JASON JACOBS, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI CNTY., OHIO, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-cv-233
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
02/18/26
Judge Walter H. Rice
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Miami County, Ohio, Dakota Brisset, and Brad Blackburn (Defendants’ Motion, Doc. #47) and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Jason Jacobs (Plaintiff‘s Motion, Doc. #49). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff‘s Motion is OVERRULED and Defendants’ Motion is SUSTAINED.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Undisputed Facts
The volume of music played by Plaintiff at his property was a longstanding source of tension between Plaintiff and his neighbors, specifically his next-door
However, the Thens called the Sheriff on September 21, 2023, again complaining of Plaintiff playing loud music; for the first time, the Thens complained of Plaintiff playing music with explicit and racially-charged language. (Doc. #41-4, PAGEID 458). Sheriff Deputy L.B. Stanaford watched the surveillance video taken by the Thens, and “heard extremely loud music and the word ‘fuck’ could be heard multiple times.” (Id.). On September 22, 2023, Stanaford provided the details to Miami County Municipal Prosecutor Jared Chamberlain, who advised Stanaford that, based on the information provided, Plaintiff could be charged with disorderly conduct. (Id. at PAGEID 459). Later that day, Stanaford provided Plaintiff with a verbal warning about potential criminal liability. (Id.).
On November 7, 2023, the Thens again called the Miami County Sheriff complaining about the music at Plaintiff‘s house. (Incident Report, Doc. #41-5, PAGEID 469). Sheriff Deputies Dakota Brisset and Brad Blackburn responded. (Id.). The Thens told Brisset and Blackburn that the music played by Plaintiff was “‘racist,’ ‘sexist,’ and [contained] lyrics outlining people being murdered[.]” (Id.).
Blackburn took statements from five witnesses in the neighborhood, all of whom described the loud, disruptive music from Plaintiff‘s house, and Brisset received a folder from the Thens containing additional video evidence. (Doc. #41-5, PAGEID 489-506). Brisset took this information to a Municipal Prosecutor, who advised him to file the summons against Plaintiff. (Trial Tr., Doc. #42-1, PAGEID 528). Duchak agreed with the decision to file the summons, premised on the idea that Plaintiff, as the head of household, was responsible for what took place on his property. (Doc. #40-1, PAGEID 432). On November 28, 2023, Brisset and Blackburn returned to Plaintiff‘s house to issue the citation against him for disorderly conduct in violation of
B. Litigation History
On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit against Miami County and Brisset and Blackburn in both their individual and official capacities. (Compl., Doc. #1, PAGEID 1). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 14, 2025, adding State of Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost as a Defendant. (Doc. #14) Therein, he raises a facial challenge to the Criminal Statute against all Defendants (Claim One), alleging that the statute‘s prohibition on “offensively coarse utterance[s]” and “grossly abusive language” is viewpoint based, vague, and overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at PAGEID 83, ¶¶ 36-37). Plaintiff also raises an “as-applied” challenge (Claim Two), claiming that, by issuing the citation, “Defendants were not acting in the public‘s interest but were rather acting in bad faith to retaliate against Jacobs for offending their sensibilities” (id. at PAGEID 85, ¶ 53), and “Defendants’ actions were aimed at silencing Jacobs and deterring him from exercising his right to free speech.” (Id. at ¶ 54). In Claim Three, Plaintiff raises an additional “as-applied” challenge, asserting that the statute violates his First Amendment right to free association. Plaintiff alleges that his son was the one who made the choice of the content and volume of the music played (id. at PAGEID 82, ¶ 26), but that “Defendants targeted and punished Jacobs for nothing other than his association with his son.” (Id. at PAGEID 86, ¶
On November 3, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that “[b]efore even reaching the merits, this Court should dispose of the individual capacity § 1983 claims because of Plaintiff‘s inappropriate ‘group pleading.‘” Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to designate any facts as to how Brisset and Blackburn individually violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights, and that, consequently, Plaintiff‘s
Defendants raise several arguments as to why Plaintiff‘s claims against them are barred as matters of law. Defendants specifically argue that, to the extent Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief as to Claim One, since the alleged injuries of his arrest and prosecution have already
Defendants argue that “the content neutral statute was not applied to Plaintiff ‘in a viewpoint specific manner,‘” and, thus, Plaintiff‘s as-applied challenge fails. (Doc. #47, PAGEID 827, citing Oswald v. Lakota Loc. Sch. Bd., 744 F. Supp. 3d 843, 856, 858 (S.D. Ohio 2024)). Specifically, Defendants assert, the undisputed evidence shows that Blackburn and Brisset issued the citation to
Defendants assert that Claim Three fails at the outset, because the right to free association with family members arises not under the First Amendment, but the Fourteenth, which is never mentioned in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. #47, PAGEID 829, quoting Blick, 105 F.4th at 884). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that he participated in his son‘s decision to play outdoor music, and thus, he cannot proceed under a theory of “right to expressive association[.]” (Id. at PAGEID 829-30, citing Blick, 105 F.4th at 882, 884; Doc. #38-1, PAGEID 325, 327-28, 330-31). Finally, Defendants claim that the citation being for excessive noise means that Plaintiff has not been deprived of any right to viewpoint or content
As to Claim Four, Defendants argue that the video evidence provided by the Thens, along with the statements from the Thens and five other witnesses, gave Brisset and Blackburn probable cause to issue the citation; consequently, Defendants claim, Brisset and Blackburn cannot be liable for malicious arrest. (Doc. #47, PAGEID 830-31, quoting United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2018); citing Germany v. Watkins, No. 23-3812, 2024 WL 2052153, *3 (6th Cir. May 8, 2024)). Finally, Defendants assert that because the prosecutor alone decided whether to proceed with charges, a claim for malicious prosecution against Brisset and Blackburn may not be maintained, and Brisset and Blackburn are entitled to summary judgment on all claims. (Id. at PAGEID 832-33, quoting Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 314 (6th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Ward, 43 F. App‘x 779, 783-784 (6th Cir. 2002)).
As to Miami County, Defendants argue that, because: (1) Plaintiff failed to plead a theory of liability under Monell v. v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 438 U.S. 658 (1978), (2) a county may not be held “vicariously liable in § 1983 actions merely because [it] employ[s] someone who has committed a constitutional violation[,]” and (3) Brisset and Blackburn did not commit a constitutional violation, Miami County is entitled to summary judgment. (Doc. #47, PAGEID 833-34, quoting Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 2017); citing Monell, 438 U.S. at 694
In his memorandum contra1, Plaintiff argues that, despite the dismissal, the citation had a chilling effect on his speech, given that a conviction could impact his career as a law enforcement officer. (Memo. in Opp., Doc. #55, PAGEID 1021, citing Doc. #38-1, PAGEID 337-38). He also argues that the existence of probable cause is materially disputed as to the following facts: (1) that Brisset and Blackburn were enforcing a neutral noise statute, rather than engaging in content-based retaliation; (2) the officers reasonably believed that Plaintiff was the one playing the music at an excessive volume on November 7, 2023; (3) the officers believed at all that Plaintiff was acting recklessly; and (4) Plaintiff was charged and prosecuted based on his own conduct, rather than Plaintiff‘s association with his son. (Id. at PAGEID 1022-23). Plaintiff also argues that there is a material dispute as to whether Miami County deviated from normal practice by making Plaintiff the only person prosecuted for violating
As to the First Amendment claims, Plaintiff argues that, to the extent that he was responsible for “profane, racist, and sexist” music on his property, the playing of that music constituted protected conduct. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1024-25,
citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1254 (6th Cir. 1997); Doc. #41-5, PAGEID 469-97). Moreover, Plaintiff‘s vocal disagreements with Brisset and Blackburn regarding whether and how profanity may be protected under the First Amendment is similarly protected conduct. (Id. at PAGEID 1025-26, quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987); citing Wood v. Eubanks, 25 F.4th 414, 423 (6th Cir. 2022); Doc. #46-1 PAGEID 784-85). Second, Plaintiff claims that the government action—issuance of a citation and prosecution for violation of
Third, Plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could conclude that Brisset and Blackburn lacked probable cause to issue the citation and for Miami County to prosecute Plaintiff, and that Brisset and Blackburn were “the driving force behind the prosecution” of Plaintiff; consequently, Plaintiff claims, there was “a causal connection between a defendant‘s retaliatory animus and subsequent injury[.]” (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1027-28, quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006); citing Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 482-84, 489 (6th Cir. 2024); Doc. #41-5, PAGEID 473; Doc. #44, PAGEID 723-24; Doc. #46-1, PAGEID 786-89). Plaintiff asserts that Brisset and Blackburn stopped treating the Thens’ noise complaints as an ordinary dispute and began treating them as potential criminal matters only when the subject of the complaints became the language in the music, rather than
Plaintiff also argues that the question of whether probable cause existed is one of fact for the jury, and that there is a legitimate dispute as to “whether any objectively reasonable officer could believe that probable caused existed at all” with respect to Plaintiff. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1035, citing Brown v. City of Albion, 136 F.4th 331, 343 (6th Cir. 2025)). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts, there was no evidence that Plaintiff himself made any unreasonable noise; nor was there evidence of Plaintiff communicating the excessive noise or language to another person, much less “recklessly,” as required by the statute. (Id. at PAGEID 1037, 1038, citing
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot do this, for three reasons. First, Defendants have failed to identify any standard by which noise is considered excessive under the statute, and as discussed above, they have not issued any other citation for excessive noise in the last five years. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1041, citing Doc. #40-1, PAGEID 405-07, 417). Second, there was no discussion of criminal liability when the gravamen of the complaints was merely noise level; it was only after Brisset and Blackburn received complaints about the music‘s explicit content that Defendants sought to cite Plaintiff. (Id. at PAGEID 1042). Third, the “head of household” theory used by Duchak to justify the issuance of the citation when it was Plaintiff‘s son who played the music was factually dubious and legally untenable. (Id.). Plaintiff concludes that, given how thin the
As to Claim One, a facial challenge to
Plaintiff further argues that
Plaintiff argues that Claim Three, Free Association, is properly raised as a First Amendment claim, because it pertains to Plaintiff‘s “right to associate for the purpose of speaking[.]” (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1043, citing Hartwell v. Houghton Lake Cmty. Sch., 755 F. App‘x 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2018)). Plaintiff claims that under any theory advanced by Defendants, he was cited only because he associated with his son; that he did not gather with his son “for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a
Plaintiff also argues that, for several reasons, Miami County may be held liable under Monell. First, he posits that Sheriff Duchak, as the final decisionmaker regarding law enforcement in the county, ratified the actions of Brisset and Blackburn via the “head of household” theory to which he testified. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1045-47, quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-84 (1986); Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726, 746 (6th Cir. 2020); citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Monell, 438 U.S. at 694; Doc. #40-1, PAGEID 385-86, 408-09). Plaintiff claims that “[a] jury could treat that testimony” by Duchak regarding his theory of liability “as ratification by a final policymaker of the very theory that made this prosecution unconstitutional.” (Id. at PAGEID 1047).
Second, Plaintiff asserts that Miami County could be subject to Monell liability under a “failure to train” theory. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1048, citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 287 (6th Cir. 2020)). Specifically, Duchak sent Brisset and Blackburn to
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Brisset and Blackburn are not entitled to qualified immunity, because they actually violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights and because “no reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was lawful.” (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1053, citing Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 310, 313 (6th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff claims that “Defendants had ample notice that officers
Plaintiff argues that “[a] jury could find that Blackburn induced a prosecution of Jason Jacobs, without probable cause, because of the content of the music and Jacobs‘s insistence on his First Amendment rights and on his son‘s rights[,]” (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1056), and that Brisset‘s decision to charge Plaintiff “rather than the son, even though the son admitted playing the music” could be reasonably interpreted by a jury “as retaliation for association and for speech.” (Id. at PAGEID 1057). He asserts that Carrick is inapposite, as that case concerned only the volume of music and the time at which it was played, and did not address the content or viewpoint-based citation issued here. (Id. at PAGEID 1057-58, quoting Carrick, 2012-Ohio-608, ¶ 22). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Deputy Prosecutor‘s involvement does not shield Brisset and Blackburn from liability, because Brisset and Blackburn proximately caused the issuance of the citation and subsequent prosecution despite there being no probable cause. (Id. at PAGEID 1058-59).
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff failed to address his facial (Claim One) and as-applied (Claim Two) First Amendment challenges to the statute in his
Defendants also argue that, by using a First Amendment-based argument in his memorandum contra, Plaintiff has abandoned his malicious arrest and prosecution claim (Claim Four). (Doc. #63, PAGEID 1184-85). Even if Plaintiff had
Even if the claims have not been abandoned, however, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot defeat qualified immunity, because “[a] reasonable person in the position of Deputies Brisset and Blackburn ‘would not have thought that [they were] acting unlawfully,’ especially when the prosecutor approved the disorderly
As to Miami County, Defendants argue that “[t]he absence of an underlying constitutional violation by Deputy Brisset or Deputy Blackburn automatically destroys Plaintiff‘s Monell claim.” (Doc. #63, PAGEID 1197, citing Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 535 (6th Cir. 2019)). Moreover, Defendants assert, Plaintiff‘s Monell claim fails because the Amended Complaint failed to put Miami County on notice of the gravamen of that claim. (Id. at PAGEID 1197-98, citing Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009)). Also, Plaintiff‘s Monell claim fails under any theory, as “mere acquiescence in a single discretionary decision by a subordinate is insufficient to show ratification.” (Id. at PAGEID 1198 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 656
The matters are now ripe for decision.
II. Legal Standards
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Once the burden has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
“Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Id. at 255. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe. Credibility determinations must be left to the
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court need only consider the materials cited by the parties.
B. Qualified Immunity
“The qualified-immunity standard is a familiar one. The doctrine ‘shield[s]’ public officials from money-damages liability if ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‘” Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016) (brackets in original), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has established a two-step test for establishing whether government officials are not entitled to qualified immunity: (1) whether plaintiff‘s constitutional rights or guarantees were violated; and (2) whether those rights and guarantees were “clearly established” at the time of violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). A court may analyze either step first; in other words, if the rights at issue were not clearly established, then the Court need not determine whether the officials actually violated those
C. Fair Presentation and Abandonment of Claims
When a properly-raised claim is challenged on summary judgment, but never responded to by the non-movant, “[t]his Court‘s jurisprudence on abandonment of claims is clear: a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown, 545 F. App‘x at 372 (collecting cases).
A. Fair Presentation
As Defendants correctly note (Doc. #63, PAGEID 1177), Plaintiff devotes much of his memorandum contra to arguing that Defendants’ conduct constituted retaliatory prosecution, in violation of the First Amendment. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1024-43). Retaliatory prosecution is different in kind from Plaintiff‘s initial claim of malicious arrest and prosecution, which arises under the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. #14, PAGEID 87, ¶¶ 71-79). While both claims require a plaintiff to prove absence of probable cause, see, e.g., Hartman, 547 U.S. at 258, retaliatory prosecution requires a plaintiff to prove that “the adverse action was motivated at least in part as a response to the exercise of the plaintiff‘s constitutional rights.” Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998). No such showing of animus is required for malicious prosecution. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022) (“[a] plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.“). Thus, Plaintiff‘s retaliatory prosecution argument did not arise out of Claim Four for malicious prosecution. Moreover, Plaintiff addressing his facial challenge of the statute (Claim One), and his free association claim (Claim Three) separately in his memorandum contra (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1043-45) means that he does not view his retaliatory prosecution argument as connected to those claims; nor could he reasonably so argue.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff‘s “as-applied” challenge, he alleges that “Defendants applied the law to Plaintiff in a manner to retaliate against him for his protected
B. Abandonment
As discussed above, Plaintiff‘s First Amendment retaliatory prosecution argument in his memorandum contra Defendants’ Motion is distinct from his Fourth Amendment malicious arrest and prosecution Claim Four in the Amended Complaint. Indeed, the word “malicious” appears nowhere in the memorandum contra, despite Defendants arguing extensively in their Motion that Plaintiff‘s claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter of law. (Doc. #47, PAGEID 830-33). Accordingly, Plaintiff has abandoned Claim Four, and it must be dismissed with prejudice.
In his Motion, Plaintiff “moves for summary judgment declaring
This distinction is not semantic, but, rather, at the core of Article III standing: even assuming arguendo that the Court agreed with Plaintiff that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court is without power to fashion a remedy given the parties in the case. In other words, Plaintiff‘s harm alleged in the facial challenge is not redressable by the remaining Defendants. “[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary‘s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal
In sum, the Court lacks the authority at this juncture to declare
D. Claim One: Facial Challenge
In their Motion and Reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a facial challenge, because he has not identified an imminent injury that would entitle him to injunctive or declaratory relief. (Doc. #47, PAGEID 824-25; Doc. #63, PAGEID 1183-84). A claimant alleging that he has already been injured by an unconstitutional statute has not alleged “an adequate injury in fact to confer standing for declaratory and injunctive relief.” See Grendell, 252 F.3d at 832. Plaintiff argues only that he “had standing to challenge the offensive-language provision of
To meet his prima facie burden in a claim for retaliatory prosecution, like other First Amendment retaliation claims, Plaintiff must “plausibly show (1) that he was ‘engaged in protected conduct,’ (2) that the defendant took adverse action against him ‘that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct,’ and (3) that the protected conduct caused the adverse action, at least in part.” Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff‘s Office, 109 F.4th 864, 871 (6th Cir. 2024), quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). A court may “consider the last prong first. To show causation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant would not have taken the adverse action ‘absent the retaliatory motive.‘” Id., quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398-99 (2019). Plaintiff must demonstrate “a ‘causal connection’ between the government defendant‘s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff‘s ‘subsequent injury[.]‘” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398 (internal citation omitted); accord Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262-66 (holding that plaintiff must show retaliatory animus and but-for causation between that animus and the prosecution without probable cause).
Plaintiff argues that Brisset and Blackburn are not immunized from liability simply because the Miami County deputy prosecutor was the one who actually prosecuted Plaintiff, because Brisset and Blackburn “induced the prosecution.” (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted), citing Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 482-84, 489 (6th Cir. 2024)). In support, Plaintiff asserts
However, even if Brisset and Blackburn‘s distaste for the music being played at Plaintiff‘s house constituted animus on their parts, the causal link between that shift and the ultimate prosecution of Plaintiff is too attenuated for Plaintiff to satisfy the third element of retaliatory prosecution, even at the summary judgment stage. Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398. It is undisputed that, after Brisset and Blackburn became aware of the presumed protected speech, they followed Captain Wheeler‘s instruction not to issue citations unless they witnessed a violation first-hand. (Doc. #41-5, PAGEID 473).
More importantly, there is no dispute that, on November 8, 2023, Brisset closed the case against Plaintiff without any charges. (Doc. #41-5, PAGEID 473). It was only after Wheeler reversed himself and instructed Brisset and Blackburn to take the case to the Deputy Prosecutor, and the Deputy Prosecutor himself directed Brisset and Blackburn to issue the citation, that Plaintiff was subject to prosecution. Given that Brissett closed the case against Plaintiff without charges, any retaliatory animus by Brissett and Blackburn could not have been the direct
Alternatively, Defendants are correct that “[t]here is no violation of a clearly established constitutional right when following a supervisor‘s instruction to complete an investigation and let the prosecutor decide whether any charge should be filed.” (Doc. #63, PAGEID 1196, citing Kinkus v. Vill. of Yorkville, Ohio, 289 F. App‘x 86, 91 (6th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases)). Thus, Brisset and Blackburn are entitled to qualified immunity, and Claim Two fails for that reason as well.
F. Claim Three: First Amendment Association
Plaintiff clarifies in his memorandum contra that he is bringing a First Amendment claim—specifically, that the decision to charge Plaintiff grew out of his association with his son, the one who was playing the supposedly offensive music. (Doc. #55, PAGEID 1043-44). He argues that “[i]t is enough that Jacobs associated with his son in a way that involved listening to music and, together, pushing back against government efforts to suppress that speech.” (Doc. #55 at PAGEID 1044-45, citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; Miller, 622 F.3d at 538-39).
In a First Amendment free speech association claim, the Court evaluates whether: (1) “the identified group [may] seek freedom-of-association ‘protection’ because its members associate partly to express a message“; (2) “the challenged state action ‘significantly burden[s]’ the group‘s ability to spread its message“;
At the outset, it is not clear that these allegations meet the first element of our freedom-of-association test. [Appellant] cites no case that has treated an informal and ad hoc group (parents who seek to attend a school-board meeting) as an “expressive association” entitled to First Amendment protection. Most Supreme Court cases have instead involved formal entities like the Boy Scouts, the NAACP, or other charitable organizations.
Id. at 884, citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
There is no evidence of record indicating that Plaintiff and his son had even formed an ad hoc group for the purpose of playing explicit music. (See, e.g., Doc. #38-1, PAGEID 325, 327 (Plaintiff testifying that “[t]here‘s no objective behind any music being played if I play music[,]” and that “I told [the deputies] that I was not playing music.“)). Even if they had, however, Blick demonstrates that any extension of First Amendment free association rights to encompass Plaintiff was not clearly established at the time of the issuance of the citation. Thus, Brisset and Blackburn are entitled to qualified immunity as to Claim Three.
G. Monell Liability
In his memorandum contra, Plaintiff argues that, by suing Brisset and Blackburn in their official capacities, he put Miami County on “clear notice that
Moreover, Monell liability is derivative; if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a city or county employee violated his constitutional rights, then he cannot hold the employing municipal or county entity under Monell. Blick is again instructive:
[Plaintiff] sought to hold the School District (the entity) liable for its alleged “policy or custom” of violating its employees’ First Amendment rights. We can make short work of this argument. We have repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot hold a city liable for an unconstitutional policy unless the policy led to a violation of the plaintiff‘s own rights. Because Blick failed to show that any school officials violated her First Amendment rights, her Monell claim against the District necessarily fails too.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Brisset, Blackburn, and Miami County‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #47) is SUSTAINED, and Plaintiff‘s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #49) is OVERRULED. Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 18, 2026
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT