602 S.W.3d 504
Tex.2020Background
- D.S. was born in Massachusetts; parents married and previously lived in Texas. Mother lived in Collin County, Texas; Father had moved to Massachusetts.
- Mother filed for divorce in Collin County and amended to sever Father’s parental rights based on Father’s unrevoked affidavit of voluntary relinquishment. Father was a nonresident.
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, found it had jurisdiction under Chapter 152 (UCCJEA), and entered an agreed order terminating Father’s parental rights and appointing Mother sole managing conservator.
- Months later Father filed a bill of review claiming Texas lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction because Massachusetts was the child’s home state when the termination commenced.
- The trial court denied relief; the court of appeals reversed, holding a home‑state error under Chapter 152 could be collaterally attacked despite Tex. Fam. Code § 161.211(c).
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review and held § 161.211(c) bars collateral attacks on voluntary‑relinquishment terminations except for fraud, duress, or coercion, reversing the court of appeals and denying Father relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tex. Fam. Code § 161.211(c) permits a collateral attack on an agreed termination based on an erroneous Chapter 152 (home‑state) jurisdictional finding | Father: § 161.211(c) should not preclude a collateral attack because the trial court lacked jurisdiction—Texas was not the child’s home state | Mother: § 161.211(c) plainly limits collateral attacks to fraud, duress, or coercion; trial court’s Chapter 152 finding is conclusive in collateral attack | Held: § 161.211(c) bars collateral challenges based on erroneous home‑state determinations; petition for relief denied (court of appeals reversed) |
| Whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to show lack of jurisdiction when the termination record is facially regular and the trial court previously considered jurisdiction | Father: extrinsic evidence proves no home state and jurisdictional defect | Mother: trial court’s jurisdictional findings are conclusive; extrinsic evidence is not permitted in collateral attack | Held: Court did not decide; appeal disposed on § 161.211(c) ground and court declined to reach admissibility issue |
Key Cases Cited
- In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. 2017) (§161.211(c) limits post‑judgment attacks on voluntary relinquishment terminations to fraud, duress, or coercion)
- Moore v. Brown, 408 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013) (UCCJEA jurisdictional challenge to voluntary relinquishment termination is barred by §161.211(c))
- Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) (finality of judgments; collateral attacks disfavored)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parental rights are a fundamental interest warranting procedural protections)
- Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000) (Texas district courts are courts of general jurisdiction; discussion of subject‑matter jurisdiction concepts)
