RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondents Bruce Marteney, Steve Marteney, and Chrystal Dahlstein are the adult children of Marty and Marie, who were the original plaintiffs in the underlying action.
A. Trial and Judgment on Original Complaint
In August 2012, Marty and Marie commenced the action, asserting claims for negligence, breach of warranties, strict liability, and loss of consortium
Prior to trial, Marty and Marie entered into settlements with several defendants totaling $2,390,000. As a result of the settlements and other dispositions, at the commencement of jury selection, UCC and Elementis were the only defendants to appear at trial. In July 2013, a jury returned special verdicts in favor of Marty and Marie on their claim for strict liability, and awarded them damages totaling $1,525,000. That sum comprised $400,000 in economic damages to Marty and Marie, $375,000 in noneconomic damages to Marty, and $750,000 in noneconomic damages to Marie. The jury also allocated UCC a five percent share of comparative fault, and Elementis a three percent share of comparative fault.
In August 2013, Marty and Marie sought determinations of UCC's and Elementis's liability for damages. The trial court (Judge John J. Kralik) found that 20 percent of the settlement funds were reasonably allocated to future wrongful death claims. In view of that allocation, the court found that the settlement credits to which UCC and Elementis were entitled reduced their liability for economic damages "to zero" ( § 877 ). The court also ruled that
In October 2013, the trial court entered a judgment awarding damages totaling $56,250 against UCC, and damages totaling $33,750 against Elementis, reflecting its determinations that they were liable solely for noneconomic damages proportionate to their respective shares of comparative fault. Later, in December 2013, the judgment was amended to include an award of costs. UCC and Elementis noticed an appeal from the judgment.
B. Proceedings Regarding Respondents' Complaint
On January 16, 2015, while that appeal was pending, Marty died. In July 2015, Marie, acting as an individual and as representative of Marty's estate, together with respondents, filed a first amended complaint for wrongful death (FAC) against UCC and Elementis, asserting claims for negligence, breach of warranties, and strict liability.
Prior to trial on the FAC, Marie voluntarily dismissed her wrongful death claims, and respondents settled their claims against UCC for $75,000. In early September 2016, following a trial, a jury found that respondents suffered economic damages totaling $195,000 and noneconomic damages totaling $163,000. The jury allocated the damages as follows: to Bruce Marteney, $87,000 in economic damages and $44,000 in noneconomic damages; to Steve Marteney, $54,000 in economic damages and $44,000 in noneconomic damages; and to Chrystal Dahlstein, $54,000 in economic damages and $75,000 in noneconomic damages.
On September 27, 2016, the trial court (Judge Charles F. Palmer) entered judgment in favor of respondents on their wrongful death claims against Elementis. The judgment awarded economic damages totaling $195,000, subject to further adjustment due to prior settlements. The judgment also awarded noneconomic damages totaling $4,890, predicated on the jury's findings and the prior allocation of a three percent share of comparative fault to Elementis. The noneconomic damages were apportioned as follows: to Bruce Marteney, $1,320; to Steve Marteney, $1,320; and to Chrystal Dahlstein, $2,250.
In October 2016, Elementis requested a determination of settlement credits ( § 877 ). After concluding that Elementis was entitled to a credit based solely on respondents' settlement with UCC -- and not on Marty's and Marie's settlements -- the trial court found that Elementis was liable for economic damages totaling $154,149.25. In February 2017, the court amended the judgment to reflect that finding.
In March 2017, Elementis filed a motion to vacate the judgment in favor of respondents
DISCUSSION
Elementis contends (1) that the 2017 judgment in favor of respondents is void, and (2) that the trial court erred in determining the settlement credits to which Elementis was entitled. For the reasons discussed below, we reject those contentions.
We begin with Elementis's challenge to the 2017 judgment, which Elementis contends is void for "lack of jurisdiction."
1. Standard of Review
In order to demonstrate that a judgment is void, a party may file a motion to vacate the judgment in the pertinent action or an independent action in equity. ( Preston v. Wyoming Pacific Oil Co. (1961)
Under subdivision (d) of section 473, a party may challenge judgments that are " ' "absolutely void." ' " ( Tearlach Resources Limited v. Western States Internat., Inc. (2013)
Subdivision (d) of section 473 also permits challenges to judgments that are voidable, rather than absolutely void. ( Rodriguez v. Cho (2015)
An error in excess of jurisdiction does not render a judgment a nullity; rather, the judgment "is valid until it is set
Before the trial court and on appeal, Elementis has offered two distinct arguments in support of its contention that the 2017 judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. Elementis maintains (1) that the appeal from the 2013 judgment in favor of Marty and Marie removed the court's jurisdiction to permit the filing of the FAC, and (2) that the underlying action "was dead" after we affirmed the 2013 judgment and Elementis paid the damages owed to Marty and Marie.
As the facts material to Elementis's contentions are undisputed, the character of the purported defect determines the standard of review applicable to the ruling on the section 473 motion. To the extent Elementis asserts that the 2017 judgment is absolutely void for want of subject matter jurisdiction, our review is de novo. ( Tearlach , supra ,
2. Filing of the FAC
Elementis contends the automatic stay triggered by the appeal from the 2013 judgment removed the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to accept the filing of the FAC. As explained below, we disagree.
a. Governing Principles
Under section 916, subdivision (a), "the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order," unless the matter falls within enumerated
The principal effect of the automatic stay is to remove the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction relating to proceedings within the scope of the appeal. As our Supreme Court has explained, the stay divests the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction "over any matter embraced in or affected by the appeal during the pendency of that appeal." ( Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 196-197,
The crux of Elementis's contention is that due to the automatic stay triggered by the appeal from the 2013 judgment, the filing of the FAC was a jurisdictional error rendering the 2017 judgment void. Because the FAC contained wrongful death claims, Elementis's contention implicates the principles governing those claims. Generally, wrongful death claims are legally distinct from claims for personal injury and loss of consortium. ( Wilson v. John Crane, Inc. (2000)
Elementis's contention also implicates the trial court's authority to permit amendments to the original complaint, as the FAC introduced new claims and parties into the action. Generally, "the trial court has wide discretion in allowing the amendment of any pleading [citations]." (
b. Analysis
We conclude that notwithstanding Elementis's appeal from the 2013 judgment, the filing of the FAC reflected no jurisdictional error sufficient to render the 2017 judgment void. Our focus is on respondents' wrongful death claims in the FAC, as any error capable of invalidating the 2017 judgment -- if it exists - - must relate to those claims. That is because the 2017 judgment encompassed only respondents' claims, which -- as noted above (see pt.A.2.a., ante ) -- were separate from Marie's wrongful death claim, which she dismissed prior to trial on the FAC.
In rejecting Elementis's challenge to the 2017 judgment, the trial court concluded that the parties' stipulation staying proceedings on the FAC acted to prevent any material jurisdictional error. The court stated: "The only actions taken by the superior court[ ] between the filing of the notice of appeal and the issuance of the court of appeal['s] remittitur were ... to accept the [FAC] for filing[ ] and ... to accept for filing the stipulation staying the
In our view, the appeal from the 2013 judgment did not remove the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the FAC, insofar as it asserted respondents' wrongful death claims. By accepting the FAC for filing, the trial court effectively permitted respondents -- who were not parties to the original action -- to intervene in order to assert their wrongful death claims (see Houze v. Kovacevich (1941)
Moreover, even had the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in permitting respondents to assert their claims while the appeal was pending, Elementis failed to preserve any such contention of error. " 'An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method .... The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver .... Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.' [Citation.]" ( Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979)
Generally, the failure to object in a timely manner to the assertion of new claims bars contentions of error predicated on that irregularity. In Groom v. Bangs (1908)
Upon determining that the amended complaint stated a wrongful death claim, our Supreme Court reversed, even though it recognized that the trial court had erred in permitting the husband to assert that claim. ( Groom , supra , 153 Cal. at pp. 458-459,
In Barnes v. McKendry (1968)
We reach a similar conclusion here. "When ... the court has jurisdiction of the subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction." ( Griffin , supra ,
In an effort to show that the automatic stay barred the filing of the FAC, Elementis contends that because the FAC "superseded and nullified" the original complaint, it necessarily implicated matters embraced by the 2013 judgment.
Relying on the principles governing final judgments, Elementis contends our affirmance of the 2013 judgment limited the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to the enforcement of the 2013 judgment. Elementis argues that after our remittitur issued, the 2013 judgment became the final judgment in the action, and no proceedings were permitted on the FAC. We reject that contention.
Generally, the term " 'final,' " as applied to judgments, has several meanings. ( Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997)
Nothing in these principles foreclosed the proceedings on respondents' wrongful death claims after our remittitur issued in the appeal from the 2013 judgment. An appeal of a judgment final for purposes of the one "final judgment" rule does not remove the trial court's jurisdiction to conduct litigation of claims outside the scope of that judgment, that is, involving other parties. ( Rocca v. Steinmetz (1922)
Elementis contends the trial court necessarily lacked jurisdiction over respondents' claims because they were first alleged following the 2013 judgment, arguing that "[w]hat happened here was not the
B. Section 877 Settlement Credits
Elementis contends the trial court erred in determining the settlement credits to which it was entitled under section 877. In assessing Elementis's liability for respondents' economic damages, the court found that Elementis was entitled to a settlement credit based on respondents' $75,000 settlement with UCC, but declined to award any credit based on Marty's and Marie's settlements. Elementis has failed to demonstrate error in that ruling.
1. Governing Principles
Section 877 specifies circumstances under which an award of economic damages against a defendant may be offset by a codefendant's settlement. ( Hackett v. John Crane, Inc. (2002)
As discussed further below, Elementis contends that under section 877, the agreements "given" by Marty and Marie to the settling defendants prior to the 2013 judgment operated to "reduce" respondents' claims against Elementis, even though respondents were not signatories to the agreements. Generally, courts have construed section 877 to diminish a nonsettling
Elementis's contention thus implicates the principles by which persons may be bound by, or subject to, a settlement agreement they did not execute. Generally, the settlement of claims "by one party plaintiff ... does not operate to bar the actions of other plaintiffs." ( Estate of Kuebler v. Superior Court (1978)
In July 2013, following the trial on the claims in the original complaint, the jury awarded Marty and Marie $400,000 in economic damages. Later, Marty and Marie sought determinations of the settlement credits to be applied to offset the jury's award of economic damages against UCC and Elementis. Marty and Marie contended that 50 percent of the funds from their pretrial settlements were properly allocated to claims not litigated at trial -- namely, prospective wrongful death claims based on Marty's death -- and that any credits due UCC and Elementis should be appropriately reduced to reflect that allocation. They maintained that UCC and Elementis were jointly and severally liable for $86,551.50 in economic damages, after the jury's award was offset by credits based on an allocation of 50 percent of the settlement funds to wrongful death claims.
UCC and Elementis opposed the determinations requested by Marty and Marie. Regarding economic damages, they contended that because Marty and Marie failed to show that the settlement agreements allocated any funds to prospective wrongful death claims, the appropriate settlement credits were sufficiently large to "reduce the economic damages to zero."
The trial court (Judge Kralik) found that only 20 percent of the settlement funds were reasonably allocated to future wrongful death claims. In view of that conclusion, the court further found that UCC and Elementis had no liability for economic damages, as the settlement credit offsets to which they were entitled exceeded the jury's $400,000 award for economic damages. The 2013 judgment reflected that determination.
In September 2016, following the jury trial on respondents' wrongful death claims, the trial court (Judge Palmer) entered judgment in favor of respondents and against Elementis. The judgment awarded economic damages totaling $195,000, in accordance with the jury's findings, with the proviso that "offsets for
In October 2016, Elementis requested settlement credits based on Marty's and Marie's settlements and respondents' settlement with UCC. Elementis argued that respondents were bound by the prior finding (by Judge Kralik) that 20 percent of the funds from Marty's and Marie's settlements were properly allocated to then-future wrongful death claims. In view of that contention, Elementis asserted that respondents' net recovery for economic damages was "zero dollars," as the settlement credit it sought exceeded the jury's total award for economic damages.
Respondents contended any settlement credit must be based solely on their $75,000 settlement with UCC, arguing that assigning credits to Elementis
The trial court agreed with respondents, concluding that "there [was] no basis for subjecting the verdict in [respondents'] wrongful death trial to offset by the settlements obtained by Marty and Marie." The court found that respondents had not participated in the litigation of Marty's and Marie's claims or in the negotiation of their settlement agreements, and that Marty and Marie agreed "to indemnify the settling defendants" in the event Marty's heirs later pursued a wrongful death case against them. The court determined Elementis's aggregate liability for economic damages to be $154,149.25 -- reflecting a settlement credit of $40,851.75 -- and entered an amended judgment in accordance with that finding.
3. Analysis
As explained below, we discern no error in the trial court's determinations. "We generally review a ruling granting or denying a section 877 settlement credit under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] To the extent that we must decide whether the trial court's ruling was consistent with statutory requirements, we apply the independent standard of review. [Citation.]" ( Wade v. Schrader (2008)
Although no decision has directly examined when claims asserted by nonsignatories to a settlement agreement are properly subject to settlement credits under section 877, we find guidance on Elementis's contention from Wilson , supra ,
The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of the settlement funds from the calculation because the plaintiffs had asserted no wrongful death claim, reasoning that "the settlement of [a] claim may serve as a credit only against a judgment on the same claim." ( Wilson , supra ,
Hackett involved similar plaintiffs and similar claims against multiple defendants. ( Hackett , supra , 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1237,
On appeal, the defendant contended an excessive amount of the settlement funds had been allocated to future wrongful death actions, arguing that the trial court failed to consider that the plaintiffs' sons were not signatories to the settlement agreements, and thus were free to assert such actions. ( Hackett , supra ,
Here, Elementis failed to show that respondents were subject to Marty's and Marie's settlements. Absent special circumstances, " 'a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.' [Citations.]" ( Sander/Moses Productions, Inc. v. NBC Studios, Inc. (2006)
In opposing Elementis's request for settlement credits, respondents submitted declarations stating (1) that they were not parties to the litigation of
On appeal, Elementis's principal contentions focus on whether respondents may recover from Marie's settlement funds allocated to future wrongful death actions. Elementis suggests several theories potentially supporting such a recovery, including that Marty and Marie were acting as respondents' agents or trustees when they negotiated the settlements, as well as that a constructive trust may be imposed on the settlement funds for the benefit of respondents. In connection with these theories, Elementis places special emphasis on the finding (by Judge Kralik) underlying the
It is unnecessary to examine whether there is a viable theory under which respondents may recover settlement funds from Marie, as we reject the central premise underlying Elementis's contentions. The premise is that such a theory, if it exists, entitles Elementis to a section 877 credit based on the settlement funds allocated to wrongful death claims. Elementis asserts: "Respondents are of course free to let their mother keep [that] money, but it belongs to them and Elementis is entitled to the settlement credit."
The premise fails because the propriety of a section 877 credit hinges on whether Marty's and Marie's settlements foreclosed potential wrongful death claims by respondents against the settling defendants , not on whether respondents may recover a share of the settlement funds from Marie. As explained above, as a nonsettling defendant, Elementis may seek section 877 credits in respondents' wrongful death action based on Marty's and Marie's settlements in the original action only if those settlements bind respondents,
Elementis suggests that Marty and Marie, in negotiating the settlements, acted as respondents' agents because the settlements secured funds intended to resolve prospective wrongful death actions. We disagree. As respondents did not directly authorize Marty and Marie to resolve their claims, Elementis must rely on a theory of "ostensible" agency. Under such a theory, respondents are bound by Marty's and Marie's settlements only if respondents ratified them -- that is, accepted the settlement funds -- because there is no evidence that respondents created the appearance that Marty and Marie were negotiating the settlements on respondents' behalf.
Nonetheless, Elementis suggests that respondents did, in fact, receive settlement funds, pointing to their trial testimony that their parents gave them cash "gifts" totaling $114,000 shortly before and after Marty died. However, because Elementis never directed the trial court's attention to respondents' trial testimony, that contention has not been preserved for appeal. ( Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986)
The judgment and orders of the court are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur:
WILLHITE, J.
COLLINS, J.
Notes
All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
Because the original plaintiffs and two respondents share their surname, we refer to the original plaintiffs by their first names.
In actions for personal injury and wrongful death, a nonsettling defendant is ordinarily liable for an amount of noneconomic damages proportionate to its share of comparative fault, without any offset for settlements by other defendants encompassing noneconomic damages. (See Garcia v. Duro Dyne Corp. (2007)
We note that the record provided by Elementis contains no order permitting the filing of the FAC, and that the parties dispute whether there was such an order.
Generally, " 'an amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading. [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'Such amended pleading supplants all prior complaints. ... [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971)
The "one final judgment" rule is codified in section 904.1, subdivision (a). (Morehart, supra,
Under section 877, a defendant's good faith settlement has other effects, including "cut[ting] off the right of other defendants to seek contribution or comparative indemnity from the settling defendant." (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987)
The statute has been interpreted broadly to achieve those goals. (Dell'Oca , supra ,
The appellate court stated: "[The plaintiff] entered into hold harmless agreements with the settling defendants on behalf of himself and his estate. Although it is theoretically possible that the sons could sue and that no settlement proceeds would be left to fulfill the hold harmless agreements and that the defendants would not prevail under any one of several possible grounds for claiming an offset, it is plain that the settling defendants did not believe they were paying $4.5 million for an empty promise. The agreements make it clear that the settling defendants believed and expected there would be no future claims by the heirs. [The nonsettling defendant here] advanced a similar contention in the Wilson case." (Hackett, supra,
Elementis suggests that determination was erroneous because respondents did not assert wrongful death claims against any of the settling defendants. However, as plaintiffs asserting wrongful death claims need not join all potential defendants in a single action (Helling v. Lew (1972)
Although Elementis argued below that respondents were estopped from challenging the finding, Elementis has abandoned that contention on appeal.
Ordinarily, a party seeking to assign liability to the principal for the acts of an ostensible agent must establish three elements: (1) the party held a reasonable belief in the agent's authority in dealing with the agent; (2) the principal's conduct -- active or neglectful -- generated the party's belief in the agent's authority; and (3) the party was not negligent in holding the belief. (Associated Creditors' Agency v. Davis (1975)