, agreement petitioner, except support the in IV-D shall be made to unmarried until that child either “completes (b) 46b-231,payments as defined in subsection of section shall be made to Support designated agency. Bureau of Child Enforcement or its Such agreements support prescribed by written shall be on forms the Office to, of thе Chief binding Court Administrator and shall be sworn and shall be person executing on the the same whether he is an adult or a minor. any “(c) any signing acknowledgment paternity, At time after the of upon application any party, any judge interested the court or thereof any family support magistrate support brought or in IV-D cases and in matters 46b-213v,inclusive, summons, under signed sections 46b-212to shall cause a by family judge support magistrate, by such or the clerk of the court [said] by Superior Court, issued, requiring or a commissioner of the to be acknowledged appear place father to in court at a time and as determined ninety days summons, the clerk but not more than after the issuance of the why family support magistrate assigned to show cause the court or the judicial judgment district in IV-D cases should not enter for by payment periodic of the child of a sum until the child attains years age eighteen provided subsection, together or аs otherwise in this provision past upon ability with for reimbursement for due based pay (b) in accordance with the of subsection of section 17b- 17a-90, 17b-81, 17b-223, (b) 17b-179, or section of section [subsection 17a-90,] 46b-129, amended, 46b-130, provision section as for health coverage required by 46b-215, of the child as section as amended this act, expense and reasonable of the action under this subsection. such If unmarried, high residing child is school student and with the full-time parent, according parents’ custodial such shall continue respective abilities, support, such child is in need until such child if completes grade nineteen, or attains the whichever twelfth first *4 family support magistrate, support cases, occurs. Such court or in IV-D shall authority acknowledged subject also have the to order the father who is to plan past-due support incapacitated, for reimbursement of and is not to participate may include, in work activities whiсh but shall not be limited to, job search, training, experience participation job training work and in the retraining program pursuant and established the Labor Commissioner to section 31-3t. (1) (2) (a) “Sec. 4. Subdivisions and of subsection of section 46b-215 of general repealed following the statutes are and the is substituted in lieu (Effective 1, 2004): thereof October Superior “(a) (1) family support magistrate The Court or a shall have authority payment support against any to make and enforce orders for of person neglects necessary support person’s who or refuses to furnish to such spouse age eighteen provided or a child under the of or as otherwise subsection, person’s ability according support, this to such to furnish such notwithstanding unmarried, the of section 46b-37. such child is If high residing parent, school student and with the custodial full-time support according parents’ respective abilities, such shall continue nineteen, which attains age the grade the twelfth retroactively support to applies occurs,” first ever that act’s effective at the time of already in effect orders 2 state of Connecti plaintiff 2004. The date of October dis of the trial court appeals3 judgment the cut from family from decision the appeal the missing its child orders the terminating magistrate retroactive to the defendant, Jeffrey Jodoin,4 the against child, birthday of the minor Joshua Jodoin. eighteenth family statutes amended various Because P.A. 04-100 to a child unmarried to render the available child provided to that to a whose parents equal protection equal that the divorced, have we conclude to clause of fourteenth amendment the United the requires to construe P.A. 04-100 States constitution us minor apply retroactively. This child to entitles birthday and, his accord support beyond eighteenth judgment we of the trial court. ingly, reverse undisрuted The and following record reveals facts Robin procedural history. plaintiff, Walsh, named is the mother of the minor who was bom on Novem- child, acknowledged ber The defendant is the father In March, 1990, state, of the minor child. which support, completes child such is in need until such child the twelfth if nineteen, grade .’’(Empha- occurs. . . or attains the whichever first added.) sis (u) (1), (t) (3) § Pursuant Statutes is a to General 46b-231 the state party plaintiff plaintiff, of the named Robin Walsh. The state has on behalf appealed services; on see General Statutes behalf of enforcement 46b-207; acting § on behalf of Walsh. which appealed judgment Appellate The state from the of the trial court Court, appeal pursuant this court we transferred to General (c) § Statutes and Practice Book 65-1. 51-199 *5 participate proceedings We note did not in the that the defendant before appearance Appellate thе trial court file an with the Court or this court. Accordingly, comply requiring the defendant failed to with our order because 27, by appeal file a will be him to brief December this considered on only. the state’s brief and the record public had been providing assistance to Walsh for the support of the child, applied minor to the court for a support pursuant order to General Statutes to (Rev. 1989) (b).5 family support 46b-172 magistrate, § Hutchinson, Katherine Y. granted request the state’s pay and ordered the defendant to support continuing to as well arrearage Walsh, provide as to medical and dental insurance at a reasonable cost for the minor child.

Thereafter, November, family support the Lifshitz, Harris T. magistrate, granted appli- the state’s cation and appear ordered the defendant to in January, why to show cause he should not be held in contempt comply of court for failure to with thе court’s previous March, orders in the case. In 2005, at a hearing held on that the application, support enforcement offi- cer that, informed the court the minor child although years had turned the eighteen age, state would con- tinue to enforce pursuant order to P.A. 04-100 because he was still enrolled school. high (Rev. provides 1989) part: “(b) General Statutes 46b-172 in relevant any filing any acknowledgment paternity, At time after the with the court of upon application any any party, judge interested the court or thereof or any family support magistrate summons, in IV-D cases shall cause by signed him or the clerk or assistant clerk or assistant clerk of the family support magistrate support cases, court, decision in IV-D of said issued, requiring putative appear be father to in court at a time and place cause, any has, therein, why named to show if he the court or the family support magistrate assignеd judicial district in IV-D judgment by payment cases should not enter for of the child of a periodic years, eighteen together sum until the child attains the with provision lying-in expense, for reimbursement for accrued maintenance and expense acknowledg reasonable of the action under this subsection on the paternity previously prior judgment ment of with filed said court. The as paternity judicata shall be res as to that issue and shall not be reconsidered court, person seeking acknowledgment unless the review of the petitions superior judicial having hearing court for the district venue for a paternity years judgment on the issue of within three of such or within three years payments of October whichever is later. All such shall be family through superior made relations office of the court.” *6 however, that the order concluded, Lifshitz Magistrate minor law on the by operation had been terminated 8, birthday on November eighteenth child’s he order, to extend the he refused Accordingly, modify or to services to enforcement ordered as of the order reflect termination adjust its records to 8, 2004. of November of Magistrate from the decision appealed

The state to General Statutes pursuant court to the trial Lifshitz P.A. that the state claimed appeal, On (n).6 46b-231 person provides part: “(1) (n) A in relevant § 46b-231 General Statutes family support magistrate by is entitled aggrieved of a a final decision who is by way appeal judicial section. under this review by petition filing appeal a “(2) Proceedings shall be instituted for such family judicial of the superior district in which the decision court for the days filing of support magistrate than fourteen after was rendered not later Family Support assigned to the assistant clerk final decision with an the requested, or, rehearing later than fourteen Magistrate not Division if a In IV-D days filing thereon. a the notiсe of the decision after by copies accompanied case, petitions that be a certification such shall agency upon in subsection petition the IV-D as defined have been served the upon agency parties IV-D Service the (b) and all of record. of this section copy petition by mailing may by appellant the certified be made Attorney General in Hartford. office of the mail to the jury by Superior “(6) appeal Court without be conducted The shall as the and such additional evidence to the record ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍and shall be confined Court, upon Superior permitted Superior be introduced. The has Court request, argument and receive written briefs. shall hear oral family support may Superior “(7) affirm the decision of Court Superior proceedings. The Court magistrate for further or remand the case appellant rights may modify if substantial of the the decision reverse or family support magistrate prejudiced the decision of the have been because statutory provisions; (B) in excess (A) or In violation of constitutional is: family support (C) upon statutory authority magistrate; made of the of the clearly by law; (E) procedure; (D) erroneous other error of affected unlawful reliable, probative, evidence on the whole and substantial in view of the by arbitrary capricious record; (F) abuse of discretion or characterized or or clearly of discretion. unwarranted exercise appeal pursuant Any under this “(8) court to an order entered original may of the order entered retroactive to the date subsection be family support magistrate. denied, Upon appeals be taxed in favor “(9) which are costs all such Superior Court, party prevailing but no costs at the discretion of against . . .” taxed the state. shall be applies retroactivеly to extend orders

04-100 already public had been entered before the act’s *7 effective date of October on this court’s Relying Smith, decision in D’Eramo v. 273 Conn. 872 A.2d 55-3,7 court, 408 and General Statutes the trial (2005), § Swienton, J., concluded that P.A. a 04-100 was substan- presumptively applied pro- tive in the law that change spectively only. The trial court further concluded that history there was in the text or nothing legislative P.A. 04-100 that indicated that had legislature apply public retroactively, intended for the act to not- purpose, equalize its which was to withstanding independent in need of support, treatment children parents’ of their marital status. trial Accordingly, court rendered the state’s judgment dismissing appeal.

Thereafter, the state moved for reargument, con- that the trial court’s construction of P.A. 04- tending equal protection 100 violated the clauses of federal and state constitutions a providing greater parents benefit to the children of divorced than to chil- parents. dren of unmarried The trial court denied the appeal motion for This followed. reargument. trial appeal, improp- On the state claims court erly apply concluded that P.A. 04-100 does not retroac- tively legislature of the fact that the had enacted light parity support. it to create all children entitled to among The state also claims that the trial court’s construction contrary equal protection violates the rights parents by children of unmarried disadvantaging them compared to children of who were married Although when those children were bom. we conclude provides: provision general statutes, General Statutes 55-3 “No of the previously state, imposes any of the not contained the statutes which obligation any person corporation, new on shall be construed to have a retrospective effect.” requisite legisla- insufficient evidence that there is of this sub- appliсation justify retroactive tive intent to that P.A. 04- conclude we nevertheless law, stantive only prospective retroactively because applies equal protec- continuing perpetuate would application unmarried children of respect with violation tion parents. ques raises a retroactively applies

Whether a statute review which our over statutory construction tion of Nowell, State plenary. See, e.g., of a application retroactive (2003). A.2d 76 “[T]he yet not law was new or revised only if the law occurs underlying events the relevant on the date that in effect *8 marks quotation (Internal occurred.” application its A.2d 633, 681, 888 Skakel, v. State omitted.) L. Ct. U.S. 127 S. denied, cert. 428 (2006). Ed. 2d retroactively prospec- or a apply

“Whether to statute in legislature the intent of the tively depends upon determine the ... In order to the statute. enacting rules of intent, we utilize well establishеd legislative departure is Gen- statutory point Our construction. provision which states: No 55-3, eral Statutes § in the stat- statutes, previously not contained general on imposes any obligation which new state, utes of the to have corporation, shall be construed any person or to in the referred retrospective obligations effect. . . we Thus, law. . statute are those of substantive presumed uniformly interpreted 55-3 as a rule have substantive affecting intent that statutes legislative only. . . . The rule is apply prospectively shall rights impose be unfair to in the notion that it would rooted upon changes grounds amendment that substantive who parties maintained on which an action be already committed already transacted or who are have unless con- cases, however, ... In civil litigation. justice otherwise, sense and dictate good siderations of presumed procedural applied it is that statutes will bе retrospectively. . . . Procedural statutes have been traditionally affecting remedies, viewed as not substan- preexisting tive and therefore leave the scheme rights, . presumed proce- intact. . . we have [Although apply dural or remedial statutes are intended to retroac- tively expression absent a clear intent to legislative contrary which, provides ... a in but form, statute remedy actually change brings changes but about subject applica- substantive is not to retroactive rights precise tion. . . . While there is no definition of either law], or it is procedural generally agreed [substantive creates, that a substantive law defines and regulates procedural prescribes while a law the methods of rights such redress.”8 enforcing rights obtaining (Citations D’Eramo omitted; quotation internal marks omitted.) Smith, supra, differently, 273 Conn. 620-21. Put sub- any stantive to statutes “in the absence of clear changes contrary intent expression legislative [are] presumptively prospective.” Id., 623.

The relevant of P.A. which is a law governing rights substantive of chil- have an parents, dren of unmarried effective date of process process statutory This also is consistent with our usual inter *9 pretation, objective give under which fundamental is and to ascertain “[o]ur apparent legislature. words, ... effect to the intent of the In other we seek determine, manner, statutory meaning language in a reasoned the of the to case, question applied including as to the facts of the of whether the [the] actually language apply. seeking meaning, does ... In to determine that § l-2z first to the General Statutes directs us consider the text of statute relationship If, examining itself and its to other statutes. after such text considering relationship, meaning plain and such the of such text is and yield unambiguous results, and does not absurd or unworkable extratextual meaning evidence оf the of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When plain unambiguous, interpretive guidance a statute is not and we also look for history enactment, legislative surrounding and circumstances its policy implement, relationship legislative designed the it was to its existing legislation principles governing general and common law the same subject (Internal quotation omitted.) Connecticut Ins. . . . .” matter marks Guaranty State, (2006). Assn. 896 A.2d 747

197 explic state act does not public the 1,2004, but October rendered support orders only to itly applies whether it 46b-84,9 § Statutes contrast, In General that date. after 94-61 (P.A. Acts No. by Public which, as amended in parental obligations similarly extended 94-61), apply that it “shall provides cases,10 specifically divorce of mar decree of dissolution in where the only cases entered on or annulment or separation riage, legal Thus, (b). 46b-84 General Statutes July 1,1994.” after part: “(a) Upon provides or subse in relevant § 46b-84 General Statutes entry any marriage of a quent or or dissolution of to the annulment divorce, parents legal separation of a minor child of or decree respective abilities, according if marriage, to their maintain the child shall Any postjudgment procedure afforded maintenance. the child is in need of present by chapter future financial secure the 906 shall be available to periodic payment party for the with a final order interests of a in connection support. of child marriage has attained the “(b) of the who If there is an unmarried child parent, high age eighteen, and resides with a is a full-time school student according respective abilities to their shall maintain the child completes as such child in of maintenance until ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍such time if the child is need nineteen, age The grade whichever first occurs. the twelfth or attains the only apply in where the decree of shall cases of this subsection separation marriage, legal on after or annulment is entered dissolution of July 1, 1994. . . .” 10According George Jepsen, P.A.94-61was intended “to encour to Senator by addressing legislature viewed as an lads to finish school” what the frequently by attorneys negotiating in unaddressed settlements issue left Sess., p. 1805; Proc., Proc., see also 37 H.R. divorce cases. 37 S. Pt. 9, 1994Sess., pp. 3066-67, Representative Wollenberg remarles of William Pt. attorneys (stating failure to that “we must do this statute” because bill, commenting agreement”). In this into the “[work] only Jepsen emphasized apply and dissolutions Senator it was to to divorces Proc., supra, p. July 1, that were entered on or after 1994. See 37 S. July 1, 1994, legislature’s date for P.A. 94- choice of as an effective expanded importance this child 61 indicated its view of the By July 1, proceedings. choosing dissolution as benefit the context of applicability date, legislature of the statute effectivе accelerated the date of October 1. See State v. three months over the default effective Nowell, supra, (legislature’s provision that Public Acts 262 Conn. 703 mandatory judges minimum trial to deviate from No. which allows ” “ July 1, 2001,’ cases, was intended sentences in narcotics ‘shalltake effect *10 default date of October effective date of the act from the “to accelerate the by 2-32]”). provided Statutes 1 otherwise for [General applicable in dissolution although the related statute quite clearly applies only to orders entered proceedings in P.A. 04- certain, legislature, enacting a date after provide, clarity, did not with similar an indication respect application.12 intent with to its its history similarly contains no evidence legislative clearly whether the intended P.A. indicating legislature retroactively already in apply 04-100 to to court orders its date. in Speaking effect as of effective subsequently the bill that was enacted as P.A. 04-100 shortly Representa- before its the House of passage Christopher only Stone stated tives, Representative “incorporates it several of the characteristics or several presently that we have for married requirements who have children who are in divorce couples engaged provisions presently into the the books proceedings and collection of child [f]amily magistrates for [c]ourt primarily individuals. Most support for unmarried the bill extends the of child substantively, obligation support for non-married individuals who have children years old or graduates to a—until the child is [nineteen] whichever occurs first. That’s the school, from high for individuals who are married and have present law subsequently and who divorced and is a get children Proc., child 47 H.R. Pt. obligation.”13 only applies Notwithstanding the clear statement in P.A. 94-61 that it certain, a date we cannot conclude to court orders rendered on or after provision legislature’s failure to include a similar in P.A. 04-100 that the applies retroactively. that, recognize P.A. We indicates its intent that 04-100 subject provision, statute, given with reference to one contains a “[w]here provision concerning a related the omission of such from a similar statute subject (Inter significant ... that a different intention existed.” to show Problem, quotation omitted.) Asylum Solving nal marks Hill Revitalization cannot, however, King, (2006). A.2d 522 We Assn. v. omit, legislature supply language that the have chosen to retroactive especially specified in the relevant of P.A. because it elsewhere it was to become effective on October 04-100 that 13Similarly, Stephen Ment, deputy legislative director of affairs for the judicial branch, speaking the bill that would be enacted as P.A. noted that the “first four sections of the bill would create parity and children of unmarried betwеen children of divorces *11 Represen- remarks of id., p. 2337, 2336; see also Sess., p. consistency really just provides bill (“this tative Stone law”). within our there is of P.A. purpose

Despite the remedial that the us to conclude permit insufficient evidence retroactively, particu apply intended it to legislature by 55-3. See foot set forth larly the limitations given that however, well settled opinion. is, It note 7 of this construe possible, to try, whenever court should “[t]his may not infirmity, but a constitutional statutes to avoid by eschewing plain its the statute rewriting do so marks State quotation omitted.) language.” (Internal 390, denied, A.2d cert. 244, 251, 210 Conn. Snook, 106 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1989); 109 S. Ct. 492 U.S. Lutters, also, State v. e.g., see between two construc choosing A.2d 434 (2004) (“[in] constitutionally one valid and one statute, tions of an and constitu precarious, we will search for effective reasonably that accords with tional construction parents continuing support unmarried until the child com- for children of pletes age [nineteen], grade or attains the of whichever occurs the [twelfth] Judiciary, Sess., Standing Hearings, Pt. 2004 first.” Conn. Joint Committee p. response question Representative 2376.In to a from G. Kenneth Bernhard children, unequal Ment testified “that has been an about the treatment of years, [legislature, issue . . . the over the last few has taken a look that currently yes, really at and has addressed. But there there are two are— classes, children of who were married and children of unmarried couples. again, many years, [legislature, And has looked at this issue for currently you couple got it, if are the child of a but as I understand you divorced, you support grade or can obtain until finish the [twelfth] you age [nineteen], whichever comes first. But if are a child attain the of couple of an unmarried . . . I believe that the would end at the Id., Fray, age [eighteen].” pp. Diane director of the bureau of of 2378-79. department services, child еnforcement at the of social testified similarly “provision obligation in non- that the would extend up cases for children who are dissolution [nineteen] parent. presently unmarried, high school, living This is still in with a dissolution, legal separation, and annulment with the rule for cases decrees July 1, proposal apply Our would the same rule entered on or after regardless parents.” (Emphasis the marital status their all children for added.) Id., p. 2382. quotation intent” legislature’s underlying [internal Indeed, duty marks our to construe statutes omitted]). if protects them, possible, in a manner that from consti- require well us to conclude that jeopardy tutional Marriage Bouquet, See In re they retroactively. apply *12 1371, Rptr. P.2d 128 Cal. 427 16 Cal. 3d previously divorce statute that (1976) (amendment men against providing earnings discriminated while wife, husband, living and accumulations of but not separate applied retroactively apart property, were probable infirmity constitutional because “the lend some to the conclusion former law does intended the amendment to have [legislature that the reasonably may infer, effect . . . retroactive [and] [w]e replace wished to therefore, [legislature that the constitutionally unobjec- its possibly infirm law with possible” tionable successor as soon as [citation omitted]). the state’s claim that we must turn to

Accordingly, only vio- apply prospectively P.A. 04-100 to construing equal protection clause of the fourteenth lates with to the United States constitution14 amendment unmarried of children bom to respect rights equal protection that an viola- parents. argues The state prospective only construction tion occurs because this inherent in the perpetuates the constitutional violation P.A. statutory prior that existed scheme equal protection clause, amendment The federal of the fourteenth provides part: in relevant “No State shall to the United States constitution deny any person any . . . within its make or enforce law which shall protection jurisdiction equal of the laws.” analysis first, § state’s also mentions article of the constitution provides part: person Connecticut, in relevant “No shall be denied which equal protection Although . that the of the law . . the state notes protection greater than the federal state constitution afford citizens separate analysis any constitution, provide such claim. it does not a See, principles. Accordingly, is limited to federal constitutional our review Health, Batte-Holmgren v. e.g., Public Commissioner of n.9, (2007). 914 A.2d 996 parents with of unmarried provided had children which similarly situated was available to less than at the time of were married who children the children’s birth. invidiously may not settled that “a

It is well [s]tate by denying children against illegitimate discriminate children generally. benefits accorded them substantial judicially right enforceable posits [0]nce [s]tate from their natu of children to needed on behalf justifi constitutionally ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍sufficient ral fathers there is no to a child right such an essential denying cation for not married its its natural father has simply because 535, 538, 93 S. Ct. Perez, Gomez v. 409 U.S. mother.”15 This ban on discrimination 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973). however legal illegitimacy, exists because “the status of a characteristic is, origin, like race or national defined, *13 within the control of the determined causes not it bears no relation to the individual, and illegitimate in and contribute to ability participate individual’s Reed v. society.”16 quotation omitted.) marks (Internal L. n.5, 2234, 854 106 S. Ct. 90 Campbell, 852, 476 U.S. Ed. 2d 858 (1986). children history treating illegitimate

“In view of the favorably ones, than United States legitimate less [the 15 Supreme example, Court has held it be the United States For right equal protection a state to “create a of action of the clause for violation aparent illegitimate wrongful and exclude death of in favor of children for right,” “illegitimate children such a or to exclude children from the benefit of recovery equally sharing in the of workmen’s . . . from with other children Perez, parent.” compensation v. the death of their Gomez benefits for 535, 537-38, 872, (1973). 93 S. Ct. 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 U.S. society’s express “[V]isiting upon in order to condemnation the child unjust. Moreover, impos parents’ illogical disapproval liaisons is contrary concept illegitimate ing to the basic disabilities on the child relationship system legal some to individual our burdens should bear responsible Obviously, responsibility wrongdoing. for his birth no child is or unjust— penalizing illegitimate an ineffectual —as well as an child is quotation omitted.) way deterring parent.” (Internal marks Reed v. 2234, n.5, (1986). Campbell, L. 2d 858 854-55 106 S. Ct. 90 Ed. 476 U.S. statutory subjected classifications

Supreme Court has] scrutiny to a level of illegitimacy heightened based on . we have held that classifi- [although . . [noting that] suspect, subject arе not illegitimacy cations based on scrutiny scrutiny applied exacting to our most one .... classification to them is not a toothless [A] unless it bears on is unconstitutional illegitimacy based particular an evident and substantial relation . to serve. . . designed . . . interests statute is [the] children illegitimate on suits [Restrictions they scrutiny to the extent equal protection will survive to a state interest.”17 substantially legitimate are related quotation omitted.) marks omitted; internal (Citations L. 103 S. Ct. Brown, Pickett v. 462 U.S. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. Ed. 2d 372 see also Mills (1983); (1982) 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 91, 99-100, 102 S. Ct. of limitations in year down one statute (striking “inter- parents despite unmarried state’s involving cases of stale or fraudulent claims litigation avoiding est limitation that are justify periods will those [that] loss or dimi- sufficiently present a real threat of long “[b]y granting illegitimate because nution of evidence” year paternity, in which to establish only one children adequate with an provide failed to them Texas has of these light Viewed oрportunity support”). to obtain in effect that our statutes cases, apparent it is P.A. but before the effective date of after the *14 very least, were, 04-100 at the effective date of P.A. questions constitutional because subject to significant 17 is, however, permissible some distinctions made in “a basis for There “upheld statutory Supreme part legitimacy” as the Court has on the basis of [sjtate’s provisions relation to the have an evident and substantial that just orderly providing a decedent’s distribution of interest in for the Campbell, supra, 855; (“state’s property 476 U.S. id. interest death.” Reed v. at may justify imposition orderly disposition of decedents’ estates in the right illegitimate special requirements upon to an child who asserts of justifies gener father, and, course, the enforcement of of it inherit from her may ally applicable which claims time and the manner in limitations on the asserted”). be wedlock with less children bom out of they provided bom to mar- provided than was to children support parents. ried find instmctive those sister state we

Accordingly, to res- support have constmed their statutes cases that jeopardy under the United cue them from constitutional law.18 For Supreme Court’s case illegitimacy States App. 590, 591, in 23 Mass. example, Roe, Doe bom out year man, a nineteen old (1987), N.E.2d in home while wedlock, of who lived his mother’s community from the Probate college sought attending support obligation order his father’s extending Court an beyond prescribed by of the relevant eighteen situation, parents in but with person statute. A a similar birth and who had been married at the time of his sup- received such subsequently divorced, could have sparse. do, however, point law on We find Connecticut’s case this Gianetti, App. Appellate instructive the Court decision in Moll v. required interpret (1986), 510 A.2d 1009 wherein that court was attorney’s § 1he fee sectiоn of General Statutes 46b-62 in a manner that against parentage. The would not discriminate children on the basis of by Appellate that the framed of Court noted issue “is [General 46b-61, 46b-54, which, coryunction, provide §§ 46b-62 and that Statutes] support by illegitimate brought an the custodial in an action for of child thereby parent, by parent the counsel fees incurred cannot be recovered parent, by parent support from while for the noncustodial the fees incurred Id., legitimate parent.” of a child be recoverable from the other that, deny parent § court concluded to “construe 46b-62so as to a custodial collect, parent, right, from the noncustodial counsel fees incurred in effectively illegitimate ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍§ an 46b-61for an would action under child preclude pursuit parents from noncustodial on behalf of the illegitimate class of children need of maintenance custodial prosecute legislative without funds to such suits. ... It would be a hoax permit illegitimate § an action for children under 46b-61 and effectively support in at the same time to bar such actions for their cases greatest parents who, indigency, need exhibited custodial because of Id., Noting the courtroom for cannot even enter want of counsel fees.” 53-54. infirmity strictly,” “the obvious constitutional 1he if the court statute read permit attorney’s concluded that 46b-62“must be award of construed to illegitimate Id., fees in child actions filed on behalf of children.” 54-55.

204 support for orders port providing under the statute that there were no Id., Noting dissolution cases. 592. case; id., n.3; in the problems proof paternity of that Gomez and the other Supreme the court concluded proposition person for the that a Court cases stood “constitutionally is entitled to the bom out of wedlock father, from his after type support biological same and until he reaches eighteen attaining as a child of divorced would be twenty-one, .’’Id., in like entitled to receive circumstances proposition interpret on this The court relied broadly equity jurisdiction enough Probate Court’s postmajority support persons for bom allow for such Hartman, see also Rawles v. Id., 595; out of wedlock.19 App. 931, 935-36, (construing Ill. 3d 527 N.E.2d 680 provide payment court discretion to statute to trial give bom out of postmajority expenses for child college pro applicable statute to divorces wedlock because Ill. 2d appeal denied, 123 payments), vided for such Moore, Gerhardt v. Estate (1988); 535 N.E.2d 441 N.W.2d 734 stat 563, 571-72, (1989) (A 150 Wis. 2d addi children the to seek denying illegitimate right ute lump sum tional from their fathers after is unconstitutional because payment settlement “[t]he is barred from child, child, unlike the marital nonmarital support, of need. That is regardless additional seeking hardly child, fair to the nonmarital much less constitu parte Jones, cf. Ex 592 So. 2d 609 (Ala. tional.”); bom out of wedlock its to children 1991) (extending parte Bayliss, in Ex 986, 987 550 So. 2d prior holding jurisdiction provide trial courts 1989], giving [Ala. in divorce postmajority cases). educational in the In this case law and the differences light of of children of married applicable statutes legislature Indeed, also noted that the subse the Massachusetts court support pay provide quently amended the statute to for such had birthdays. beyond eighteenth persons of wedlock their ments to bom out Roe, supra, App. 23 Mass. 594 n.5. Doe *16 readily 2004, it 1994 and between parents and unmarried consistency in the law and the fairness apparent is that has constitu- P.A. 04-100 of by the enactment provided prof- not has Moreover, the state implications. tional state any “legitimate of we cannot conceive fered, and of surviv- capable disparity that justify this interest” based scrutiny legitimacy given ing heightened Brown, supra, 462 Pickett v. See, e.g., classifications. a construc- cannot, therefore, countenance 8. We U.S. this perpetuate would serve to P.A. 04-100 that tion of violation,20 constitutional year ten old more than retroactively to applies P.A. 04-100 that we conclude time of already in effect at the orders extend improperly court the trial Accordingly, enactment.21 its argument to the state’s that it was “not insensitive” The trial court stated prospective application in countless P.A. 04-100 would “result of that a age eighteen, parents losing while at the of children of unmarried support through age parents are entitled to receive children of divorced that, Indeed, completion high court noted school.” the trial nineteen or of of years, were treated children of married and nonmarried “for eleven however, disparity not, differently.” passage this does render of time constitutionally appropriate. Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties See Chapter, 573, 630, Union, Pittsburgh 492 U.S. 109 S. Ct. Greater acceptance practice (1989) (“[historical not in of a does L. Ed. 2d 472 practice practice [cjlause if the under the itself validate that [establishment just acceptance protected [c]lause, as historical the values violates practices gender does not immunize such of racial or based discrimination scrutiny [a]mendment”); Commis Walz Tax from under [fourteenth 664, 678, (1970) (“no sion, one 25 L. Ed. 2d 697 397 U.S. 90 S. Ct. by long acquires protected right a vested or in violation of the [constitution use, span time our entire national existence even when that covers predates it”). indeed 21Accordingly, disagree Hunter v. with the trial court’s reliance on we Hunter, (1979), in which this court 416 A.2d 1201 retroactively apply No. Public Acts determined whether jurisdiction 46b-66, gave which trial courts codified at General Statutes incorporated agreements, into written in dissolution to enforce “ сare, education, orders, a child maintenance or court ‘for the beyond eighteen’ that there was . . . .” This court concluded justify application legislative the 1977 intent to insufficient evidence of resulting judgment, public which became from a 1969 act to a order 330-31; id., eighteen; because six months after the child turned effective parties changes rights public “brought to a about in substantive act

dismissed the appeal state’s from the decision of the family support magistrate.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to sustain the state’s appeal.

In opinion BORDEN, this KATZ and PALMER, Js., *17 concurred.

ZARELLA, J., I concurring. Although agree with the majority, conclusion of the I do not all agree, for of the D’Eramo expressed my reasons concurrence in v. Smith, (Zarella, A.2d 408 (2005) J., history concurring), legislative of Public Acts No. 04-100 should be consulted (P.A. 04-100), to determine the intent. legislative Having concluded that P.A. provision 04-100 is substantive that contains language specifically retroactively no that it be directing applied, majority has no reason to consult extratex tual evidence of the intent. legislature’s See General N l-2z;1 Statutes see also General § Statutes 55-3.2evert § heless, fully I with agree majority’s constitutional analysis and ultimate conclusion that we cannot con marriage involving concerning cause of action for dissolution of orders children, jurisdictional formerly ground, absent, and established a under Superior agreement which the Court act where there is a written education, ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍providing care, beyond for the maintenance or of a child eighteen.” Id., inapposite because, Hunter is unlike the present case, analysis present any equal protection therein did not implications respect rights other constitutional with of the child support. need of provides: meaning shall, § General Statutes l-2z “The statute in the instance, first be ascеrtained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship If, examining considering to other statutes. after such text and relationship, meaning plain unambiguous such of such text is yield results, does not absurd or unworkable extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” provides part: provision General Statutes 55-3 in relevant “No general imposes any any obligation person statutes . . . which new on retrospective shall be construed to have a effect.” it uncon render way that would in such a strue a statute stitutional. SAUCIER RICHARD CONNECTICUT OF

STATE 17502) (SC Sullivan, Vertefeuille, Katz, Palmer, Js.* Borden, Norcott, Zarella and *18 * consisting panel originally argued court before a of this case was This Thereafter, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, and Zarella. Vertefeuille of Justices (b), sponte, court, ordered that the pursuant § 70-7 sua to Practice Book Accordingly, Justice Borden and Senior en banc. Justice case be considered record, they panel, briefs have read Sullivan were added transcript argument. of the oral

Case Details

Case Name: Walsh v. Jodoin
Court Name: Supreme Court of Connecticut
Date Published: Jul 17, 2007
Citation: 925 A.2d 1086
Docket Number: SC 17837
Court Abbreviation: Conn.
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