OPINION
This interlocutory appeal presents several interesting jurisdictional twists. The Plaintiff, Kevin Everson, suffers from epilepsy. He sued multiple defendants, including Hamilton County Sheriff Simon Leis and Deputy Sheriff Albert Wittich, Jr., for their purported unlawful treatment of him during and after a seizure he suffered in 2003. Sheriff Leis and Deputy Sheriff Wittich moved for summary judgment on various grounds, including qualified immunity. Rather than address the merits of the motion, the district court held it in abeyance and ordered that discovery be reopened. Defendants sought interlocutory appeal of that decision.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over Defendants’ qualified-immunity defenses. We further conclude that Defendants are immune from personal liability on several of Everson’s federal claims.
I
A. Factual Background
Everson alleges the following facts in his complaint: On or about April 19, 2003, *489 Everson was at the Northgate Mall in Hamilton County, Ohio. Deputy Sheriff Wittich and Deputy Sheriff John Doe (collectively, the “Deputies”) were employed by the Hamilton County Sheriffs Office as deputies and by the Northgate Mall as security officers.
While at the mall, Everson suffered an epileptic seizure that required medical assistance. Although they were trained by the county on how to respond and to assist someone suffering an epileptic seizure, Ev-erson contended that the Deputies physically agitated and attacked him. They knew that someone suffering a seizure can be violent, and that any violence was the direct result of the epilepsy. Everson told them that he was an epileptic and that them conduct was likely to cause him to suffer another seizure. Nevertheless, he asserted that the Deputies assaulted him, including hogtying him, and took him into custody. While in custody, Everson requested but was denied medical care. Ev-erson was charged with assault and disorderly conduct, but the charges were later dismissed.
During his deposition, Everson provided further details regarding his seizures and the events at the mall. He can usually remember what happens before and after a seizure, but not what happens during a seizure. He frequently feels groggy and sometimes has headaches immediately after a seizure.
The seizure at Northgate Mall began when he was washing his hands in the restroom. He described his state of mind as “dazed” at the time. He exited the restroom and saw several individuals in uniform approach him. He could not say whether they were sheriffs deputies or mall security. He recalled that they asked him his name, and he responded by asking if he could sit down. The last thing he recalled prior to his seizure was being on the ground. After his seizure began to subside, he recalled finding himself in hand- and foot-restraints, lying face down on a cot.
He was then asked with whom he was at the mall, and he responded he was with his family. He was able to tell the individuals his name and where he was located. When asked whether he wanted to go to the hospital, he responded that his seizures did not require immediate medical attention. He was placed in a sheriffs squad car. He testified that his family did not see any of this.
Everson testified that while in the sheriffs squad car, he heard one deputy ask another, “What are we going to charge him with?” and the other responded, “I’ll think something up and fax it down.” He was eventually transported to the local detention center.
He testified that he told officials at the detention center that he had epilepsy and was taking medication for it. No one from the medical staff saw or treated him, however, while at the detention center. During his stay, he had several seizures. At least one guard knew of his seizures because he offered Everson a mat for the floor so that Everson would not hit his head if he had another seizure. He remained at the detention center from Saturday evening to Monday morning.
Everson did not recall telling a deputy at the mall that he could have another seizure nor did he recall whether he pushed the deputy. He had an epilepsy-identification tag on his keychain, but not on a chain around his neck or wrist.
For their part, Defendants assert that the following factual statements are undisputed: Everson threatened to swing at mall security staff and local EMS. He kicked and swung at individuals as they approached him. When Deputy Wittich *490 attempted to retrieve his identification, Everson became violent and kicked the deputy. After being placed on the ground, Everson continued to kick and fight. When an EMS worker tried to obtain a blood sugar reading, Everson pushed the worker away.
B. Procedural Background
Everson sued Sheriff Leis, Deputy Sheriff Wittich, Deputy Sheriff John Doe, Nor-thgate Mall, and John Doe Employee of Northgate Mall. He sued the government officials in both their individual and official capacities. He brought causes of actions under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for illegal search, excessive force, unlawful arrest, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; a separate equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; and an emotional distress claim under Ohio law.
The district court held a scheduling conference on July 22, 2005. The district court set a settlement conference for January 5, 2006; a discovery cut-off date of June 15, 2006; and a deadline for any motions for summary judgment of August 1, 2006. Shortly after the date for the settlement conference, Defendants deposed Everson. Everson’s counsel failed to engage in any discovery. On August 1, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, claims of qualified immunity. 1
Everson’s counsel failed to file a response, even after receiving a two-month extension of time to do so. The district court issued a show-cause order; Ever-son’s counsel asked to withdraw from the case for personal reasons. His request was granted, and he was subsequently suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. Everson obtained new counsel. Everson’s new counsel filed a response opposing summary judgment and asking that discovery be reopened. The district court granted the request, ordered that discovery be reopened for ninety days, and ordered that Everson’s counsel file a second response to the motion after the close of discovery.
Defendants sought interlocutory appeal of the district court’s decision.
II
A. Jurisdiction
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 limits appellate jurisdiction to “final decisions of the district courts.” Interlocutory appeals can be made under § 1291 in limited circumstances, namely when the district court’s order “is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,” when it “conclusively determine[s] the disputed question,” and when the question involves a claim “of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.”
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
Defendants rely upon a series of cases holding that a district court cannot refuse to resolve a question of qualified immunity raised before discovery is closed, but must instead determine whether qualified immunity is proper or whether further discovery is necessary to resolve the question. In
Skousen v. Brighton High School,
*491
the court on interlocutory appeal found that the district court had erred in first holding a summary-judgment motion in abeyance and then denying it without prejudice while the plaintiff finished discovery.
Rather than dismiss the [summary judgment] motion because discovery was not complete, the district court was required to determine — prior to permitting further discovery — whether [plaintiffs] complaint alleged the violation of a constitutional right at all, and if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
Id.
Qualified immunity is intended not only to protect officials from civil damages, but just as importantly, to protect them from the rigors of litigation itself, including the potential disruptiveness of discovery.
Id.
at 526. By refusing to address qualified immunity when it was raised, the district court had undercut one of the primary rationales for such immunity — to save officials from unwarranted discovery.
Id.
at 527. The panels in
Summers v. Leis,
In arguing against jurisdiction, Everson relies upon this court’s decision in
Kimble v. Hoso,
The court held that Kimble’s case differed from Skousen in two critical ways. First, there was no order by the district court in Kimble’s case actually dismissing without prejudice the summary-judgment motion. Id. at 335. Without an order to appeal, the court believed that the issue of qualified immunity had not been conclusively determined. Id. Second, the court noted that “the district court did not delay ruling on the defendants’[ ] motion for the legally erroneous reason of permitting further discovery.” Id. The court went on to explain that with discovery stayed, “[t]his type of delay, which does not require the defendants to face any additional stages of litigation, does not undercut the essential purpose of qualified immunity.” Id.
Here, we are faced with an appeal set between the Skousen line of cases and Kimble. Like Kimble and unlike the Skousen line, the district court did not deny or dismiss without prejudice Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Yet, like the Skousen line and unlike Kim-ble, the district court did permit additional discovery without first resolving the question of qualified immunity. The question becomes, then, whether this case is more like Kimble or more like the Skousen line.
We side with the latter. The rationale for qualified immunity clearly favors jurisdiction here. Like in
Skousen, Wal-lin,
and
Summers,
the district court permitted discovery to continue before first resolving the qualified-immunity question. Thus, Defendants would “be forced to go through a large part of the litigation process that the qualified immunity doctrine seeks to avoid.”
Wallin,
This court “has held on multiple prior occasions that, when faced with a motion based on qualified immunity, a district court can not avoid ruling on the issue.”
Summers,
Finally, the three factors used by the Supreme Court in
Mitchell
favor interlocutory appeal. As noted above, qualified immunity involves rights different from but collateral to those asserted in the action. As to the second factor, the district court’s order to hold the motion until after the completion of additional discovery cannot be undone on final appeal — the goal of minimizing an official’s exposure to unwarranted discovery will have already been undermined. On the third factor, the order conclusively determined Defendants’ claim of right to avoid further discovery. Applying this same analysis, the Fifth Circuit held in
Helton v. Clements
that a district court’s order declining or otherwise refusing to rule on a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is an immediately appealable order.
A district court can, of course, determine in its reasoned judgment that a decision on a motion for summary judgment *493 cannot be made without further discovery. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), “If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may ... (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken.... ” Here, the district court held Defendants’ motion in abeyance because, in its view, ruling on the motion “would unduly penalize [Everson] for circumstances entirely outside of his control.” Everson v. Leis, No. 1:05-CV-0087, Order Reopening Discovery at 1-2 (S.D.Ohio Oct. 11, 2007). Nowhere in its order did the district court address whether discovery was actually necessary, i.e., whether Everson’s complaint alleged the violation of a constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established on April 19, 2003.
In ordering a new period for discovery, the district court relied upon the sworn declaration of Everson’s present counsel. In that declaration, counsel stated that as a result of the prior counsel’s failure to take any discovery, “Plaintiff cannot present facts essential to oppose the merits” of Defendants’ dispositive motion. He further stated, “If the Court reopens discovery, Plaintiff will depose Defendants and eye witnesses to the incident in question, request production of documents from Defendants, and issue interrogatories to Defendants.” This is the extent of counsel’s explanation for the need for new discovery.
This declaration does not meet the minimum standards of Rule 56(f). “Bare allegations or vague assertions of the need for discovery are not enough” under Rule 56(f).
Summers,
Thus, the district court did not have sufficient grounds under Rule 56(f) for ordering a new discovery period. Without some sound reason for refusing to rule on Defendants’ motion that was related to the proper resolution of the motion (e.g., a well-supported need for discovery), the district court’s refusal to rule can be appealed immediately to this court.
B. Qualified Immunity
1. In General
In order to prevail on a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ever-son must establish that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Smoak v. Hall,
*494
The issue of qualified immunity is essentially a legal question for the court to resolve.
Elder v. Holloway,
When, as here, a defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Baker v. City of Hamilton,
2. Sheriff Leis
Viewed in the light most favorable to Everson, the allegations do not show that Sheriff Leis violated any constitutional right of Everson’s. Everson argues on appeal that Sheriff Leis “failed to train his corrections officers at intake and at the Queensgate jail to provide medical care to Mr. Everson.” Appellee’s Br. at 18. There are at least two fundamental problems with this argument. First, Everson never pleaded a failure-to-train claim against Sheriff Leis. The only place where the word “train” appears in his complaint is in the factual allegations at ¶ 9, “Defendant [sic] Hamilton County trained their Deputies on how to respond and assist an individual having an epileptic seizure and how to approach and recognize an individual who is coming out of an epileptic sei
*495
zure.”
5
Nowhere does Everson make a claim that the Sheriff failed to train his deputies in some way or that any failure or deficiency in training amounted to a deliberate indifference to Everson’s rights.
City of Canton v. Harris,
Second, Everson attempts to conflate a § 1983 claim of individual supervisory liability with a claim of municipal liability. Section 1983 liability must be premised on more than mere respondeat superior, the right to control one’s employees.
Shehee v. Luttrell,
Here, Everson makes no specific allegation against Sheriff Leis vis-a-vis training. He does not suggest, for example, that Sheriff Leis enacted a policy that restricted deputy training for dealing with an individual suffering an epileptic seizure. In general terms, he argues in his brief on appeal that Sheriff Leis is the chief policy officer and is responsible for the actions of those who serve under him. Appellee’s Br. at 18. He further argues by inference that because the Deputies allegedly failed to give him proper medical attention, that shows that Sheriff Leis’s training was improper and inadequate. Id. at 20. This court recently explained that these types of general allegations are insufficient to support a failure-to-train claim made against an official, as opposed to a municipality:
Although the district court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Roane County had a policy or custom of deliberately ignoring prisoners’ medical needs, that finding is not on appeal. See Meals [v. City of Memphis], 493 F.3d [720], 727 [ (6th Cir.2007) ] (a city is not entitled to appeal the district court’s denial of summary judgment on an interlocutory appeal). The Estate’s general allegations that the correctional officers and paramedics were not properly trained are more appropriately submitted as evidence to support a failure-to-train theory against the municipality itself, and not the supervisors in their individual capacities. See City of Canton v. Harris,489 U.S. 378 , 385,109 S.Ct. 1197 ,103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (recognizing that a systematic failure to train officers adequately as a custom or policy may lead to city liability). While an individual supervisor may still be held liable in his or her individual capacity under a failure-to-train theory, the Estate must point to a specific action of each individual supervisor to defeat a qualified immunity claim. And because the Estate has not advanced any specific allegations against Yager, Haggard, or Wright, we dismiss the case against these three defendants.
Phillips v. Roane County,
*496 As Everson’s assertions reveal no specific allegations of a failure to train by Sheriff Leis, and as Everson did not even plead a failure-to-train claim against the Sheriff in his complaint, Sheriff Leis is entitled to qualified immunity.
3. Deputy Sheriff Wittich
As in
Skousen,
there exists a wrinkle in the analysis of Everson’s claims against Deputy Sheriff Wittich. Generally, once a party makes a motion for summary judgment and supports it as required under Rule 56(c), the opposing party “cannot rest solely on the allegations made in [his] pleadings.”
Skousen,
Yet, when analyzing qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal, our jurisdiction is quite narrow. Interlocutory review is permitted where a defendant argues merely that his alleged conduct did not violate clearly established law.
Mitchell,
Despite the lack of affidavits or other forms of evidence from Everson’s side, there is some evidence in the record from Everson — his deposition testimony. Ever-son’s prior counsel was present during the deposition, and a review of the transcript shows that Everson was permitted in large part to give his side of the story. With the requirements of Rule 56(c) and the narrow scope of this court’s jurisdiction, we read Everson’s deposition testimony in the light most favorable to his claims against Deputy Sheriff Wittich in determining whether the deputy should be immune from any personal liability. If, however, there is “hard evidence” that one of Everson’s factual allegations made in his complaint is “demonstrably false” and his deposition testimony is otherwise silent, we need not treat that allegation as true for purposes of this interlocutory appeal.
Skousen,
Given the rather awkward procedural posture of this appeal, it should be unsurprising that Defendants may fail to present Everson’s factual allegations in the best light in every instance. While the refusal to concede factual questions to a plaintiff will typically doom a defendant’s interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity, that need not happen here. “As this court has frequently observed, ‘[i]f ... aside from the impermissible arguments regarding disputes of fact, the defendant also raises the purely legal question of whether the facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly established law, then there is an issue over which this court has jurisdiction.’ ”
Kirby v. Duva,
Everson argues on appeal that he has pleaded various federal constitutional claims against Deputy Sheriff Wittich. These are: illegal search; excessive force; arrest without probable cause; and failure to provide adequate medical attention. He also asserts a claim under the ADA and one under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal-Protection Clause. These are each addressed below.
a. Illegal Search
In determining whether the right against unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated, we must consider whether the action is “attributable to the government,” and amounts to a “search” or “seizure” for Fourth-Amendment purposes. If so, then we must determine whether the search or seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances.
See
U.S. Const, amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, ... but upon probable cause (emphasis added)). While a warrant issued upon probable cause is generally required for a search or seizure to be deemed “reasonable,” the Supreme Court has recognized particularized exceptions to the main rule, when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
Everson did not allege in his complaint that either Deputy Sheriff Wittich or the John Doe deputy performed an illegal search on his person. Rather, he alleged that an unknown employee of Nor-thgate Mall searched him. Nor, in his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, did Everson clarify that the illegal-search claim was directed at Deputy Sheriff Wittich. While Everson faults Defendants for failing to address the illegal-search claim in their motion for summary judgment, see Appellee’s Br. at 21-22 & 21 n. 1, they were not on reasonable notice that he was even making out a claim of illegal search against Deputy Sheriff Wittich. In any event, Everson has not shown how Deputy Sheriff Wit-tich’s admitted attempt to ascertain his identification during his seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances.
b. Excessive Force
As with the purported illegal-search claim, Everson argues on appeal that Defendants failed to address his excessive-force claim in their motion for summary judgment and therefore should be precluded from seeking immunity from it on appeal. See Appellee’s Br. at 21-22. But, again, Everson never clearly made out an excessive-force claim in his complaint. At best, he pleaded factual allegations that could support such a claim. Yet, in his second and third causes of actions — the ones claiming violation of federal constitutional law — he speaks of equal protection violations, deliberate indifference to his medical needs, illegal search, and the lack of probable cause to arrest, file charges, and prosecute. There is no assertion of a claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It appears that the *498 first time he asserted an excessive-force claim is in his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Even assuming he had given sufficient notice of an excessive-force claim against Deputy Sheriff Wittich, Everson testified that he had no recollection of the events between when his epileptic seizure began and when he fully regained awareness as he was being transported to the squad car. The affidavits of Deputy Sheriff Wittich and EMS personnel describe during this period a vocally abusive and physically agitated person who continued to kick and fight even when personnel tried to restrain him. Everson testified that he did not recall whether he pushed anyone; in fact, he testified that he was dazed, groggy, and that he suffered “strobe-light” sensations during this time. Even taking his deposition testimony in the best light, there is nothing to rebut the affidavits submitted by Defendants showing that Everson posed an immediate threat to the safety of himself and emergency personnel. This distinguishes this case from
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.,
c. Unlawful Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
Everson does clearly allege in his complaint that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and prosecute him. Both claims essentially come down to whether Deputy Sheriff Wittich had probable cause to arrest and charge Everson with assault and disorderly conduct.
“In order for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the police lacked probable cause.”
Fridley v. Horrighs,
A determination of whether probable cause existed requires us to examine the totality of the circumstances, and we may “consider only the information possessed by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.”
Harris v. Bornhorst,
“In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.”
Fridley,
Deputy Sheriff Wittich argues that Ev-erson verbally threatened and physically assaulted mall personnel, EMS personnel, and the Deputies. He contends that these actions “clearly met the elements” of assault under O.R.C. § 2903.13 and disorderly conduct under O.R.C. § 2917.11. He argues that because there was no constitutional violation, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Contrary to Everson’s argument on appeal, law enforcement officials are not necessarily precluded under federal law from arresting someone who displays symptoms of a known medical condition.
See, e.g., United States v. Villagrana-Flores,
Everson argues that Deputy Sheriff Wittich lacked probable cause to arrest him for assault and disorderly conduct. Although there is unrebutted record evidence that Everson constituted a physical threat during the time he suffered his seizure, this does not necessarily mean that the resulting arrest was warranted. Viewed in the light best to Everson, he had recovered from his seizure when he arrived at the squad car. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he was physically or verbally abusive at that time. Deputy Sheriff Wittich knew that Everson had suffered an epileptic seizure. It is a fair inference, then, that the deputy should have known that Everson’s actions were made with, at best, a semi-conscious frame of mind.
Everson directs our attention to O.R.C. § 2305.43(A), which sets forth the standard of care under Ohio law to be applied by an officer dealing with a disabled person,
A law enforcement officer shall make a diligent effort to determine whether any disabled person he finds is an epileptic or a diabetic, or suffers from some other type of illness that would cause the condition. Whenever feasible, this effort shall be made before the person is *500 charged with a crime or taken to a place of detention.
Because the provision requires that an officer determine whether a person is an epileptic “before the person is charged with a crime,” it stands to reason that § 2305.43(A) may excuse otherwise criminal conduct if the conduct is committed by an epileptic, at least under certain circumstance; otherwise, there would be no need to determine whether the person was an epileptic prior to charging him. Everson’s assault charge required that a person knowingly commit an assault, while the disorderly conduct required that a person recklessly commit the act. 6 Given Deputy Sheriff Wittich knew that Everson was suffering an epileptic seizure during the time he engaged in the otherwise criminal conduct, § 2305.43(A) arguably calls into question whether the deputy had probable cause to arrest Everson. In short, Deputy Sheriff Wittich considered the inculpatory evidence of guilt, but not the exculpatory evidence of lack of mens rea, according to Everson.
The next question, then, is what effect, if any, does this state statute have on Deputy Sheriff Wittich’s claim of qualified immunity from Everson’s federal claim? Plainly, the federal right to be subject only to arrest upon probable cause was clearly established when Deputy Sheriff Wittich arrested Everson. Moreover, it was clearly established that officers had to consider both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence under the federal totality-of-the-circumstances standard. However, it was not clearly established how O.R.C. § 2305.43(A) altered, if at all, an officer’s probable-cause calculus. To date, no federal or Ohio state court has addressed the question of whether O.R.C. § 2305.43(A) requires an officer to refrain from arresting and charging a disabled person who has committed an act that would clearly be a criminal act if committed by a non-disabled person. While Ohio state courts generally recognize that blacking out during a seizure can be an affirmative defense in certain instances,
see In re Kristopher F.,
NO.2006CA00312,
d. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Although Everson asserted in his complaint that he needed medical care immediately after his seizure at the mall, he testified to the opposite. As he explained during his deposition, he was asked whether he wanted to go to the hospital and he declined, explaining to emergency personnel that the kind of seizure he had did not require medical attention. He has consis *501 tently claimed, however, that personnel at the county jail ignored his medical condition — he was refused any medication to control his seizures and only given a mat to protect his head in case he suffered another seizure.
There is, however, nothing in the complaint, Everson’s deposition, or the affidavits filed in support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to suggest that Deputy Sheriff Wittich worked at the detention center, had any personal contact with Everson at the center, or was present there at any time other than when he took Everson in for booking. Considering Ev-erson’s allegations and the factual record in the light most favorable to him, it is clear that Deputy Sheriff Wittich did not act with deliberate indifference to Ever-son’s serious medical needs during Ever-son’s stay in the detention center.
C. Americans with Disabilities Act
Everson has also asserted a claim under Title II of the ADA. Defendants argue that the claim must be dismissed because there is no provision under Title II that addresses Everson’s allegations. Everson responds that qualified immunity is not available on an ADA claim. 7
Defendants’ argument goes to whether Everson’s entire claim must fail as a matter of law, not to whether they should be immune in their individual capacities from civil damages. Our jurisdiction on this interlocutory appeal is strictly limited to matters of qualified immunity. Therefore, because we lack jurisdiction, we cannot address the merits of Everson’s ADA claim.
D. Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
Everson asserted a claim against Defendants under the Equal-Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although difficult to decipher, it appears that Ever-son claims that Deputy Sheriff Wittich violated his right to equal protection by failing to treat him as an epileptic patient. As with the ADA claim, there is a question of whether Defendants asserted qualified immunity to Everson’s equal-protection claim. Because Sheriff Leis’s liability for any equal-protection violation must be premised on a failure-to-train theory, his argument for qualified immunity against Everson’s constitutional claims is broad enough to encompass this claim. However, in the motion for summary judgment, Deputy Sheriff Wittich did not argue that he should be immune from personal liability for any claim premised on treating Ev-erson differently as a result of his epilepsy; instead he argued that Everson had *502 failed to state a valid cause of action. While the claim appears to have little or no support in law or fact, because Deputy-Sheriff Wittich has not specifically sought qualified immunity on the claim, we are without jurisdiction to address it.
E. State Law Claims
Finally, Everson asserted a claim of emotional distress under Ohio law, and Defendants sought immunity from liability under O.R.C. ch. 2744. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 vests the district court with the authority to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. The district court has not yet ruled on the matter. Accordingly, we do not address Defendants state-law immunity argument at this time.
Ill
For the reasons set forth above, the district court erred by ordering additional time for discovery without first addressing Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity. The district court’s decision to hold the motion for summary judgment in abeyance was a final judgment for purposes of this court’s jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal. On the merits, Sheriff Leis and Deputy Sheriff Wittich are entitled to qualified immunity on all of Everson’s federal claims, with the following exceptions: (A) because neither Sheriff Leis nor Deputy Sheriff Wittich have yet to seek qualified immunity on Everson’s ADA claim, we are without jurisdiction to reach that claim at this time; and (B) because Deputy Sheriff Wittich has yet to seek qualified immunity on Everson’s equal-protection claim, we are similarly without jurisdiction to reach that claim on interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s decision to hold the dispositive motion in abeyance and REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Northgate Mall was dismissed from the case in January 2006.
. After granting summary judgment to one defendant, the district court went on to hold in the same order,
[A]ll parties and attorneys are here notified that any further motions in this case will not be ruled upon by the court prior to trial but will be carried along with the trial of the case on the merits. This ruling applies to any pending motions. Helton,787 F.2d at 1017 . This court in Kim-ble distinguished Helton on the grounds that, unlike Helton, there was no concern that the purpose of qualified immunity would be undercut because discovery had been stayed. Kimble,439 F.3d at 335-36 . In this sense, the present case is more analogous to Helton than to Kimble.
. "[Individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent."
Alkire v. Irving,
. This two-part test is sometimes expanded to three parts.
See, e.g., Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville,
. Hamilton County was never a defendant in this case.
. See O.R.C. § 2903.13(A) ("No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another....”); O.R.C. § 2917.11(A) ("No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by doing any of the following: (1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior. ...”).
. Under the case law of this circuit and our sister circuits, the proper defendant under a Title II claim is the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity.
Corten v. Kent State Univ.,