delivered the opinion of the Court.
This dispute arises out of highly contentious bankruptcy proceedings. During the bankruptcy proceedings, a committee representing bond and trade unsecured creditors vigorously disputed the valuation of the debtor as presented by the debtor’s management. The committee sought to replace the debtor’s management with a bankruptcy trustee, based in part on allegations of intentional undervaluation of the debtor. In addition, the committee objected to the debtor’s plan of reorganization, again raising allegations of intentional undervaluation. Over two years after the bankruptcy court entered its order confirming the reorganization plan proposed by the debtor, a class of bondholders brought this suit. The class of bondholders alleges that the officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties by intentionally undervaluing the debtor during the bankruptcy proceedings. The trial court granted summary judgment against the class and entered a take-nothing judgment. We consider whether the class claims, based on conduct occurring during bankruptcy proceedings, can be maintained in state court years after the bankruptcy court’s final order confirming the debtor’s reorganization plan. We conclude that the claims cannot.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. Bankruptcy Proceedings
On October 28, 1990, National Gypsum Company and its parent holding company, Aancor Holdings (collectively National Gypsum), filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The United States *340 Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, consolidated and jointly administered the cases.
National Gypsum had three classes of publicly traded debt: 1) senior notes, 2) senior debentures, and 3) junior bonds. The senior notes and senior debentures were held by several entities known collectively as the Senior Bondholders. The junior bonds were held by persons and entities referred to as Junior Bondholders, and include Jeff Prostok and the class members he represents. In addition, there were parties holding actual or potential claims against National Gypsum arising from personal injury and property damage related to asbestos products, the Asbestos Claimants. This case stems from conflicts that arose during the bankruptcy proceedings between the Junior Bondholders and Asbestos Claimants, on one side, and the Senior Bondholders and National Gypsum management, on the other.
During the bankruptcy proceedings, National Gypsum operated as debtor-in-possession under the Bankruptcy Code. 1 In November 1990, the United States trustee appointed a committee of bond and trade unsecured creditors (the BT Committee) to serve as a statutory creditors’ committee in the Chapter 11 proceedings. 2 Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the bankruptcy court to replace a debtor-in-possession with an appointed trustee upon a determination that it would be in the best interest of the debtor’s stakeholders or upon a determination of “cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management.” 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 3 In January 1992, the BT Committee moved to replace National Gypsum’s management with a bankruptcy trustee for the National Gypsum estate. The BT Committee claimed, among other things, that National Gypsum management had intentionally undervalued National Gypsum by “understating] all its forecasts to hide its objective views of the company.” After a two-day hearing on the motion in March 1992, the bankruptcy court held that the BT Committee did not meet its burden on this issue and denied the BT Committee’s motion.
National Gypsum submitted a plan of reorganization to the bankruptcy court based on a $850 million valuation of National Gypsum. As part of National Gypsum’s proposed plan, a second corporate entity, a new National Gypsum Company (New NGC), would receive National Gyp *341 sum’s operating assets and ongoing business. The plan provided that the officers and directors of National Gypsum would remain as the initial management of New NGC. New NGC stock would be largely owned by the Senior Bondholders, with Junior Bondholders receiving warrants to acquire New NGC stock.
However, the BT Committee was not satisfied with the plan and proposed a competing plan based on a $630 million valuation of National Gypsum. In November 1992, the BT Committee filed its objections to National Gypsum’s plan of reorganization. The BT Committee alleged that National Gypsum’s “[mjanagement knowingly misrepresented [National Gypsum’s] future business prospects and value.” The BT Committee explained that:
[i]n exchange for greater than 100% recovery and control of the reorganized company’s board of directors, certain post petition acquirors of Senior Notes ... publicly accepted the [National Gypsum] Plan, including its management-entrenchment and enrichment provisions. Hence, management deceived [National Gypsum’s] creditors with a misrepresentation of the value of the company to coax a small creditor faction into supporting its plan and opposing the BT Plan.
Confirmation proceedings on the competing plans of reorganization began in December 1992. At the conclusion of the valuation phase of the proceedings, the bankruptcy court concluded that the BT Committee plan could not be confirmed because it failed to prove the value of National Gypsum as of the effective date of the plan of reorganization. The order confirming the National Gypsum reorganization plan was entered on March 9, 1998 and was effective as of July 1,1993.
An interested party may contest a bankruptcy confirmation order within 180 days after its entry on the basis that it was procured by fraud. 11 U.S.C. § 1144. The 180-day period expired on September 9, 1993. No interested party requested that the order be set aside within the 180-day period or otherwise appealed the confirmation order. In October 1993, New NGC announced a new cost-savings plan that allegedly resulted in an annual reduction of expenses of $30 to $40 million dollars.
B. Current Litigation
Prostok, individually and on behalf of all other Junior Bondholders, filed the current case in state court in October 1995 against the former officers and directors of National Gypsum (Officers and Directors) and their financial advisor, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation (DLJ). 4 Prostok amended his petition to add one of the Senior Bondholders, TCW. 5 Prostok sued for breach of fiduciary duties, fraud and constructive fraud, and civil conspiracy against all the defendants. Prostok also brought claims against DLJ and the Officers and Directors for gross negligence, and alternative claims against TCW and DLJ for participating, aiding, assisting, and/or inducing breach of fiduciary duties.
Prostok alleges that during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Senior Bondholders, the Officers and Directors, and their financial advisors intentionally undervalued National Gypsum by concealing a plan to dramatically reduce the com *342 pany*s operating expenses. Specifically, Prostok alleges that the Officers and Directors represented that National Gypsum was worth $800 to $375 million, based on management’s “best estimate and intention of how the company would operate once out of bankruptcy,” though the Officers and Directors were fully aware of the cost-savings plan later announced in October 1993. Prostok alleges that this cost-savings plan resulted in an increase in the market value of New NGC’s outstanding stock from $350 million to almost $1 billion. According to Prostok, had the Officers and Directors disclosed the plan to cut expenses to the bankruptcy court, the value assigned to National Gypsum would have been higher, and the distribution to the Junior Bondholders would have been greater. Prostok claims that as a result of the cost-savings plan, the value in stock acquired by Senior Bondholders by reorganization far exceeded its initial value, resulting in a windfall for Senior Bondholders. Prostok alleges that in exchange for them participation in concealing the cost-savings plan, the Officers and Directors maintained their positions in New NGC and received lucrative incentive deals.
On November 15, 1995, the Officers and Directors and DLJ (the only defendants at the time) removed the case to federal district court. The bankruptcy court remanded the case to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. The federal district court affirmed the remand order.
On March 30, 1998, New NGC intervened in the action. New NGC asserted that under the terms of the reorganization plan, it owned the claims asserted by Pros-tok, and thus Prostok’s class lacked standing to raise the claims. New NGC sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. 6
On February 1, 1999, the Officers and Directors, DLJ, New NGC, and TCW (except The TCW Group, Inc.) joined in a motion for summary judgment asserting that Texas law did not recognize Prostok’s claims. 7 TCW (except The TCW Group, Inc.) filed a separate supplemental motion for summary judgment against Prostok, asserting statute of limitations, res judica-ta, collateral estoppel, and lack of a fiduciary duty. 8
*343 On March 1,1999, the trial com*t specifically denied TCW’s motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds but granted summary judgment in favor of the Officers and Directors, TCW, and New NGC without specifying grounds. On April 21,1999, the trial court signed a final judgment and dismissed New NGC’s plea in intervention as moot.
C. Appeals
Prostok appealed the trial court’s final take-nothing judgment. Subsequently, DLJ and several of the Officers and Directors settled their disputes with Prostok and the class. Accordingly, the court of appeals severed the claims between these parties and remanded them to the trial court to effectuate their settlements. Thus, the remaining parties on appeal were Prostok, the non-settling Officers and Directors, 9 TCW, and New NGC.
Prostok complained on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims against the Officers and Directors and TCW. The court of appeals held that none of the theories asserted by the Officers and Directors could support summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the Officers and Directors against Prostok.
TCW cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court of appeals held that TCW’s motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds was meritorious. Thus, the court of appeals effectively affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of TCW on different grounds than the trial court articulated in its judgment. 10 New NGC cross-appealed, complaining that the trial court erred in failing to consider and sustain New NGC’s standing argument as an alternative ground for dismissal. 11 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of New NGC’s intervention as to the surviving causes of action. The court of appeals remanded this “ownership” issue to the trial court as a challenge to capacity to sue, instead of as a standing issue as it was raised by New NGC. Therefore, the court of appeals held that Prostok take nothing from TCW because of statute of limitations but remanded all other pending claims to the trial court.
The Officers and Directors petitioned this Court for review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in reversing summary judgment. Specifically, they argue that summary judgment was proper because: 1) Prostok’s claims are an impermissible collateral attack on the bankruptcy court’s final judgment; 2) Texas law does not recognize the duty on which Pros-tok’s claim relies; 3) Prostok’s claims, which arise from alleged misconduct in
*344
prior litigation, are precluded under this Court’s holding in
Trevino v. Ortega,
New NGC also petitioned this Court for review arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that its claim of ownership merely raised an issue of capacity to sue. New NGC argues that Prostok lacks standing to bring claims for harm suffered by the estate. Lastly, Prostok petitions this Court for review arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that its claims against TCW were barred by limitations.
II. Standard of Review
In a summary judgment motion brought under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Knott,
The trial court’s order specifically rejected the motions based on statute of limitations but does not specify which of the remaining grounds asserted formed the basis of its summary judgment. Thus, we may affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. Id. at 216.
III. Finality of Confirmation Orders
Section 1144 of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides that upon proper request made within 180 days of the entry of the confirmation order and after notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may revoke the order if and only if the order was procured by fraud. 11 U.S.C. 1144. Section 1144 provides the exclusive means for revoking a confirmation order.
Dale C. Eckert Corp. v. Orange Tree Assocs. (In re Orange Tree Assocs.),
In accordance with these principles, the First Circuit in
Newport Harbor
held that notwithstanding the court’s traditional equitable powers, or powers conferred by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a motion seeking to revoke an order confirming a Chapter 11 reorganization plan filed three years outside the applicable limitations period was filed too late.
12
Some federal courts have held that Section 1144 is not the exclusive remedy for debtors or creditors subject to a fraudulently obtained confirmation order
if
an independent action may otherwise be maintained for the fraudulent conduct.
See id.; see also In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc.,
An action is not truly independent when maintenance of the action would violate established finality doctrines or constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the confirmation order.
See In re Newport Harbor Assocs.,
IV. Collateral Attack
Collateral attacks on final judgments are generally disallowed because it is the policy of the law to give finality to the judgments of the courts.
Tice v. City of Pasadena,
*346 [T]he mischief of retrying every case in which the judgment or decree rendered on false testimony, given by perjured witnesses, or on contracts or documents whose genuineness or validity was in issue, and which are afterwards ascertained to be forged or fraudulent, would be greater, by reason of the endless nature of the strife, than any compensation arising from doing justice in individual cases.
United States v. Throckmorton,
A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against.
Crawford v. McDonald,
The heart of Prostok’s complaint is that the alleged misconduct of the Officers and Directors and TCW during the bankruptcy proceedings resulted in the bankruptcy court’s undervaluation of National Gypsum. In turn, he argues, the Junior Bondholders received less than what they would have received had the estate been properly valued. To calculate the damages incurred by Prostok and the Junior Bondholders he represents, a court would need to determine not only how much larger the bankruptcy estate would have been but for the defendants’ conduct, but also what percentage of the estate each class of creditors would have been entitled to if the bankruptcy court had considered the larger estate. Thus, while Prostok’s action contemplates relief other than revoking the confirmation order, it necessarily challenges the integrity of the
*347
order and results in a review, perhaps a recalculation, of the bankruptcy determinations of the assets to which some claimants are entitled.
See Miller,
The court of appeals held that Prostok’s claims do not collaterally attack the confirmation order because they are based on conduct extrinsic to the confirmation order.
Extrinsic fraud is fraud that denies a losing party the opportunity to fully litigate at trial all the rights or defenses that could have been asserted.
Montgomery v. Kennedy,
Intrinsic fraud, by contrast, “relates to the merits of the issues [that] were presented and presumably were or should have been settled in the former
*348
action.”
Tice,
The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud as grounds for attacking a judgment represents a balance of competing concerns. On one hand, the sound policy of promoting finality in judgments arises from a general level of confidence that the adversarial process leading to judgment is reasonably effective to ascertain the merits of the controversy.
See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 70 cmt. a (1982). While no system is infallible, “[e]ndless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice.”
Hagedom,
It is undisputed that the BT Committee represented the interests of Prostok and the other Junior Bondholders in the bankruptcy proceedings.
National Gypsum submitted a reorganization plan to the bankruptcy court based on a valuation of $850 million. In November 1992, the BT Committee objected to the confirmation of this plan. Again, the BT Committee raised an allegation of intentional undervaluation. The BT Committee alleged, among other things, that “[National Gypsum] management [had] systematically exploited the plan process and intentionally manipulated downward its business projections and [National Gypsum’s] value.” Further, the BT Committee alleged that this plan was supported by a small creditor faction “[i]n exchange for greater than 100% recovery and control of the reorganized company’s board of directors.” Confirmation hearings on the proposed plan began on December 7, 1992. On March 9, 1993, the Bankruptcy Court entered its order confirming National Gypsum’s reorganization plan and its supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The bankruptcy court expressly overruled all objections to the confirmation of the plan and found that the debtor solicited the plan in good faith.
In this case, Prostok complains that the Officers and Directors intentionally misled the bankruptcy court regarding the proper valuation of National Gypsum. The controlling question is “whether the alleged fraud prevented the party from knowing about and presenting [their] legal rights at trial.” Montgomery,
*350
Prostok argues that, at a minimum, claims based on fraudulent conduct occurring post-confirmation could not have been subject to the confirmation order. It is axiomatic that fraud discovered post-confirmation could not have been litigated in the pre-confirmation bankruptcy proceedings. The post-confirmation conduct to which Prostok refers is the delayed implementation of a cost-savings plan. However, it is the misrepresentation of the proper valuation of National Gypsum, by failing to reveal this cost-savings plan to the bankruptcy court
during the bankruptcy proceedings,
that is ultimately the basis of Prostok’s alleged damages. In addition, the implementation of a cost-savings plan simply does not present the type of new evidence of fraud necessary to justify deviation from the general rule of finality.
See In re Pub. Serv. Co.,
Prostok also argues that we cannot treat his claims as a collateral attack on the bankruptcy court’s confirmation judgment because the bankruptcy court itself expressly rejected this argument. In ruling on Prostok’s motion to remand, the bankruptcy judge held that the complaint did not give rise to ancillary jurisdiction under the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Baccus v. Parrish,
Finally, the court of appeals relies heavily on several federal cases for the proposition that “bankruptcy courts agree that Section 1144 does not bar fraud claims unless those claims would require revocation of a confirmed plan.”
In
Emmer Brothers,
a creditor bank sued a debtor for wrongfully withholding and concealing the existence of an asset, thereby obtaining a settlement agreement and order approving it on false pretenses.
Similarly, in
Circle K,
the creditors sought damages based on allegations of improper conduct, defective disclosures, and erroneous valuation information in connection with the debtor’s plan of reorganization.
V. Conclusion
Because we hold that Prostok’s suit constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the confirmation order, we need not reach the other issues raised in the Officers and Directors’, New NGC’s, or Pros-tok’s petitions for review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in part and affirm in part, and render judgment that Prostok take nothing. 13
Notes
. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court, upon a showing of cause, will appoint a trustee to manage the estate of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1104. If a trustee is not appointed, the debtor will continue to operate the business as the debtor-in-possession during the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. § 1108. The debtor-in-possession assumes most of the powers and duties of the trustee. Id. § 1107(a).
. At the same time, the trustee created the official asbestos claimants’ committee, comprised of attorneys representing asbestos-related personal injury and property damage claimants in the bankruptcy proceedings.
. Section 1104(a) provides:
At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee — (1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or (2) if such appointment is in the interests of .creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor.
. Jackie Field Jr. and Alfred Earnest were later added as additional class representatives. We refer to Prostok, Field, and Earnest collectively as Prostok.
. The group referred to as TCW consists of TCW Special Credits, The TCW Group, Inc., Trust Company of the West, and TCW Asset Management Company.
. New NGC joined the NGC Asbestos Disease and Property Damage Trust as an involuntary plaintiff on July 24, 1998. However, the court of appeals subsequently severed and abated all claims made by and against the Asbestos Claimants. Thus, we express no opinion regarding the issues concerning the Asbestos Claimants and omit any background and procedural history concerning this party.
. The TCW Group, Inc. did not move for summary judgment at the same time as the other TCW defendants because it had filed a special appearance. The TCW Group, Inc. moved for summary judgment on March 5, 1999 on the same grounds applicable to the other TCW defendants. The motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part on April 21, 1999 on the same grounds as applicable to the other TCW defendants.
.Prostok and the Asbestos Claimants also moved for summary judgment on New NGC’s cross-claim and the counterclaims of the Officers and Directors and DLJ, which sought to enforce the fee-shifting provision of the bankruptcy plan. This provision provided that in any suit contesting any action or inaction of certain parties (including the Officers and Directors, New NGC, or their financial advisors) as not being in good faith, the losing party would be required to pay the prevailing parties reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The trial court granted Prostok and the Asbestos Claimants’ motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed the trial court. Prostok does not raise this issue to this Court. Accordingly, we omit any discussion regarding litigation on the fee-shifting provision from our opinion.
. The non-settling Officers and Directors are Peter C. Browning, Edward A. Porter, Autino O. Maraia, Bernard Kasriel, Gerard P. Carroll, and Cynthia Hartley.
. The relevant portion of the court of appeals' judgment reads:
That portion of the trial court’s judgment denying summary judgment on the grounds of the statute of limitations is REVERSED and judgment is hereby RENDERED that Jeff P. Prostok, Jackie Field, Jr., and Alfred Earnest, and all others similarly situated, take nothing by way of their claims against TCW Special Credits, Trust Company of the West, TCW Asset Management Company, and The TCW Group Inc.
Because TCW was successful on other grounds at the trial court, the reversal on their cross-appeal effectively affirmed the trial court's judgment.
.New NGC, joined by the Officers and Directors, also complained on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against it on its cross-claims for attorneys’ fees under the fee-shifting provisions of the reorganization plan. See supra note 7.
. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from final judgment for several enumerated reasons, including fraud by an adverse party.
. The court of appeals held that Prostok take nothing from TCW based on TCW's limitations defense. We affirm the judgment in favor of TCW but on the grounds described in this opinion. We do not reach TCW's limitations defense. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court’s dismissal of New NGC’s plea in intervention. We do not decide whether the trial court’s dismissal was proper since no cause of action upon which New NGC’s plea in intervention was based survives this judgment.