In re S.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B307988 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00090)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 11/15/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (see dissenting opinion)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff, v. J.C., Defendant and Appellant; R.G., Defendant and Respondent.
Caitlin Christian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.C.
J.C. (Mother) filed a timely appeal from the juvenile court‘s denial of her request for a permanent restraining order protecting her from R.G. (Father). While Mother‘s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in an order from which Mother did not appeal.
We hold that Mother‘s failure to appeal the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not render Mother‘s restraining order appeal moot. In so holding, we disagree with certain cases to the extent they stand for the broad proposition that an appellate court can never grant effective relief in a dependency appeal following the unappeаled termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. Here, were we to conclude the juvenile court‘s denial of Mother‘s restraining order request constitutes reversible error and direct the court to issue the restraining order, our remittitur would vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court for the limited purpose of correcting that error. Correcting an erroneous denial of Mother‘s restraining order request would immediately afford Mother effective relief. Mother‘s appeal is therefore not moot.
As to the merits, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother‘s requested restraining order because the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Mother‘s safety would be in jeopardy without such an order. Nor do we agree with Mother that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on her request. Even assuming the court did so err, however, such error would not warrant reversal because it is not reasonably probable that Mother would have obtained a more favorable result under the correct standard.
Accordingly, we affirm
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
A. Background
Mothеr and Father ended their relationship in 2011, when their older daughter, S.G., was one year old, and Mother was still pregnant with their younger daughter, L.C. They “agree that their relationship was unhealthy or dysfunctional.” In a May 2011 referral, Mother alleged that Father emotionally abused unborn L.C. when “Father attacked [Mother] and hit . . . her pregnant stomach.” Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
In the years that followed, Mother and Father repeatedly accused each other of various forms of misconduct through referrals to DCFS, all of which DCFS deemed unfounded or inconclusive. These include: February 2012 and November 2012 referrals in which Father alleged general neglect by Mother, both of which DCFS deemed unfounded; a November 2012 referral in which Mother alleged physical abuse by Father that was deemed unfounded; a November 2015 referral in which Mother alleged emotional and physical abuse by Father that was deemed unfounded; February 2016 and December 2016 referrals in which Mother alleged general neglect and sexual abuse by Father, both of which DCFS again deemed unfounded; and a November 2017 referral by Father alleging general neglect by Mother that was deemed inconclusive.
Mother and Father also accused each other of various types of wrongdoing in their requests to the family court during custody proceedings. In September 2016, Father requested Mother‘s custodial time be reduced based on allegations that she was not taking the children to school and was withholding the children from him. Less than two weeks later, Mother obtained a temporary restraining order against Father based on allegations that he was “aggressive” during custodial exchanges and that he had withheld the children from her. In December 2016, Mother sought another temporary restraining order and to have Father‘s custody reduced based on allegations that he may have sexually abused S.G. In January 2017, the family court found the allegations were untrue, denied the restraining order request, and modified the custody order to name Father as the primary custodial parent. The parents were ordered to attend parenting classes, communicate through Talking Parents (an online co-parenting communication tool), and obtain counseling for the children.
Between 2010 and 2020, Mother filed approximately 13 requests in family court for restraining orders against Father. Some of these resulted in the family court granting a temporary order, often on an ex parte basis, but the court always denied corresponding requests for permanent orders after an evidentiary hearing. Our record does not contain details regarding the bases for any of these requests, except the 2016 request discussed above and the 2019 request discussed below.
B. Mother‘s November 2019 Request for a Restraining Order
In November 2019, Mother filed in the family court a request for a restraining order protecting both her and the children from Father. As support
She also described an October 7, 2019 incident that occurred after Mother took S.G. home from school because S.G. was ill and Father could not be reached. According to Mother, Father came to her home, yelling and using profanity, and “bang[ed]” on the windows and doors. L.C. was in Father‘s car while this occurred. Mother indicated she was in the restroom when Father arrived and was “scared [and] confused.” Father called the police, who came to the scene, but took no further action. The children remained with Mother after the police left.
The family court granted a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on the request for permanent orders.
C. Initiation of Dependency Proceedings
Before the family court could hear the request for a permanent restraining order, DCFS filed a petition under
D. Mother‘s Renewed Restraining Order Request
All parties agreed to extend the family court‘s November 2019 temporary protective order until the juvenile court held a hearing on the permanent restraining order. The juvenile court required Mother to file a renewed request, in which she incorporated by reference her November 2019 restraining order request filed in the family court, as well as DCFS‘s detention report.
The detention report included statements by Mother that Father had been “verbally and physically abusive towards her” in the past. Specifically, she told social workers that Father had “‘called her everything from here to the moon,‘” that “‘he also punched [her] when [she] was pregnant with
The detention report also listed the family‘s referral history and indicated that both parents have some criminal history related to domestic violence, although it does not indicate (nor does the record elsewhere clarify) whether this history involved arrests or convictions. Specifically, the report notes that “[F]ather has [a] criminal history regarding disorderly conduct: . . . battery of [a] spouse on [October 26, 2015] and inflict[ing] corporal injury on [a] spouse/cohabitant on [May 13, 2011]. [¶] Mother has [a] criminal history regarding battery of [a] spouse on [October 26, 2015 and] battery on [a] person on [November 18, 2015].”4
When interviewed by DCFS about the October 2019 incident, S.G. stated that “on a Monday this year,” “‘daddy came to mommy‘s house screaming and banging on her door . . . like the police and kicking on the door and windows.‘” L.C. similarly described the incident as having “‘happened on a Monday when [S.G.] stayed at mommy‘s house sick.‘” L.C. stated that “‘daddy came to mommy‘s house’ . . . [and] ‘daddy was banging on the door and yelling and saying bad words.‘” In a subsequent interview, L.C. further stated that, during the incident, “‘daddy was trying to get a bat in his car‘” and that “‘he held it, but let it go‘” while he was “‘sitting in the backseat of . . . [Father‘s] car, and mommy was looking out from her door.‘” The report included interviews with Father, in which he denied the incident occurred as Mother and the children described it, and stated instead that he knocked on the door, and claimed that the children were being coached by their mother to dеscribe the incident differently.
The detention report also included statements by S.G. that “‘one time daddy hit mommy around 2014 or 2015,‘” that “‘mommy was bleeding and crying, and he pushed her one time when she was pregnant.‘”
E. Hearing on Jurisdiction, Disposition, and Mother‘s Restraining Order Request
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, hearings on Mother‘s request for a restraining order and jurisdiction and disposition were continued and did not begin until September 9, 2020.
In reaching its decision denying Mother‘s request for a permanent restraining order, the court stated that it considered the allegations in the request, the exhibits and testimony, and the family law file. The exhibits included the DCFS jurisdiction/disposition report, in which DCFS noted the family‘s “on-going custody dispute,” and told the court: “This family has extensive child welfare referral history with a very specific pattern of the parents calling in referrals on one another related to parenting issues, and appears to be rooted in their custody dispute.” The family law file included two 2017 “statement[s] of issues and contentions” filed by the children‘s appointed counsel in family court pursuant to
The court denied Mother‘s request for the permanent restraining order. Specifically, the court “[found] insufficient evidence, certainly, not by a preponderance of the evidence to show that Mother and/or the children are at risk of any threats or actual physical violence by . . . Father towards either the mother or the children.” The court did, however, grant Mother‘s alternative request for a mutual stay-away order, requiring that “[n]either Mother nor Father are to be within 100 yards of one another or their home or their job.”
The court then found that the children were persons described in
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the court‘s jurisdiction and disposition orders, as well as the August 28, 2020 order denying her request for a permanent restraining order. On appeal, however, she challenges only the court‘s denial of a permanent restraining order protecting her from Father.
In a May 5, 2021 order, issued while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and granted the parents joint legal and physical custody of both children. No party has sought review of the order.
At the request of this court, Mother and Father each filed a supplemental brief regarding whether the juvenile court‘s termination of jurisdiction mooted Mother‘s appeal.5
DISCUSSION
A. Mootness and the Termination of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
In arguing Mother‘s appeal is moot, Father cites a “general rule” tying mootness of a dependency appeal to the unappealed termination of juvenilе court jurisdiction. (See In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 (C.C.), citing In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 (Michelle M.).) Although the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction can, under certain circumstances, render an appeal from a prior juvenile court order moot, we disagree that a necessary association exists between the two. In this section, we lay out what we view as the correct framework for assessing mootness under such circumstances, and how we reconcile that framework with existing case law. In the following section (see Discussion part B, post), we apply the framework to Mother‘s appeal.
1. Mootness depends on our ability to grant effective relief
Mootness in the dependency context—as in any context—depends on “whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 (N.S.); accord, In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [“[a]n appeal may become moot where subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief“].) The termination of juvenile court jurisdiction
2. Termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not categorically prevent a reviewing court from providing effective relief
Put differently, the remittitur creates the limited jurisdiction needed for a juvenile court to correct reversible errors found by an appellate court. Thus, even after a juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction, a reviewing court can still effectively require the juvenile court to correct reversible error.
3. Cases reciting a rule that the unappealed termination of juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal moot should be limited to their specific facts
We understand the oft-repeated “general rule” that termination of juvenile court jurisdiction moots an appeal as acknowledging that, given the unique
Some decisions, including one cited by Father, have articulated a different basis for the “general rule” that termination of juvenile court jurisdiction renders a pending dependency appeal moot: Namely, that “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the now-closed case” (unless a party also appeals the termination of jurisdiction) (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164), so “a remand for further proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless.” (Id. at p. 165.) This reasoning ignores that when an appellate court reverses with directions, it revests the lower court with jurisdiction to follow those directions. (See, e.g., Francisco W., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 704–705.) Thus, to the extent these cases hold that an appellate court cannot effectively require the juvenile court to correct reversible error solely because the latter has terminated jurisdiction, we disagree.
Cases that appear to express such a view rely primarily on Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 330 as its source. (See, e.g., Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164−165 [citing Michelle M. for the proposition that “[u]nless the appellate court reverses or vacates the order terminating dependency, the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the now-closed case . . . [citations] . . . [and] a remand for further proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless“]; Michelle M., supra, at p. 330 [“Here, no direct relief can be granted even were we to find reversible error, because the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction and we are only reviewing that court‘s ruling. We hold that the appeal filed herein . . . is moot. Appellant‘s remedy was to attack the juvenile court‘s order terminating jurisdiction in order to raise the issues he urges before us.“].) Although the outcome in Michelle M. may have been correct on its facts, the blanket rule it espouses regarding mootness is too broad.
First, the authority Michelle M. cites in establishing this rule—In re Lisa M. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 915, 920 (Lisa M.)—does not support the rule, nor does Lisa M. even consider creating an exception to
The court in Michelle M. concluded that the same reasoning applied to the appeal from a juvenile court‘s dispositional order at issue in that case. (Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 328−329.) The court in Michelle M. reasoned that reversing the dispositional order could not facilitate effective relief unless the court also reversed the not-appealed-from order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction—otherwise the juvenile court would lack jurisdiction to issue a new dispositional order. (Ibid.)
But, as discussed above, an appellate court reversal and resulting remittitur gives the juvenile court jurisdiction to act on directions the Code of Civil Procedure expressly authorizes an appellate court to issue. Thus, the reasoning of Lisa M. was not implicated in Michelle M., and is likewise not automatically implicated whenever juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated following an appeal from a juvenile court order where the appellant does not appeal the termination of jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, Michelle M. appears to have reached the correct result on the facts of that case—but not for the reasons reflected in the rule it created and upon which it purported to rely. This is because the appeal in Michelle M. was in part from custody and visitation rulings in a dispositional order. (Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 328.) When the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction in Michelle M., it also issued a custody and visitation order and transferred that order to family court to be enforced. (Ibid.) Thus, under the facts presented in Michelle M., the exit order provided the juvenile court‘s last word on custody and visitation (in addition to terminating jurisdiction). Therefore, reversing an earlier order on custody and/or visitation could not deliver the desired relief—namely, a change in
Michelle M. does not explain its holding in this way, however. Rather, it expressly states a broad rule that a reviewing court lacks the power to order further proceedings in the juvenile court after a nonappealed order terminating jurisdiction. (Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 329−330.) We disagree with Michelle M. to the extent it states such a broad rule not necessary to the correct outcome on the specific facts of that case.
A few cases, including Rashad D., cite Michelle M. for this broad principle. Our conclusion that the Michelle M. rule is too broad does not mean that we view all cases citing the Michelle M. rule as incorrectly decided. To the contrary, like the Michelle M. decision itself, the published decisions relying on Michelle M. appear to have been correctly decided on their facts for reasons other than those reflected in the Michelle M. rule and reasoning. (See Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159, 164 [discussed below]; N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 56−57, 60 [citing Michelle M. in holding the mother‘s challenge to jurisdictional finding mooted by subsequent order terminating jurisdiction and restoring the mother full custody]; C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1488–1489 [appeal from dispositional order regarding visitation mooted by unappealed exit order terminating jurisdiction where the exit order reinstated the mother‘s visitation rights, providing her “the very relief she seeks by her appeal“].) In Rashad D., for example, the father challenged a “jurisdiction finding [that] resulted in an adverse juvenile custody order” and “[sought] to have that custody order set aside.” (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.)
Following that appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in an unappealed order that also addressed custody. (Id. at pp. 159, 164.) Although the Rashad D. court recited the broad Michelle M. rule, the court expressly limited its holding to a scenario in which an appellant challenges a custody determination superseded by custody terms contained in an unappealed exit order. (See, e.g, id. at p. 159 [noting that “termination of dependency jurisdiction does not necessarily moot an appeal from a jurisdiction finding that directly results in an adverse juvenile custody order,” and noting that father needed to also appeal “from
B. Mother‘s Appeal Is Not Moot
We now apply the principles and framework clarified above to Mother‘s appeal. We conclude that we can afford Mother effective relief.
1. Upon remand, the juvenile court would have the power to issue the requested restraining order
Here, were we to reverse, we could instruct the juvenile court to issue the desired restraining order. As discussed above,
The terms of the unappealed order terminating jurisdiction in this case dо not supersede or conflict with the ruling Mother challenges on appeal—the denial of Mother‘s request for a restraining order. Thus, unlike in Michelle M. and Rashad D., the order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction would not need to be modified in order to grant Mother the relief she seeks. Mother‘s failure to appeal therefrom does not prevent us from providing effective relief.
The dissent concludes that the juvenile court lacks fundamental jurisdiction to issue Mother‘s requested restraining order upon remand based not on the broad Michelle M. rule with which we disagree above, but rather on the language of the specific statute governing Mother‘s restraining order request,
None of the fundamental jurisdiction cases the dissent cites addresses a lower court‘s jurisdiction—fundamental or otherwise—following remand to
from which Mother appeals. The cases the dissent cites do not consider, let alone stand for the proposition, that a remittitur cannot empower a lower court to correct an erroneous decision—here, by issuing the requested restraining order.6
We must next determine whether the juvenile court issuing Mother the desired restraining order upon remand would still afford Mother effective relief, now that the dependency proceedings have been terminated. We conclude that it clearly would. The restraining order a juvenile court could issue following reversal and remand could afford Mother protection necessary to assure her safety in the same way it would have, had the juvenile court issued the order while dependency proceedings were still pending. Mother‘s need for such protection did not end simply because the dependency proceedings concluded. A juvenile court order granting Mother‘s request would immediately provide her such protection. Her appeal is not moot.
We now turn to the merits of that appeal.
C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Mother‘s Request for a Permanent Restraining Order
1. The evidence supports the juvenile court‘s denial of Mother‘s restraining order request
“[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual findings in support of a [
The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a unique formulation where, as here, “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W., supra, at p. 1528.) Specifically, we ask “whether the appеllant‘s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Issuance of a restraining order under
Mother argues that the record contains evidence “compel[ling] a finding in her favor” and thus that the court‘s denial of her
The parties presented competing and conflicting evidence on key issues related to Mother‘s rеquest. Father denied banging on the doors and windows of Mother‘s home during the October 2019 incident, whereas Mother and the children indicated that he did. Mother and S.G. indicate Father has hit Mother in the past, but Father denies these allegations. All allegations of physical aggression by Father made in referrals, family court custody disputes, and juvenile court requests were ultimately deemed unsupported or inconclusive.
Mother further points to Father‘s criminal history in 2011 and 2015, which included either arrests or convictions for domestic violence, as well as her testimony that Father violated the 2019 temporary restraining order by parking near her driveway. This evidence—even considered together with the conflicting evidence discussed above—is not ” ‘of such a character and weight as to leavе no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support’ ” the requisite finding—namely, that a permanent restraining order was necessary to protect Mother‘s safety. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528; see In re B.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.)
The court expressly questioned Mother‘s credibility, and the record does not contain even the most basic details of Father‘s at least six-year-old criminal history (such as whether he was arrested or convicted). If the court chose to believe Father‘s version of events—as it reasonably could have, and as its findings regarding Mother suggest it did—then the record does not contain substantial evidence of any violent behavior by Father for almost four years before Mother‘s November 2019 restraining order request (or, for that matter, thereafter). (See In re C.Q., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 364 [reversing grant of restraining order where no violent behavior for a year following a domestic violence incident].) We therefore decline Mother‘s implicit invitation to reevaluate the competing evidence and revisit the juvenile court‘s failure-of-proof conclusion.
Mother argues in the alternative that the juvenile court applied the incorrect legal standard in assessing her request, and thus abused its discretion. ” ‘If the court‘s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The question of whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review [citation].’ ” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820–821.)
Mother argues that, because “a restraining order under
Even if the juvenile court did incorrectly understand the scope of its discretion, we “should not disturb the exercise of a trial court‘s discretion unless it appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) Thus, as Mother concedes, a lower court decision applying the incorrect legal standard “is subject to reversal upon a showing it is reasonably probable that, but for the error, the appealing party would have obtained a more favorable outcome.” (See Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715, 724–725 [applying “reasonably probable” prejudice аnalysis in the context of an appeal from a Domestic Violence Prevention Act restraining order]; see also In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [a “miscarriage of justice” occurs and requires reversal in dependency proceedings when “the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error“].)
For the reasons discussed above, and particularly in light of the juvenile court‘s findings bearing on Mother‘s credibility and that Mother coached the
Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the court‘s denial of Mother‘s restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court‘s order is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
I concur:
BENDIX, J.
CHANEY, J., Dissenting.
If we were to reverse the juvenile court‘s denial of mother‘s request for a restraining order under
” ‘When courts use the phrase “lack of jurisdiction,” they are usually referring to one of two different concepts, although, as one court has observed, the distinction between them is “hazy.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A lack of jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense results in ’ “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.” [Citation.] On the other hand, a court may have jurisdiction in the strict sense but nevertheless lack ” ‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrencе of certain procedural prerequisites.” [Citations.] When a court fails to conduct itself in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] [¶] The distinction is important because the remedies are different. ‘[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Rather, an act beyond a court‘s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and void’ ab initio.” (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 224-225; accord Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287-288; Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 369; In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 356 (J.W.); Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 138-139.) And a remittitur from this or any other appellate court does no more than re-vest a lower court with the power to act of which it had been divested with the filing of a notice of appeal or a petition for review. Neither an appellate court order nor a remittitur creates fundamental jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist, on even a limited basis.2
“In this state, fundamental jurisdiction over juvenile dependency cases . . . is governed by
Here, the juvenile court terminated its “fundamental jurisdiction,” and no party appealed from the order terminating that jurisdiction. There is no mechanism before us by which we could reinstate or otherwise affect that conclusion. (In re A.R., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.)
Mother sought a restraining order in the juvenile court pursuant to
By its express terms, then, a court may only act under
A protective order issued under
By contrast, no authority to issue an order under
The mootness doctrine commands us to “dismiss an appeal when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant effective relief.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59fundamental jurisdiction, as that term is discussed above, and is therefore currently without authority to enter an order under section 213.5 even if we concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it declined to do so on mother‘s request; any order the juvenile court entered on remand would be beyond its jurisdiction—void ab initio. If the appellate court reversed this juvenile court‘s ruling on the requested restraining order under section 213.5 given the trial court‘s unappealed termination of jurisdiction, any order under section 213.5 the juvenile court later entered would have no legal effect.
To contrast, this is not the case where fundamental jurisdiction in the juvenile court persists. This is not an appeal from an order finding jurisdiction that also includes review of a restraining order issued under
“As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but ‘must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’ ” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) “[A]n erroneous jurisdiction finding,” for example, “can have unfavorable consequences extending beyond termination of dependency jurisdiction and that termination does not necessarily moot an appeal of such a finding.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164this case. I am aware of no authority to support the obviously incorrect proposition that an appellate court can never grant effective relief in a dependency аppeal following the unappealed termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. But the fact that an appellate court may view a trial court‘s order as reversible error does not itself on remand vest a trial court with subject matter jurisdiction that it otherwise would not have.
An erroneous finding under
There is no statutory or any other legal requirement that a court, when considering whether to grant a restraining order under any statutory authority, consider a previous denial of a request for a restraining order. And to suggest that a court should or might consider a previous denial of a restraining order when determining a request—in the absence of any authority that it do so—has potentially dangerous consequences. In sum, the denial of a restraining order under
To conclude that potentially erroneous orders remain justiciable because they are potentially erroneous is to conclude that mootness is no more.
Holding that an appeal is not moot solely because a trial court might have erred dismantles the mootness doctrine wholesale.
I would have concluded that the appeal was moot. On that basis, I would dismiss the appeal.
I respectfully dissent.
CHANEY, J.